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Global population growth and increasing incomes across the world are resulting in 
consumers’ rising demand for quality and diverse foods. Trade liberalisation and 
modernisation of production, processing and distribution systems enable agro-food 
companies to quickly access raw materials from farmers. Thus, efficient supply 
chains have a key role to play in the global marketing of foods. They also 
significantly contribute to satisfying consumers’ needs and responding to emerging 
food trends. The organisation of the product flow among farmers, buyers, processors 
and customers through contracts represents an increasingly important marketing 
channel in modern food supply chains due to its potential to decrease costs and 
increase profits for the participants in the chain. However, vulnerable small-scale 
farmers in developing countries such as Malawi are often excluded from the benefits 
of the transformed food industry. Contract farming is recognised as one of the tools 
linking farmers with modern agro-food supply chains, which enables Malawian 
small-scale farmers to improve their livelihoods. This study explored, examined and 
addressed the key challenges in contract farming arrangements in the paprika supply 
chain in Central Malawi. A mixed methods approach was used to collect qualitative 
and quantitative data. A total of 428 household questionnaires were administered to 
contracted small-scale paprika farmers in two Malawian districts. These were 
supplemented with ten focus group interviews with small-scale farmers, 21 semi-
structured stakeholder interviews, ten expert semi-structured interviews, field 
observations and two focus group discussions with stakeholders. The study found 
that the quality of communication among the key participants in the paprika supply 
chain was low. Furthermore, the enabling environment provided limited access to 
input and services for small-scale farmers. The paprika contract secured quality 
seeds and extension services to contracted small-scale farmers. Nevertheless, the 
provision of fertilisers, pesticides, chemicals, storage and transportation services 
were not part of the Malawian contract. Poor contract design and side-selling 
practices posed a threat to the chain’s efficiency and sustainability. Small-scale 
farmers gained benefits from the contracted production but contracting itself was not 
a sufficient strategy to sustain their livelihoods throughout the year. More dedicated 
involvement of farmers’ organisations and NGOs in empowering small-scale 
farmers, and the Government’s presence through the national Contract Farming 
Strategy could contribute to better efficiency and sustainability of the chain. The 
study’s main contributions include: adding new evidence on contract farming 
performance in developing countries; highlighting the importance of contract design 
and the issue of side-selling for improved contracting conditions, and demonstrating 
how dissemination of the study’s findings can be incorporated into study design to 





PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 Introduction to the Study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The first chapter sets the foundation for the study. The introduction to the study, 
background and justification are first presented. The chapter further outlines the 
research problem, aims, objectives and questions. The overview of research 
methodology and thesis outline is given. The chapter continues with the research 
scope and limitations. Expected outputs in academic and practical aspects conclude 
this chapter. 
 
1.2 Introduction to the Study 
In the early decades of the 21
st
 century, the world is facing a growing population and 
rising demand for quality and diverse food. The agricultural sector and food industry 
are expected to perform efficiently and promptly to satisfy consumers’ needs, which 
puts pressure on available resources and agri-food
1
 supply chains. Due to 
globalisation and market liberalisation, the borders of supply chains are vanishing, 
meaning that raw materials might be produced in Africa, processed in Asia and 
finally consumed in the United States of America. Thus, the food industry is 
becoming more global and supply chains are transforming to reach vertical 
integration that enables better communication and distribution among different 
players at distant locations (Reardon et al., 2009; Maertens et al., 2012). Managing 
modern agri-food supply chains often entails some agreement between producers, 
buyers, processors, distributors and retailers. 
 
One of the ways of organising relations in supply chains is through contract farming 
(abbreviation CF). Contract farming is defined as an institutional arrangement 
between two (or more) parties in which the first party supplies inputs and extension 
services needed for the production of the contracted crop and the second party 
produces and sells that crop to the first party (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Jia and 
Bijman, 2013). Contracts are often signed between exporters or processors and 
                                                          
1
 The term ‘agri-food’ used throughout this study refers to a system of commercial food production 
through farming. Generally, the system involves input providers, producers, processing units, logistics 




farmers. The literature reveals both the benefits and challenges encountered in 
contracted production. Benefits include improved access to technology and inputs, a 
secured outlet and price for the produce, and improved productivity, quality and 
income generation for farmers. On the other side, contract farming might influence 
farmers’ indebtedness and loss of control over the land, cause unbalanced relations 
in the household and rural communities and shift traditional production patterns 
towards trendy cash crops. Despite its potential threats for vulnerable farmers, 
contract farming is frequently promoted by Governments in developing countries
2
 as 
means for poverty alleviation and rural development due to its potential to link 
small-scale farmers with profitable markets.  
 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a population of around 16.7 
million and US$ 255 GDP per capita, and with an economy that is largely based on 
agriculture and small-scale farmers as the driving force for economic growth (World 
Bank-WB, 2015, 2016a). In Malawi, small-scale farmers mostly cultivate staple food 
crops and are marginalised in the case of high-value export cash crops, such as 
tobacco, sugar and tea (see chapter 6, Figure 6.1 for the details on the study area). 
Therefore, contract farming in Malawi poses the opportunity for small-scale farmers 
to be included in the global food market and gain meaningful profits to improve their 
livelihoods.  
 
1.3 Background to the Study 
According to the United Nations (UN) (2015a) estimates, the world population 
reached 7.3 billion in 2015 and continued to grow by 1.18% annually, which 
accounts for an additional 83 million people every year. The fastest growing area in 
population was Africa, where the population grew 2.55% per year in 2010-2015. By 
2050, a significant share of the population growth will take place in African 
countries, adding 1.3 billion people to the global population (UN, 2015a). In 
addition, by 2100, ten African countries, including Malawi, will experience an 
increase in their population by at least five-fold (UN, 2015a). 
                                                          
2
 The term 'developing country' usually refers to a country with predominately agriculture-based 
economy and poorly developed industrial sector. World Bank does not use this term anymore but 
rather defines a 'low-income' country as a country that had gross national income per capita as $1,025 
or less in 2015 (WB, 2016c). This study however uses the term 'developing country' when refering to 
countries in African, Asian and Latin American regions within the framework given by the United 




Population growth has a significant impact on the global food demand and 
production. The rising number of consumers, growing per capita incomes and 
continuous urbanisation are increasing the demand for more diverse, quality and safe 
food, and shifting dietary patterns towards fruits, vegetables and animal products 
relative to the traditional starches (Minot and Roy, 2007; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development-OECD and Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations-FAO, 2015). Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012) suggested that 
the demand for agricultural products would rise by 1.1% per year between 2005-
2050. According to the World Resources Institute (WRI) (2013), to produce enough 
food for 9.7 billion of people on Earth expected by 2050, it is estimated that the 
amount of produced food will have to increase by 70% compared to the amount of 
food produced in 2006. The needed increase in food supply mostly relies on 
additional agricultural production, which is achieved through improved production 
levels and yield increase, and by expanding the land used for agriculture.  
 
Developing countries have an important role in providing food for the world. In 
2013, 60% of the total cereals and 62% of the total meat produced were supplied 
from the developing world (FAO, 2015a, 2015b). The share of cereals and meat 
supply from Sub-Saharan countries in 2013 was 4.6% and 6% respectively (FAO, 
2015a, 2015b). It is estimated that, in developing countries, 80% of the needed 
increase in agricultural production would be a result of increased yields and cropping 
intensity, while only 20% would come from the expansion of the arable land 
(Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). 
 
Although the agricultural sector provides the majority of the food for the developing 
world, small-scale farmers in developing countries are often living in poverty
3
 (FAO, 
2001; Aksoy and Hoekman, 2010). Indeed, the majority of the world's poor (70%) 
are located in rural areas with agriculture as the primary source of income (WB, 
2016b). The most prominent challenges for poor farmers in developing countries 
include exclusion from the high-value markets and limited opportunities to earn 
                                                          
3
 According to the UN’s statement, ‘poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, it is a violation 
of human dignity. It means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society. It means not 
having enough to feed and clothe a family, not having a school or a clinic to go to, not having the 
land on which to grow one's food or a job to earn one's living, nor having access to credit. It means 




sufficient income due to a particular food supply chain’s structure which directs 
benefits to buyers (i.e. processors, exporters, retailers, etc.) or wealthier farmers 
(Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2012; da Silva and Rankin, 
2013). In 2015, the UN introduced Agenda 2030 and seventeen comprehensive 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 targets to promote inclusive 
industrialisation in developing countries and include small-scale farmers in markets 
(UN, 2015b). The key message throughout the SDGs Agenda 2030 is a commitment 
to eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions (UN, 2015b). In doing so, Goal 
9 advocates for establishing a resilient infrastructure and promoting inclusive 
industrialisation in developing countries (UN, 2015b). In specific terms, Target 9.3 
advocates for efficient integration of small-scale enterprises into global chains and 
markets, which represents a starting point for this study. 
 
1.4 Justification for the Study  
The increasing academic interest in challenges related to efficiency and sustainability 
of contract farming in developing countries has resulted in numerous case studies 
being carried out in the past two decades (see studies in Appendix A). Nevertheless, 
solutions for improving the efficiency and sustainability of supply chains operated 
through contract farming still do not include comprehensive recommendations on 
how all involved stakeholders could contribute to the supply chain’s progress. The 
justification for this study is based on the current knowledge gaps, particularly in the 
following areas:  
 
(i) The need for continuous research and discussion regarding contract farming’s 
efficiency and sustainability - Contract farming is re-emerging in developing 
countries after gaining more approval from the academic community and 
development practitioners as a prospective business model that empowers small-
scale farmers, compared to early stages of modern CF in 1980s and 1990s when the 
main critique was directed against CF’s exploitative nature (Bijman, 2008). Also, the 
food industry in the 21
st
 century requires a more integrated approach in supplying 
food. As raw materials come from distant locations, high-level processing, logistics 
and quality are required in today’s supply chains. Therefore, contracts within supply 
chains are becoming a tool to coordinate all requirements and link small-scale 




to valuable information and inputs, as suggested by the extensive CF literature 
(Minot, 1986; Key and Runsten, 1999; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; da Silva, 2005; 
Shepherd, 2007; Singh, 2007; Bijman, 2008; Birthal, et al., 2008; Miyata et al., 
2009; Prowse, 2012; Will, 2013; Cai et al., 2014). Involvement in the global food 
market exposes supply chain players to the risk of uncertainty, especially regarding 
volatile international commodity and input prices. This risk implies that CF has its 
merits but is not without certain pitfalls. 
 
Since contract farming has a significant impact on the livelihoods of small-scale 
farmers, it is necessary to provide a constant assessment and recommendations for 
enhancing contracting models. Thus, the evidence on the efficiency and 
sustainability of contract farming needs to be continuously updated. This study 
generated new lessons on contract farming to advance this field. The study extended 
on previous findings from the relevant contract farming literature and joined existing 
efforts to enhance the efficiency and sustainability of contract farming in developing 
countries through research. 
 
(ii) The lack of empirical studies on contract design in food supply chains - Although 
both theoretical and empirical bodies of the literature are vast on issues related to 
contract farming, current research does not provide sufficient evidence on the best 
practices in designing contracts for small-scale farmers in developing countries. For 
example, even though the knowledge of contract design is significant for theoretical 
and applied purposes, there is a lack of research on how companies design contracts 
(Brousseau, 2008). According to Smalley (2013), exit options that are given to small 
producers in contracts should be further explored. There are many new types of 
contracts emerging, so future research should compare different design features 
(Bolwig et al., 2009). Also, Sykuta and Parcell (2002) and Vavra (2009) argued that 
the access to contract documentation and the privacy surrounding contracts hinder 
better understanding of contracting issues. To date, in-depth research on contract 
design challenges in developing countries is missing, with the exception of studies 
done by Cotula (2011), Prowse (2012) and Pultrone (2012) and the new Legal Guide 
(2015) that serves as a reference point. For instance, empirical studies from 
Schipmann and Qaim (2011), Huh et al. (2012) and Abebe et al. (2013) refer only to 




consider the entire contract. This study is addressing the issue of the contract design 
in Malawi’s paprika supply chain using an authentic case from the field and 
analysing all clauses contained in the contract to make relevant inferences. 
 
(iii) The lack of empirical evidence on the state of contract farming in the paprika 
supply chain in Malawi - Indications of possible progress for Malawi's economy are 
found in the emerging paprika sector. Studies done in Malawi explored the 
significance of paprika (Capsicum Annuum, L.), which has the potential to contribute 
to an increased share of Malawi's trade (Agar and Chiligo, 2008; CYE Report, 2009; 
Makoka, et al., 2010; National Statistical Office Malawi-NSO, 2014). Growing 
international demand for paprika makes it a valuable export commodity, while 
Malawi‘s comparative economic advantage in low input technology presents 
opportunities for small-scale farmers (Kumwenda and Madola, 2005; Makoka et al., 
2010). Also, small-scale farmers’ advantages in agricultural production include 
access to abundant family labour, lower supervision costs and intensive use of land 
(Hazell et al., 2007; Key and Runsten, 1999; Singh, 2011; Wiggins, Kirsten, and 
Llambi, 2010). Makoka et al. (2010) argued that financial incapacity and low 
productivity, coupled with poor crop quality and little value addition, are the most 
challenging problems for the majority of Malawian small-scale farmers in attempting 
to with the high-value agricultural markets. 
 
The paprika sector has potential to boost the Malawian economy, however, recent 
literature does not report on the status of contract farming activities in this sector. 
Makoka et al. (2010) focused on the value chain analysis of paprika, and up to now, 
this is the most recent study available on the paprika sector in Malawi. The CYE 
Report (2009) also explored the value chain for paprika. Both studies only implicitly 
considered contract farming arrangements for paprika. In contrast, Agar and Chiligo 
(2008) more thoroughly explored contracts for paprika in Malawi. Since 2008, the 
structure of the paprika market in Malawi changed significantly. The principal 
contracting companies for exporting paprika active in 2008 no longer operate on the 
market in the 2014-2016 period. Considering the value of the paprika supply chain 
for contracting arrangements and Malawian small-scale farmers, this study sought to 
update evidence on the status of contracting in Malawi’s paprika sector to provide 




(iv)The lack of a mixed methods approach in current studies on contract farming - 
Notable studies concerning contract farming have been conducted in the past. Many 
of those studies addressed issues related to contracting from a quantitative 
perspective only (especially Miyata et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012; Narayanan, 2014; 
Briones, 2015; Girma and Gardebroek, 2015) or using solely qualitative inquiry (e.g. 
Strohm and Hoeffler, 2006; Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw, 2013; Han et al., 2013). 
Recent studies using both quantitative and qualitative methods are scant (e.g. 
Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2012; Prowse and Moyer-Lee, 2014). This study contributes to 
bridging the methodological gap by employing mixed methods approach and adding 
comprehensive evidence from the perspectives of various stakeholders in contractual 
relations. By combining both qualitative and quantitative data, the analysis allows 
more in-depth interpretation of the studied phenomenon. 
 
(v) Context-specific implications and generalizability - The justification for the study 
also arises from the importance of contract farming for Malawian agriculture and its 
driving force - small-scale farmers. In 2016, the Malawian Government was still 
revising the official contract farming Strategy, which is a leading policy document 
for regulating contractual arrangements in Malawi for all agricultural produce. Thus, 
based on the research done in the paprika supply chain, this study is targeted at 
informing policy guidelines on how to improve contract farming so it can be 
implemented and enforced more efficiently, taking into consideration small-scale 
farmers' interests. In broader terms, the study outputs are applicable in cases of 
neighbouring countries that employ contract farming as one of the strategies for 
poverty alleviation. Lessons learned from Malawi can serve as the guideline in 
communication with key players and further in shaping strategies and policies for 
efficient and sustainable contracting. 
 
The part of the study dealing with the contract design has an additional use. Since 
contracting principles in agri-food supply chains are similar (not the same), the study 
recommendations could be considered in a context of supply chain governance in 
national and international trade. Weaknesses in the design exposed in this study 
serve as an example to assist in avoiding contract traps in supply chains of both 





1.5 Research Problem and Main Assumption 
Limited capital and assets hinder small-scale farmers in developing countries from 
investing in costly inputs and improved crop varieties, cultivating more suitable 
crops for high-value markets or meeting high-quality standards and consistency of 
supply (Minot and Roy, 2007; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). Small-scale farmers 
often produce small quantities and poor quality crops. The lack of premium produce 
narrows the choice of market channels for small-scale farmers. In an extensive 
literature on modern supply chains, it is recognised that the exclusion from lucrative 
commodity markets might lead already poor small-scale farmers in developing 
countries into a deeper poverty trap, creating a vicious cycle for a few generations 
(Bijman et al., 2007; Barrett, 2010; da Silva and Rankin, 2013).  
 
This study builds on the already defined fundamental problem for Malawian small-
scale farmers: the lack of linkages with markets.
4
 Both theoretical and empirical 
literature suggests that contract farming can ensure the missing link and, by 
coordinating relations in supply chains, contribute to poverty alleviation and 
sustainable income generation for small-scale farmers (Key and Runsten, 1999; 
Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Prowse, 2012). Nonetheless, poorly developed contracts 
could pose challenges to small-scale farmers in circumstances of unequal market 
power between the contractor and small-scale farmers. In the wider context of a 
research problem, this study focused on how to ensure efficient market participation 
for small-scale farmers to improve their livelihoods. The study addressed the 
problem of small-scale farmers' participation in high-value markets and, more 
specifically, analysed the relationship between the contracting company
5
 and 
Malawian small-scale farmers. 
 
1.6 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to explore, examine and address the key challenges in 
contract farming arrangements using the example of the paprika supply chain in 
Central Malawi. The four objectives that guided the study are: 
                                                          
4
 The definition of the problem is based on studies from Agar and Chiligo (2008), the CYE report 
(2009) and Makoka et al. (2010). More detailed account of these studies is given in Chapter 6. 
5
 Due to confidentiality, the name of the company used as a case study is not disclosed in this study. 
the Company's name is coded as ‘Company D', and it is used throughout the study to mark the 





 Objective 1: To explore and analyse current dynamics in Malawi’s paprika 
supply chain. 
 Objective 2: To identify factors that motivate small-scale farmers to enter into 
contractual relationships and explore how existing contracts influence small-
scale farmers’ livelihoods. 
 Objective 3: To identify, describe and analyse the key challenges in the 
contractual relationship within the supply chain. 
 Objective 4: To propose and critically evaluate options for improving contracting 
conditions, in particular for small-scale farmers.  
 
1.7 Research Question and Sub-questions 
The study defined one overall research question and a set of specific sub-questions in 
relation to the research objectives. The overall research question is: How can 
contracting conditions
6
 in Malawi be improved, especially for small-scale farmers, 
to facilitate more efficient and sustainable relations
7
 in the existing paprika supply 
chain?  
The following specific sub-questions were related to stated objectives: 
 Sub-questions 1: How do key players in the paprika supply chain interact among 
themselves regarding their roles, responsibilities and relations? What are the 
characteristics of contracted small-scale farmers? What is the level of small-scale 
                                                          
6
 In this study, contracting conditions are defined as internal and external conditions that affect 
contract farming. Internal conditions are primarily related to the contract itself and its design (what is 
contained in the contract clauses), which determines the relationship between the contractor and 
small-scale farmer. External conditions refer to the enabling environment surrounding the supply 
chain, in particular, the policies and support available from the Government, civil society, farmers' 
organisations, NGOs, research sector and aid organisations. 
7
 The terms efficiency and sustainability are widely used in almost all scientific fields and can have 
many different meanings. In the light of the supply chain management, efficiency often refers to 
various models measuring how to improve the performance of all or some parts of the supply chain, 
especially logistics (e.g. Liang et al., 2006; Geunes et al., 2016; Perez Loaiza et al., 2017). The 
complex efficiency measurements, however, are not applicable in this study due to the nature of 
Malawi's paprika supply chain (e.g. no reliable data on suppliers' production and costs, uncertain 
delivery dates, no possibility to measure customers' satisfaction, etc.). In the context of this study, 
efficiency is explored through two main criteria: the inputs provided and delivered volumes of 
paprika. It is posited that efficient relationships in the supply chain will involve the timely provision 
of sufficient volume and quality of inputs to small-scale farmers, and agreed volumes of paprika 
delivered to the contractor with no or minimum side-selling. Sustainability in the supply chain 
management implies integrating ‘environmental performance, social performance, and economic 
contribution' into core business functions (Ansari and Kant, 2017, p. 2524). This study focuses on the 
practices of building a long-term relationship (through developing trust and paying a premium price) 
and enhancing communication (by information sharing and transparency). Thus, a sustainable 
relationship in the supply chain is built through the contract and entails high trust levels, satisfaction 




farmers’ involvement in farmers’ organisations/unions and which factors 
influence small-scale farmers’ membership? 
  Sub-questions 2: What factors motivate small-scale farmers to enter contracts? 
How does contracting affect small-scale farmers’ livelihood in terms of 
productivity, income generation and food security? Are small-scale farmers 
willing to expand their contracting to other crops and which factors influence 
small-scale farmers’ willingness to expand? 
 Sub-questions 3: What are the key challenges in Malawi’s paprika supply chain? 
How do the structure and the content of the contract for paprika support efficient 
and sustainable relations? What is the level of side-selling in the paprika supply 
chain and which factors influence small-scale farmers’ engagement in side-
selling? 
 Sub-questions 4: What changes or new practices need to be adopted for improved 
contracting conditions? How can the identified options for improving contracting 
conditions be implemented in the Malawian paprika supply chain? Which actors 
need to implement the identified options? 
 
1.8 Overview of the Research Methodology 
The choice of research methodology used for this study was influenced by the 
tradition of pragmatism and the belief that the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative data can provide appropriate evidence for proposing improvements in 
contracting arrangements. The study employed a mixed methods approach, which 
‘provides a better understanding of the problem than if [qualitative or quantitative] 
dataset had been used alone' (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007, p. 7). The embedded 
single case study, specifically the embedded design – multilevel model with both 
concurrent and sequential data collection and QUAL priority, was used (Creswell 
and Plano Clark, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). The research included a total 
of 21 semi-structured stakeholders’ interviews, 10 semi-structured interviews with 
experts, two focus group discussions with stakeholders, 428 household 





1.9 Study Outline 
The study is organised into five parts (Figure 1.1). The first part consists of Chapter I 
and II. Chapter I introduces the research background, justification, objectives, 
questions and limitations, and positions the study in the context of existing 
knowledge. Chapter II presents the study’s conceptual framework, synthesises the 
study's key concepts and links them with the theoretical framework that applies in 
the studied case.  
Figure 1.1 The outline of the study 
 
The second part includes, in total, four chapters and represents the review of the 
relevant literature from which the study arose. Chapter III looks at the transformation 
of the food industry, outlines key features of modern food supply chains and assesses 
the position of small-scale farmers in new circumstances. Chapter IV first introduces 
contract farming and provides an overview of the positive features of contracting as 
well as empirical evidence supporting it. Chapter V focuses on challenges in 
contractual arrangements and draws lessons from highlighted examples where 
contracting failed. Chapter VI introduces the main characteristics of the Malawian 
context: the status of agriculture, the position of small-scale farmers, experiences 
with contract farming and the country's potential for further development.  
 
Chapter I Introduction to the Study 
Chapter II Conceptual Framework of the Study 
Chapter III Transforming Agri-food Industry and Modern Supply Chains 
Chapter IV Contract Farming: Solution for the Agri-food Supply Chains 
Chapter VI Context of Malawi: Performance of Agri-food Supply Chains and Contract Farming 
 
Chapter V Challenges in Contractual Relations and their Impact on Small-scale Farmers 
Chapter VII Research Methodology 
PART THREE 
Methodology  
Chapter VIII Dynamics in the Paprika Supply Chain 
Chapter IX Contract Farming and its Influence on Small-scale Farmers’ Livelihood  
Chapter X Key Challenges in Contract Farming: Contract Design and Side-selling  
Chapter XI Options for Improving Contracting Conditions for Small-scale Farmers in Malawi 
PART FIVE 
Conclusions  
Chapter XII Conclusions and Recommendations 











The third part comprises of Chapter VII, which elaborates on the use of the mixed 
methods approach, describes the data collection, the analytical framework and 
limitations, and discusses the benefits of the used approach for the study outcomes.  
 
The study results are divided into four chapters, which together comprise the fourth 
part of the study. Chapter VIII analyses different roles, responsibilities, and relations 
in Malawi’s paprika supply chain. Chapter IX identifies primary motivational factors 
that guide small-scale farmers to enter into contracts and provides a detailed account 
on how contract farming influences small-scale farmers’ livelihoods. Chapter X first 
elaborates on the key challenges identified in the paprika supply chain and then 
focuses closely on the contract design and the issue of side-selling. Chapter XI 
discusses the models for improving contracting conditions. 
 
Chapter XII forms the fifth and concluding part of the study. It outlines key 
outcomes, draws conclusions and implications based on the studied example, 
recommends necessary steps for improved efficiency and sustainability of the 
paprika supply chain, and suggests the direction for further research.  
 
1.10 Research Scope and Limitations 
The study explores one paprika supply chain spread through two districts in Malawi. 
The study participants were supply chain players, contracted small-scale farmers, 
Company D providing contracts and the enabling environment. The enabling 
environment involved direct and indirect players both in Malawi and abroad (for 
example, experts are considered as indirect or distant parts of the enabling 
environment in this study). Supporting players in the supply chain, such as agro-
dealers or transporters, were not included in the study. Since the primary focus of the 
research was a contract arrangement, the study did not explore other channels for 
marketing paprika, such as supermarkets or traditional spot markets in more detail, 
although their presence is deemed essential for small-scale farmers' linkages with the 
market. 
 
The study did not consider differences between contract and non-contract farmers in 
the paprika supply chain, as many studies on contract farming have already done so. 




allowed for the cross-sectional study, while more objective and accurate results are 
yielded with longitudinal studies, especially panel studies, when it comes to 
comparing benefits from contract farming between two groups of farmers (Barrett et 
al., 2012; da Silva and Rankin, 2013). On the other hand, the study used only the 
example of contracted farmers to link the specific contract design with relations that 
are evolving in a particular supply chain. With this concept, the study aspired to 
grasp more deeply the contract features that are more or less favourable. 
 
The Malawian paprika supply chain was geographically scattered across three 
countries: production was carried out in Malawi, processing in South Africa and the 
most important customer was located in Germany. Due to time and resource 
constraints, the study followed the product flow in the chain up to South Africa, 
while characteristics of the final product and final customer were not captured. The 
methodological limitations are described in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
1.11 Study Outputs 
This study advances the understanding of complex relations in contractual 
arrangements and suggests options for improving contracting conditions for small-
scale farmers in Malawi’s paprika supply chain. The study’s recommendations serve 
as an orientation to different stakeholders - from small-scale farmers to the 
Government level. To ensure visibility, the study outputs were communicated: (i) to 
the academic community through submitted scientific articles and conference 
contributions, and (ii) to stakeholders by disseminating the data on the field. 
 
1.12 Summary 
Chapter 1 introduced the study. The main characteristics of the study along with the 
justification were presented. The study seeks to examine how to improve contracting 
conditions for small-scale farmers in Malawi and provide more efficient and 
sustainable relations in the paprika supply chain. The next chapter introduces the 




Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework of the Study 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the conceptual framework of the study. A study’s conceptual 
framework consists of a set of concepts and related theoretical explanations derived 
from the critical literature review, which provides in-depth insights into the research 
topic and creates the basis for the research design. The first part of the chapter 
explains the importance of a conceptual and theoretical framework for guiding the 
research. The second part describes the elements of the study's conceptual 
framework. The last part of this chapter elaborates on two central concepts - supply 
chain and contract farming – and the underpinning theories. 
 
2.1.1 Conceptual Framework 
According to Meleis (2012), a concept is a label, which describes a phenomenon or a 
group of phenomena. A concept offers a summary of thoughts about the 
phenomenon and helps to summarise a great deal of details that surround a concept 
(Meleis, 2012). Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013) offered a basis for 
understanding a theoretical and conceptual framework and how they can be utilised 
simultaneously in the study: 
 
 ‘Theoretical and conceptual frameworks may be used well together in a 
 study.  A researcher may, for example, draw key concepts from the literature 
 that inform the choice of a phenomenon of study and selection of 
 participants and then use a specific theory to guide data analysis.’ (p. 
 143) 
 
This study used both theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The conceptual 
framework was adapted to represent the blueprint of the research. The study's 
conceptual framework integrated the main elements of the study design, relevant 
concepts and related theoretical considerations. In addition, the conceptual 
framework covered the choice of methodology. The analytical framework was also 
based on the relevant theory that guided the data analysis (see chapter 7, Section 





2.1.2 Application and Relevance of Theoretical Framework for the Study 
There is a considerable difference in how theory is used in qualitative, quantitative, 
and mixed methods research. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) and Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2009) provided valuable insights on this (Table 2.1). In qualitative 
research, which is often close to the constructivist paradigm,
8
 a researcher works 
with a ‘bottom up' approach, meaning that the participants' views are taken to build 
broader themes and the theory is created by linking those themes (Creswell and 
Plano Clark, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
8 
Table 2.1 The use of the theory in the case of three different paradigms 
Elements   Constructivism Postpositivism Pragmatism 
Ontology: 
What is the 













Singular and multiple 
realities: researcher 
tests hypotheses and 
points out different 
perspectives. 
Epistemology: 






The subjective point 




point of view: 
researcher 
objectively 
collects data on a 
phenomenon. 
Both objective and 
subjective points of 
view, with practicality 
in mind: researcher 
collects data by ‘what 
works’ to address the 
research question. 
Methodology: 





researcher starts with 
participants’ views 




deductive:  a 
researcher tests 
hypotheses to 
confirm or refute a 
priori theory. 
Both inductive and 
hypothetico-deductive: 
a researcher collects 
both qualitative and 
quantitative data and 
integrates them. 
Theory: 
How does the 
theory relate to 
the research? 
  
Theory building is an 
outcome of research. 
The theory is a 




The theory is needed to 
inform the quantitative 
part of research. Also, 
inductive-deductive 
research cycles are 
possible. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), Teddlie 
and Tashakkori (2009) and Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013). 
                                                             
8
 Thomas Kuhn (1996, p. x) defined paradigms as ‘universally recognised scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners'. Guba and Lincoln 
(1994, p. 105) described paradigms as the worldview (the term later adopted by Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2007) or the system of beliefs that ‘guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but 
in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways’.  
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In contrast to qualitative research, in quantitative research a researcher usually relies 
on postpositivist paradigm and applies a ‘top down' approach, i.e. the primary 
concern is the theory that prompts a researcher to develop hypotheses and test the 
data against those hypotheses to confirm or refute the theory (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). In mixed methods research, however, a 
researcher is likely to take pragmatism as a stance and employ both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to enable better understanding and solution to the studied 
problem (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
Depending on the model used, the theory will play a role in mixed methods research 
by informing the quantitative side of the research (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
In this study, the theory played a significant role and its relevance was particularly 
reflected in informing the research design and interpreting the results. The theory 
was applied throughout the study as follows: 
  
i. The direction of the study was influenced by the theory on philosophical 
stances, i.e. the most appropriate worldview considering the aim of the 
research. Since the study strived to suggest a solution to a problem, it was 
recognised that pragmatism and the related mixed methods approach
9
 allowed 
collection of required evidence (both stories and numbers), which are needed in 
making recommendations for public policy.  
ii. The concepts of supply chain and contract farming were used to frame the 
scope of the research, i.e. to inform the choice of study participants and 
understand their dynamics.  
iii. A theoretical basis taken from Supply Chain Management, Contract Theory, 
Principal-Agent Game and New Institutional Economics accumulated 
assumptions about relations between parties and challenges in contract 
arrangements and thus prompted the formulation of the study aim and 
objectives. 
iv. The same theoretical basis was later used as a guideline for the interpretation, 
discussion and comparison of results against the existing knowledge. 
                                                             
9














 Academic: Advancing the understanding of contracting within supply chains in developing countries context; scientific articles and conference contribution. 
 Practical: Increasing the awareness and knowledge about contracting challenges on the local level, mobilising local stakeholders to discuss different options and 








Agri-food Supply Chain 
Contract Farming 
Methodology  
Level 2: Company D 
 
Research Aim, Overall 
Question and Objectives  
Theoretical Framework 
Coase (1937), Williamson (1981; 2000), (Hart 












Mentzer et al. (2001); Simchi-Levi et al. (2003); 
Christopher (2005); Mangan et al. (2008); Tsolakis 
et al. (2014) 
Supply Chain Management 
Minimised costs + maximised profit + 
integration into network 
Key success factors: efficient design 
and operations, overcoming 
uncertainties, managing evolution of 
relations over time, acknowledging 
cultural differences, choosing 
appropriate supplier and negotiation. 
Agri-food Supply 
Chain Management 
Specific challenges: long production 
times, seasonality, diseases and 
weather threats, inconsistency in 
quality and quantity and low flexibility. 
Contract Theory, Principal-Agent 
Game and New Institutional 
Economics 
A: To explore, examine and 
address key challenges occurring 
in contract farming arrangements. 
Q: How can contracting conditions 
in Malawi be improved, especially 
for small-scale farmers, to facilitate 
more efficient and sustainable 
relations in existing paprika supply 
chain? 
 
O1: To explore and analyse current 
dynamics in the paprika supply chain. 
O2: To identify factors that motivate 
small-scale farmers to enter the 
contractual relationship and explore 
how existing contracts influence 
small-scale farmers’ livelihoods. 
 
O3: To identify, describe and analyse 
key challenges in the contractual 
relationship within the supply chain. 
O4: To propose and critically 
evaluate options for improving 
contracting conditions, in particular 




 Survey embedded in the case study 
MIXED METHODS APPROACH:                       
Embedded Design-Multilevel Model with 
Both Concurrent and Sequential Data 





 Focus group 
interviews 







Level 1: Small-scale paprika farmers 
Level 3: Enabling environment: 
 Farmers’ Association 




 Civil society 
 Aid organisation 
 Vendors, Supermarkets 
 University 
 Experts 
 Transaction Cost Economics 
 Asymmetric Information 
 Opportunistic Behaviour 
 Bounded Rationality 
 Incomplete Contracts 
Contract Farming  
Key benefits: premium price, higher 
income, better productivity, decreased 
risks. 
Key challenges: contract design, side 
selling, bargaining, power. 
Outcomes  
Van Roekel et al. (2002); Bourlakis and Bourlakis 
(2004); van der Vorst et al. (2007); Dani (2015) 
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2.2 Study’s Conceptual Framework  
2.2.1 Main Elements and their Sequence 
The study's conceptual framework consists of five main elements: Concepts, 
Theoretical Framework, study design (Research Aim, Overall Questions and 
Objectives, and Methodology) and Outcomes. Concepts are the starting point of the 
research, the main idea, and the boundary of the study (Figure 2.1). Concepts are 
related to Theoretical Framework. Theoretical Framework provides an account of 
the existing critical knowledge about Concepts. The Theoretical Framework extends 
to inform Research Aim, Overall Questions and Objectives that represent the core of 
the study. To fulfil study Objectives, the Methodology outlines the approach and 
instruments used. Finally, Outcomes links all the elements and, based on the study’s 
findings, synthesises the study’s key contributions in academic and practical 
perspectives. 
 
2.3 Overarching Concept: Supply Chain 
The basic concept of a supply chain (SC) is the organisation of various flows 
between two ends. Although every supply chain is unique, a generic industrial 
supply chain will usually include: a supplier, manufacturer, warehouse, distribution       




A supply chain consists of numerous and dynamic processes and activities 
exchanged through upstream (supplier's end) and downstream (customer's end) 
linkages (Mangan et al., 2008). The ultimate goal of every supply chain is to satisfy 
customer needs by providing the expected product or service in time and of 
appropriate quantity and quality, and to generate profit for the supply chain players 
(Chopra and Meindl, 2007). 
 
Besides actual flows (i.e. information sharing), the transformation of the product,
11
 
and exchange of funds, supply chains also include a subtle part or so-called ‘rules of 
the game’. The supply chains do not exist in a vacuum but are always embedded in 
the wider context of societies. Hence, these ‘rules’ facilitate flows in supply chains 
                                                             
10
 Since supply chains differ significantly, it is acceptable to state that a supply chain involves all 
parties directly or indirectly engaged in satisfying a customer’s request (Chopra and Meindl, 2007). 
11
 Throughout the supply chain, the initial product can go through one or a few phases of 
transformation, where physical form and value of the product are enhanced.  
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through various laws, policies, and regulations and are considered institutional 
elements, as suggested by da Silva and de Suoza Filho (2007). Also, support 
services, such as unions, associations, government, non-governmental organisations, 
regulatory bodies, and research and innovation units have a significant role in 
informing and implementing institutional elements (Tsolakis et al., 2014). The 
institutional elements and support services together form a supply chain's enabling 
environment (da Silva and de Souza Filho, 2007). 
 
2.3.1 Players and their Relations in the Supply Chain 
The players in a supply chain are all individual or business entities that participate in 
producing the good or service and have an impact on the costs occurring as a result 
of activities in a supply chain (Simchi-Levi et al., 2003). When analysing a 
particular supply chain, the scope sometimes has to be extended even to suppliers' 
suppliers and customers' customers because they also influence the supply chain 
performance (Simchi-Levi et al., 2003; Christopher, 2005). Thus, there is a tendency 
to look at today's supply chains relations concerning players' integration rather than 
connections among isolating units performing independent activities (Christopher, 
2005). 
 
The literature suggests that the term ‘network’ best describes the organisation of the 
supply chain. For example, Christopher (2005) outlined the idea of a supply chain as 
a network with the company buying the goods at the centre and surrounded by 
suppliers and customers (Figure 2.2 where various colours represent different players 
in the supply chain).  
 
Figure 2.2 The idea of a supply chain as a network with nodes and links 
Source: Adapted from Christopher (2005, p. 5). 
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Mangan et al. (2008, p. 11) argued that the supply chain involves ‘multidimensional 
network of collaborating entities’ and by understanding supply chains as systems, 
the interaction among various entities becomes a focus of the supply chain analysis. 
In a supply network, different entities represent nodes, and their relations are 
depicted through links across the supply chain (Mangan et al., 2008). Bourlakis and 
Bourlakis (2004) anticipated that supply chain players would continue to form 
networks in an attempt to increase their competitiveness on the global market. This 
assumption applies in particular to smaller producers. Due to the trend of fewer and 
larger firms operating in the food industry and the pressure for product and service 
consistency, smaller producers face a threat of being excluded from the market 
unless they can enter larger supply systems (Wysocki, 2000). 
 
2.3.2 Supply Chain Management  
The strategies on how to govern supply chains are the core of the Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) concept. SCM was introduced in the 1980s and, since then, it 
continuously develops to improve the efficiency of supply chains.
12
 The importance 
of SCM for the firm cannot be overemphasised, because, in some industries, SCM is 
‘perhaps the single most important factor determining the success of the firm’ 
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2003, p. 7).  
 
As noted by Mentzer et al. (2001), SCM can be viewed as: (i) an operational term 
involving the flow of products and materials, (ii) a management philosophy or (iii) a 
management process. Storey et al. (2006) saw SCM as a tool that influenced players’ 
behaviour in a particular direction. Dani (2015) argued that two basic principles of 
SCM are to satisfy consumers’ requirements and to guide the supply chain to 
become and remain economically sustainable. Simchi-Levi et al. (2003) described 
SCM as a set of approaches that aim to integrate all supply chain players efficiently 
to produce and distribute products and services in the right quantities, time and 
locations. Moreover, Simchi-Levi et al. (2003) emphasised that the goal of SCM is 
to minimise the costs along the supply chain and satisfy customers’ requirements. 
Similarly, Mangan et al. (2008) viewed SCM as the management process that 
                                                             
12
 The evolution of SCM encompasses several phases, and in-depth elaboration is beyond the scope of 
this study. However, it is important to emphasise that SCM developed from logistics background and 
extended the logistics by linking it with manufacturing, information technology, marketing, sales, and 
strategic planning (Sweeney, 2007). 
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coordinates upstream and downstream entities and related flows. The authors pointed 
out that SCM has the purpose of creating value in the form of products and services 
(Mangan et al., 2008). Chopra and Meindl (2007) stated that the task of SCM is to 
maximise that overall value generated. Christopher (2005) integrated the two ideas 
by stating that the primary objective of SCM is to deliver superior value to the 
customer at lower costs for all supply chain players. Also, the author highlighted the 
importance of managing the relationship among players and recognised potential 
pitfalls coming from different interests across the supply chain:   
  
 ‘The focus of supply chain management is on co-operation and trust and the 
 recognition that, properly managed, the "whole can be greater than the sum 
 of its parts". Thus the focus of supply chain management is upon the 
 management of relationships to achieve a more profitable outcome for all 
 parties in the chain. This brings with it some significant challenges since 
 there may be occasions when the narrow self-interest of one party has to be 
 subsumed for the benefit of the chain as a whole.’ (Christopher, 2005, p. 5) 
 
 
Christopher's idea of putting effort into the management of relationships to enable 
more efficient and sustainable supply chains is the guiding thought adopted in this 
study. 
 
2.3.3 Agricultural Food Supply Chain Management 
The agricultural food (agri-food) supply chains generally share a similar conceptual 
background as the industrial supply chains, so the Agricultural Supply Chain 
Management (ASCM) targets the same objectives as SCM.
13
 The ASCM manages 
the flow of the product ‘from farm to fork’. Due to the peculiarity of agricultural 
production, agri-food supply chains face additional challenges compared to the 
industrial ones. According to van Roekel et al. (2002), van der Vorst et al. (2007) 
and Tsolakis et al. (2014), agri-food supply chains may experience challenges due 
to:  
 Long production times - production of a new or additional product is time-
consuming, 
                                                             
13
 This statement has to be considered in broad terms, especially because suggested comparison of 
agricultural and industrial supply chains may take several directions, depending on the examples 
taken. However, what is similar in both supply chains is the flow of information, materials, and funds, 
and the goal to integrate all players in the supply chain to achieve highest profits and lower costs. 




 Seasonality - some agricultural commodities cannot be supplied all year-round 
because of climatic conditions, 
  Disease and extreme weather threats such as pest attacks, floods and droughts, 
 Inconsistencies in quality and quantity as the lack of inputs can limit yields and 
decrease crop quality, 
 Low flexibility (e.g. lack of capital to upgrade production). 
 
With some exceptions, agri-food supply chains tend to be more vulnerable 
concerning changing trends and distortions in international markets compared to 
non-food supply chains. Van der Vorst et al. (2007) distinguished and described two 
main types of agri-food supply chains: (a) chains for fresh agricultural products and 
(b) chains for processed food (Figure 2.3.). In the case of fresh agricultural products, 
the raw material (e.g. the vegetable, flowers or fruit) maintains its initial 
characteristics and the core supply chain activities involve farming (including 
cultivation, harvesting and post-harvest handling), storing, packaging, transporting, 
and trading. For processed food, the raw material is used to produce consumer 
products that have higher added value (e.g. canned food, juice or spices); thus, the 
supply chain activities also include processing.  
 
Figure 2.3 The agri-food supply chain for fresh and processed agricultural products 
Source: Based on Bourlakis and Weightman (2004), da Silva and de Suoza Filho 
(2007), van der Vorst (2007), Tsolakis et al. (2014) and Dani (2015). 
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Considering that agricultural products might be used in various forms (fresh, semi-
processed or ultra-processed), the role of ASCM is also to determine the optimal 
purpose and marketing channel for the agricultural product (e.g. whether the 
commodity should be a material for export or green market). Indeed, management of 
modern agri-food supply chains is becoming a complex and challenging task 
(Tsolakis et al., 2016). Due to scarce resources, rising world population, and 
increased requirements regarding the food quality and safety, the importance of 
ASCM will grow in the coming years. 
 
2.4 Central Concept: Contract Farming 
Some of the key tasks of SCM include minimising costs and increasing control over 
uncertainties, thus parts of a supply chain can be regulated through futures contracts. 
Futures contracts can have many forms and they differ in their content; however, 
they usually define quantities, qualities, delivery time, and prices for the product 
supplied (Simchi-Levi et al., 2003). The parties agree on the price of a product in the 
present, while the delivery and the payment for the product take place at a future 
time agreed. In futures contracts, the contractor speculates on the increase or 
decrease of the future price and hedges the risk by signing a contract with the 
supplier (Dani, 2015). Contract farming is founded on the principle of futures 
contracts. 
 
Figure 2.4 Supply chain with indicated contracted and non-contracted relations 
Note: A company represents a mediator between primary producers and the rest of 
the supply chain. Source: Author’s adaptation of the literature. 
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One of the primary functions of the contract is to mitigate imperfections on the input 
and output markets and to secure a regular supply of the produce (da Silva, 2005). 
Figure 2.4 shows that contracts can be made at different stages of the supply chain. 
Contract farming refers to the relationship between an agricultural producer and 
subsequent player(s) in the chain organised through the contract. Contract 
arrangements define responsibilities of the party that cultivates and sells the product 
and the party that buys the product. The following sub-headings bring more details 
on relevant theories underpinning contracting.  
 
2.4.1 Contract Theory and Principal-Agent Game as the Foundation of Contract 
Farming 
Contract theory is based on the assumption that parties can arrange their relations 
efficiently through contracts (Hart, 2010). The law of contract regulates transactions 
between suppliers and buyers of goods and services (Brownsword, 2009). However, 
contract theory does not imply a single thought that can be expressed about the 
nature of the contracts; rather it is a collection of ideas and methods that fit various 
situations (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Also, contract theory relies on the field of 
law and economics (Hart, 2010). For example, when referring to contract theory, 
Salanié (2005) noted that this theory has a number of models, which vary depending 
on whether the unit of analysis involves complete or incomplete contracts, or 
bilateral or multilateral relationships. This study explores the nature of bilateral 
contracts found in agri-food supply chains, so the theory further focuses on this 
particular relationship and its characteristics. 
 
There are several necessary requirements regarding contract arrangements. To be 
legally enforceable, the contract must contain an offer, acceptance, and consideration 
(Massey et al., 2009). In agri-food supply contracts, one party usually obliges itself 
to support farmers' production and to buy the crop (offer). The other party, by 
accepting the offer, commits itself to deliver the determined quantity and quality of 
the crop (Bijman, 2008). The inputs and money exchanged for the crop represent 
considerations in the case of a contract involving a crop. Additionally, contracts 
distribute value, uncertainty and decision rights between the parties (Sykuta and 




Contractual relationships are often explained through the Principal-Agent Game 
theory. Based on this theory, the principal (a company) proposes the contract and 
defines the terms of the contract by anticipating how the agent (a small-scale farmer) 
will answer each strategy proposed, that is, the agent will either accept or reject the 
contract in the proposed form (Key and Runsten, 1999, Salanié, 2005, Vavra, 2009). 
Key and Runsten (1999) further explained that the principal maximises its profits if 
(i) the agent accepts the contract as the contract gives greater profit than the next best 
option (e.g. selling the product on the green market) and (ii) the agent complies with 
the contract terms. In an attempt to motivate the agent to act on behalf of, and for the 
benefit of the principal, the principal must outline the contract that secures 
appropriate incentives, which will exceed any alternative and make the agent 
complete the principal's requirements (Kirsten et al., 2009; Vavra, 2009). Various 
scenarios in the contractual relationship between the principal and agent are further 
considered and described under the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework 
in the following sections. 
 
2.4.2 New Institutional Economics and Contract Farming 
Extending the neoclassical theory, NIE has emerged in the early 1970s and is rooted 
in the work of Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson and Douglass North
14
 (Rutherford, 
2001; Foss and Klein, 2008). The central concepts of NIE are institutions and 
institutional arrangements. Institutions are defined as a critical factor influencing the 
economic performance and governance tools that have the role to reduce transaction 
costs (Joskow, 1985; North, 1991, 1993; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Kirsten et al., 
2009). 
 
Contract farming in developing countries is often explained using the NIE theoretical 
framework (Key and Runsten, 1999; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Cook et al., 2008; 
Kirsten et al., 2009; Jia and Bijman, 2013). In NIE tradition, contracts are regarded 
as institutional arrangements that facilitate cooperation among parties, reduce 
transaction costs and mitigate specific market failures, such as expensive inputs, lack 
of credit, and information asymmetry (Key and Runsten, 1999; Kherallah and 
                                                             
14
 The early works that shaped NIE include: Roland Coase (1937) ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 
Economica 4(16), pp. 386-405; Oliver Williamson (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and 
Antitrust Implications - A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization, New York: The Free 
Press; and Douglass North (1991) ‘Institutions’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), pp. 97-112.  
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Kirsten, 2001; Brousseau, 2008). Brousseau (2008) argued that NIE revived the 
contract as a central object of economic investigation. For the purpose of this study, 
NIE elements considered include transaction cost economics, asymmetric 
information, opportunistic behaviour, bounded rationality and contractual 
incompleteness.
15
 Although NIE perspective offers a solid foundation to explore 
contract farming, critics pointed out that this paradigm does not address issues of 
trust, fairness, power and idiosyncrasies of contracting (Kirsten et al., 2009; Jia and 
Bijman, 2013). Still, NIE represents the most comprehensive framework for this 
study’s aim.  
 
2.4.2.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
The key assumption of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is that every transaction 
between economic actors involves so-called transaction costs, which should be 
considered as the ‘costs of running the economic system’ and therefore distinguished 
from the ‘usual production costs’ (Coase, 1937; Arow, 1969, p. 2; Williamson, 
1985, p. 18; Jia and Bijman, 2013). In the case of contracts, transaction costs are 
costs that occur ex-ante during: (i) searching for agents, (ii) screening of agents, (iii) 
writing the contract, (iv) negotiating, (v) signing the contract, (vi) transferring goods 
and services, and ex post while: (vii) monitoring contract compliance, (viii), 
enforcing contracts, and (ix) breaching the contract (Joskow, 1985; Williamson, 
1985; Key and Runsten, 1999; Rehber, 2007; Brousseau, 2008; Vavra, 2009; Jia and 
Bijman, 2013). Companies always seek to minimise their transaction costs. For 
example, if it is more expensive to supply the raw material from the market, the 
company will try either to vertically integrate into production of that raw material or 
employ contractual arrangements to lower the total transaction costs over time 
(Joskow, 1985; Rehber, 2007).
16
 Considering contract farming, if the company 
decides to contract with fewer but larger farmers, some transaction costs (such as 
costs of setting and monitoring contracts) might be decreased (Key and Runsten, 
                                                             
15
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to include a detailed account of the NIE framework, thus, 
sections focus on elements that are relevant to understand better contracting and provide theoretical 
foundation for interpreting the study’s results.  
16
 Joskow (1985) distinguished between three basic options of governance structures in the case of 
vertical relationships. At one extreme is vertical integration. At the other extreme are auction markets. 
In between these governing structures is a broad range of contractual agreements. More details on this 
topic are contained in Chapter 4 of this study. 
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1999; Vavra, 2009). However, contracting with larger farmers leads to excluding 
vulnerable small-scale farmers from markets. 
 
2.4.2.2 Asymmetric Information  
In economic relations, the assumption is that two parties do not have access to the 
same information; therefore, the distribution of resources throughout the economy is 
likely to differ compared to the situation where both parties have all the necessary 
information (Grossman, 1981; Vavra, 2009). In other words, because of asymmetric 
information, parties have different knowledge on the circumstances of another party 
and decisions that take place regarding any transaction are influenced by the amount 
of information available to each party. Being aware of asymmetric information is of 
high significance to understand relations in contract farming. Just like in Spence’s 
(1973) seminal example of an employer hiring an employee, the company that drafts 
the contract will not have complete information on the capabilities (production 
capacities and skills level) of each small-scale farmer that signs the contract. Hence, 
during the initial phase of the contract, the company will mainly depend on 
signalling, that is, small-scale farmer’s self-representation.
17
 Similarly, the small-
scale farmer is not likely to have the information on a company’s financial status or 
long-term strategic plans before signing the contract (or in the course of a contractual 
relationship) and will have to rely on the company’s signals. Therefore, since the 
information is asymmetrically distributed between parties, the transaction is often 
subject to hazards and opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975).  
 
2.4.2.3 Opportunistic Behaviour 
Opportunistic behaviour represents a threat to the contract efficiency. Opportunism 
reflects in dishonest behaviour when one or both parties shirk or disguise the actual 
conditions related to the contract performance (Williamson, 1981, 2000; Sykuta and 
Parcell, 2002). Examples of opportunistic acts in the case of contracting include: (i) 
using received credit intended for inputs to buy other materials or not buying 
anything at all, (ii) loan default, (iii) low selling prices offered by the company, (iv) 
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 Spence (1973) explained signalling using an example of a job market. The author argued that when 
hiring an employee, the employer does not have the information on the quality of an employee's 
work; hence, the decision on hiring is made under uncertain conditions. Given that the employer 
cannot directly observe the employee's capabilities, the decision on hiring will be based on observable 




tampering scales, and (v) selling poor quality inputs (Dorward et al., 2004; Dries et 
al., 2014).  
 
Opportunism also refers to strategic manipulation with information and actions. Two 
most frequent expressions of opportunistic behaviour include adverse selection (ex-
ante opportunism) and moral hazard (ex-post opportunism) (Williamson, 1985). 
Adverse selection occurs when the principal has imperfect information about the 
agent, and the agent takes advantage of the asymmetry by misrepresenting the true 
state of the world (Williamson, 1985; Vavra, 2009). Applying Salanié's (2005) 
example
18
 of an adverse selection situation to the contract farming context, the 
company faces adverse selection by offering input provision through the contract 
while not having complete information on the farmer's land size or loan repayment 
history. The farmer may withhold the true information on the actual size of the land 
to acquire more inputs and gain profit by selling the surpluses. Also, the farmer 
could disguise information on unpaid loans from previous business activities. In an 
adverse selection situation, the principal must try to make an agent reveal the correct 
information and one of the ways is to propose different types of contracts assuming 
that the agent's choice will reveal the information on the agent (Salanié, 2005; 
Vavra, 2009). It is costly to monitor and obtain complete information about every 
agent, especially in contract farming arrangements where the company contracts 
with hundreds of scattered farmers.  
 
Moral hazard is likely to occur whenever the objectives of involved parties differ and 
the principal is not able to control the agent’s actions (Salanié, 2005; Vavra, 2009). 
In the case of contract farming, companies might aim to obtain a certain amount of 
raw material while small-scale farmers desire to receive a premium price for the 
crop. Since the company is not able to observe and influence all small-scale farmers’ 
actions, it is likely that small-scale farmers will choose to act to optimise their gains 
through side-selling the crop outside the contract for a higher price. To avoid moral 
hazard, companies often tie small-scale farmer's remuneration to the observable 
variable, (e.g. delivered quantity of the crop) and motivate small-scale farmers to 
                                                             
18
 Salanié (2005) provided an example of an adverse selection situation. The government-regulated 
company has better information on its internal productivity and costs compared to the regulator; thus, 
the company is in a position to manipulate disclosure of the information to the regulator and 
maximise own profits. 
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choose actions that are better aligned with the companies’ objectives (Salanié, 2005; 
Vavra, 2009). Both asymmetric information and opportunism are likely to increase 
transaction costs. 
 
2.4.2.4 Bounded Rationality 
For a while, one of the well-accepted assumptions in neoclassical economics was 
that economic actors possess extended rationality that helps them to accurately 
evaluate the state of the world and act rationally to resolve problems (Foss and 
Klein, 2008; Vavra, 2009). According to NIE tradition, the human mind is subject to 
cognitive limitations, which results in bounded rationality (Williamson, 2000, 1981). 
This fact is important for analysing contract design. Because principals, as contract-
drafters, are limited in their rationality and cannot deal with the complexity of all 
contractual aspects, contracts will not include all the information needed and are 
usually considered incomplete (Williamson, 1981; Anderlini and Felli, 1994; Hart 
and Moore, 1999; Tirole, 1999; Sykuta and Parcell, 2002; Brousseau, 2008; Wu, 
2013). 
 
2.4.2.5 Incomplete Contracts 
Incompleteness in contracts occurs mostly due to ex-ante and ex-post transaction 
costs related to drafting and enforcing contracts, asymmetric information, and 
parties’ bounded rationality (Hart, 1988; Williamson, 1998; Hart and Moore, 1999, 
2006; Maskin, 2002; Katz, 2005; Brousseau, 2008; Kirsten et al., 2009; Grandori, 
2010; Saenger et al., 2012). The incomplete contract does not contain all the 
necessary information and does not describe all possible present and future ‘states of 
the world' or parties' rights and responsibilities in contingencies (Tirole, 1999; 
Maskin, 2002; Shavell, 2003; Sykuta and Parcell, 2003; Rehber, 2007; Prowse, 
2012). According to Hart (2010), the reason for leaving a contract incomplete might 
be to take advantage of the agent's cognitive limitations. Besides, Gow et al. (2000), 
Katz (2005) and Codron et al. (2013) stated that incompleteness might be a strategic 
move to allow ex-post negotiation and give more flexibility in the case of external 
(market) disruptions. In cases when parties know that the contract will be 
renegotiated, parties might decide to ignore incentives in the initial contract and act 
according to the incentives expected in a renegotiated contract (Bogetoft and 
Ballebye Olesen, 2002).  
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2.5 Alternative Approaches to the Theoretical Framework 
Contract farming is a multifaceted phenomenon, and it stretches over several 
different disciplines, especially agronomy, economics and law, development, and 
sociology. Except for exploring contract farming from a Supply Chain Management 
perspective and NIE paradigm, there are other relevant approaches applicable. This 
section introduces two such approaches: the Sustainable Livelihood Framework 
(SLF) and Value Chain Analysis (VCA). Contract farming arrangements can be 
considered, for example, from the lens of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework. 
The SLF is a tool that helps to improve understanding of the livelihoods of the poor 
and it is used to assess the contribution of different economic activities to livelihood 
sustainability (Department for International Development - DFID, 1999). The aim of 
SLF is to assist in alleviating poverty and highlight the opportunities available to 
support the poor's livelihoods through identification of (i) factors that affect 
livelihoods, (ii) the relative importance of those factors, and (iii) the way factors 
interact (DFID, 1999). Although contract farming represents an opportunity to 
alleviate poverty and improve small-scale farmers' livelihoods, the SLF does not 
provide explanation or guidelines for complex relations between contracting parties. 
Moreover, the SLF consists of numerous elements, and the application of the SLF is 
more appropriate for long-term studies or projects compared to cross-sectional 
research. The SLF might be efficient in a single country context; however, 
translating the findings into widely applicable knowledge could be challenging. In 
particular, the SLF focuses on the vulnerability context and different forms of capital 
(human, natural, financial, social, and physical), which are important but are a 
marginal part of this study. Therefore, the SLF was not employed. 
 
The supply chain concept is often compared to the value chain (VC) concept. The 
boundaries between supply chains and value chains are still not clear in the 
literature, mostly because the two have the same unit of analysis. Applying value 
chain analysis (VCA) was considered for this study. Both SC analysis and VC 
analysis explore flows among different players across the chain. However, the 
purpose of the VCA is to disaggregate a company into strategically relevant 
activities and understand the cost structure, which is a foundation for a company's 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). Porter (1985) also added that a company could 
gain a competitive advantage by performing activities in the chain more efficiently 
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than its competitors perform. Moving away from the company-focused view, the 
VCA looks at the transformation of the raw material by recording and analysing the 
value that each player adds to the product. Dani (2015) suggested that players along 
the value chain intend to increase their returns through the addition of value. 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) highlighted the importance of VCA for new poor 
agricultural producers entering the market to secure income generation. Nonetheless, 
the choice of SC or VC analysis is influenced by the research circumstances. For 
example, this study explored the flow of a crop intended for export. In Malawi’s 
case, value addition was only possible after the raw material already progressed from 
small-scale farmers to the buyer, and even to the processor (second buyer) because 
of the required export procedure.
19
 This study focused on small-scale farmers, the 
first buyer, and how to improve their relations. Further stages of the chain were not 
considered in much detail. Besides, main participants in the study were small-scale 
farmers with limited assets and skills to add significant value to the product. The 




The second chapter presented the conceptual framework that guided the research and 
focused on the first two elements of the framework. The study’s conceptual 
framework consists of five inter-related elements: Concepts (Supply Chain and 
Contract Farming), Theoretical Framework (Supply Chain Management, Contract 
Theory, Principal-Agent Game and New Institutional Economics), Research Aim, 
Overall Question and Objectives, Methodology and Outcomes. The following four 
chapters outline a review of the relevant literature underpinning the study.  
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 For export purposes, buyers usually require a quality raw material with, as much as possible, 




PART TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 3 Transforming the Agri-food Industry and Modern Supply Chains 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the phenomena leading the transformation of the agri-food 
industry over the last five decades and outlines key characteristics of modern supply 
chains. After determining the key success factors for agri-food supply chains, the 
chapter examines the position of farmers in developing countries within a modern 
agri-food industry. The last section discusses whether small-scale farmers can follow 
the rules and succeed in the transformed agri-food industry. 
 
3.2 Transformation of the Agri-food Industry and its Main Determinants 
The world’s agri-food industry is undergoing a significant transformation spurred by 
market liberalisation, globalisation, climate change, fast-changing trends and scarce 
resources (Hubeau et al., 2017). This transformation especially reflects in the way 
that food is produced, processed and traded. For instance, Shepherd (2007) observed 
that farmers are no longer producing without having an idea when, where, to whom 
or at what price they will sell their produce and whether the market will be able to 
absorb the produced quantities. Rather, the coordination between farmers and 
processors, retailers and other players in supply chains has increased, encouraging 
farmers to specialise their production and target consumers’ requirements (Reardon 
et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2012). The agri-food industry has become more concentrated 
by switching from independent markets towards more tightly aligned and controlled 
food supply chains (Vavra, 2009).  
 
The evolution of this new agri-food industry is intertwined with several different 
factors. First, technological progress has advanced agricultural and processing 
sectors, resulting in higher yields and more secure and long-lasting foods. Da Silva 
(2005) and McCullough et al. (2008) argued that the transformation process was a 
result of developments in information and communication technologies; innovations 
in transport; improved crop and animal genetics; better post-harvest management; 
increased importance of nutrition; and implementation of biotechnology. Second, 
agricultural production patterns had to change due to increased global food demand. 
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Vavra (2009) and Tonts and Siddique (2011) highlighted the occurrence of the 
decrease in agricultural diversity and ‘farms' consolidation', meaning that the 
average number of farms globally decreased while, at the same time, farms grew in 
size, productivity and specialisation.  
 
Second, the input supply industries, which used to supply inputs to the agricultural 
sector as by-products of other industrial sectors, experienced increased concentration 
and introduced the era of companies such as Monsanto and DuPont who supply 
advanced seeds and further influence trends in the global food industry (Coleman et 
al., 2004; Chen and Stamoulis, 2008). Third, regarding management of the agri-food 
industry, Kherallah and Kirsten (2001) emphasised that intensified competition 
among global food supply chain players, challenges in size and scope of production 
and distribution, overall risk mitigation and strategic positioning of food companies 
prompted the need for new organisational structures to guide the agri-food industry. 
Furthermore, there are many more diverse factors simultaneously influencing 
transformation. However, the following sub-section considers more carefully market 
liberalisation and globalisation and the shift in consumers' demands as the central 
and overarching determinants of the transformed agri-food industry. 
 
3.2.1 Market Liberalisation and Globalisation in the 1908s and 1990s 
 At their simplest, market liberalisation and globalisation can be understood as 
processes in which the world breaks its economic, cultural and political walls and 
becomes closer. In particular, market liberalisation is characterised by the reduction 
or removal of trade barriers and protective policies between countries and regions 
with an aim to create more open and global production, processing and trading 
mechanisms (Figure 3.1) (Coleman et al., 2004; Mangan et al., 2008). Dornbusch 
(1998, p. 217) argued that liberalisation creates ‘a more economically rational 
market structure' since free trade encourages the transfer of know-how and helps to 
break oligopoly and inherited inefficiencies of narrow markets in protected 
economies. In addition, Stiglitz (2002) suggested that opening up to international 
trade gave an opportunity to numerous countries to achieve faster growth, especially 
in cases where a country's exports fuels its economic progress. Market liberalisation 
induced the mobility of capital flows and affected the organisation and performance 
of the agri-food industry - companies expanded their operations internationally 
34 
 
while, at the same time, global markets became more integrated (da Silva, 2005). 
The competition among different, and now also global, supply chain players 
increased and caused structural changes in agri-food supply chains (Weatherspoon et 
al., 2001; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; Chopra and Meindl, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 The increase of merchandised export in world and Sub-Saharan Africa: 
1960-2013. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on World Bank (2015). 
 
One of the consequences of market liberalisation is the phenomenon of overseas 
facilities and suppliers as, due to increased international trade, companies had to 
expand their producing and supplying networks to meet growing needs of the 
population (Mangan et al., 2008). In developing countries, market liberalisation 
reduced the state’s control over food chains, encouraged the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and expanded trade links between consumers in the developed 
world and farmers in the developing countries (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; 
Bijman, 2008; Chen and Stamoulis, 2008). Market liberalisation provoked both 
scepticism and high expectations regarding the growth of developing economies, and 
the evidence of the market liberalisation effect has been mixed so far (Greenaway et 
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al., 2002). For instance, market liberalisation encouraged export; however, primary 
producers and consumers in developing countries faced highly volatile commodity 
prices, which posed serious threats to their livelihoods (Deaton and Miller, 1995; 
Dehn, 2000; Combes and Guillaumont, 2002). Stabilisation policies, including 
domestic market insulation, seem to fail in ensuring protection in the case of price 
volatility. Instead, they are costly, robust, and might even deepen poverty and food 
insecurity of poor nations (Moledina et al., 2004; Gouel and Jean, 2012; Anderson et 
al., 2013; Gouel, 2013). 
 
Nonetheless, market liberalisation opened the door to international 
interconnectedness and increased movement of ideas, technology, culture, economy 
(goods, services, capital and labour) and policy (Bende-Nabende, 2002; Hirst and 
Thompson, 2003). Globalisation has many definitions, but it can be considered as a 
set of processes that widen, deepen and speed up worldwide connections, transform 
social relations and transactions, and generate interregional flows and interactions 
(Held et al., 1999; McCullough et al., 2008). Perhaps the most vivid description of 
globalisation is the one where ‘local happenings are influenced by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa’ (Bende-Nabende, 2002, p. 7). Starting from the 
1970s, globalisation still continues in 2010s (Perraton, 2003; Reardon et al., 2009).  
 
For the agri-food industry and its transformation, economic and cultural aspects of 
globalisation matter, as suggested by Coleman et al. (2004). The production of 
agricultural products now entails global linkages with numerous suppliers, 
processors and retailers, and the trade of agricultural commodities and processed 
food has increased. On the other hand, Coleman et al. (2004) brought forward the 
importance of cultural influences when it comes to food preferences, as choices 
regarding what food to eat and how to prepare it are often integrated into the culture 
of communities. Indeed, globalisation spurred the exchange of cultural identities and 
features beyond geographical borders and tightened the global community, which 
reflects in dietary patterns, too, and explains an increasing consumption of 
American-style convenience foods worldwide (McCullough et al., 2008). 
 
Aside from the benefits in the form of prosperity, globalisation also involves some 
threats, particularly in developing countries. Stiglitz (2002; 2006) summarised the 
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positive side of globalisation by stating that this on-going process has the potential 
to: (i) eliminate the sense of economic and cultural isolation present in many 
developing countries; and (ii) raise living standards through enabling access to 
knowledge, lucrative markets, and income generation and savings for the poor. 
Nevertheless, the critique of   globalisation is rather serious as:  
 
 ‘…the problem is not with globalization itself but in the way globalization 
 has been managed. Economics has been driving globalization, especially 
 through the lowering of communication and transportation costs. But politics 
 shaped it. The rules of the game have been largely set by the advanced 
 industrial countries – and particularly by special interests within those 
 countries – and, not surprisingly, they have shaped globalization to further 
 their own interests. They have not sought to create a fair set of rules, let 
 alone a set of rules that would promote the well-being of those in the poorest 
 countries of the world’ (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 4). 
 
It is hard not to notice the point the author is making - globalisation has not been 
tailored for everyone equally; nevertheless, in the end, almost like Smith's invisible 
hand (Smith, 2007), it secures the progress for the whole world. Hazell et al. (2007) 
and Mangan et al. (2008) argued that globalisation increases risks and might exploit 
the poor as a consequence of the tireless race for new markets. Ultimately, Timmer 
(2009) raised the question whether non-globalisation of some countries is the result 
of their external exclusion from the trade and technology flows, or internal 
shortcomings of effective policies and governance. The answer to this question is yet 
to be found. 
 
The dynamics of the agri-food transformation stimulated by liberalisation and 
globalisation in developing countries are more closely depicted in Figure 3.2. 
According to Reardon et al. (2009), the transformation occurred in two related 
phases: (1) preliberalisation/pre-globalisation from the 1960s until the mid-1980s, 
and (2) liberalisation/globalisation from the mid-1980s onwards. The transformation 
can be further broken into the restructuring of three relevant segments: (i) wholesale, 
(ii) processing and (iii) retailing. The pre-liberalisation/pre-globalisation phase was 
marked by the transformation of the food system led by the public sector and 
government's investment in farm consolidation. In the wholesale sector, the changes 
involved investment in upgrading wholesale markets and developing market 
information systems to enable small-scale farmers' access to markets. In the 
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processing sector, large-scale parastatal processors were transformed into small- and 
medium-scale processors. During this first phase, the retailing sector did not 
experience major developments. Market liberalisation/globalisation phase brought 
increased food trade and introduced supermarkets and fast-food chains to the 








1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 2020s 
Pre-liberalisation/Pre-globalisation 
 
· Food system transformation 
governed by public sector 
· Government investment in the 
modernization, i.e. shift from 





· Doubling of the food trade due to trade liberalization and 
logistical progress 
· Occurrence of ‘Supermarket revolution’ and fast-food chains 
· Characteristics: consolidation, multinationalisation, 
specialization/differentiation, institutional change (contracts) 
and private grades and standards 
 
Wholesale sector restructuring                         
(1960s-1990s) 
Processing sector restructuring 
(1970s-1990s) 
Retailing sector 
restructuring    
(1990s-2000s) 
	
· The need to upgrade wholesale markets and invest 
in market information systems to reduce 
transaction costs for small farmers so they can 
access market; farmers earned higher net gains 
but faced greater market risks; ‘specialised and 
dedicated wholesalers’ emerged 
· Parastatal large-scale processors         private small 
and medium-size processors         consolidation 
(merges and acquisition of small and medium-size 
processors), multinationalisation due to FDI and 
specialization among smaller niche processors 
· Large amounts of FDI, 
urbanization, income rise 
and modern procurement 
(contracts, standards, global 
networks) spur ‘take off’ of 
supermarkets and fast-food 
chains 
Source: Adopted from Reardon et al. (2009). 
 
Figure 3.2 Process of liberalisation and globalisation 
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In the wholesale sector, so-called specialised and dedicated wholesalers
20 
emerged, 
while small-scale farmers started to gain greater income but faced market risks. 
20
 
In the processing sector, small and medium processors went through consolidation as 
the multinational companies started to enter developing countries due to increased 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The rise of supermarkets attracted considerable 
attention from the academic and development community (for example, Boselie et 
al., 2003; Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Reardon et al., 
2004; Traill, 2006; Minten and Reardon, 2008; Reardon and Gulati, 2008; 
Abrahams, 2010; Reardon et al., 2012), which (cautiously) advocated utilising a new 
market channel to help small-scale farmers fight their poverty. Following changes in 
the food retailing, procurement needed to modernise through contracts, private 
standards and global supply chains to support the growing food demand (Reardon et 
al., 2009). 
 
3.2.2 Shift in Consumers’ Demand 
Market liberalisation and globalisation made it possible for the world to stand 
together. On the other hand - shifting patterns in global demand now circulate much 
faster and require a quicker response, and thus significantly shape the modern agri-
food industry. Apart from the previously mentioned globalisation and population 
rise, the most important factors contributing to changes in consumers' demand 
globally are urbanisation and growing per capita income (Reardon and Barrett, 
2000; Birthal et al., 2005; Will, 2013). Urbanisation is especially noticeable in 
developing countries as the increasing population regularly settles in cities and towns 
and transforms traditional consumption patterns: (i) urban consumers buy the 
majority of their food compared to rural consumers who prefer to grow it and (ii) the 
choice of available food is much wider in urban than in rural areas (Minot and Roy, 
2007). Urban consumers usually have higher wages and are ready to pay more for 
convenient foods (McCullough et al., 2008; Montgomery, 2009). According to the 
Engel’s Law, there is ‘a negative relationship between size of income and the 
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 Reardon et al. (2009) described terms ‘specialised wholesaler’ as the wholesaler who specialises in 
one product category and ‘dedicated wholesaler’ as the wholesaler who is devoted to meeting the 
needs of the modern food industry clients and sources the materials from farmers and processors 
usually through vertical coordination to ensure appropriate supply. Often the ‘specialised and 
dedicated wholesaler’ will be supplied by the preferred medium or large-scale supplier due to matters 
of supply consistency (Minot and Roy, 2007; Tschirley, 2007). 
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proportion of expenditures for food’,
21
 meaning that growing incomes will increase 
the absolute expenses for food (the dollars spend will increase) but the relative 
expenses (the percentage of the budget allocated for food) will decrease 
(Zimmerman, 1932, p. 101; Loeb, 1955, as stated in Vaile et al., 1952, p. 96-97). 
 
So, what kind of food is preferred today in the globalised society? The high-value, 
processed and food outside of a home is the preference of modern consumers. Staple 
foods (such as grains and pulses) have been rapidly replaced with high-value 
agricultural products including milk, eggs, meat, fruits and vegetables, fish and 
horticultural products (Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Birthal et al., 2005; Minot and 
Roy, 2007; Shepherd, 2007; Bijman, 2008; Gómez et al., 2011). In addition, there is 
a growing demand globally for processed food that can be conveniently prepared, for 
example, frozen, pre-cut, pre-cooked and ready-to-eat food (da Silva, 2005; 
Ramaswami et al., 2006; McCullough et al., 2008). Reardon and Barrett (2000), 
Minot and Roy (2007) and McCullough et al. (2008) argued that the popularity of 
processed food could be attributed to two main factors. First, consumers require such 
food that will spare their time. The processed food is often less perishable, which 
decreases shopping frequency, and it is quick to prepare. Second, the rise in full-time 
employment of women is expected to induce the demand for processed and food 
outside of home (e.g. restaurant food) as the traditional breadmakers increasingly 
become breadwinners
22
 and spend longer hours at their workplace. 
 
Modern consumers are also more aware of the non-tangible characteristics of food, 
thus, they demand more information on environmental conservation, certification 
(e.g. organic or fair trade), status of farm workers, animal welfare and social/ethical 
responsibility related to the food (da Silva, 2005; Vavra, 2009; Gómez et al., 2011; 
Groenewald et al., 2012). Consumers' sensitivity to quality and safety issues has 
direct consequences for supply chain players. In particular, farmers are encouraged 
to regularly supply commodities that adhere to stringent safety and quality grades 
and standards (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; da Silva 
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 This interpretation of much-debated Engel’s Law comes from Zimmerman (1932), who repeatedly 
warned that Engel’s Law has its limitations and should not be applied out of its context. 
22
 Breadwinner denotes a common term for a person in the household who is earning money (position 
often attributed to males) while the breadmaker marks the person preparing the food for the family 
(position often attributed to females). 
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and Rankin, 2013). Uniformity and standardisation of agricultural products 
according to consumers' taste is becoming a practice in the new agri-food industry 
(Simmons, 2002; Reardon and Gulati, 2008). Finally, to produce and deliver the 
desired food today, processes from ‘farm to fork' are becoming more complex and 
stretch to: (i) new post-harvest management techniques to extend the shelf life of 
perishable foods, (ii) innovative packing techniques and (iii) refrigerated 
transportation (Dixon et al., 2001; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). 
 
3.3 Modern Agri-food Supply Chains 
As shown, the transformed agri-food industry abounds with fast-growing 
international linkages, strict regulations and increased competition among market 
players, which makes it challenging to succeed, especially as a small-scale farmer. In 
these conditions, modern agri-supply chains must overcome market inefficiencies, 
decrease costs and secure profits for its participants. Adding the UN's initiative 
through Sustainable Development Goals to involve small-scale farmers in global 
supply chains, the structure and governance of modern agri-food supply chains 
becomes a rather complex and onerous task. 
 
3.3.1 Characteristics of Modern Agri-food Supply Chains 
An overarching trend in modern agri-food supply chains involves closer 
coordination among production, processing, transporting and trading units (Chen and 
Stamoulis, 2008; McCullough et al., 2008; Kühne et al., 2015; Jonkman et al., 
2017). Tighter relations lead to increasingly integrated and concentrated supply 
chains with a few large retailers and supermarkets and multinational corporations 
dominating the food sector (Peterson, 2002; Maertens et al., 2012). The 
transformation especially favoured the retail sector, which is becoming the most 
powerful global stakeholder (Chen, 2006; Lee et al., 2012). Reardon and Gulati 
(2008, p. 36) argued that, in today’s ‘demand-driven, consumer-dominated 
transformation’, organised retailing occupies a large market share, which affects the 
majority of stakeholders in supply chains. Stakeholders who receive benefits from 
growing retailing power are likely to support the transformation while others are 
either resisting the change or adapting their operations to minimise losses (Reardon 
and Gulati, 2008).  
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Retailers are gaining prominence in developing countries as well (Hazell et al. 
2010). The so-called ‘supermarket revolution' in developing economies started in the 
1990s and had been spreading in eastern and southern parts of Africa in the late 
1990s and early 2000s (Reardon and Gulati, 2008). The main trigger for the 
emerging supermarket sector was the increased flow of FDI in developing countries 
due to globalisation and market liberalisation (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). 
Weatherspoon and Reardon (2003) and Reardon and Gulati (2008) further described 
how supermarkets usually enter the market in developing countries: 
 
(1) Better off first: Supermarkets are first established in largest and richest African 
countries and afterwards (supported by FDI) in smaller and poorer ones. 
(2) From urban to rural: Supermarkets start in large cities, then spread to 
intermediate cities and towns, and then reach small towns in rural areas. 
(3) Profitability as a priority: In the early stages, the primary target for supermarkets 
is the upper-income class that offers the highest profit for invested capital. Thus, 
supermarkets are often considered as a luxury niche in a developing country context. 
In the next phases, supermarkets will move to the middle class and in the end, enter 
the market for the urban poor. 
(4) From processed to fresh: In newly established areas, supermarkets will first offer 
processed foods. The second wave of product penetration involves semi-processed 
foods. In the final stage, supermarkets will introduce fresh foods, such as leafy and 
bulk vegetables. 
(5) Small-scale farmers as the last suppliers in the row: Regarding the supply of 
products, supermarkets search for medium- to large-scale producers in the country 
and prefer those already organised in associations who supply both the export and 
local markets. If such farmers are not available and small-scale farmers find it 
difficult to meet quality and quantity standards, supermarkets will rely on imports. 
Supermarkets will supply products from small-scale farmers if there is an 
opportunity to establish projects that can help small-scale farmers to upgrade their 
production and satisfy supermarkets’ criteria. In addition, Reardon et al. (2009) 
noted that companies would source materials from small-scale farmers if they 
dominate in the agrarian structure of the country and if farmers have access to non-
land assets, such as farm equipment, irrigation and paved roads.  
42 
 
Supermarkets, processors and other traders prefer to have a smaller supply base but 
with predominantly large-scale farmers and fewer intermediaries to cut transaction 
costs (Allison, 2004; Echánove and Steffen, 2005; Hazell et al., 2010; Lee et al., 
2012). Swinnen and Maertens (2007) added, however, that companies might 
diversify their supply and include medium- and small-scale farmers to avoid over-






















Another characteristic of modern agri-food supply chains is the increased 
competitive pressure for all players (da Silva and Rankin, 2013). The companies are 
competing on the open global market with numerous competitors that offer similar 
products; thus, achieving a competitive advantage through chains' integration, 
business alliances, reduced costs, delivered high-quality services and added value 
products is becoming increasingly important for survival (Figure 3.3) (van Roekel et 
al., 2002; da Silva, 2005; Lee et al., 2012). 
Desired strategic outcomes: 
 To maximise competitive advantage and 
market share 
Figure 3.3 Key characteristics of modern agri-food supply chains 
Source: Based on Allison (2004, p. 52). 
 
Key characteristics in food supply strategies employed by food 
manufacturers and retailers: 
 Smaller supply base but preferred larger scale suppliers 
 Shorter (fewer intermediaries) supply chains 
 Management of food production, processing and supply by 
buyer in vertical collaboration with farmer 
Demand by contemporary consumers:  
 High-value products, e.g. meat, fish, 
dairy products, fruits and vegetables 
 Processed and ‘ready to eat’ food 
 International cuisines 
 Food at the ‘right’ price 
 Seasonal, regional and speciality food 
 Safe, high quality and ‘ethical’ food 
43 
 
The current dynamics of the agri-food industry transformation encouraged the 
emergence of dualistic systems, which is particularly visible in developing countries. 
For instance, alongside supermarkets, traditional food systems (such as local green 
markets) still prevail in developing economies and represent the most important 
channel for purchasing food for the majority of the population (FAO, 2013). 
Furthermore, apart from supplying the national market, modern agri-food chains also 
introduced high-value export markets and made them accessible for capable 
producers (Maertens et al., 2012). Nevertheless, varying capabilities of local 
producers deepen the gap between industrialised large-scale farmers and subsistence 
small-scale farmers and cause divisions in the agrarian structure of developing 
countries (Reardon et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2012). 
 
Small-scale farmers are today faced with four main types of agri-food chains, as 
described by Lee et al. (2012). A buyer-driven chain is not supportive towards 
small-scale farmers since it is relatively short, involves few intermediaries, i.e. large 
importers or exporters and imposes high safety and quality standards. Fresh fruits 
and vegetables are often supplied through buyer-driven chains. A producer-driven 
chain is suitable for small-scale farmers since it imposes less strict standards, a 
processor usually operates in the middle of a chain, and particular attention is given 
to crop quality. Thus, the production process is highly controlled, and small-scale 
farmers do not have much choice in using varieties and fertilisers. Small-scale 
farmers are also limited in achieving higher gains as the processor takes the larger 
share of benefits. Processed tomatoes and organic coffee and cocoa are often 
supplied through producer-driven chains. 
 
Lee et al. (2012) further suggested that, in bilateral oligopolies
23
, small-scale 
farmers are incorporated as out-growers and rely on resources and an outlet provided 
by the company. The relation between the company and small-scale farmers is tight 
as parties mutually depend on each other. Participation requires investments on the 
small-scale farmers' side to comply with required standards. This type of supply 
chain often involves contract farming and plantations. Finally, traditional markets 
                                                             
23
 Bilateral oligopoly is defined as ‘a situation where there are few buyers and sellers of a given 
product in a market. The level of concentration in the sale and purchase of the product results in a 
mutual inter-dependence between sellers and buyers’ (OECD, 2013, p.17). 
44 
 
serve as a buffer zone for small-scale farmers that do not meet safety and quality 
requirements for the local fresh produce intended for export. The requirements are 
only a few and exchange is made on the field with instant cash payment. In 
summary, the literature suggests that modern agri-food supply chains are globally 
oriented, increasingly integrated and competitive, with high standards and entry 
barriers, and led by the retailing sector, which prefers the small base of larger 
suppliers. 
 
3.3.2 Key Success Factors in Managing Modern Agri-food Supply Chains 
Considering that modern supply chains operate under a wide array of conditions, the 
ASCM must overcome challenges related to the nature of supply chains. Of 
particular importance to this study are the following key success factors in ASCM 
defined by Wood et al. (1995), Simchi-Levi et al. (2003), Chen (2006), Chopra and 
Meindl (2007), van der Vorst et al. (2007) and Fernie and Sparks (2014): 
 
(1) Efficient design and operation: It is challenging to develop and operate a supply 
chain where costs are minimised, and the quality of product or service is maintained 
at a high level, especially if the supply chain involves several different entities. On 
the other side, supply chain design and operation decisions have a significant impact 
on the success or failure of a company. ASCM aims at designing supply chains that 
have ultimately clear benefits for all players and rely on solid communication, 
information sharing, trust, respect and minimising costs in its operations. 
 
(2) Overcoming uncertainties: Every supply chain faces numerous difficulties. The 
most obvious one is the uncertainty about the demand for a product or service and, 
despite advanced forecasting techniques, it is unlikely that the precise demand for a 
particular item will be predicted. Other related uncertainties involve delays in 
delivery, component availability,
24
 price volatility, and natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes, floods or droughts. The role of ASCM is to design a supply chain that 
will eliminate as many uncertainties as possible and deal effectively with the 
remaining uncertainties.  
 
                                                             
24
 In the case of agricultural production, the component availability may refer to the supply of 
appropriate quality and quantity of inputs. 
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(3) Appropriate dealing with the evolution of relations over time: Supply chains are 
dynamic, and relations among players are likely to alter over time. This is due to the 
changing character of customers' demand and suppliers' capabilities. The ASCM has 
to direct players to act towards achieving what is optimal for general mutual interest 
of the supply chain. 
 
(4) Acknowledging cultural differences: In an international supply chain, the 
importance of potential cultural differences should not be neglected. In particular, if 
the same (or similar) beliefs, values and customs are not shared among players, this 
might affect the efficiency and outcomes of the supply chain. Therefore, managing 
an international supply chain should involve acknowledging differences based on 
cultural heritage and adjusting operations to be acceptable to all players yet efficient 
for the overall supply chain goal. 
 
(5) Choosing an appropriate supplier: Especially in smaller and shorter supply 
chains, suppliers will have a great impact on company performance. The selection of 
a supplier will mostly depend on two main factors. First, whether a supplier has the 
skills and capacities to provide promised materials or services. This consideration is 
of high importance in cases where a supplier is providing critical materials or 
services, and it is challenging to replace that supplier. Second, the cost structure of a 
supplier will also play a role in suppliers' selection. It is known that part of the costs 
arises from a supplier's characteristics, i.e. how a supplier organises its processes, 
and the rest of the costs are the result of market factors, such as raw materials and 
labour costs. Hence, successful managing of agri-food supply chains involves a 
choice of a supplier that will reflect a balance between suppliers' abilities to deliver 
and accompanying costs. 
 
(6) Negotiation: Setting the rules and conditions among players in a supply chain is 
necessary. Often, this will be reached through a negotiation process. The key to an 
efficient negotiation is to achieve a win-win situation, which is also an aim of 
ASCM. Since a supply chain is an integrated network, players mutually depend on 
each other's activities. If the players negotiate on a single dimension, e.g. the price, it 
is not possible to reach a win-win outcome as one party wins at the other party's 
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expense, which is a characteristic of a zero-sum game.
25
 Accordingly, the 
negotiation should include multiple issues, e.g. the quality, delivery time, and 
volumes, which gives more opportunity to satisfy different preferences and 
accomplish the win-win result. In this case, for example, a supplier might be willing 
to decrease its price slightly if a company allows for a more flexible delivery time. 
 
3.3.3 A Way Forward Towards Vertical Integration 
Traditional spot markets are efficient in the case of numerous small buyers and 
sellers, homogeneous goods and perfect information (Minot, 1986). However, 
modern agri-food supply chains have rapidly shifted from spot markets to more 
tightly connected governance forms of vertical integration (Kirsten and Sartorius, 
2002; Peterson, 2002; Minot and Roy, 2007; Shepherd, 2007; Vermeulen and 
Cotula, 2010; Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw, 2013). Some examples of vertical 
integration include franchising, strategic alliances, acquisitions, contract farming, 
joint ventures and full vertical integration (Young and Hobbs, 2002; da Silva, 2005; 
Maertens et al., 2012). Vertical integration involves establishing strong vertical 
linkages among input suppliers, farmers, processing units and agribusiness 
companies with an aim to increase the control over the product from the production 
stage until it reaches the final consumer (Warning and Key, 2002; Coleman et al., 
2004; FAO, 2013; Jia and Bijman, 2013). Control is crucial for achieving quality and 
safety standards, consistent supply and addressing market inefficiencies 
(Groenewald et al., 2012; Dries et al., 2014). Also, new forms of vertical integration 
are initiated by private companies and are not state-controlled (Swinnen and 
Maertens, 2007). 
 
Figure 3.4 depicts spot markets, contract farming and full vertical integration in 
relation to the degree of a producer’s/buyer’s control of production and marketing 
processes and the level of uncertainty in price, quality and outlet. Producers have a 
much higher level of control on spot markets compared to full vertical integration; 
however, uncertainties are highest on spot markets (Kelley, 1995; Vavra, 2009). 
Contract farming is located between two extreme governance forms and thus implies 
                                                             
25
 A zero-sum game is a part of the game theory. It describes a situation where two or more players 
engage in a business activity, and one person's gain is equivalent to the other person's loss; therefore, 
the net change in wealth or overall benefit created is zero (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 4).  
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moderate control over production and marketing processed by the farmer and 
substantial security in price, quality and outlet for the commodity (Key and Runsten, 
1999; Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2012). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Positioning of contract farming as a market governance structure 
Source: Author’s visual based on the literature review. 
 
3.4 Small-scale Farmers in Modern Agri-food Supply Chains 
The importance of the small-scale sector for developing countries is significant. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, small-scale farmers represent the majority of the rural 
population
26
, have a crucial role in a country’s economic development but also show 
high levels of poverty (Bijman et al., 2007). It is deemed necessary to consider the 
position of small-scale farmers within modern agri-food supply chains due to the 
impact that this transformed industry has on farm households. The core question is 
whether small-scale farmers can benefit and how risks and rewards are distributed in 
modern supply chains (Coleman et al., 2004; McCullough et al., 2008). The essential 
pre-requisites for small-scale farmers to participate in internationalised markets are 
an investment in assets and diversification into high-value commodities (Tonts and 
Siddique, 2011; Hazell and Rahman, 2014). Still, the allocation of risks and rewards 
will mainly depend on the market power of players involved in the supply chain.  
                                                             
26
 Hazell and Rahman (2014) estimated that there are around 450 million small-scale farmers spread 
in developing countries. 
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Small-scale farmers in developing countries are usually defined according to several 
factors: the size of the land, labour and income expenditure. Although there are no 
official criteria regarding the size of the land that makes someone a small-scale 
farmer, the literature suggests some parameters. Minot (2011) considers farmers with 
3-5 hectares or less as small-scale farmers. Conway (2014) and Livingston et al. 
(2014) suggested that the small-scale farmer has two or fewer hectares of land. 
Regarding labour, small-scale farmers primarily rely on unpaid family labour 
(Baumann, 2000; Bijman et al., 2007; Hazell et al., 2010). Small-scale farmers tend 
to spend earned income locally and thus stimulate the rural non-farm economy 
(Wiggins et al., 2010). Another characteristic is related to small-scale farmers: they 
aim at improving the income and food security of their households while preserving 
their independence as owners of farm enterprise (Glover and Kusterer, 1990). The 
following two sections summarise the main opportunities and challenges for small-
scale farmers in modern agri-food supply chains.  
 
3.4.1 Opportunities for Small-scale Farmers 
The greatest advantage of small-scale farmers lies in their land and labour use. 
Small-scale farmers employ labour-intensive methods that can increase land 
productivity with less capital investment compared to larger farms (Swinnen and 
Maertens, 2007; Singh, 2011; Hazell and Rahman, 2014; Lee et al., 2014). Small-
scale farmers have access to cheap and abundant family labour, which is self-
supervising and often more dedicated and motivated than hired labour (Key and 
Runsten, 1999; Prowse, 2012; Will, 2013). Stated advantages reduce transaction 
costs, which represents the main reason why agribusiness companies want to engage 
with small-scale farmers.  
 
Once integrated into the supply chain, small-scale farmers might increase their 
income and mitigate poverty (Birthal et al., 2007; McCullough and Pingali, 2008; 
Reardon et al., 2009). Dixon et al. (2001) suggested that even if some small-scale 
farmers cannot efficiently reach criteria to be included in the market, they could still 
benefit as more progressive farmers might employ the poorer ones during activities 
such as land preparation, harvesting, packaging and transport. Moreover, 
participating small-scale farmers may increase productivity due to open access to 
inputs, credits and technology (Singh, 2003; Reardon and Gulati, 2008; Vorley et al., 
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2008; Barrett et al., 2012). Offered opportunities make modern agri-food supply 
chains attractive to small-scale farmers since they can address inherited pitfalls (e.g. 
lack of inputs) and ensure progress from subsistence to more commercialised 
farming. Nevertheless, there are certain obstacles on that road. 
 
3.4.2 Obstacles for Small-scale Farmers 
Despite the fact that small-scale farmers use their land and labour more efficiently, 
as mentioned - agribusiness companies are keener to source raw materials from 
larger farmers. Thus, small-scale farmers can quickly become marginalised and 
excluded from modern supply chains (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Swinnen and 
Maertens, 2007; Bijman, 2008; Barrett et al., 2012; Groenewald et al., 2012). Access 
to technology might not be only an opportunity for small-scale farmers. Technology 
adoption often requires additional costly investments, technical knowledge and 
entails high risks of failure in early stages, all of which small-scale farmers cannot 
afford (Baumann, 2000; Hazell et al., 2007; Minot and Roy, 2007; Barrett, 2010; da 
Silva and Rankin, 2013). Moreover, Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) and Ramaswami et 
al. (2006) noticed that nowadays small-scale farmers have to produce according to 
consumers' demand yet farmers are too remote to track and adapt their production to 
changing preferences efficiently.   
 
Small-scale farmers often lack access to suitable land and related facilities, such as 
irrigation, roads, ports and greenhouses needed for efficient production and 
exchange (Bijman et al., 2007; Louw et al., 2008; Reardon et al., 2009; Barrett, 
2010). Also, small-scale farmers’ ability to participate in high-value markets is often 
limited by the great geographical distance from trading zones (Shepherd, 2007; 
Barrett et al., 2012). High safety and quality standards and continuous supply are 
one of the major constraints that keep most small-scale farmers away from modern 
markets (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Tschirley, 
2007; Birthal, 2008; Louw et al., 2008; Reardon and Gulati, 2008; Hazell et al., 
2010; Lee et al., 2012). In particular, high-value export markets are sensitive to 
chemicals and demand strict control of their application. Small-scale farmers in 
developing countries tend to use cheap but unacceptable types and quantities of 
pesticides, which makes the product inappropriate for the market (Key and Runsten, 
1999; Dinham, 2003). 
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Lack of financial stability and restricted access to needed credit is another obstacle 
that small-scale farmers face (McCullough et al., 2008; Sautier et al., 2008; Sharma, 
2008; Minot, 2011; Kunte et al., 2014). Regarding market power and information, 
small-scale farmers are mainly in a weak position, too. If included in modern supply 
chains, small-scale farmers are likely to be overpowered by large players (e.g. 
processors, retailers, exporters and even large commercial farmers from developed 
countries), meaning that the distribution of revenues will not be in favour of small-
scale farmers (Harl, 2000; Dixon et al., 2001). Also, small-scale farmers often do not 
have accurate and timely information on market prices, production methods for new 
varieties, risk levels and possible legal protection, which lowers their bargaining 
power (Dinham, 2003; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Minot, 2011).  
 
3.4.3 Survival in Modern Agri-Food Supply Chains 
Hazell et al. (2007, p. v) questioned whether ‘small farms have a future in the 
developing world’, which alludes to the challenging position of small-scale farmers 
in modern supply chains and their role in the agricultural and economic development 
of vulnerable economies. Vermeulen and Cotula (2010) noted that some streams 
suggest consolidation of smaller farms into few large estates to gain economy of 
scale and increase mechanisation. On the other hand, Wiggins et al. (2010) argued 
that small farm development is desirable and feasible for efficient poverty reduction. 
McCullough et al. (2008) added that the joint objective for developing countries 
should be to facilitate the transition of small-scale farmers, rather than to eliminate 
this sector. Furthermore, Dorward and Kydd (2002) concluded that small-scale 
farmers are actually ‘locked in’ and ‘locked out’ of markets. The only option for 
small-scale farmers to improve their livelihoods is to join modern markets (‘locked 
in’), however, looking at their characteristics – small-scale farmers are not prepared 
for such high requirements (‘locked out’) (Dorward and Kydd, 2002).  
 
To succeed on the global food market, small-scale farmers need to exploit 
opportunities for tighter business linkages and vertical integration to capture the 
market share for themselves. Fostering institutional innovations such as contracts 
between small-scale farmers and agribusiness companies can overcome current 
limitations for small-scale farmers (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Hazell et al., 2010; 
Wiggins et al., 2010). Linking small-scale farmers through contracts with private 
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companies is usually the task of the government, NGOs and civil societies. If 
contracts can improve the currently poor status of small-scale farmers in modern 
agri-food supply chains and maximise farmers’ potential and benefits, then 
contracting might efficiently help in strengthening the small-scale agricultural sector 
in developing countries and facilitate its better integration into global markets. 
Hence, contract farming is a solution worthy of consideration. 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter positioned contract farming in the wider context of modern agri-food 
supply chains. Spurred by globalisation and market liberalisation, transformed agri-
food industry requires tight coordination, high quality and safety standards, 
consistent supply and quick adjustment to consumers’ needs. Small-scale farmers 
have poor status within modern chains due to their limited access to land, inputs, 
technology, information and finances. However, as a form of vertical integration, 
contract farming offers options to small-scale farmers. Chapter 4 introduces contract 





Chapter 4 Contract Farming: Solution for the Agri-food Supply Chains 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In chapter 4, contract farming is explored in-depth. Foundations for understanding 
contractual arrangements and the importance for developing countries are first 
elaborated. The most recent research endeavours regarding contract farming are 
outlined to capture the progress in the field. The chapter further elaborates on the 
legal side of contracts and synthesises the best practices for contract design. The last 
two sections of this chapter explore the benefits of contract farming for involved 
parties and use the empirical evidence from developing countries to make a case for 
contracting as a viable solution for modern agri-food supply chains. 
 
4.2 The Phenomenon of Contract Farming  
Contract farming is not a new phenomenon, and it can be tracked back to the 19
th
 
century when it was used in Asia and Latin America (Will, 2013). Modern 
contracting started in the 1960s, and it was encouraged by emerging globalisation 
ideas (Weatherspoon et al., 2001). Jia and Bijman (2013) pointed out that behind the 
core of contract farming, there was an attempt to increase the dynamics of rural 
development, internationalise agriculture and assist the rural poor in integration into 
industrial sectors. In Africa, contracts were introduced in the late 1980s in the form 
of out-grower schemes where farmers cultivated the crop further marketed by a 
multinational company; thus, contracting represented an alternative to government-
related price and market controls and established a needed link between farmers and 
markets (Weatherspoon et al., 2001; Jia and Bijman, 2013). In the past decades, 
contracting has significantly expanded, especially in the developing world, covering 
a broad range of agricultural commodities (Figure 4.1) (ActionAid, 2015).  
 
Most African countries count more than one million farm households; however, the 










Figure 4.1 Spread of contract farming in world regions 
Source: Author’s compilation based on UNCTAD (2000), Vermeulen et al. (2008), ICRAF (2007), UNCTAD (2009), Fréguin-Gresh et al. 
(2012), Oya (2012), Boulay (2013), Goel (2013), ActionAid (2015), World Bank (2015).  
Note: Legend on each map shows a total population size. Map: FAO (2015d). 
East Asia, Pacific and India Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 China, Indonesia and Malaysia: significant 
contracting operations 
 India: 5.91% of total basmati rice area under 
contracts 
 Vietnam: >90% cotton and fresh milk, 50% tea 
and 40% rice  
 Thailand: 70% of eucalyptus plantation area 
under contracts 
 Brazil: 75% poultry, 40% pork, 35% 
soybean, most of the banana production 
 The Caribbean, Ecuador and Nicaragua: 
most of the banana production 
 Mozambique: 100% of cotton, 100% tobacco 
 Zambia: 100% cotton, 100% tobacco, 100% paprika 
 Kenya: 60% tea, 60% sugar 
 Ivory Coast, Ghana and Burkina Faso: majority of cotton 
 Swaziland: 36% sugarcane 
 Zimbabwe: 10% fresh produce and flowers 
 South Africa: 78.5% of fruits and vegetables under 
contracting 
 South African small farmers under contracts: timber (4%), 
sugarcane (1.2%), fresh fruits and vegetables (0.3%), 




Oya (2012, p. 6541) concluded that ‘there is still no substantiation that [contract 
farming] is a dominant form of production, despite the increase in the number of 
studies and reports, and the fact that market liberalisation and globalisation seem to 
have spurred outsourcing in the form of privately led [contract farming].’  
 
The underlying purpose of contract farming in the modern agri-food industry is not 
unanimously accepted. An on-going debate exists regarding the question whether 
contracting can become the primary driver for rural development and economic 
growth in developing countries. The main critique of contract farming as a means for 
achieving developmental goals rests on the argument that contract arrangements 
often exclude small-scale farmers or do not enable farmers to fully access promised 
benefits (Miyata et al., 2009; Minot, 2011). Da Silva (2005) and Miyata et al. (2009) 
highlighted that contracting should not be considered as a one-size-fits-all solution 
for improving performance in the agri-food industry of developing countries since it 
is only applicable and efficient in certain circumstances. Similarly, Minot (1986, 
2011) warned that contract farming should not become a foundation for rural 
development and poverty alleviation strategies, as it is not suitable for all sectors and 
farmers. Woodend (2003) and Will (2013) stressed that contracts are not a panacea 
for small-scale farmers and although often supported by governments and donors, 
contracting schemes that are structured to support national development goals (such 
as rural development and commercialisation of the small-scale agricultural sector) 
might experience failures.  
 
Stated views on contracting are consistent with the evolving paradigm shift 
addressing agriculture: even for small-scale farmers, the agricultural activity is now 
considered as a potentially comprehensive business that relies upon and triggers 
many adjacent units, such as institutions and policies, organisational management, 
quality and safety standards, sustainable development and others. In this sense, 
contract farming is more likely to encourage small-scale farmers with entrepreneurial 
aspirations and neglect categories of vulnerable and risk-averse small-scale farmers. 
This is not to claim that contract farming does not offer opportunities for small-scale 
farmers. On the contrary, when organised transparently, with clear and achievable 




promotes sustainable growth, contracts might significantly improve small-scale 
farmers' livelihoods. 
27
Nonetheless, contract farming is a business activity rather than an aid tool as 
contracts ‘that are primarily motivated by political and social concerns rather than 
economic and technical realities will inevitably fail’ (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001, p. 
3).  
 
4.2.1 Defining Contracting 
Contract farming can be defined in numerous ways according to its main features 
(Table 4.1). The primary attribute of the contract is to provide a link between farmers 
who produce a particular commodity and buyers interested in buying that 
commodity. Contract farming is firstly an agreement between two parties who want 
to exchange a specific product, and according to this purpose, they arrange future 
relations. Furthermore, contract farming is a governance form that can be considered 
within concepts of supply chain and the market. A raw commodity can be produced 
and sold by various channels, e.g. by an independent farmer or highly specialised 
processor. An independent farmer is likely to sell the commodity on the spot market, 
while a processor might have developed a full vertical integration for its commodity. 
 
Understanding contracts as institutional arrangements intended to overcome market 
imperfections (such as high transaction costs or lack of input markets and 
information asymmetry in developing countries) is consistent with the NIE 
perspective. The institutional aspect of contract farming is gaining momentum and 
studies often refer to contracting from an institutional point of view (for example, 
Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Sartorius and Kirsten, 2007; Cook et al., 2008; Sykuta, 
2008; Chirwa and Kydd, 2009; Jia and Bijman, 2013). A contract can also be defined 
as a mean of allocating values, risks and rights among parties. This implies that 
contract clauses reflect parties’ agreement on how gains, uncertainties in production 
and marketing, and the right of buying and selling will be addressed. 
According to the degree of parties’ control and level of market uncertainties, contract 
farming is often defined as a governance form between spot markets and full vertical 
integration. 
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(2010, p. p. 
29) 
‘Contract farming may be defined as agricultural production carried out according to 
a prior agreement in which the farmer commits to producing a given product in a 
given manner and the buyer commits to purchasing it.’ 
Minot                     
(2007, p. 1) 
‘Contract farming (CF) is defined as forward agreements specifying the obligations 
of farmers and buyers as partners in business.’ 
Will                         




and full vertical 
integration 
‘Contract farming is an intermediate form of industrial organisation in agriculture, 
standing between spot markets and full vertical integration.’ 
Kirsten and 
Sartorius 
(2002, p. 511) 
‘Contract farming is the vertical coordination between growers of an agricultural 
product and buyers or processors of that product.’ 
Warning and 
Key (2002, p. 
255) 
‘Contract farming is generally a form of vertical integration between agricultural 
producers and buyers (exporters, agro-processing companies or retailers at the end 
of the value chain).’ 
Oya                      






‘Contract farming is explained as an institutional response to imperfections in 
markets for credit, insurance, information, factors of production, and raw product; 
and in transaction costs associated with search, screening, transfer of goods, 
bargaining and enforcement.’ 
Key and 
Runsten 
(1999, p. 382) 
‘Contract farming schemes usually arise because of imperfections in the market 
environment that do not allow normal price signals to regulate supply. Thus, contract 
farming is in fact a response to market imperfections.’ 
Bauman                
(2000, p 24) 
‘Theoretically, CF is often explained using the lens of new institutional economics 
(NIE) or, more specifically, transaction cost economics (TCE). Central to NIE and 
TCE is the idea that all transactions between economic actors involve transaction 
costs. These costs relate to finding a market/customer, negotiating, signing a con- 
tract, controlling contract compliance, switching costs in case of premature 
termination of the contract, and all lost opportunities. Transaction costs appear in 
different forms, but are mostly caused by uncertainty and/or asymmetric 
information.’ 
Jia and Bijman      
(2013, p. 26) 
Means of 
allocating 
values, risks and 
rights 
‘Contracting is fundamentally a way of allocating the distribution of risk between the 
firm and its growers.’ 
Glover and 
Kusterer 
(1990, p. 3) 
‘Fundamentally, every transaction has three basic elements: the allocation of value 
(or the distribution of gains from trade), the allocation of risk (when value is subject 
to uncertainty), and the allocation of decision rights. A contract is simply an 
institutional construct that outlines the mutually agreed upon rules (and 





Contracting is fundamentally a way of allocating risk between producer and 
contractor; the former takes the risk of production and the latter the risk of 
marketing. 
Barrett et al.         
(2012, p. 716-
717) 
















purchase of the 
produce 
‘Contract farming can be defined as an agreement between farmers and processing 
and/or marketing firms for the production and supply of agricultural products under 
forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices. The arrangement also 
invariably involves the purchaser in providing a degree of production support through, 
for example, the supply of inputs and the provision of technical advice. The basis of 
such arrangements is a commitment on the part of the farmer to provide a specific 
commodity in quantities and at quality standards determined by the purchaser and a 
commitment on the part of the company to support the farmer’s production and to 
purchase the commodity.’ 
Eaton and 
Shepherd 
(2001, p. 2) 
Contracts usually involve advance agreement between producers and purchasers on 
some or all of four parameters: price, quality, quantity (or acreage) and time of 
delivery. Specific contract terms and arrangements determine how the parties involved 
share the benefits, costs and risks of coordination. These may deal with timing of 
payment; mechanisms for setting price; provision of services and inputs; 
documentation requirements; quality and quantity produced; arrangements for 
assessing quality; and mechanisms for settling disputes and enforcing agreements. 
Singh                    
(2002, p. 
1621) 
‘Contracting is an intermediate mode of coordination, whereby the conditions of 
exchange are specifically set among transaction partners by some form of legally 
enforceable, binding agreement. The specifications can be more or less detailed, 
covering provisions regarding production technology, price discovery, risk sharing and 
other product and transaction attributes.’ 
da Silva                 
(2005, p. 12) 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the literature review. 
 
The most wide spread and well-accepted definition of contract farming in the 
literature is that of a legally binding forward agreement between the farmer and 
buyer, which defines terms for the price, inputs, quality, quantity, delivery and 
purchase of a commodity. Although contracts vary significantly in their content and 
do not even have to be written, the latter definition provides some of the key 
elements needed for a fair contract relation. 
 
For the purpose of this study, contract farming is defined as: 
A forward written institutional arrangement between a farmer and a buyer based on 
the principles of trust and fairness, and with unambiguously and sufficiently defined 
terms and conditions for production and marketing of a contracted crop. The written 
contract enables transparency and serves as a proof of agreed terms and conditions. 
Also, a written contract implies stronger ethical obligation, and it is more binding 




it is driven by the desire to arrange relations in most appropriate and efficient 
economic and social norms. Enough details in contract clauses and an opportunity 
for renegotiation can reduce incompleteness and vagueness. Finally, the elements of 
trust and fairness are rarely incorporated in contract farming definitions. By 
excluding principles of trust and fairness from the contract formulae, the incidence 
of opportunistic behaviour is likely to be high.   
 
4.2.2 Pre-conditions, Motivation and Individual Characteristics as Triggers for 
Participation in Contract Farming 
 
Preconditions 
Before engaging in contract farming, some requirements need to be met. Based on 
the review of the existing literature, four main factors were identified and described 
as pre-conditions for contract farming: 
 
(1) Parties’ perception  
The decision on participation in contract farming first and foremost depends on the 
perception that each party has regarding potential benefits from the contract. In most 
cases, the contract will be compared with the best possible alternative option. 
According to Bogetoft and Ballebye Olesen (2002) and Abebe et al. (2013), a party 
will engage in contracting only if the expected profit is at least equal to the party’s 
best alternative option. This means that the driving force behind the participation is 
the expected similar or higher profit from selling the commodity to the buyer (in the 
farmer’s case) or supplying the commodity through farmers (in the buyer’s case) 
(Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). To participate in contract farming, parties must 
perceive that they are better off engaging in contracts than not doing so (da Silva, 
2005; Barrett et al., 2012). 
 
The second assumption on participation involves the cost component. The parties 
will enter the contract if the benefits of contracting surpass its costs (Birthal, 2008; 
Minot, 2011; Jia and Bijman, 2013). For the buyer, this assumption implies that the 
costs of dealing with a bigger number of small-scale farmers must be outweighed by 
benefits from this decision. For the farmer, benefits received from the contract (e.g. 




buyer (e.g. transporting the crop to the collection point). Simmons (2002) argued that 
the contract must be attractive to parties by either increasing their profits or reducing 
the risks of the transaction. The participation in contract farming is likely to happen 
if farmers perceive that contracts are their only option to start a cash crop production 
and access lucrative markets (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Kirsten and Sartorius, 
2002; Bijman, 2008). 
 
(2) Type of buyer 
Contract farming requires large expenses on the buyer's side; thus, not all buyers are 
suitable to perform contract farming operations successfully. Eaton and Shepherd 
(2001) and Minot (2011) described a type of buyer capable of becoming a contractor. 
The authors highlighted that the contractor needs a supporting team of field officers 
for negotiations, input distribution, technical assistance and collection of the 
commodity. The contractor must identify the market and have precise calculations on 
needed volumes to supply that market in the long run consistently. Thus, the 
contractor is likely to be a large-scale processor, exporter or supermarket chain 
rather than a traditional wholesaler or small- and medium-scale buyer. The 
advantages of a large-scale contractor lie in its access to capital, knowledge and 
market information so this type of a buyer can offer credit, extension services and a 
secured outlet to contracted farmers (Minot, 2011). 
 
(3) Commodity 
Similar to the type of buyer, the criteria for the commodity acceptable for contracted 
production are known in the literature. It is recognised that heterogeneous, high-
value, perishable, non-traditional, labour-intensive cash crops with high-quality 
standards are eligible for contracting (Jaffee, 1994; Delgado, 1999; Baumann, 2000; 
Minot, 2011; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2011). The key reasons why stated 
characteristics make a crop suitable for contract farming are potential high 
transaction costs, technically demanding production and needed know-how, high 
premiums that can cover costs of contracting for the buyer and no open market 
(Minot, 2011; Singh, 2011; Prowse, 2012). In the case of described conditions, the 
contractor will have a foundation to offer contracts to farmers and achieve a sort of 
monopsony component that ‘is the only way to ensure that companies can secure a 




not attractive to contractors due to their relatively low value and high risk of either 
retaining the crop for the household consumption or side selling it (Woodend, 2003). 
The following commodities have been recorded as contracting crops: fruits and 
vegetables, horticultural crops, organic products, spices, flowers, sugarcane, tea, 
tobacco, coffee, cotton, cocoa, rubber, palm oil and seed crops (Delgado, 1999; 
Baumann, 2000; Miyata et al., 2009; Minot, 2011). 
 
(4) Environment 
The last pre-condition for contract farming is the environment, which refers to both 
physical and social factors. Regarding physical factors required for contracting, 
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) listed utilities and communication services, appropriate 
roads, water, electricity, land and inputs as needed pre-requisites. In addition, social 
factors desirable for contracting in small-scale farmers' situation are the existence of 
farmer groups or associations due to their potential to increase farmers' bargaining 
power (Dinham, 2003). Besides collective action, Bijman (2008) also highlighted 
supportive state policies and the presence of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) as one of the conditions for successful contract farming for farmers.  
 
According to Schipmann and Qaim (2011, p. 676), trust is regarded as ‘the most 
important factor in the relationship between farmers and buyers’, thus it should be 
considered as part of the social pre-conditions for contract farming. For instance, in 
the recent study of Sluis and De Giovanni (2016), the authors reported that when 
players in the supply chain trust each other, the supply chain coordination could be 
reached through price negotiation and by identifying profit-sharing mechanisms. 
Similarly, Singh (2011) and Groenewald et al. (2012) argued that a trustworthy 
relationship between the buyer and farmers in contract farming is essential.  
 
In contrast, the lack of trust might lead to operational and economic inefficiencies as 
neither party is motivated to honour the agreement (Shepherd, 2007; Sluis and De 
Giovanni, 2016). Moreover, Will (2013) attributed the absence of trust to one of the 
key reasons why contract farming still does not prevail in industrialised economies. 
Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw (2013, p. 100) concluded that ‘contracts solely based 
on a “business plan” to generate profits and short-term profitability are rarely 




contracting and potentially influences the success of the agreement. One might argue 
that the trust develops over time and cannot be considered as an a priori condition 
for contracting between the buyer and farmers. While this point is valid, the reverse 
situation – the absence of trust – is likely to discourage any attempt to contract. 
Disproving the importance of trust as a pre-condition for contracting might lead to an 
oversimplified understanding of contracting as a straightforward and logical 
agreement between two parties with no need for building social capital. If posed as a 
debate on what comes first – the trust or the contract, the matter of trust turns into (at 
least) a visible potential pre-condition for contracting. 
 
Motivation to join contracting 
Except for pre-conditions, a motivation for contracting from farmers' side will 
influence the decision whether to contract or not. Motivation represents concrete, 
tangibly perceived benefits; thus, it develops once the initial perception on 
contracting is in favour of participation. In developing countries with imperfect input 
and output markets, farmers' primary motive for contracting is to obtain missing 
provisions. Indeed, throughout reviewed empirical studies, farmers expressed the 
following motives for entering contracts: access to market, guaranteed market price, 
stable income, access to credit and quality inputs, risk sharing, reduced production 
and marketing costs, and technical assistance (Echánove and Steffen, 2005; 
Masakure and Henson, 2005; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; Guo and Jiang, 2007; 
Imbruce, 2008; Sharma, 2008; Vavra, 2009; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011; Abebe et 
al., 2013; Briones, 2015). In contrast, Schipmann and Qaim (2011) found that non-
contract farmers refuse to join contracts due to the potential loss of independence, 
lower prices and limited bargaining power. 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Characteristics of farmers’ household can help predict to a certain extent whether 
farmers are likely to participate in contract farming. For example, Costales et al. 
(2008) and Swain (2012) suggested that farmers with larger farm size, access to 
irrigation, higher educational level and bigger family size were keener to engage in 
contracts. Similarly, available extension services, access to credit and membership in 
a farmers group will increase the likelihood of households' participation (Simmons et 




the distance to the house of the village head influenced participation in contract 
schemes as farmers living near the village head were more likely to have contracts. 
The availability of labour was also found to influence participation levels (Costales 
et al., 2008; Miyata et al., 2009).  
 
Nonetheless, Barrett et al. (2012) offered a counterargument to the claim of 
generalizable causal relationship regarding farmers' characteristics and participation 
in contracting. Based on the comparative study of cases in Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Ghana, India and Nicaragua, the authors concluded that farm size does 
not influence participation. Access to irrigation and membership of a farmers’ group 
were associated with contract farming participation. Barrett et al. (2012) warned on 
possible partial endogeneity of stated variables to participation. 
 
4.2.3 Different Models and Types of Contract Arrangements 
Agricultural contracts differ significantly in their design and context. In many cases, 
contracts supplying agricultural commodity are regarded as forward contracts where 
two private parties agree on a particular price for the produce and the produce is 
delivered later on according to the determined date (MacDonald and Korb, 2011). 
Contracts are divided into two exclusive categories: implicit and explicit contracts. 
Gürtler and Gürtler (2014) provided explanations for the differences between the 
two: 
 Implicit contracts are known as informal or oral contracts, and they rely on 
observable but non-verifiable information. Implicit contracts can be built on 
recognised values, such as mutual trust, friendship, respect and reliability of 
involved parties. These kinds of contracts do not rely on forms and can be 
concluded by a mere handshake. Implicit contracts are not enforceable by courts 
but through self-enforcement. 
 Explicit contracts or formal written contracts are founded on verifiable 
information and can be enforced by courts. Explicit contracts consist of various 
clauses. Clauses are a particular part (sentences or sections) of the contract that 
specify provisions such as rights, duties and privileges of each party. These 





Despite the prevailing opinion on the low reliability of implicit contracts, there is 
some evidence in the contract farming literature that points to the contrary. For 
instance, Narayanan (2012, p. 1) stated that contracts in India were ‘seen more as a 
relationships and less as contracts’. Costales et al. (2008) found that informal 
contracts were less exclusionary in the case of small-scale farmers, and households 
with higher educational levels, full-time farming operations and reported farming as 
their main occupation were more likely to participate in informal contracts. Imbruce 
(2008) noted that as farmers in Honduras gained bargaining power, they encouraged 
their contractor to abandon written contracts. It is not entirely clear whether the 
degree of contract formality influences parties’ performance. 
 
In the case of explicit agricultural contracts, the literature distinguishes between 
contract models and types. Contracting can be organised through five different 
contracting models: centralised, nucleus estate, multipartite, informal, or 
intermediary models (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001) (Figure 4.2).  
 
In a centralised model, a buyer supplies the product from a large number of farmers. 
This model involves high-quality standards and processing, as well as quota 
allocation and various degrees of input provision – from the buyer's minimum 
involvement to overtaking the control of production process (Eaton and Shepherd, 
2001; Prowse, 2012). A centralised model is suitable for tea, vegetables, tree crops, 
poultry and dairy (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
 
In a nucleus estate model or so-called out-grower scheme, the buyer supplies the 
product from a large number of farmers and also manages their own estate or 
plantation. The estate or plantation is used as a guarantee for the buyer’s regular and 
controlled supply while farmers' supply increases available volumes at the buyer's 
disposal (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Prowse, 2012). This model includes a 





Figure 4.2 Types and models of contract farming arrangements 
Source: Author’s adaptation based on the literature review. 
 
A multipartite model may include various public and private institutions gathered to 
supply a particular commodity. Usually, the contract will include the buyer, a 
farmers' organisation as the representative of farmers and a national financial 
institution. Since this model can include the government, it is regarded as potentially 
politicised (Prowse, 2012). 
 
An informal contract model gathers individuals who trade between themselves on a 
seasonal basis without a formal agreement. The inherited challenges with informal 
models involve a high incidence of side selling and the need for government support 
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In an intermediary model, the buyer might not have direct contact with contracted 
farmers as the operations are organised through intermediaries, such as farming 
committees or traders (Prowse, 2012). This model is used to supply fruits and 
vegetables that need minimal processing, and the risk includes the loss of control 
over production and quality standards of the product due to lack of direct linkages 
with farmers (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
 
Bijman (2008) and Will (2013) (based on Mighell and Jones, 1963) described three 
types of contract farming arrangements (Figure 4.2). First, in market specification 
contracts, the producer and contractor agree on the terms of delivery (such as 
quantities, qualities, and timing). The producer bears most of the production risk but 
retains the control over the majority of the production-related decisions. The 
marketing risk is distributed between the parties. Second, production management 
contracts involve delegating a substantial amount of decisions regarding cultivation 
and harvesting from the producer to the contractor. The producer agrees to follow the 
production and input regime suggested by the contractor because the contractor takes 
over most of the marketing risk. Lastly, in the resource-providing contracts the 
contractor secures the market and the key inputs for the production. The inputs are 
offered as in-kind credit and are subject to recovery upon product delivery. The 
degree of control in this type of contract could vary. Resource-providing contracts 
can be similar to production-management types where the producer's degree of 
control is low. Also, resource-providing contracts can focus on solely providing 
markets and inputs, leaving more production and marketing risk to the producer. The 
contract model and type will be influenced by variables such as the crop 
characteristics (e.g. one-season or perennial crop), the status of the producer (e.g. 
individual or in the group), and the final destination (e.g. local or export market). 
 
4.2.4 Importance of Contract Farming for Developing Economies 
Assessing the importance of contract farming for developing economies is becoming 
more and more relevant as the interest in contracting increases (Bolwig, 2012). This 
section explores what contract farming offers to developing countries.  
 
In many developing countries, processes of globalisation and market liberalisation 




sector. This is reflected in decreasing state subsidies for agricultural inputs and 
extension services, and abandoning protected producers’ prices. Since the agri-food 
industry has continued to transform with the introduction of supermarkets and export 
supply chains in developing economies, government withdrawal from the 
agricultural sector has left a gap between the small-scale and emerging lucrative 
international and global markets. Contract farming arrangements hence connect 
small-scale farmers with potential markets (Birthal et al., 2007; Singh, 2011). 
Contracting can be efficient in countries with a substantial small-scale agricultural 
sector as it can promote and export activities and influence the transformation of the 
subsistence and dependent agricultural sector into a more commercialised one 
(Singh, 2002; Woodend, 2003). Nevertheless, the limitations of contracting in 
playing a more robust developmental role should be respected (as mentioned by 
Minot, 2011; Will, 2013).  
 
Contract farming is known to initiate development of public-private partnerships, as 
noted by Singh (2011), and thus encourage governments to offer indirect support by 
providing incentives for corporations entering the agribusiness sector through 
contracting schemes (e.g. multipartite model). Also, Sautier et al. (2006, p.22) 
suggested that contracting has the potential to create industry employment, and 
therefore public policies can play a role in supporting contract farming to ‘become a 
suitable institution with implications concerning equity, efficiency and 
sustainability’. Through contracts that require controlled production, new technology 
adoption and complying with high-quality standards, developing countries can build 
their internal capacities and follow the latest advances in international markets.  
 
Contract farming can create positive spill-over effects, such as the emergence of 
private and modern input supply providers or post-harvest processing and 
distribution units due to the high demand for various quality inputs and a strict 
regime related to post-harvest handling (Reardon and Barrett, 2000). Another 
advantage of contract farming in a developing country is related to the state's 
legislative framework. For example, the government in India placed significant 
efforts on building an effective legislation for better contract enforcement and 
dispute resolution while preserving the interests of both farmers and companies 




contract farming and provide needed credit for small-scale farmers who would not be 
able to access financial inputs in other circumstances (Sharma, 2008). 
 
Perhaps a less obvious potential contribution of contract farming to the state is its 
usage as a means of crop diversification (Tripathi et al., 2005). Fréguin-Gresh and 
Anseeuw (2013, p. 80) suggested that contracted production might be considered as 
‘a way to integrate [native] smallholders in the mainstream agricultural economy’ 
in South Africa, which implies significant progress in social terms.  
 
4.2.5 Recent Research Directions and Methodology Used in Exploring Contract 
Farming 
In terms of exploring the contract farming concept, most studies focus on: 
 A general comparison of livelihood conditions among contract and non-contract 
farmers (Reardon and Gulati, 2008; Miyata et al., 2009; Narayanan, 2012) and 
determinants of participation (Barrett et al., 2012; Swain, 2012), 
 Relations with other stakeholders in the supply chain, the role of the enabling 
environment in supporting contracts, variations in contract configuration and 
small-scale farmers’ motivations and preferences (Masakure and Henson, 2005; 
Abebe et al., 2013; Briones, 2015), trust, information asymmetry and future 
markets (Masuku, 2009; Algieri and Kalkuhl, 2014), 
 The role of the New Institutional Economics and its performance (Brousseau, 
2008), 
 The impact of contracting on farmers’ gains (Ramaswami et al., 2006; Jones and 
Gibbon, 2011; Narayanan, 2014; Girma and Gardebroek, 2015), crop 
productivity (Sharma, 2008) and distribution of benefits from a gender 
perspective (Bolwig, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the emergence of new ways of marketing commodities in Sub-Saharan 
developing countries, such as supermarkets and auction floors, opened a path for 
exploring the acceptance and the influence of more rigorous procurement systems 
that offer both opportunities and challenges for small-scale farmers (for example 
Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Cadilhon et al., 2006). Additionally, researchers 




benefits are more important in the case of breaching the contract (for example Cotula 
2010, 2011; Huh et al., 2012; Pultrone, 2012). 
 
From the methodological point of view, numerous studies used a quantitative 
perspective, including means of statistical and econometric analysis, to provide an 
evaluation of contracting schemes. In particular, the empirical studies reviewed in 
Table 4.2 assessed: (i) small-scale farmers’ degree or likelihood of participation in 
contracting arrangements, (ii) contract’s impact on the small-scale farmers’ income 
generation, and (iii) differences in incomes between the contract and non-contract 
small-scale farmers (for example, Miyata et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012; Narayanan, 
2014; Briones, 2015; Girma and Gardebroek, 2015).  
 
The majority of quantitative studies presented in Table 4.2 used the household 
questionnaire as an instrument for data collection while the analyses involved probit 
and logit models, ordinary least squares and the Heckman selection model. There are 
some inherited challenges with the idea of measuring the impact of the intervention 
on farmers' livelihood. According to Barrett et al. (2012), most empirical studies that 
evaluated the effects of contracting on small-scale farmers' welfare were limited in 
proving the causality between the income and participation in the contract due to the 
presence of unobservable factors, such as the placement and selection bias. Da Silva 
and Rankin (2013) further suggested that the evaluation of contracting effects should 
consider a longer-term dynamic, and employ longitudinal sample surveys to control 
for confounding variables.  
 
Table 4.2 also outlines qualitative studies conducted on contract farming. The 
instruments for data collection included a case study approach using interviews with 
different stakeholders engaged in contract farming schemes. It was observed that 
qualitative studies provided rich data in terms of describing the context of contract 
farming, roles and relations between the key stakeholders and challenges they face. 





Table 4.2 Review of the methodology used in recent studies of contract farming 
Qualitative approach Quantitative approach Mixed methods approach 
Strohm and Hoeffler (2006): 29 interviews 
with farmers, producer groups, exporters and 
processors. Analysis: Narrative, five 
commodities. 
 
Costales et al. (2008): Survey with 400 farmers (200 
independent, 166 with informal contracts and 34 with 
formal contracts). Analysis: Simple probit and multinomial 
logit model to determine the likelihood of engagement in 
formal or informal contract, one sector. 
Singh (2002): Interviews with the farmers’ groups and company officials, 
and survey with 108 farmers. Analysis: Narratives and quotes for qualitative 
data, descriptive statistics for quantitative data (frequencies and 
percentages), one commodity group. 
Singh (2006): Case study through interviews 
with 12 farmers. Analysis: Narrative, one 
commodity. 
Miyata et al. (2009): Survey with 162 farmers. Analysis: 
Probit model to estimate the probability of participation in 
contracting, Ordinary least squares (OLS) model to 
estimate per capita income, Heckman selection-correction 
model also the estimation of per capita income, two 
commodities. 
Masakure and Henson (2005): Exploratory interviews with key informants, 
40 in-depth interviews with farmers, a survey with 300 farmers Analysis: 
Narrative and quotes for qualitative data, K-means cluster analysis for 
quantitative data, one group of a commodity.  
Phoumanivong and Ayuwat (2013): In-depth 
interviews with 10 key informants (buyers, 
officers and production groups) and 20 
households to explore impacts of contract 
farming on rural households. Analysis: 
Content analysis, one commodity. 
Bolwig et al. (2009): Survey with 112 certified organic and 
48 non-certified farmers. Analysis: probit model for 
scheme participation and Poisson model for the use of 
organic practices, Ordinary least squares (OLS) and a full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimate of the 
Heckman selection model for the effect of certification and 
organic practices on revenue, one commodity. 
Simmons et al. (2005): Key informant interviews and survey with 800 
farmers. Analysis: Narrative for qualitative data and probit analysis to 
identify factors contributing to participation in contracting and two-stage 
estimation process (linear probability model and ordinary least squares) to 
measure the effect of contract participation on gross margins and labour 
use for quantitative data, three commodities. 
Han et al. (2013): Case study through the 
interview with four contracting companies to 
explore contract management. Analysis: 
Narrative with tabular summaries, one sector. 
Schipmann and Qaim (2011): Survey (choice experiment) 
with 244 farmers (112 on contract and 132 non-contract). 
Analysis: Mixed logit model for farmers’ market channel 
choice, one commodity. 
Vermeulen et al. (2008): Interviews and survey with 61 contracting 
companies to explore procurement arrangements. Analysis: Narrative and 
tabulation for qualitative data and descriptive statistics for quantitative data, 
12 commodity groups. 
Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw (2013): Case 
study through the interview with one 
contracting companies (one exporting and 
one processing company) to present a 
characterisation of contract procurement 
patterns. Analysis: Narrative with visuals, one 
commodity. 
Jones and Gibbon (2011): Repeated household survey 
(2005 and 2009) with 222 farmers. Analysis: Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to measure the impact of contract 
farming scheme on farm income, one commodity. 
Chirwa and Kydd (2009): Focus group interviews with farmers’ groups, life 
histories of farmers who witnessed events over time and interviews with 
managers of agribusinesses, and a survey with 190 farmers. Analysis: 
Narrative for both type of data, one commodity. 
 




Table 4.2 Review of the methodology used in recent studies of contract farming – Continued 
Quantitative approach Mixed methods approach 
Bellemare (2012): Survey with 1,200 farmers. Analysis: Probit model, 
treatment regression and Ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the 
impact of participation in contracting on household welfare various 
commodities. 
Fréguin-Gresh et al. (2012): Interviews with 40 households and survey with 335 farmers. Analysis of 
qualitative data – the agrarian systems diagnostic approach to categorise factors influencing the 
transformation of the rural environment and a livelihood approach to understand the combination of 
activities and income sources. Analysis of quantitative data: probit model to analyse the uptake of 
contracts, the first step of Heckman model (probit analysis) to determine whether farmers commercialise 
their agricultural produce, and the second step of Heckman model (regression analysis) to identify 
determinants of farm income for farmers under the contract, various commodities.  
Abebe et al. (2013): Survey with 72 contract and 72 non-contract farmers 
(analytical hierarchy process and discrete choice experiment). Analysis: 
Conditional logit model to investigate the importance of contract design 
attributes one commodity.  
Prowse and Moyer-Lee (2014): Participatory rural appraisal, 8 focus group discussions, dozens of semi-
structured interviews and household survey with 127 farmers + follow-up survey with 46 farmers. 
Analysis: Narrative and diagram for qualitative data and descriptive statistics and simple calculations for 
quantitative data, one commodity. 
Narayanan (2014): Survey with 474 farmers. Analysis: Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
test of equality of distributions of net profit and endogenous switching model 
to estimate net farm profits from participation in contract farming, four 
commodities. 
 
Briones (2015): Survey with 316 farmers. Analysis: Multivariate analysis 
including least squares regression, tobit and probit models and Heckman’s 
two-step estimator to assess the impact of contract farming on farm 
profitability and which variables affect participation in contract scheme, one 
commodity. 
 
Girma and Gardebroek (2015): Survey with 195 farmers. Analysis: Ordinary 
least squares (OLS), probit regression and propensity score matching to 
assess the effect of different factors on farmers’ income, one commodity. 
 
Kariuki and Loy (2016): Analysis: Survey with 249 farmers. Multivariate 
probit model to test whether selected variables impact different strategies of 
interest, one commodity. 
 





Narratives were mostly employed to present studies’ findings. Since one of the most 
severe critiques of qualitative studies
 
is that they use a loose analysis, the use of 
established analytical procedures (such as thematic or content analysis) could have 




A mixed method approach in exploring contract farming was also considered (Table 
4.2). Some studies combined interviews with stakeholders and questionnaires. Focus 
group discussions were less represented. The analysis included narratives and 
quotations from interviews for qualitative data. In the case of quantitative data, the 
analysis ranged from narrative and simple descriptive statistics to probit models and 
ordinary least squares. The advantage of a mixed methods approach in studying 
contract farming reflects in the robustness of outcomes as the qualitative data 
provide the width and depth and quantitative data the unobservable relations among 
particular variables. This comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon is 
important for shaping recommendations to direct public policies and government 
incentives. Since greater attention is given to the mixed methods approach in recent 
years, contract farming studies might increasingly apply mixed methods in the 
future, while use of a solely qualitative approach is likely to decrease.  
 
4.3 Design and Legal Dimension of Contract Farming  
4.3.1 Structure of a Contract 
Contract design is defined as the structure and content of the contract (Furlotti, 
2007). Da Silva and Rankin (2013, p. 11) argued that ‘despite differences in 
contractual features as a function of product specificities and particularities of the 
enabling environment, it appears that a tendency towards a convergence in clauses 
and conditions does exist'. Despite variations among contracts, an example of a 
complete contract for a horticultural crop would contain most of the clauses defined 
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Table 4.3 Structure of a general agricultural contract 
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 Force majeure events might include, but are not limited to, floods, droughts, extreme temperature 
shocks, epidemics, change in government and legislation, riots, strikes, conflicts, embargo and 
currency depreciation (Legal Guide, 2015).   
Clause Definition 
Parties to a 
contract 
Group or individual entity entering into an agreement and accepting contract 
terms and conditions. Identification of parties is usually through ID, name, 
address and telephone. 
Preamble 
Underlying reasons for contracting and the nature of the relationship between 
parties. 
Duration Date of signing the contract and the exact duration of the contract. 
Input provision 
Provision of inputs to cultivate or deliver the product (e.g. seeds, fertilisers, 
chemicals, bags). 
Training 
The obligatory or free instructions on agricultural practices provided by the 
buyer or third party to assure the quality of the final produce. 
Quantity  
An explicit statement of production volumes that the farmer has to deliver to the 
buyer or the buyer is obliged to buy from the farmer. Quantity can be 
determined explicitly, as minimum quantity, as a quota, or variable quantity 
depending on the buyer's orders. 
Delivery  
Definition of terms (e.g. time, frequency, location, transport means and form) for 
exchanging the product. 
Grades 
The explicit specification of grades for the product, i.e. the description of quality 
levels for the product (e.g. colour units, moisture level allowed, % of damage). 
Price 
The precise amount or formulae to determine a final amount to be paid to the 
farmer, taking into consideration variations in quality of the product, financial 
obligations, such as loans for inputs and services received, and conditions on 
the international market. 
Payment The procedure and timing (prior, upon or after delivery) for paying the farmer. 
Quality/quantity 
failure 
An indication of the remedy/compensation if one or some of the contract terms 
and conditions regarding the quality or quantity are not completed. 
Breach 
Deliberate and conscious violation of agreed terms and conditions coming from 
either party. It can result in contract termination or compensation procedures. 
Liabilities 
Party’s legal responsibility for acts or omissions (e.g. land title and business 
licence). 
Termination 
Describes conditions under which either party has the right to exit from the 
contract.  
Disputes  
The case of conflict between parties regarding the definition or performance of 
agreed terms and conditions. It might be settled through mediation, arbitration 




A provision that frees both parties from the obligation if an extraordinary event 
occurs. An extraordinary event includes unforeseeable and unavoidable 
situation, which is not the result of party's actions. 
Applicable law 
National or regional law competent for dealing with contractual arrangements, 
and especially with possible disputes.  
Signatory 
The warranty that the person signing the contract is an appropriate one and has 
the authority to execute the contract. All responsible parties are signing the 
contract. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Echánove and Steffen (2005), Kelley (1995), 
Vermeulen et al. (2008), Melese, (2012), Prowse (2012), Pultrone (2012), da Silva Júnior et al. 




Based on the reviewed literature, the structure of a contract can be divided into three 
main parts as follows: 
 
(1) Preliminary matters or general parts of the contract 
General parts of the contract are in most cases located in the introductory part. Here, 
contracts will usually first identify parties that are legally bound by the contract. 
Contracts might indicate the commodity of exchange and its preferred delivery form 
(e.g. fresh or dry, seeded or de-seeded). Some contracts contain a preamble, but this 
clause is not considered as a crucial one compared to others. The preliminary part 
may finish by defining contract duration and possible renewal. 
 
(2) Specific terms and conditions 
Specific terms and conditions are closely related to the commodity, production 
characteristics, and also model and type of a contract; therefore, the clauses vary 
considerably. Under this part, the contract might define inputs, volumes, delivery 
terms, grades, prices and payment method. Besides, rights and obligations of each 
party in different circumstances might be established, such as regarding training, 
delivery failures, breach, termination, disputes and force majeure events. If not 
stated in the introductory part, the applicable law is commonly indicated at the end 
of specific terms and conditions part. 
 
(3) Closing part 
The final part of the contract consists of individual signatures from involved parties. 
In many cases, the third party – the witness – is required to sign the contract.  
  
Except for the number and schedule of the clauses (the structure of the contract), the 
attractiveness of the contract will significantly depend on what those clauses define. 
In other words, the design of the contract will have an influence on the final output 
in terms of parties’ economic gains. Contract design pre-determines if the party 
receives benefits or carries the risks. Warning and Hoo (2000) and Narayanan (2012) 
found that food supply contracts in developing countries were ambiguous and one-





Contracts are often written in an incomprehensible technical language (Vavra, 2009; 
Cotula, 2011; Pultrone et al., 2012). Maertens (2006) argued that contracts could be 
designed to favour buyers; thus, even if the farmer increases the productivity and 
quality levels of the product - the buyer will capture the entire premium, depriving 
the farmer of any meaningful benefits. This section outlined the contract structure. 
The following section provides recommendations on the content of contract clauses. 
 
4.3.2 Legal Guide and Recommendations for Best Practices in Contract Design 
‘Legal Guide on Contract Farming’ (throughout this study, the term ‘Legal Guide’ 
marks this publication) is a publication that represents a joint effort of several 
leading organisations concerned with the issue of contracting: International Institute 
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Legal Guide 
was officially published in 2015 with the purpose as an ‘advice and guidance on the 
entire relationship, from negotiation to conclusion, including performance and 
possible breach or termination of the contract’ (Legal Guide, 2015, p. xv). Legal 
Guide (2015) recognises the process of contract formulation as a critical point in 
building a long-term contractual relationship. Legal Guide (2015) promotes 
transparency, trust and good faith, close collaboration and negotiation between 
parties, and defining complete and detailed contract clauses. Ultimately, Legal Guide 
(2015) acknowledges the diversity of contracting conditions; therefore, it does not 
promote one contract form over another but rather serves as a reference point for 
contract designs, parties' legal position and available options. Legal Guide is 
formulated to advocate for improved contract design, which could then lead to 
enhanced contract farming administration. 
 
According to Legal Guide (2015), the following clauses of an agricultural contract 
are particularly prone to manipulation: contract duration, quality, volumes, input 
provision, price and payment mechanism, breach, disputes and termination of the 
contract. Legal Guide (2015) suggested the best practices (see Table 4.4) in 
designing the contract and recommended core principles to guide parties in shaping 





Table 4.4 Recommended best practices for the contract design 
Clause Best practices  
Duration 
As well as the exact duration period, the contract should define options for a 
renewal for each party (e.g. by express agreement, automatic renewal or 
according to the contractor’s optimal judgement).  
Input provision 
The amounts and method of paying for inputs (cash, credit or deduction) 
should be set in the contract. This will provide a clear overview of costs and 
payments for each party.  
Training 
Instead of providing a general formula on farmers’ obligation to comply with 
instructions, the contract should list specific tasks required. This will reduce 
possible misinterpretation. 
Quantity  
The quantity of produce should be clearly specified as: whole production, 
partial production or exact amount in kg/t/mT/bags. If the contract expects the 
whole production from the farmer, then ‘whole' must be defined, e.g. the whole 
production from x amount of hectares/acres or inputs provided. The ownership 
and selling right of possible excess should be regulated in the contract. 
Grades 
Quality requirements and appropriate grades should be expressed precisely, 
preferably with a formula or specifications in attachment to avoid possible 
misunderstanding and disputes. The farmer and third party should be allowed 
to witness and comment the grading process. 
Price 
As one of the most important contract term, the price should: (i) be clearly and 
completely defined at the time of signing the contract, (ii) secure a return rate 
that covers costs of each party and (iii) be calculated in a transparent manner 
and open for verification by the farmer and/or third party. 
Payment 
The payment method should be specified clearly in the contract, especially 
who, when and how will execute the payment. This will promote certainty and 
reduce possible disputes. 
Quality/quantity 
failure 
To avoid potential ex-post manipulations, the quality and quantity criteria 
should be clearly drafted in contract clauses. Possible penalties should be 
discussed between parties, not imposed. 
Breach 
What is considered as the breach from each party and 
consequences/remedies of the contract breach (e.g. termination, penalties or 
revision) should be clearly defined. If possible, the breaching party should be 
granted the right to cure (fixing the breach) within a reasonable time frame 
before application of remedies.  
Termination 
‘Termination at will’ should be avoided. A bilateral termination clause granting 
each party the right to terminate the contract should be used. Clear pre- and 
post-conditions for termination must be (e.g. 30 days prior notice and 
maintenance of confidentiality after exiting). 
Disputes  
The method of dealing with disputes should be discussed while drafting the 
contract. An agreed procedure (amicably, mediation, arbitration or courts) 
should give each party an equal position. 
Force majeure 
The difference between unforeseeable and uncontrollable events from one 
side and non-performance on the other must be clear. The force majeure 
clause must not be used to hide non-performance. Including a list of potential 
force majeure events will increase the clarity. 
Applicable law 
If possible, the applicable law should be tied to the country of production since 
farmers are more likely to be familiar with the domestic law rather than the 
international one. 




1) Preliminary bargaining – refers to the negotiation between parties before 
accepting the contract offer. Each party should have the freedom to negotiate 
specific terms and the right to reject an economically unbalanced contract. 
Preliminary bargaining should reduce the incidence of adhesion type contracts, 
which are formulated in favour of a stronger party. 
 
2) Avoiding vagueness – clauses defining price, payment, volumes, quality and 
contract duration should be sufficiently defined and precise to encourage the optimal 
performance of all parties and decrease the potential for disputes. 
 
3) Practising reciprocity – refers to an equal right of parties to initiate a particular 
action or to be granted fair allocation of responsibilities in the contract. Reciprocity 
is especially needed in clauses defining contract renewal, breach, termination, 
dispute settlement and the right to sell or buy (indicated in Table 4.4 through the 
expression ‘each party’). 
 
4.4 Benefits of Contract Farming in Developing Countries 
Before elaborating on the benefits of contracting for farmers in developing countries 
based on the studies conducted, this section briefly considers advantages that 
contracts bring to the buyers.  
 
The most prominent benefit of contract farming for buyers is the assurance of a 
continuous supply of quality raw product by applying technology and tight control of 
production processes, which helps to reduce uncertainty and costs (Minot, 1986; 
Kelley, 1995; Delgado, 1999; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Singh, 2002; Ramaswami 
et al., 2006; Prowse, 2007; Birthal, 2008). Regarding costs, contract farming can 
lower screening, selection and coordination costs, quality measurement and 
monitoring costs (Cook et al., 2008; Prowse, 2012; Will, 2013; Wang et al., 2014b). 
Contracting can also grant buyers access to land through contracted farmers, which 
is a challenge due to certain constraints on land ownership in some developing 
countries (Shepherd, 2001; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Prowse, 2012). By 
contracting with farmers, the buyer does not need to own the land. However, the 




If the buyer supplies the commodity from small-scale farmers, the costs of hiring and 
managing the labour force will be minimised as small-scale farmers mostly rely on 
the unpaid family labour (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Minot, 2011). According to 
Simmons (2002), contract farming might serve larger buyers as a means to expand 
their operations or diversify sources of supply. A buyer who offers contracts to 
vulnerable farmers might enjoy a higher reputation in public due to the inclusiveness 
of contracting as a model (Will, 2013). In addition, a positive image can encourage 
the government to award the buyer with sponsored subsidies for production or 
marketing activities within contract farming (Echánove and Steffen, 2005). The 
following sections summarise the key benefits of contract farming for farmers in 
developing countries as discussed in the literature. 
 
4.4.1 Access to Technology and Extension Services 
Contracted production often requires the adoption of modern technology in 
producing the commodity. Thus, contracted farmers can benefit from the access to 
technological information and assistance or new processing facilities that enable 
farmers to diversify into much more valuable commodity, which would otherwise be 
unattainable (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Shepherd, 2001; Warning and Key, 2002; 
Simmons, 2002; da Silva, 2005; Bijman, 2008; Prowse, 2007; Smalley, 2013; Cai et 
al., 2014a). Many contracts include a clause on the buyer’s obligation to provide 
extension services for farmers (Woodend, 2003; Maertens, 2006; Sautier et al., 2006; 
Shepherd, 2007; Miyata et al., 2009; Prowse, 2012). The role of extension services is 
to transfer knowledge, build capacities and skills and encourage farmers to comply 
with the required production procedures (Birthal, 2008; Fréguin-Gresh and 
Anseeuw, 2013).  
 
4.4.2 Access to Inputs 
Poor financial capabilities usually do not allow small-scale farmers access to 
valuable inputs in required volumes. Without adequate inputs, small-scale farmers 
are likely to achieve low crop quality and small yields, while losses due to diseases 
might be substantial. Contract farming can overcome this constraint by ensuring 
seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, chemicals and other production inputs to farmers either 
on credit or deduction upon selling (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Woodend, 2003; 




commodities, specialised inputs are hardly available in existing local markets. 
Through the contract, the buyer provides not only specialised inputs but also inputs 
at the right time to the farmer (Delgado, 1999; Dhillon and Singh, 2006; Fréguin-
Gresh and Anseeuw, 2013).  
 
4.4.3 Access to Credit 
Apart from obtaining inputs, farmers may also gain access to credit (Simmons, 2002; 
Bijman, 2008; Minot, 2011; Smalley, 2013; Cai et al., 2014a). In the case of a 
multipartite contract model, one of the parties to the contract could be a financial 
institution, which secures credit for farmers to improve their cash flow and enable 
investments in other farm and non-farm activities (Dhillon and Singh, 2006; 
Maertens, 2006). The buyer could also offer some credit scheme. Lending 
institutions sometimes accept contracts as a form of collateral (Prowse, 2012; Will, 
2013). Dries et al. (2014) suggested that access to credit could be a strong incentive 
for farmers not to breach a contractual agreement. Key and Runsten (1999) argued 
that poor small-scale farmers are willing to pay the most to obtain credit; thus, the 
buyer has the additional motivation to offer the farmers a contract.  
 
4.4.4 Secured Outlet and Price 
One of the benefits of contracted production is the fact that farmers efficiently 
reduce their risk of uncertain markets and price by signing the contract. Buyers will 
purchase a farmers’ commodity at pre-determined volumes and guaranteed price 
(Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; da Silva, 2005; Birthal et al., 2007c; Shepherd, 2007; 
Miyata et al., 2009; Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2012; Will, 2013). Contract farming might 
open up the opportunity for small-scale farmers to participate in otherwise 
unavailable lucrative markets, such as non-traditional and export markets (Woodend, 
2003; Minot, 2011). Farmers might be awarded a premium price for adding more 
value to their product, which acts as an additional motivation to sustain the 
contractual relationship (Miller, 2003). By having a continuously secured outlet and 
a guaranteed price, the farmers can plan their strategy for improving livelihood 






4.4.5 Reduced Production, Marketing and Transaction Risks 
The consequences of enabled access to technology, inputs, credits, market and stable 
price are reduced production and marketing risks for the farmer (Minot, 1986; 
Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Maertens, 2006; Birthal, 2008). Contracts serve as a 
tool for mitigating stated risks since the buyer shares responsibilities and 
uncertainties with the farmer (Sharma, 2008). Agricultural production is highly 
sensitive to unpredictable and uncontrollable events, and prices on commodity 




Thus, without contracts, small-scale farmers are likely to fail to cope with production 
and marketing risks (Ramaswami et al., 2006). Contract farming might decrease 
farmers’ transaction costs regarding searching for a reliable market that can receive 
produced volumes, acquiring market information on prevailing prices, obtaining 
relevant knowledge on production and accessing credit for needed inputs (Simmons, 
2002).  
 
4.4.6 Improved Productivity, Quality and Income Generation 
Through contracting, the buyer exercises certain control over production processes. 
This is due to the buyer’s interest to obtain needed volumes of high-quality produce 
from the farmer. In this sense, contracting will have the goal to encourage best 
practices in agricultural production through provision of inputs, technology and 
extension services. In turn, farmers are likely to increase their productivity and 
quality of the produce (Minot, 1986; Birhtal, 2008). Farmers might apply gained 
knowledge on producing the contracted crop to improve cultivation of other food 
crops and thus maximise their potential and increase household’s food security 
(Maertens, 2006). 
 
In addition to improved productivity and quality, the extant literature reports that 
contract farming potentially stabilises or increases farmers’ income generation 
(Watts, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; Baumann, 2000; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; 
Warning and Key, 2002; da Silva, 2005; Dhillon and Singh, 2006; Bijman, 2008; 
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 Cashin et al. (1999) found that commodity prices rapidly and unexpectedly move from a price 
boom to a price slump, which represents a serious challenge to policymakers in developing countries 




Minot, 2011; Prowse, 2012; Abebe et al., 2013; Smalley, 2013). Income stabilisation 
will occur thanks to the secured outlet and guaranteed price on which farmers can 
rely with their contracts. Increases in income might be due to accessing a new 
lucrative market, which offers a premium price compared to other commodities. 
Also, increased incomes could be directly related to increased volumes and quality 
of the commodity available for marketing; thus reflecting the result of provided 
inputs and knowledge through the contract.   
 
4.4.7 Creating Employment 
Contract farming can create more employment opportunities for farmers and non-
farmers. Contracting requires high labour inputs, especially during the harvest, 
grading process, packaging, transport and marketing, and can prompt hiring 
neighbouring farmers or mobilise available rural working force (Singh, 2005). 
Besides, if the contracted commodity proceeds to processing facilities, this spurs a 
need for additional workers and has high non-farm employment effects (Warning 
and Key, 2002; Jia and Bijman, 2013). The contractor is likely to hire local experts 
as extension officers in the company due to their better orientation in the area, an 
advantage in knowing the local language and familiarity with farmers' attitudes. 
 
4.4.8 Recent Empirical Evidence on Contract Farming Performance in Developing 
Countries 
Contract farming is present both in developed and developing countries and in 
different proportions among small-, medium- and large-scale farmers. This section 
focuses on small-scale farmers in developing countries and benefits they experienced 
under contracts as this is in line with the broader aim and objectives of this study. 
The existing literature provides cases of contract farming from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
India and Latin America mainly; thus recent evidence from stated areas are 
presented (see Appendix A for the summary of selected studies). 
 
4.4.8.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Huddleston and Tonts (2007) explored an out-grower scheme in the palm oil 
industry in Ghana and found that contracting created employment in rural areas for 
both contracted farmers and farm workers, which had positive implications for 




Masuku (2009) investigated the sugarcane sector in Swaziland and concluded that 
mutual trust could enhance the performance of supply chain players and improve the 
entire supply chain. The author also suggested that contracting based on trust and 
cooperation is self-enforcing and can reduce transaction costs related to monitoring 
since there is no need for the presence of a third party (i.e. courts) (Masuku, 2009).   
 
Three studies reported on the impact of contract farming in the case of organic 
production in Uganda. For organic coffee farmers, contracts secured the market and 
price premium for meeting agreed quality standards, which in turn lowered 
uncertainties about net returns (Bolwig et al., 2009). Organic cocoa farmers were 
able to improve the quality of their crop and productivity due to credible incentives 
for adopting the technology (Jones and Gibbon, 2011). Contract farming improved 
food security for organic pineapple and coffee farmers since higher profits from 
certified organic crops increased household capacity to access needed food and 
decreased poverty levels among participants (Bolwig, 2012). 
 
In Malawi, tea farmers who transferred from statutory contracts
31
 to private-led 
contracts received better services and increased profitability of their farming (Chirwa 
and Kydd, 2009). In a study of the contract farming impact on the welfare of farmers 
producing various crops in Madagascar, Bellemare (2012) found that contracting 
increased total household income and suggested that promoting contracts can 
contribute to poverty alleviation. Fréguin-Gresh et al. (2012) and Fréguin-Gresh and 
Anseeuw (2013) explored the sub-tropical fruits and citrus sector in South Africa. 
Contracting increased farmers’ incomes, allowed access to inputs, credit and 
information, and opened opportunities for participating in competitive markets 
(Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw, 2013). 
 
In Ethiopia, Girma and Gardebroek (2015) studied organic honey supply and found 
that contracted farmers received premium prices and increased their income. Farmers 
growing vegetables in Tanzania received technical assistance and supervision 
through contracts, which encouraged integration into lucrative markets and helped 
farmers to develop new skills (Rüsch et al., 2013). In addition, clear communication 
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between players and involvement of the village head as an intermediary contributed 
to the success of the contracting model (Rüsch et al., 2013).  
 
Empirical examples showed that farmers under contract farming in some Sub-
Saharan countries gained benefits by improving their production and economic 
status. Three topics deserve further attention. First, contract farming proved 
successful in encouraging farmers to reach high-quality standards in organic 
production. Thus, complying with standards awarded farmers with the premium 
price and better revenues. Second, Masuku (2009) discussed the importance of trust 
for relations in supply chains and implied that trust is a vital part of contract farming. 
Third, Rüsch et al. (2013) extended on the point of trust by suggesting that 
transparent communication between parties and the presence of a trustworthy person 
(i.e. village chief) might positively influence the performance of contracts. This 
gives rise to re-considering players’ roles and quality of relations as potential drivers 
for enhanced supply chains and contract schemes.  
 
4.4.8.2 India 
In Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, Singh (2002, 2003) studied the vegetables and 
cottonseed sectors and found that contracting increased farmers’ incomes and 
opened opportunities for additional employment. Potato farmers in Haryana obtained 
higher yields, price and net returns under contracts compared to non-contract farmers 
(Tripathi et al., 2005). Ramaswami et al. (2006) reported that contracted farmers in 
the poultry sector in Andhra Pradesh received higher gains and faced lower 
uncertainty as the great share of market risk was shifted to the buyer. The authors 
concluded that contracts represent useful institutional arrangements suitable for 
providing insurance, technology and credit to farmers (Ramaswami et al., 2006). 
 
Using an econometric analysis based on a sample of 127 farmers (contract and non-
contract farmers cultivating various commodities) in three Indian districts, Sharma 
(2008) argued that contracting positively influenced crop productivity and improved 
farm income. Being a member of a farmers' organisation increased the likelihood of 
participation in a contract scheme (Sharma, 2008). Narayanan (2012, 2014) explored 




supply chains and offered some valuable insights. The study emphasised the 
importance of personal relations in contract arrangements since results showed that 
parties perceived contracts as relationships rather than legally binding agreements 
(Narayanan, 2012). Furthermore, the ‘moral economy' of contracts occurred in 
studied examples as a transgression where extension officers offered their assistance 
to farmers not exclusively related to the contracted crop but also regarding good 
practices for the non-contracted crop (e.g. the use of pesticides) (Narayanan, 2012). 
In turn, farmers were keener to fulfil their obligations and companies were able to 
rely on repeated interaction with farmers over a long term to decrease contract 
breach (Narayanan, 2012). Farmers in the papaya and broiler sectors achieved clear 
net gains from contracts (Narayanan, 2014).  
 
Goel (2013) studied formal written contracts between PepsiCo
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  and basmati rice 
farmers in Punjab. PepsiCo offered technical training free of charge and supplied 
quality seeds to farmers. Farmers increased their income due to better productivity 
and price received. In their contract, PepsiCo included the clause that allowed 
farmers to sell their crop to other companies if PepsiCo prices did not satisfy 
farmers’ expectations or were below the market price. Such a clause in the contract 
was PepsiCo’s response to government regulation that encouraged companies to 
offer conditions where farmers can realise higher returns if the market price exceeds 
the contract price (Goel, 2013). 
 
Studies in India and Sub-Saharan Africa showed that contract farming increased 
income and productivity, and decreased uncertainties for contracted farmers. 
Narayanan (2012, 2014) highlighted ideas on the mutual relationship and 
communication in contracts, which is in accordance with Masuku (2009) and Rüsch 
et al. (2013). PepsiCo took an additional step by introducing the clause that gives the 
farmer a right to seek better returns outside the contract. Since the provision was 
encouraged by government regulation, the PepsiCo example sheds new light on 
contract formulation and the possible role that government (and the enabling 
environment) can play in regulating the power in contracts.  
 
                                                             
32




4.4.8.3 Latin America 
According to Saenz and Ruben (2004), contracted production of chayote in Costa 
Rica was profitable for farmers as contracts decreased uncertainties, granted access 
to credit, inputs and information, and enabled the increase of crop quality due to 
better land use. Farmers who received technical assistance and credit showed great 
loyalty; thus, Saenz and Ruben (2004) concluded that contracts positively influenced 
participation of small-scale farmers in international market chains. Farmers 
cultivating export vegetables and grains in Mexico had secured markets and received 
technical assistance and credit through contracts (Echánove and Steffen, 2005). 
Furthermore, in Nicaragua, the Walmart contract systematically reduced price 
volatility for contracted farmers (Michelson et al., 2012). For oilseed farmers in 
Brazil, contract farming represented a valuable economic tool as contracts secured 
the market, increased average annual revenue per farmer by 600% and provided free 
technical assistance (da Silva Júnior et al., 2013). Fromm (2013) posited that 
although contracts offered higher prices and thus improved incomes for cocoa 
farmers in Honduras, it is the investment in training (namely promoting awareness 
on quality, good practice and environmental issues among farmers) that will have 
long-term positive effects. The success of contracting and the cocoa sector in 
Honduras was a result of joint efforts by local and international, public and private 
organisations working together to support farmers (Fromm, 2013).   
 
Another example from Honduras where farmers cultivated Asian vegetables under 
contracts warrants attention. Contracting increased farmers’ gains and a successful 
trade of Asian vegetables on the American market brought diversification inside the 
industry (Imbruce, 2008). Farmers were able to strengthen their position and demand 
from buyers to abandon written contracts, adjust their policies and allow farmers to 
collaborate with more export buyers at the same time. Imbruce (2008) noted that 
buyers showed willingness to answer farmers' demands.  
 
The evidence from Latin America added another relevant piece to understanding the 
contract farming system. While Fromm (2013) advocated for greater collaboration of 
supply chain players to achieve successful contracting, the case described by 
Imbruce (2008) has similarities with the PepsiCo example. In both cases, an external 




the contract and award farmers with better conditions. The question remains whether 
dismissing written contracts (Imbruce, 2008) can strengthen or weaken farmers’ 
position in the long-term as there is no guarantee for any commodity market to 
remain unchanged and/or profitable for too long. Production without contracts will 
be efficient in the situation of high demand for the commodity, limited supply, high 
prices and numerous interested buyers. In this case, farmers will have a better 
position than buyers will and might even dictate the price. As the market starts to 
develop and if the interest for the commodity continues to be high, it is likely that 
suppliers from other countries (e.g. China and India) will enter and offer either better 
quality or lower prices to buyers. Thus, the production without any agreement and 
coordination might be uncertain. 
 
4.5 The Case Pro Contract Farming  
Based on the elaborated literature, this section summarises circumstances where 
contract farming represents an appropriate solution for addressing challenges in 
modern agri-food supply chains in the context of developing countries:  
 
(1) Substantial share of small-scale farmers in agricultural sector 
Small-scale farmers make a reasonable choice for contract farming due to their 
advantages in labour efficiency and consequently decreased costs of monitoring. 
Developing countries without industrial force and with a predominantly rural 
population that depends on agriculture might exploit contract farming to empower 
their small-scale sector. Contracts are potential tools for commercialisation of 
numerous rural households as contracting improves food security and contributes to 
the country's economic growth through increased productivity and trade of 
agricultural commodities. Contracting can revive the small-scale sector by providing 
an opportunity for vulnerable groups of farmers, such as women-headed households 
and youth. 
 
(2) High entry requirements for lucrative export commodities 
Contract farming is especially suitable for export cash crops that require technical 
know-how, specialised inputs, must comply with stringent standards and have a high 




the contractor. For a developing country with available land and climatic conditions 
to produce a lucrative export commodity, contracts will provide a secure market 
channel and contribute to a country’s exports. In addition, the contractor will direct 
the production processes and ensure that farmers gain needed knowledge and inputs, 
achieve appropriate quality and receive a premium price. 
 
(3) Lack of input markets 
Quality inputs are not always available in markets of developing countries. However, 
a lack of general input markets does not discourage contract farming since the 
contractor might acquire even greater control over production processes by securing 
inputs from reliable international sources. In this sense, lack or low-value inputs will 
not threaten the quality of the final product. The contractor might offer seeds, 
fertilisers, pesticides and chemicals to farmers and overcome the major constraint to 
their higher productivity and quality.   
 
(4) Existing enabling environment  
As shown in the literature, the success of contract farming can be increased if 
stakeholders collaborate. Contractor's transaction costs might significantly decrease 
when farmers are organised in groups and deliver larger quantities of the product at 
once. Also, farmers' groups serve as a safeguard for farmers' interests and contribute 
to the fairness of the contract. Linkages with NGOs and government bodies may 
secure useful subsidies for the contractor and farmers. Where NGOs work with 
farmers' groups on improving their livelihoods, a contractor can offer a market for 
commodities and stable incomes. The presence of contractors might open the 
dialogue with government bodies for forming public-private partnerships.   
 
(5) Sound legal framework and government regulations 
The contract is legally binding agreement and requires appropriate legislation to 
operate. Sound legal framework and government regulations regarding the trade 
(especially export of commodities) ensure the rules of the game. In contrast, the 
absence of legal support and regulations for contract farming might leave both 
buyers and farmers in an unfavourable position (e.g., the contract enforcement is not 
possible in the case of contract breach, and the aggrieved party cannot be 




governments to draft strategies for regulating relations in the contract and thus 
protect the position of farmers against exploitation. On the other side, contract 
schemes might encourage policy adjustments to facilitate making business in 
developing economies (e.g. reducing entry barriers for foreign businesses or 
providing reduced taxes for companies contracting with vulnerable farmers). 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter introduced the key themes needed for understanding contract farming: 
the main debate, factors triggering participation, recent research directions, legal 
side, recommended practices for contracting, and the positive impact that contracts 
have on farmers. Empirical studies on contracting in Sub-Saharan Africa, India and 
Latin America provided evidence to support contract farming as a promising solution 
for modern agri-food supply chains. Chapter 5 further challenges contracting by 








Chapter 5 introduces some of the challenges related to contracting. The chapter treats 
the topic in two parts. The first section looks in-depth at challenges in the contract 
design and, by providing evidence from real contract clauses, it demonstrates pitfalls 
hidden behind the vague or unfair formulation of clauses. The second section focuses 
on challenges in contracting practice found in the literature. The final section of this 
chapter discusses the future of contracting: is it going to vanish, evolve or expand?   
 
5.2 Key Challenges in Contract Content 
Designing a contract is complex (Bogetoft and Ballebye Olesen, 2002). The previous 
chapter discussed contract design and best practices recommended by the Legal 
Guide (2015). The first section of this chapter reviews the literature on reported 
challenges in contract farming relations emerging due to poorly designed contracts.  
 
Based on the existing literature, it is argued that the vagueness, lack of reciprocity 
and transparency and incompleteness represent the key challenges in the contract 
content.
33
 Pultrone (2012) made a strong claim by stating that benefits from contract 
farming can diminish if the contract offers unclear, incomplete and misguiding 
contract clauses. Katz (1990), Vavra (2009) and Melese (2012) emphasised that 
contracts are often not completely understood by all parties (especially small-scale 
farmers) and the source of misinterpretation might be the high level of technical 
legal language used. Narayanan (2012) questioned whether farmers comprehend 
commitments they are undertaking by signing the contract.  
33
  
Vagueness in the contract leaves space for various interpretations, which can be used 
as a strategy to force contract terms to favour the circumstances of the stronger party 
in the contract. The lack of reciprocity and transparency can result in exploitative 
contracts. For instance, da Silva (2005) noticed that companies might avoid 
transparency in one of the most important parts of the contract, i.e. price 
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determination mechanism, and thus arbitrarily impose quality and quantity 
measurements to achieve the highest gains while farmers do not receive their share 
of benefits for delivering quality produce. Reciprocity in the contract should reflect 
the power balance between parties, but contracts are often concluded under unequal 
negotiation power (Cotula, 2011). This raises doubts in the capacity of the initial 
intention to achieve a win-win situation in the case of contracting (Smalley, 2013). 
Singh (2002) provided an example where farmers under the contract faced 
inequalities, as they were obliged to deliver the produce to the company under all 
circumstances, no compensation was provided in the case of crop failure or force 
majeure, and the entire crop had to be sold exclusively to the company. In turn, the 
company protected itself from unforeseen obligations and did not take any liability 
for purchasing the farmers’ crop (Singh, 2002).  
 
The most adverse scenario for farmers is where the contract is incomplete or silent 
on relevant clauses. Incompleteness can be observed in two cases. First, a contract is 
considered incomplete if it does not contain a certain clause. Second, although a 
clause might be present, the way it is formulated might prompt further questions, 
such as how to execute the content of the clause or how to act if different conditions 
occur. In this sense, Prowse (2012) argued that companies often fail to incorporate 
even basic information in the contract, leaving farmers without an accurate idea of 
the nature of the arrangement they signed. The author further stated that farmers are 
rarely aware of the fact that by signing the contract, they might be giving their rights 
over the crop to the company or that, as farmers, they have to acquire a legal title 
over the land where the contracted crop is grown (Prowse, 2012). Some contracts 
might not provide the clause on exact duration or will not specify intended inputs 
(ActionAid, 2015). Incomplete contracts can shift an excessive risk to farmers by 
relying on their low economic power, lack of legal protection and limited knowledge 
on contract matters. The following sections present how stated key challenges reflect 
in the contract content and how they impact small-scale farmers. 
 
5.2.1 Input provision 
Inputs are one of the most important benefits available through the contract for 
small-scale farmers (Legal Guide, 2015). In some cases, production without 




production). The provision of inputs via contract varies significantly from case to 
case. The major challenge in defining an input clause in the contract is an explicit 
specification of: (i) which type(s) of inputs will be provided, (ii) how much of each 
input will be provided and (iii) what is the price (or method of paying) for each 
input. While most contracts will sufficiently define how small-scale farmers should 
repay their inputs, types and quantities of inputs might be vaguely determined. For 
small-scale farmers, the impact of vaguely defined input clause may be reduced 
ability to produce agreed quantities and hence becoming liable for delivery failures. 
Pultrone (2012) argued that in the cases where farmers have weak economic power, 
the reliance on inputs is considerable as farmers’ production of agreed quantities and 
quality of the product depends on the contractor’s input provision.  
 
5.2.2 Defining Quantity 
Companies rely on supplied volumes of the crop for their further marketing actions. 
Thus, defining expected quantities allows the company to plan the amount of crop 
ready for trade. The quantity clause can be manipulated by the contractor to 
accommodate market conditions and reduce the contractor’s risk of oversupply 
(Will, 2013). For instance, the company might link the quantity it is willing to 
purchase to the order received from the next buyer. This imposes a high risk on 
small-scale farmers. The small-scale farmer might have invested in inputs and 
equipment to produce high yields and quality crop, but the company might decide to 
purchase only part of the delivery. Also, the small-scale farmer will have to find 
another buyer for the crop, which increases transaction costs. If the new buyer 
usually purchases the crop in a slightly different form (e.g. whole pods instead of de-
seeded), the small-scale farmer might have to sell a downgraded crop for a reduced 
price. Depending on the crop and perishability, the quality might decrease with days, 
so initially grade A could become grade B by the time the small-scale farmer reaches 
the new buyer.  
 
In other cases, the company may define that the ‘whole production’ or ‘whole 
production from agreed hectares’ will be bought from the small-scale farmer. Both 
options carry certain pitfalls. If the company purchases the whole production, then 
the small-scale farmer has a guaranteed outlet for the crop. In order not to breach the 




price is significantly higher than the company’s price in a given period. The option 
to deliver the whole production from specified number of hectares puts the 
contracted farmer in a better position as it technically allows the farmer to supply 
excess to another buyer unless specified differently in the contract (see Sykuta and 
Parcell, 2003). However, the company might have pre-determined minimum 
volumes that are supposed to be produced from agreed hectares and could measure 
farmers’ delivery against such criteria with the intention to remove small-scale 
farmers that underperform from their suppliers’ list. The greatest challenge with 
defining the quantity clause is the precise statement on (i) how much volumes are 
expected from the farmer or how much the company is willing to purchase and (ii) 
what are the options for selling excesses from production.  
 
5.2.3 Quality and Grades 
It is argued in the literature that clauses on quality and grades in the contract are 
sensitive to manipulation and often cause disputes between the company and farmers 
(Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Echánove and Steffen, 
2005). Vague or unfair quality and grades clauses either do not sufficiently define 
parameters that the company will use to determine the quality of commodities or 
grant the right to the company to have a final decision in classifying a commodity 
into a grade.  
 
There are three main reasons why the company might want to control these clauses. 
First, by arbitrarily controlling the classification of commodities, the company might 
downgrade some proportion of the high-quality commodity into a second grade to 
obtain more quality products at a lower price (Baumann, 2000). Second, the price of 
the commodity on the market might be lower, and the company could be tempted to 
supply the produce from the open market or export; thus, the company may ‘invent’ 
rigour quality standards and reject small-scale farmers’ commodity (Minot, 2011; 
Pultrone, 2012). Third, the market for the commodity might be saturated, and to 
reduce its risk of buying contracted commodity with an uncertain further market, the 
company might raise the quality standards to create a barrier for farmers’ produce 
with an intention to reject it (Imbruce, 2008). Thus, the biggest challenges in the case 




applied when classifying commodity, (ii) the transparency in the classification 
process and (iii) compliance with stated standards in all circumstances.  
 
5.2.4 Price 
The pricing clause can be considered as the single most important clause in the 
contract since it determines the logic behind the amount that will be paid to a small-
scale farmer for delivered produce. This clause also reflects benefits distribution, i.e. 
whether the contractor awards the premium price. From all contract clauses, the price 
clause is often subject to changes due to its link with market conditions. Some 
studies report on three main problems related to the price in the contract. First, the 
company may outline the pricing mechanism in the contract; however, the pricing 
formula might be too complex, and the real extent of the price premium for the 
farmer can be disguised (Hamilton, 1995; Pultrone, 2012). In addition, farmers rarely 
participate in price determination and their bargaining power is often reduced as they 
cannot assess if the price paid represents an appropriate remuneration (Echánove and 
Steffen, 2005; Bijman, 2008). Second, in some contracts, the price clause is omitted, 
or it is left to be determined according to the prevailing market price. Sykuta and 
Parcell (2003) noticed that, if a contract does not specify the price, then it also does 
not reduce price uncertainty for the farmer.
34
 In cases where the price is not stated 
and is left to be shaped by the market, the company might closely track market 
trends
35
 in order to set delivery dates to favour low prices (da Silva, 2005). Third, 
consequences of inadequate price defined and paid to farmers via contract might be 
either side-selling or abandoning production of that commodity (Baumann, 2000). 
 
Since the price is often determined by the contractor and without farmers’ 
participation, there is another relevant aspect of this clause that increases uncertainty: 
the time frame when the exact price becomes known to the farmer. If the price is 
defined in the contract at the time of signing (and it remains the same), the farmer 
                                                          
34
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 In most cases, the price of the commodity is lower immediately after the harvest as it is assumed 
that in this period the market abounds with the commodity. Farmers, especially poor small-scale 
farmers, want to sell their commodity as soon as possible since they lack funds to secure food for their 
households. However, if the farmer is capable of storing and maintaining  high quality of the 
commodity to sell it a bit later, then the price will increase as the demand will still be present but the 




will be able to plan potential income and adjust the strategy for securing a livelihood. 
If the price is not defined at the time of signing the contract and it is announced a 
few days before or after the harvest, the farmer might not have sufficient time to 
balance the gap between the expected and offered price. Thus, the farmer might turn 
to opportunistic behaviour. Gergely and Diallo (2011, p. vi) suggested that the price 
mechanism in the contract should be ‘as simple and understandable by producers as 
possible […] based on verifiable and non-manipulative data […] not be 
disconnected from world prices, but should also result in a fair distribution of risks 
and profits between producers and […] companies’.  
 
5.2.5 The Terms of Payment 
The terms of payment are an extension on the price clause and define how the 
payment process and monetary obligations will be executed. The payment clause is 
important to farmers for several reasons. It defines when the farmer will receive the 
payment. Also, this clause might state the form of payment, e.g. cash or bank 
cheque.
36
 If the farmer received any inputs through the contract, the payment clause 
could specify whether the amount will be deducted from the final price or the farmer 
will pay for inputs in advance. Similarly, if the farmer obtained credit from the 
contractor, the interest rate is likely to be defined in the payment clause.   
 
There is one particular challenge linked to the payment clause. The clause might 
define that the payment will occur upon delivery of the product to the company. 
However, it may not define the exact time frame acceptable for the payment to be 
performed. If the company does not clearly state the time frame, then farmers cannot 
claim their right to compensation if the payment was not made during the indicated 
period.
37
 This situation favours the company as it reduces its responsibility to make 
prompt payments. For small-scale farmers, especially the vulnerable ones, late or 
delayed payments might have consequences for their household’s food security 
status.  
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itself to pay the farmer within a clearly stated period and, in the case of delays, the company takes the 




5.2.6 Breach of Contract 
The breach of contract terms and conditions can occur on the company’s and 
farmers’ side. The most significant challenges in designing the breach clause are the 
(i) definition of what is considered as a breach and consequently (ii) distribution of 
responsibilities once the breach is determined. If the contract does not state which 
actions are considered as a breach, there is a possibility that the stronger party will 
manipulate with terms and proclaim a breach arbitrarily when suitable. On the other 
hand, both parties might exploit the omission of the breach clause in the contract and 
exercise harmful actions (e.g. delaying the payment or side-selling). From the 
reviewed contract samples, it was observed that the following actions might be 
characterised as a breach of contract: the use of chemicals that have not been 
approved by the contractor,
38










 failure to secure safe conditions for workers and the use of 
child labour,
43
 failure to supply the agreed product,
44
 failure to pay the agreed price
45
 




The impact of a contract breach on small-scale farmers is considerable. If the 
contract allows the company to breach the contract by delaying payments or 
rejecting the purchase without the obligation to indemnify the small-scale farmer, it 
is likely that the small-scale farmer will suffer financial consequences, such as the 
lack of funds to cover the household’s needs or the loss of planned gains from the 
contracted production. In addition, if the contract prescribes penalties for breaching 
the contract, e.g. for the late supply or the use of certain chemicals, the small-scale 
farmer might have to pay the fee to the company and/or the entire delivered produce 
could be rejected, which will increase small-scale farmers’ transaction costs, threaten 
income generation and potentially jeopardise future relations with the company. 
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5.2.7 Contract Termination 
There are two frequent reasons for contract termination.
47
 The contract might 
terminate as a result of a natural sequence after the indicated period of the contract 
duration has expired and both parties agreed to end their relationship amicably. The 
termination can be a consequence of a contract breach, meaning that one party 
requires termination of the contract because the other party violated contract 
condition(s). The second case is of interest here since challenges involve (i) the 
design of the termination clause that will give an equal right to parties to terminate 
the contract, (ii) allowing sufficient time for the other party either to try to correct the 
action that caused the termination or to prepare for exiting the contract and (iii) 
regulating current liabilities (e.g. loan repayment). 
 
There are two main types of contract termination: unilateral and bilateral. In 
unilateral termination clause, the contract usually gives the exclusive right to the 
company to terminate the relationship (Pultrone, 2012). The unilateral termination 
clause might allow the company to end the agreement without any reason or if the 
company estimated that the farmer breached the contract. The farmer may not have 
the right to complain to the third party, e.g. a mediator or arbitrator. The 
consequences of unilateral contract termination for the small-scale farmer are similar 
to the case of contract breach: the farmer can be held liable for paying penalties, the 
purchase of the commodity is cancelled, part or whole planned income might be lost, 
and the small-scale farmer could be asked to repay debts to the company instantly. 
 
In contrast, a bilateral termination clause recognises both parties’ right to terminate 
the agreement. The fact that small-scale farmers can freely exit the contract if they 
believe the company is breaching agreed terms or they got another business 
opportunity (e.g. more lucrative market) makes for a more balanced contract. Also, a 
bilateral termination clause could prompt the company to adhere more to its 
commitments to maintain the supply base and especially if the termination clause 
involves paying fees to farmers.  
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5.2.8 Dispute Settlement 
The dispute clause serves to regulate the procedure in the situation of conflict
48
 
between parties. The key challenge in contract farming is to (i) define a dispute 
settlement clause, (ii) secure transparent and fair process and (iii) determine 
appropriate and legally valid mechanism. There are three levels of dispute resolution 
mechanisms that are often used in agricultural contracts. The first level involves 
resolving the conflict solely between parties in an amicable manner, and this 
represents an optimal outcome of a dispute. If parties cannot reach a consensus in 
their dispute, the next step is mediation. Mediation includes a third person (mediator) 
who acts as a neutral third party and assists parties to resolve their dispute but does 
not have the authority to impose the agreement or bring the final decision (Silbey 
and Merry, 1986).  
 
The dispute settlement clause in the contract should clearly propose in advance who 
will be assigned as a mediator and both parties should agree on the choice to avoid 
potential biases towards one party. For instance, if an assigned mediator is the 
village chief, it is likely that this person will favour farmers. In contrast, if an 
assigned mediator is a financial institution where the company has its accounts, it is 
possible that the mediation process will be leaning to support the company’s side. It 
is assumed that, if the company drafts the contract, it will attempt to suggest the 
mediator that will protect the company’s interests, which might leave small-scale 
farmers in a worse off position, especially if the contract cannot be negotiated. To 
avoid this unfair position, some contracts prescribe the arbitration (third level 
mechanism)
49
 if the amicable settlement fails. 
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the interest rate for the loan. 
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 The mentioned three levels of dispute mechanism in agricultural contracts are scheduled according 
to the authority of the third party and represent a so-called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
(Bennett, 2002). ADR refers to any process for settling disputes outside traditional legal procedures 
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In the case of disputes, arbitration might be chosen instead of litigation
50
 and the 
usual procedure involves information-gathering, briefings, testimonies, and decision-
making by the arbitrator(s) that is reviewed by the court to confirm or vacate the 
arbitration award (Bennett, 2002). The contract using arbitration should also indicate 
the applicable law that is guiding the process. Legal Guide (2015) confirms that 
dispute settlement clause is among the ones most prone to manipulation in 
agricultural contracts. Pultrone (2012) further connected the importance of clear 
definition of both the dispute settlement clause and the law guiding the contract by 
suggesting that the contract should be explicit on which national law will govern the 
dispute settlement if parties come from different countries. One consequence of the 
arbitration process might be a long-term distortion of relationships between the 
company and farmers in the area, which could reduce trust and affect the efficiency 
of a supply chain. Thus, settling disputes in an amicable manner is considered as a 
priority provided it satisfies both parties and not only the more powerful one. 
 
5.2.9 Force Majeure 
The force majeure clause is not always present in contracts despite its importance in 
defining (i) responsibilities for losses occurred, (ii) liabilities for remaining 
obligations and (iii) the future of the contract (termination or continuation). If the 
force majeure clause is not defined, it can be implied that risks and responsibilities 
associated with unpredictable events are borne by the farmer (Echánove and Steffen, 
2005). Unless indicated, it cannot be predicted whether parties will be responsible 
for meeting remaining obligations and if the contract will be terminated in the case 
of force majeure. By omitting the force majeure clause, the contract could become 
vague. This is particularly relevant in circumstances of developing countries, such as 
Malawi, that often experience adverse climate conditions and where the insurance of 
agricultural commodity against force majeure is not accessible to vulnerable small-
scale farmers. The damage that the small-scale farmer might incur due to force 
majeure is likely to jeopardise the household’s food security as the contracted 
commodity may not be available for sale; hence, the income source is lost. In 
addition, if the contract does not recognise force majeure as a state of emergency and 
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requires from the small-scale farmer to either deliver the contracted commodity or 
indemnify the company for their losses, the small-scale farmer is likely to face 
indebtedness.  
 
This section elaborated on challenges in contract content and their impact on small-
scale farmers. A general conclusion can be made that the contract design determines 
roles, responsibilities, risks and benefits distribution in contractual relationships. 
Many challenges in contract farming might be mitigated at the initial stage – while 
writing and negotiating contracts. 
 
5.3 Key Challenges in Contracting Practice 
Little (2014) noticed that while contract farming creates an impression of a modern 
and progressive business model, which can attract investments from state and donor 
agencies, there also exists a different side of contracting. This section continues with 
exploring contractual relations with an aim to outline key challenges in contracting 
practice found in the literature.  
 
5.3.1 Farmers’ Loss of Autonomy and Shift of Traditional Production Patterns 
Reardon and Barrett (2000) and Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) found that contract 
farming takes the authority of decision-making regarding production processes away 
from the farmer and directs it downstream in the supply chain towards the company. 
In this sense, the farmer loses the autonomy and control over its production 
(Weatherspoon et al., 2001; da Silva, 2005; Will, 2013). In addition, the farmer 
might form a sort of dependency on the contractor (Prowse, 2012).  
 
Since the farmer is no longer in complete control of his/her a land, contract 
arrangement tends to impose rules on what and how to cultivate (da Silva, 2005; 
Smalley, 2013). Thus, contracting shifts traditional production patterns towards 
export-oriented and cash crops at the expense of local food crops (Singh, 2002). 
Because of decreased food crops cultivation, the price of food increases and makes 
local farming and non-farming households more vulnerable to the fluctuation of food 
supply and prices (Singh, 2002; Waning and Key, 2002). Woodend (2003) suggested 




chemicals or employment of farming methods with harmful results (i.e. exhausting 
or mining the soil and cultivation of crops in an inappropriate area). Considering the 
loss of autonomy and shifted production patterns influenced by contract farming 
schemes, Smalley (2013) highlighted that farmers are often suppressed for the sake 
of rural development that favours high-value cash production. 
 
5.3.2 Unequal Bargaining Power 
In a contractual relationship, small-scale farmers are likely to have less bargaining 
power compared to the company (Ramaswami et al., 2006; Poulton et al., 2010; Cai 
et al., 2014b). This stems from the available economic resources, access to 
information and knowledge, and legal protection, which are in the majority of cases 
distributed in favour of the company. As seen in the previous section that focused on 
contract contents, bargaining power plays an important role in defining contract 
terms. Due to their low bargaining power, small-scale farmers might have to accept 
unfavourable conditions (da Silva, 2005; Minot, 2011). Woodend (2003) stated that 
contract farming will never be equal for both parties unless the independent third 
party intervenes in the contract and small-scale farmers have secured protection. 
Furthermore, Will (2013) emphasised that the issue of prices and a company’s 
default (e.g. delayed payments or unjustified rejection of contracted commodity) are 
sensitive to negotiation power of two parties; hence, small-scale farmers mostly 
receive depressed prices and are not able to claim their rights when the company 
breaches the contract. Small-scale farmers could increase their bargaining power by 
forming groups or joining associations that will represent farmers’ interests in the 
contract arrangement (Baumann, 2000; Prowse, 2007). 
 
5.3.3 Exploitation of Small-scale Farmers 
One possible consequence of unequal bargaining power and weaker position in 
contractual relation is farmers’ exploitation through the contract (Dhillon and Singh, 
2006; Birthal et al., 2008). The main critique of contract farming in the literature is 
that a contract serves as a company’s tool for making profit; thus, the company takes 
advantage of farmers’ poverty by using farmers as labourers that have low wages 
and carry high production risks (Minot, 1986; Runsten and Key, 1995; Warning and 
Hoo, 2000; Miyata et al., 2009; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Minot, 2011; Oya, 




exploitative behaviour as small-scale farmers tend to exploit their unpaid family 
labour to comply with contract terms and conditions imposed by the company. 
Accusations of exploitation through contract farming will likely depend on the 
circumstances under which contracting is observed, however, the possibility that 
contractual arrangement could be exploitative must be taken into consideration when 
promoting contract farming through public policies. A sound legal framework and 
collective action that safeguards small-scale farmers’ interests represent a significant 
barrier to exploitative contracts. 
 
5.3.4 Imbalanced Relations in Households and Rural Communities 
Contracts could upset the balance between genders in the household. Challenges 
occur due to the distribution of benefits based on performed work (Shepherd, 2007). 
In the traditional rural communities, the labour related to contract farming activities 
might be assigned to women, but the cash payments may be granted to men (da 
Silva, 2005). Women’s role and interests in contract farming could be neglected and 
lead to tensions in the household (Prowse, 2012; Smalley, 2013). Also, Vermeulen 
and Cotula (2010) suggested that having longer contract arrangements might shift 
the land allocation from subsistence crops that are grown by women to more cash 
crops, which are preferred by men signing the contract. In some parts of Africa, 
women are responsible for care and feeding of the household but because men 
receive payments from contracted production, the household purchase of food and 
health related materials could be reduced (Minot, 1986). Imbalanced relations in 
households due to contract farming may be provoked by the set of cultural beliefs 
and tradition, yet sustainable contracting should insist on adequate rights for both 
men and women employed (Porter and Phillips-Howards, 1997). 
 
While contract farming may create distortions in the household, it can also increase 
disparities in rural communities. For instance, if the company has contracts only with 
large-scale farmers in the area, small-scale farmers can be excluded from markets 
and even displaced from their farms due to increased demand for the land 
consolidation (Key and Runsten, 1999; Warning and Key, 2002). Exclusion from 
contracting will result in income inequalities between different groups in the rural 
area and may cause conflicts between members (Minot, 2011). Initially excluded 




contracts, meaning that smaller farmers will have the status of labourers rather than 
independent farmers in the community (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997; 
Baumann, 2000; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). According to Eaton and Shepherd 
(2001), imbalanced relations in rural communities can be exacerbated if the farming 
calendar for contract farming obligations clashes with the timing of traditional and 
social events. 
 
5.3.5 Information Asymmetry and Increased Transaction Costs 
Contractual relations between the company and small-scale farmers involved 
asymmetric information and increased transaction costs (da Silva, 2005; Cai et al., 
2014b). On the one hand, small-scale farmers usually lack information on markets, 
prices and potential risks of contracting, which makes them vulnerable to possible 
exploitation (Minot, 2011; Jia and Bijman, 2013). On the other hand, small-scale 
farmers can use the information asymmetry to mask their side-selling before the 
company (Barrett et al., 2012). Still, in both cases, asymmetric information will have 
long-term negative consequences for small-scale farmers under contracts. 
 
So far in this study, transaction costs have been related to contract farming in a 
positive context, meaning that contractual arrangements tend to decrease company's 
transaction costs mainly because a steady supply eliminates the need for costly 
searching, screening and monitoring suppliers. Also, if a farmer has a known buyer 
for its commodity, the costs of finding reliable markets are decreased. While this is 
true mostly in the case of medium- to large-scale farmers, the literature suggests that 
the transaction costs of having contracts with a large number of small-scale farmers 
are high (Warning and Hoo, 2000; da Silva, 2005; Birthal et al., 2008). For example, 
dealing with numerous small-scale farmers will increase costs of providing extension 
services, monitoring for pesticide violations and input supply (Kirsten and Sartorius, 
2002; Shepherd, 2007; Vavra, 2009). Small-scale farmers are often dispersed, which 
adds to the costs of collecting commodities as the company has to cover a broad and 
sometimes difficult to reach geographical area (Prowse, 2007; Minot, 2011; Will, 
2013).  
 
Also, the costs of contract enforcement are higher with small-scale farmers (Birthal 




companies prefer to contract with larger farmers compared to small-scale farmers. 
However, small-scale farmers indeed show some significant advantages that are 
attractive to companies (see chapter 3). Barrett et al. (2012) argued that even though 
contracting with larger better-off farmers will decrease transaction costs the 
company might have to offer better contracting terms while the risk of non-
compliance with contract terms could be even higher with larger farmers. 
 
5.3.6 Risk of Indebtedness 
Current studies describe two main reasons for small-scale farmers’ indebtedness due 
to contracting. First, contract farming might require certain investments into 
equipment and facilities (Birthal et al., 2008). Needed investments could be 
commodity-specific and have little flexibility to adjust for the production of other 
commodities quickly. Small-scale farmers who invested in their contracted 
production and are expecting the return on that capital investments through 
contracting might fall into indebtedness if the contract they have with the company is 
cancelled or only short-term and not renewed (Pultrone, 2012). Second, since 
contract farming opens the access to needed credit, the risk of indebtedness is 
increasing considering small-scale farmers’ financial capabilities (i.e. high default on 
credit) and uncertainty of agricultural production (da Silva, 2005; Dhillon and Singh, 
2006; Prowse, 2007; Will, 2013). The lack of opportunities for saving needed capital 
to finance contracted production independently (e.g. buying seeds and chemicals) 
coupled with poor financial management, might create dependency on company's 
credit and push small-scale farmers into a vicious cycle of indebtedness (Watts, 
1994; Birthal, 2008). Companies could exploit farmers’ indebtedness to 
subsequently offer lower prices (Minot, 1986; Jia and Bijman, 2013; Smalley, 2013). 
 
5.3.7 Side-selling and Inputs Misuse 
One of the most serious challenges in contractual relations that affect both small-
scale farmers and companies is side-selling. Often called extra-contractual 
marketing, side-selling involves selling the contracted commodity to a third party, 
which is not part of the contract and did not provide any services to the farmer (e.g. 
input provision or extension services) or selling directly on the open market due to 
more attractive prices (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; 




insight into the logic behind side-selling: small-scale farmers have limited 
opportunities for earning income and urgently need cash to meet the food needs of 
their households. The attitude of a small-scale farmer is to obtain the highest possible 
price for scarce volumes produced, and if the contract does not offer this option, a 
small-scale farmer will search and sell outside of the contract (Shepherd, 2007). 
Minot (2011) suggested that small-scale farmers can also side sell to avoid repaying 
inputs that they received through the contract.
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 Side-selling may have long-term 
negative consequences for small-scale farmers as the company is likely to dismiss 
defaulting farmers and even more – the future opportunities for the local community 
to engage in contracting might be forfeited (Groenewald et al., 2012). Side-selling 
can prompt companies to supervise small-scale farmers more closely (and increase 
transaction costs) or even abandon contracting (Huh et al., 2012). 
 
Alternatively, Shavell (2009) argued that breaching of a contract might not always 
be immoral
52
 due to contract incompleteness, i.e. some contingencies are not 
explicitly described in the contract. Applying Shavell’s idea in the case of contract 
farming offers some ground to deepen the thinking about side-selling. Let us look at 
the example of a contract where the company offers inputs that farmers have to pay 
in cash and in advance. In this case, the company only serves as an input dealer 
compared to the cases where the input supply is much more dependent on the 
company due to the involvement of credit for inputs. If the contract does not define 
the exact price that will be paid to the farmer or at least some formula that will be 
used to calculate the final price, then the price clause can be considered as 
incomplete or vague. Thus, what Shavell (2009) suggests is that side-selling in the 
context of such a contract might not be necessarily immoral as the small-scale farmer 
does not have pending obligations towards the company (inputs are repaid) and the 
contract does not offer any information on the expected price, which in turn 
increases uncertainty and farmer’s marketing risk. As an ‘independent’ economic 
subject, a small-scale farmer is entitled to act in the best interest of its commodity 
and financial outcomes; thus, selling the commodity for the highest price offered is 
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 This is the case with contracts that offer inputs, which are charged through deduction from the final 
price. Small-scale farmers know that if they sell the commodity to the contractor, the price received 
will be reduced for the cost of inputs. Hence, by selling the commodity outside the contract, small-
scale farmers will receive a higher price. Nevertheless, they will be indebted, and the contractor could 
take a legal action against the farmer. 
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considered economically rational. The problem with this thinking is, however, 
ignoring the fact that the small-scale farmer often does not have a production scale, 
resources or negotiation power to independently and continuously survive on the 
market. In contrast, larger farmers could have that power, and they might violate 
contracts more often without serious consequences (Barrett et al., 2012). Therefore, 
while side-selling may not be entirely immoral in described conditions, it is certainly 
inefficient for the small-scale farmer in the long run as the risk of losing the source 
of quality inputs in the environment of poor input markets offers a sufficient reason 
to stick with selling the commodity to the contractor. 
 
Besides side-selling, input misuse is another type of opportunistic behaviour that 
might occur in contractual relations. Since inputs are a valuable but scarce resource, 
small-scale farmers might use inputs received via contract and allocate them partially 
to other crops, typically food crops (Watts, 1994; Weatherspoon et al., 2001; Jia and 
Bijman, 2013). Also, small-scale farmers sometimes sell inputs to gain an additional 
income (Prowse, 2007). By selling or diverting inputs away from the contracted 
crop, small-scale farmers are likely to have reduced yields, receive less income and 
jeopardise their relationship with the company (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Will, 
2013). 
 
5.3.8 Problematic Contract Enforcement 
Appropriate contract enforcement is a pre-requisite for efficient economic 
transactions (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). In some developing countries, enforcing 
contracts might be difficult due to poorly developed and inefficient legal systems 
(Reardon and Barrett 2000; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Guo and Jolly, 2008). North 
(1990, p. 54) took it further by stating that ‘The inability of societies to develop 
effective, low cost enforcement is the most important source of both historical and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.’ In some cases, contract 
enforcement could be costlier compared to the loss resulting from the initial dispute 
and companies will avoid enforcing contracts despite frequent contract breaches 
(Imbruce, 2008; Narayanan, 2012; Minot and Ronchi, 2014). Because few contract 
disputes reach the court, the vicious cycle of violating contract terms with no legal 





Kähkönen and Meagher (2001) suggested that the relative efficiency of contract 
enforcement mechanisms will depend on the good that is the subject of the exchange, 
the cost of enforcing mechanisms and predictability of the outcome. Still, authors 
point out that societies differ in their mechanisms depending on the history, culture 
and political system, and these factors might influence inefficiencies in developing 
countries (Kähkönen and Meagher, 2001). While Fefchamps (1996) found that 
public mechanisms were less relevant in enforcing contracts in Ghana compared to 
personalised relations based on trust, Messick (2005) and Thomas-Hawthorne (2008) 
advocated for formal contract law, third-party enforcement and private mechanisms 
to reduce problematic contract enforcement in developing countries. 
 
5.4 Possible Future Trajectories of Contract Farming 
Considering benefits and challenges of contract farming, there are a few possible 
scenarios on how this business model will be further developed within the conditions 
of the modern agri-food supply chains (chapter 3). This section briefly considers 
three future trajectories. First, there might be no need for CF once market 
inefficiencies are overcome. Singh (2007) observed that, in itself, contracting is only 
a temporary means for agricultural and rural development; thus, it will vanish when 
market failures are under control. Nevertheless, the author also noted that future of 
CF depends on the dynamics of the sector where it is performed. The idea that 
contract farming serves to correct market inefficiencies inevitably calls for further 
thinking on whether contracting is a system that has been around for a long time and 
- just like economies have their peaks and bottoms in cycles - CF gains its 
momentum when the economy starts its recuperation from poor conditions. The 
contracting might not phase out but rather remain at low levels during prosperous 
times just to be re-invented again when market inefficiencies occur. This could also 
be applied to one part of the economy – the agri-food industry that has been rapidly 
transforming over the past decades causing new co-ordination mechanisms to 
emerge (i.e. vertical integration) and adopting contract farming as one of its 
instruments.  
 
The second option is that contract arrangements will evolve into more inclusive 
models. Kelly et al. (2015, p. ix.) described inclusive business models (IBM) as the 




arrangements, support farmers and small enterprises to establish a stronger 
negotiation position, build on the skills and expertise of existing market players, are 
scalable in medium term and allow diversified income stream’. The idea of IBMs 
obviously builds on the existing contract farming philosophy, but it also announces 
the era of fairer business models judging by the term ‘inclusive'. Therefore, the CF 
might involve arrangements that will be more directly favourable for small-scale 
farmers and will strengthen their position in food supply chains. 
 
Finally, contracting could increase. Kherallah and Kirsten (2001) and Miller (2003) 
stated that the rise in contract farming arrangements would be a result of a 
continuous need for increased vertical integration to secure stable and quality supply 
of the agricultural produce at a known price. Also, Jia and Bijman (2013) predicted 
that contracting in developing countries will increase with the emergence and spread 
of supermarkets. Finally, it is likely that all three options will simultaneously appear, 
as they are not mutually exclusive. In better off developing countries, contracting in 
its most basic form might decrease or evolve into inclusive business models. At the 
same time, for developing countries experiencing agri-food transformation in its full 
extent, contracting could increase and over time become more inclusive.  
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature on challenges in contract farming arrangements. 
Concerning contract design, the literature suggested that the formulation of the 
contract clauses determines the distribution of risks and benefits among parties in the 
contract. The challenges in contract farming practice are numerous and far-reaching 
for small-scale farmers. The following chapter 6 reviews socio-economic conditions, 
food supply chains and contract farming in the context of Malawi. 
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Chapter 6 introduces the context of the study area. The first section reviews 
geographic and socio-economic characteristics of Malawi. The second section 
focuses on Malawian agriculture and the key challenges. The performance of agri-
food supply chains in Malawi is explored in section three. The chapter further 
addresses contract farming, its emergence and characteristics in Malawi. The last 
section sets the scene for the study by examining the status of the paprika sector in 
Malawi through review of available literature. 
 
6.2 Geographical and Socio-economic Characteristics of Malawi 
The Republic of Malawi declared its independence from Great Britain in 1964 and 
officially became a republic in 1966. Malawi is a landlocked country located 
between 9° to 17°S and 30° to 36°E in southern Africa and surrounded by Zambia on 
the northwest, Tanzania on the north to northeast and Mozambique on the east, south 
and southwest and with population around 16.7 million (Figure 6.1) (Reynolds, 
2006; FAO, 2014; National Statistical Office of Malawi-NSOM, 2015a; WB, 2015). 
Malawi’s total surface area is 118,484 square kilometres and the country’s border on 
one part of the east side is occupied by 571 km long Lake Malawi (Jury and 
Mwafulirwa, 2002; FAO, 2014; WB, 2016a). One of the major challenges for 
Malawi is the inefficiency of the transportation system since the country depends on 
transit corridors and ports of its neighbouring countries, which limits Malawi’s 
export capacity due to high costs and long waiting time involved (WTO, 2016). 
Malawi is divided into three regions and 28 districts.
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Figure 6.1 Location of Malawi in the Southeast Africa and the area of research 







Since 2011, the population of Malawi has been continually growing by an average 
rate of 8% in the 4 years’ period (Figure 6.2). The rural population comprised 83.7% 
of Malawi’s population in 2014, and 81% of males and 82% of females lived in rural 
areas (National Statistical Office: 2015-2016 MDHS, 2016; WB, 2016b). The urban 
population grew by 17.4% in the period 2011-2014, while the rural population 
increased by 12.2% in the same period (WB, 2016b). 
 
 
 Figure 6.2 Trend in rural and urban population growth, Malawi 2011-2015 
Source: Author’s compilation from WB (2016b). 
 
The Central Region, where the study took place, had 154 people per sq. km and the 
population of 5,510,195 (NSOM, 2015c). The male-female ratio in the country was 
49:51 (Integrated Household Survey-HIS, 2012). Life expectancy at birth was 57 
years for males and 60 years for females in 2015 (WHO, 2016). In the Central 
Region, there were around 1,222,365 households in 2008 with an average size of 4.5 
people per household (NSOM, 2015c). Male-headed households had more household 
members (average 4.8) compared to female-headed households on the national level 
(average 3.8) (National Statistical Office of Malawi – MDHS 2015-2016, 2016). 
 
In 2010, 61.31% of adult Malawians age 15 and above were literate (WTO, 2016). 
The overall literacy dropped by 2.82% in the period from 1998-2010 (WB, 2015). 
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the female population (-2.75%) (WB, 2015). On a regional level, the Southern and 
Central Regions had the same percentage of literacy (81.7%) (NSOM, 2015c) 
(Figure 6.3).  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Literacy among the population aged 5 and above in 2008 by region 
Source: Author’s compilation based on NSOM (2015c). 
 
Completion rates for primary and secondary level education increased in Malawi. In 
the period from 2005-2013, the primary education level increased by 38% and 
secondary education level by 65% (WB, 2015). In 2013, levels of both primary and 
secondary education for females decreased compared to 2010 by 0.11% and 0.04% 
respectively (WB, 2015). For males, levels of both primary and secondary education 
increased in 2015 by 0.11% and 0.04% respectively compared to 2010. 
 
In 2010, around 87% of the population was living at less than $3.10 a day and almost 
71% of the population at less than $1.90 a day (WB, 2015). About half of the 
Malawian population (50.7%) was living at the national poverty line in 2010 (WB, 
2015). In terms of the poverty status in the urban and rural areas, 17% of the urban 
population was living at the national poverty line compared to 56.6% of the rural 
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Malawi is considered as one of the poorest countries in the world. The minimum 
wage in Malawi is set at about US$ 1.12 per day (FAO, 2015b).  
 
Malawi’s GDP per capita annual growth has been unstable since 2005. In 2014, GDP 
growth was 2.5%, which was an increase of 0.48% compared to 2013 (WB, 2015). 
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (2016), GDP in Malawi will 
grow at around 4.5% in 2016 and then the growth will continue at rates of 5.5% in 
the medium term. 
 
In Malawi, on average 35% of the state budget has been provided by external donors, 
which makes the country highly dependent on the external support (WTO, 2016). 
Also, the volatility of the national currency (Kwacha) makes the business 
environment uncertain (Figure 6.4). 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Volatility of Malawian currency (Kwacha), January-June 2016 
Source: OANDA (2016). 
 
In the period between 2013 and 2014, Malawi's annual import and export decreased 
by 2.32% and 8.58% respectively (WB, 2015). The considerable decline in exports 
could be attributed to poor weather conditions affecting agricultural production, 
which represents the driving factor of Malawi's export and economic growth. 
 
6.3 Agriculture in Malawi 
Agriculture is the most important sector in Malawi (MGDS II, 2011; Chirwa, 2011; 
Phiri et al., 2012; Malawi Ministry of Agriculture, 2014; WTO, 2016). In 2014, 
agriculture contributed 33.3% to the national GDP (WB, 2015). Agriculture is a 
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source of livelihoods and food security for over 90% of Malawians, provides 
employment for nearly 80% of the total work force and accounts for around 75% of 
export earnings (CAADP Post Compact Review-PCR, 2010; FAO, 2014, 2015b; 
WTO, 2016). According to WB (2015), 69.9% of females and 58.5% of males are 
employed in agriculture. For poor rural people, agriculture is often the only source of 
income (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013). In 2009, Government expenditure for 
agriculture reached 39% of the national budget, which was a 25% increase compared 
to 2002 (NSOM, 2015). Concerning investments in agriculture, Malawi is 
considered to be below the average of other developing countries. In 2013, Malawi’s 
Government invested USD 313 million in agriculture (FAO, 2015b). Beside the 
Government, various donors contributed to the development of agriculture in total 
USD 159.76 million
54
 (FAO, 2015). Still, with around USD 473 million of 
investment in agriculture annually, it is likely that Malawi will struggle to respond to 
the expected growing domestic food demand in the coming decades. Frequent 
droughts and floods in Malawi often destroy crops and threaten the livestock, which 
contributes to food insecurity, indebtedness and poverty among Malawian farmers 
(FAO, 2016). 
 
6.3.1 Climate and Land Characteristics 
Malawi’s climate is characterised as tropical with two different seasons: a rainy, 
warm season from October to April and a dry, cooler season from May to September 
(FAO, 2014; NSOM, 2015a). About 95% of annual precipitation occurs during the 
rainy season, with approximately 1,289 mm in Mzuzu, 900 mm in Lilongwe and 
1,127 mm in Blantyre (Malawi Meteorological Service, 2006). The amount of annual 
rainfall has decreased in the 2013-2014 period in the Central and Southern Region, 
which might pose considerable challenges for the country's mainly rain-fed 
agriculture (NSOM, 2015a).  
 
In the last two decades, Malawi experienced numerous natural disasters in the form 
of floods, droughts and rising temperatures that had an adverse effect on crop and 
livestock production (IALUO, 2012; FAO, 2014). Deforestation reaches high rates in 
Malawi (WTO, 2016). Poverty and population growth in Malawi are putting pressure 
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 Ireland’s total investment in Malawi’s agriculture in 2013 was USD 7.58 million (FAO, 2015b). 
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on available agricultural land and production capacities. In 2013, from the total 
country area in Malawi, 49% (5,790,000 hectares) was in use as agricultural land 
(FAO, 2015a). In addition, 27% of the country area was under forests, and only 1.2% 
and 15.6 % of the agricultural land was used for (i) permanent crops and (ii) 
meadows and pastures respectively (FAO, 2015a). Maize (58%), pulses (20%) and 
groundnuts (9%) occupied the greatest portion (number of hectares) of the 
agricultural land in Malawi in terms of food crops (NSOM, 2015b). 
 
6.3.2 Structure of the Malawian Agricultural Sector 
The Malawian agricultural sector is divided between profitable estates, which 
contribute less than 30% to the agricultural GDP and small-scale farmers who 
dominate and contribute over 70% to the agricultural GDP (National Agricultural 
Policy, 2011). There are around 3.5 million small farming households in Malawi that 
cultivate on average 0.5-2.5 hectares of fragmented land under customary land 
tenure using traditional cultivation methods (CAADP-PCR, 2010; Phiri et al., 2012). 
Small-scale farmers usually practice subsistence farming to meet their basic needs, 
which includes growing food crops such as maize, cassava and sweet potato 
(National Agricultural Policy, 2011). In contrast, estates are focused on growing 
high-value export cash crops, such as tobacco, sugar, coffee and tea (National 
Agricultural Policy, 2011). 
 
6.3.3 Main Crops Produced 
Tobacco and maize dominate in Malawian agricultural sector (Figure 6.5). Maize is 
the national staple food, and it is grown by approximately 80% of small households 
(FAO, 2015a). Despite the fact that maize is widely cultivated, a high proportion of 
Malawian small-scale farmers do not produce a sufficient amount of food for their 
yearly needs and thus rely on market supply (Chirwa, 2011). Other important crops 
in Malawi include: rice, cassava, sugar, sweet and Irish potato, groundnuts, cotton 
and coffee. In terms of the paprika sector, production levels for chillies, peppers and 







Figure 6.5 Trend in production of main crops in Malawi in mT, 2008-2013 
Note: The graph displays logarithmic values with the base 10 for improved 
readability. Source: Authors’ compilation from WTO (2016). 
 
6.3.4 Main Export Crops in Malawi 
A significant contributor to the positive trade balance is tobacco. With an export 
value of US$ 647,408 in 2014, Malawi was the world’s 23
rd
 tobacco exporter 
(NSOM, 2014). Tobacco has a long history of cultivation in Malawi, which dates 
back to the 1890s, and until today it continues to be the single most important export 
crop (Jaffee, 2003; Chirwa, 2011; FAO, 2015; WTO, 2016). Interestingly, although 
tobacco is a highly valuable crop, this sector is dominated by small-scale farmers, 
not by estates (Prowse and Moyer-Lee, 2014). Tobacco is followed by sugar, tea, 
cotton and coffee as the most important national export cash crops (NSOM, 2016b).  
 
6.3.5 Institutional Environment for Agriculture and Trade in Malawi 
Currently, Malawi’s policy framework for sustainable economic growth embeds the 
rural development concept and strives to fight poverty and food insecurity directly 
























































Malawi CAADP Compact 
2010 
‘(a) Sets the parameters for 
long-term partnerships in the 
agricultural sector,               




development partners; and 
(c) Clarifies stakeholder 
expectations in order to 
ensure successful 
implementation of the 
ASWAP’. 
 
‘Offers a strategy for 
supporting priority 
activities in the 
agricultural sector to 
increase agricultural 
productivity and 
make Malawi a 
hunger free 
nation’. 
                         New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD):                                            
‘Overall mission is to address the critical challenges of poverty, development and 




Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy 
(MGDS II) 2011-2016 
‘The objective of MGDS 
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sector […] and [turn] 
the country from a 
predominantly 
consuming to a […] 
producing and 
exporting nation, 











(ASWAp)     
2011-2015 
 
           Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP):                         
‘In Malawi, it will help to identify strategic options and sources of pro-poor growth for the 
agricultural sector, build knowledge management systems in the sector and embrace 




‘The strategy to build 
Malawi’s productive base 
and export capacity in a 
manner that empowers 
the poor, farmers, youth, 
women and other 
vulnerable groups’. 
Malawi 2020 Vision – ‘A framework for the implementation of short- and medium-term 
plans. Agriculture and food security [are] key priority areas to foster economic growth.’ 
Malawi CAADP Compact 
(CAADAP PCR) 2010 
‘(a) Sets the parameters for 
long-term partnerships in the 
agricultural sector,               




development partners; and 
(c) Clarifies stakeholder 
expectations in order to 
ensure successful 





‘Offers a strategy for 
supporting priority 
activities in the 
agricultural sector to 
increase agricultural 
productivity and 
make Malawi a 
hunger free 
nation’. 
Figure 6.6 Summary of relevant policies for Malawian agriculture and trade 
Source: Based on ASWAp (2011), FAO (2014, 2015b), Malawi CAADP Compact 2010 (2010), 




The policy is oriented towards reorganisation, commercialisation and broadening of 
small-scale farmers' participation to encourage production, processing, export, 
income generation, food security and rural development (Agriculture Sector Wide 
Approach, 2010; Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II, 2012; National 
Agricultural Policy Framework, 2011). The means of achieving goals include 
stronger association with the private sector and, in particular, promoting contract 
farming i.e. stimulation of smallholders through the well-developed inclusive supply 
chain and profitable contracts to induce their contribution on the market (CAADP, 
2009). Despite a developed framework, the implementation of stated measures in 
addressing current challenges of Malawian agriculture remains a slow process. The 
main national and international policies guiding the agricultural sector involve 
NEPAD, CAADP, Malawi 2020 Vision, MGDS II, ASWAp, NAP, NES and 
CAADP Compact and are summarised in Figure 6.6. Malawi currently does not have 
guidelines or a strategy for contract farming, which makes it challenging to organise 
the relationship between companies and small-scale farmers in an efficient and 
sustainable manner.
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 See chapter 10 for more details. 
Figure 6.7 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development                    





The Malawian Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development (Figure 
6.7) has responsibility for developing an appropriate institutional environment and 
plays a key role in advancing country's transaction of agricultural produce through 
contract farming.
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6.3.6 Key Challenges in Malawian Agriculture 
Malawian agriculture faces numerous challenges, and the key issues are outlined as 
follows based on CAADP PCR (2010), MGDS II (2011), Phiri et al. (2012), Chirwa 
and Dorward (2013), Ministry of Agriculture (2014), FAO (2014, 2015b, 2015c) and 
WTO (2011, 2016): 
 
(a) Overall Status 
As stated, agriculture is the most important sector in the country, and Malawi is 
highly dependent on its agriculture. This creates pressure on land and the continuous 
increase in population results in small and fragmented landholdings with reduced 
capacity to produce meaningful volumes of agricultural produce. Malawi's 
agriculture is mainly rain-fed, and the irrigation system is lacking. The vulnerability 
to weather shocks, such as floods and droughts, and threats from insects, pests and 
diseases are hindering further progress. The low soil fertility in Malawi is related to 
low fertiliser use and a low usage of mechanisation. Due to the high costs of 
fertilisers, national subsidy programmes such as FISP (Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme) were created to secure the inputs to the poorest households. However, 
FISP spurred dependence on subsidised fertiliser, while its results in improving food 
security and poverty alleviation for the poorest households have not yet been shown. 
The lack of infrastructure in Malawi reflects in a lack of storage facilities and post-
harvest management. Also, transportation costs are high, which makes accessing the 
market and exporting challenging and expensive. The country’s over-reliance on 
tobacco as an export crop reduces diversity in exportable resources, although recent 
efforts have been undertaken to make coffee, sugar, tea, cotton and paprika 
alternative export crops.   
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 The structure of the Ministry was relevant for this study for identifying appropriate channels for 
dissemination of the study’s findings. 
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Malawi is missing a market information system to inform appropriate policy 
measures and enable farmers to negotiate the price of the agricultural products. 
 
(b) Small-scale Farmers’ Conditions 
Small-scale farmers in Malawi face low productivity mainly due to the usage of 
inefficient technologies and the absence of investment in mechanisation. The small-
scale farmers lack access to needed credit to invest in their production. The high 
input prices are making it difficult for small-scale farmers to use appropriate 
fertilisers, pesticides and other chemicals, which further lowers their productivity 
and quality levels. Poor overall health conditions, especially in rural areas, affect the 
efficiency of the labour force. Food insecurity influences the small-scale farmers to 
produce food crops and reduces opportunities to engage in cash crop production, 
which would potentially end the vicious cycle of farmers' poverty.  
  
6.4 Malawi and Modern Agri-food Supply Chains 
6.4.1 Selected Evidence from Recent Supply Chain Analyses in Malawi 
This section outlines how agricultural supply chains perform in the context of 
Malawi to gain better insights into Malawi’s response to agri-food transformation. It 
is based on the literature review of five recent studies conducted in different 
commodity sectors. 
 
6.4.1.1 Pigeon Pea 
Makoka (2009) explored the pigeon pea supply chain using a sample of 200 farmers 
from four leading districts in the production of this crop in the Southern Region: 
Balaka, Mangochi, Chiradzulu and Zomba. The study shows that the supply chain 
was lacking competitiveness due to high freight costs and low quality of the product. 
The small-scale farmers were mainly supplying pigeon pea and had limited access to 
market information and improved varieties. 
 
6.4.1.2 Traditional Vegetables 
Chagomoka et al. (2014) studied indigenous vegetables in Malawi using focus 
groups and interviews with farmers, intermediaries, retailers and seed suppliers. The 
findings indicated that the linkages between supply chain players were mostly weak 
119 
 
and input markets were missing. Indigenous vegetables were supplied without value 
addition, and the minority of products were processed before reaching the final 
customer. Most of the relationship between players were not regulated through 
written contracts but based on relationship marketing. 
 
6.4.1.3 Tobacco     
Burley tobacco is not a food crop; however, because of the importance of tobacco for 
Malawian economy, two studies involving tobacco are considered here. Tchale and 
Keyser (2010) and Prowse and Moyer-Lee (2014) investigated the tobacco sector. 
The studies showed that Malawi had some competitive advantage in producing and 
exporting tobacco, mainly due to low labour costs. On the other hand, farm gate 
prices were higher compared to other countries. The studies suggested that the 
farmers could improve their income by increasing productivity and lowering 
production costs. Furthermore, the competitiveness could be further advanced by 
strengthening poor links along the supply chain. One way of improving links is 
through contract farming, which emerged in the 2001/2002 season. The proportion 
of tobacco grown by small-scale farmers via contract farming increased rapidly in 
2009/2010 season, which was related to greater system efficiency in the tobacco 
sector, due to better tobacco quality, higher prices obtained and traceability, as 
implied by Prowse and Moyer-Lee (2014). 
 
6.4.1.4 Tomato 
Mango et al. (2015) examined the tomato sector and found that Malawi had a slight 
competitive advantage in tomato production compared to the neighbouring country 
Mozambique. The advantage was a result of higher productivity and lower labour 
and irrigation costs. In spite of yields were considered low, which was due to low 
fertiliser usage. The small-scale farmers obtained low values for their products. The 
study emphasised that the biggest challenge for the tomato supply chain was high 
input price (especially for fertiliser) that reflects the country's high transportation 
costs. 
 
A sample of reviewed literature showed that low product quality and productivity, no 
value addition, and high input and transportation costs represent major constraints 
for Malawian small-scale farmers competing on global agri-food markets. Small-
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scale farmers in Malawi had a competitive advantage in low labour costs, but this 
factor is not sustainable to become a long-term foundation for the country's 
competitiveness as it relies on poorly paid family labour force. Therefore, Malawi 
will have to develop other advantages to perform in modern agri-food markets. As 
demonstrated in Malawi’s leading tobacco sector, organising production and 
marketing through contracts showed the potential to improve the efficiency of a 
supply chain. 
 
6.5 Contract Farming in Malawi 
6.5.1 Emergence of Contracting in Malawi 
According to the report from the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law - UNIDROIT (2014), contract farming emerged in Malawi mainly over three 
phases. During the first phase in the 1970s, contracting was dependent on the state 
and contracts were concluded between the government and medium and large 
commercial farmers. The second phase started with the market liberalisation in the 
1980s when contracting was introduced to small-scale farmers. Since the early 
1990s, contract farming is becoming more significant in Malawi. Malawi has not yet 
developed a legal dimension for CF, and contract farming is currently relying on 
regulations from the English law of contract with certain modifications (UNIDROIT, 
2014). Malawi mostly practices contract farming for high-value cash crops, such as 
tobacco, cotton, paprika, tea, chillies, coffee and sugar (Figure 6.8).  
 
Figure 6.8 Estimated number of small-scale farmers per commodity under contracts 
in Malawi. Source: Author’s compilation based on Agar and Chiligo (2008), CYE 
report (2009) and Prowse and Moyer-Lee (2014). Map: FAO (2015d). 
 Cotton: 120,000 
 Paprika: 10,000-15,000 
 Green tea: 8,000 
 Chillies: 6,000 
 Green coffee beans: 3,000 
 Sugar cane: 1,100  
 Tobacco: 20-30% of the total 
production; majority small-scale 
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6.5.2 Current Status of Contract Farming 
The evidence on contract farming’s impact in Malawi is so far limited and mixed. 
For example, Chirwa and Kydd (2009) reported that small-scale farmers in the tea 
sector had insufficient voice and powers to enforce contracts. Alternatively, 
Kumwenda and Madola (2005) found that side-selling represented a significant issue 
reported by companies. Due to small-scale farmers' opportunistic behaviour, contract 
farming was not successfully established in Malawi (CYE report, 2009). Agar and 
Chiligo (2008) explored contract farming in Malawi’s cotton, sugar, tea, tobacco and 
paprika sector and concluded that contracting increased small-scale farmers' income 
and improved productivity. The authors identified two issues that severely hindered 
contract farming operationalisation: small-scale farmers perceived the contract price 
as intentionally too low and contractors complained about the breach of contract 
terms (Agar and Chiligo, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, one of the issues in Malawi is the absence of appropriate National 
Contract Farming Strategy.
57 
Contracting is currently being practised both in formal 
and less formal ways across the agricultural sector. This results in considerable 
differences in contracts as each contractor can formulate the arrangement according 
to its preferences (UNIDROIT, 2014). Chirwa and Kydd (2009) found that small-
scale farmers under direct private contracts in the tea sector in Malawi performed 
better compared to small-scale farmers under statutory contracts. The variety of 
contractual agreements in Malawi is further confirmed in the tobacco sector.  For 
instance, Chirwa (2011) described the system where tobacco producers sign 
contracts with buyers to sell their product at specified grades and prices. However, 
once the marketing season starts, tobacco is brought to the auction where producers 
can decide whether to sell their contracted crop to the initial buyer or at auction floor 
if they are not satisfied with the price in the contract (Chirwa, 2011). Therefore, 
contracting in Malawi remains mostly reserved for the export cash crops and it 
operates through different arrangements without regulations prescribed in the 
national policy or strategy.
  
57
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 The issue of lacking National Strategy is revisited in chapters 10 and 11 in more detail. 
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6.6 Paprika Sector in Malawi 
Considering the global paprika sector, the most important producer of paprika is 
Asia with 84.2% of the total market share reached in 2013-2014, compared to the 
African share that accounted for only 4.9% in the same period (FAO, 2015; Ferreira 
Pinto et al., 2016). The five top producers of paprika in 2014 were Vietnam, 
Indonesia, India, Brazil, and China (FAO, 2015a). 
 
In Malawi, paprika is mostly grown in the Northern Region (Nkhata Bay, Mzimba, 
Mzuzu, and Rumphi) and Central Region (Nkhotakoka, Lilongwe, Salima, Dowa, 
Dedza), while districts Blantyre, Zomba, and Mwanza in the Southern Region also 
showed the potential for contracted production (Agar and Chiligo, 2008; CYE report, 
2009; Makoka et al., 2010). Paprika was first introduced to Malawian small-scale 
farmers in 1996 and small-scale farmers now dominate in Malawi’s paprika 
production (Makoka et al., 2010). The majority of paprika in Malawi is grown for 
export, while only a small proportion is consumed domestically in hot sauces (CYE 
report, 2009).   
 
The paprika sector is of considerable importance for small-scale farmers in Malawi. 
As an export cash crop, paprika attracts premium markets and prices. The labour-
intensive production process makes paprika a less desirable choice for medium to 
large farmers; however, it opens the door for small-scale farmers with a considerable 
family labour force (Makoka et al., 2010). Because of its characteristics, paprika is a 
suitable crop for contract farming, which allows small-scale farmers to be introduced 
to contractors. 
 
6.6.1 Production and Trade of Paprika 
The area under paprika in Malawi covered 3,299 hectares in 2013, which represented 
a slight growth compared to 2011 and 2012 (CountrySTAT Malawi, 2016). The two 
paprika varieties usually required for international trade and grown by Malawian 
small-scale farmers are Papri Queen and CP133 (Agar and Chiligo, 2008; Makoka et 
al., 2010).  
 
Figure 6.9 shows that paprika production reached high volumes in the 2009/2010 
season but then dropped to levels that are lower than during the 2008/2009 season 
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mainly as a consequence of severe floods and droughts affecting Malawi. In the 
2012/2013 season, Malawi produced 1,472 metric tonnes of paprika (WTO, 2016).  
 
                 
Figure 6.9 Paprika production (mT) in Malawi, 2008-2013 
Note: The graph displays logarithmic values with the base 10 for improved 
readability. Source: Author’s compilation based on WTO (2016). 
 
 
In 2015, the export value of paprika was US$ 1.18 million, which represented a 14% 
decrease in value for the period between 2011 and 2015 (NSOM, 2016). The 
imported value of paprika was US$ 53,000, and this represented a 4% decline in 
imports from 2011-2015 (NSOM, 2016). Malawi is in 65
th
 position in terms of world 
exports of paprika (NSOM, 2016). 
 
Malawi’s raw paprika is mainly exported to South Africa, where it is processed into 
oleoresin and powder, and further to the United Kingdom, France and Spain (Malawi 
Revenue Authority-MRA, 2014; NSOM, 2016) (Figure 6.10). Also, paprika from 






























Figure 6.10 Export and import values for paprika in 2015 
Note: Values in brackets are the annual growth (%) for the period 2011-2015,               
* n.d. = no data available. Source: Author’s compilation from National Statistical 
Office of Malawi (2016b). Map: FAO (2015). 
 
6.6.2 Main Characteristics of the Paprika Production 
Capsicum anuum, L., known as paprika, peppers, chilli peppers, or chilli belongs to a 
tropical plant family Solanaceae. Bosland and Votava (2000) provided an updated 
taxonomy of genus Capsicum as follows: The genus Capsicum originated from 
Central and Southern America, and five species are today known for their economic 
value: C. annuum, C. chinense, C. frutescens, C. baccatum and C. pubescens (De 
Masi et al., 2007; Moscone et al., 2007). Paprika belongs to botanical species that 
produce flesh fruits with either hot or sweet flavours (Finger and Pereira, 2016) 
(Figure 6.11). Paprika is widely grown for commercial purposes in Europe, the 
United States, Brazil, South Africa, Zimbabwe, India and Taiwan (Mínguez-
Mosquera et al., 2007). Paprika is also used for fresh consumption, as a powder or 
spice, for colouring the food and in the medicine for alleviating pain (Bosland and 
Votava, 2000; Finger and Pereira, 2016). 
 
Paprika is a perennial crop, but it is cultivated as an annual crop, with the plant in the 
form of a bush reaching 60-150 cm in height (FAO, 2007; Finger and Pereira, 2016). 
3. France: 45,000 US$ (11%) 
4. Spain: 16,000 US$ (-50%) 
2. United Kingdom: 63,000 US$ (-19%) 
1. South Africa: 1,187,000 US$ (+5%) 1. South Africa: 46,000 US$ (-7%) 
3. India: 1,000 US$ (*n.d.)  
2. Pakistan: 5,000 US$ (*n.d.) 
US$ value imported to Malawi US$ value exported from Malawi 
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Paprika requires temperatures between 18 and 30° C during the day and 15 to 18° C 






Figure 6.11 Botanical characteristics of paprika: Flower, leaves and fruit        
Source: Gema Hernandez Milian, 2016. Reproduced with author’s permission. 
 
The conditions suitable for paprika involve medium, light textured but well-drained 
soils with the pH of 5.5-7.0 and the recommended plant spacing at 0.4 to 0.6 m x 0.9 
m (FAO, 2015e; Ferreira Pinto et al., 2016). The time needed for paprika cultivation 
is about 210 days in arid areas and 125 days in Europe and Mediterranean (FAO, 
2015e). The crop requires over 800 mm of rainfall and in Malawi, it is grown at 
altitudes up to 1,800 m (CYE report, 2009; Makoka et al., 2010). Paprika is prone to 
pests and diseases and spraying is needed on a continuous base (Agar and Chiligo, 
2008; Ferreira Pinto et al., 2016). The yield of paprika varies significantly depending 
on the climate, growing period, irrigation and inputs usage and in commercial 
production it can reach from 4 to 15 t/ha
58 
(Langmead, 2005; FAO, 2015e). 
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6.6.3 Evidence from Supply Chain Analysis of the Paprika Sector in Malawi: A 
Synthesis of Three Studies 
The paprika sector in Malawi has been previously described in studies by Agar and 
Chiligo (2008), CYE report (2009) and Makoka et al. (2010). These studies were 
conducted to (i) analyse the paprika industry and the supply/value chain, (ii) identify 
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  Levels for small-scale farmers' production are outlined in chapter 9.  
Capsicum Annuum, L. 1753 
 Kingdom: Plantae 
 Division: Magnoliophyta 
 Class: Magnoliopsida 
 Order: Solanales 




the main players and their linkages, (iii) describe and assess performance of contract 
farming arrangements, (iv) identify factors limiting CF expansion, (v) identify 
opportunities for value addition and (vi) analyse the institutional framework. 
 
The main strength of these studies is that, together, they provide a comprehensive 
introduction into the paprika sector and offer an extensive description of relations 
within the supply chain. Also, since studies were done in small time intervals, it is 
possible to compare and synthesise them to project the status of Malawi’s paprika 
supply chain.
59 
However, studies involved relatively small sample sizes to make 
inferences about the wider context (Table 6.1). Since the purpose was related to 
elaborating on completed projects and consultancy work, the studies were limited in 
providing and discussing a theoretical and analytical framework for the explored 
phenomenon. 
59
Table 6.1 Comparison of research methodology from studies on paprika in Malawi 
Study Study area Used instruments Sample size Analysis 








Mwanza in the 
South 
Primary research: Interviews with 
buyers and farmers, data 
triangulation by farmers’ 
association and union. 
Desk study: Review of sectoral 




















Primary research: Semi-structured 
questionnaires, checklists, tables 
and value chain reporting 
templates to collect data from 
farmers, traders and exporters. 
Desk study: Review of three 
relevant documents on value chain 



















Makoka et al. 
(2010): 
‘Value chain 
analysis of Paprika 
and Bird’s Eye 




Ntchisi and Dedza. 
Primary research: Household 
questionnaires with farmers and 
interviews with stakeholders. 
Desk study: Crop and trade 
estimates for paprika from the 
Ministry, National Statistical Office, 

















Source: Synthesis from Agar and Chiligo (2008), CYE report (2009) and Makoka et 
al. (2010). 
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 Throughout this study, the literature and findings are compared against the stated three studies. 
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The three studies done in the paprika sector in Malawi suggested that contract 
farming had a diverse effect on small-scale farmers so far. According to Agar and 
Chiligo (2008), contracted small-scale farmers reported improvements in their 
income generation, but they lacked the access to inputs and credit. The small-scale 
farmers were side-selling paprika and did not repay their loans (Agar and Chiligo, 
2008). Makoka et al. (2010) argued that the major constraint for the contracted 
small-scale farmers was the access to market information, in particular, about price. 
CYE report (2009) emphasised the absence of trust and negotiation practices found 
between small-scale farmers and the companies in the paprika supply chain.  
 
These studies concluded that, although the paprika sector is promising for improving 
the potential of Malawi’s food industry and exports, the unrealistic expectations from 
this crop should be discouraged, especially regarding income generation (CYE 
report, 2009). Nonetheless, the status of the paprika sector might be improved if 
legally binding contracts are promoted, farmers’ associations are established, and 
small-scale farmers are able to increase their productivity levels (Agar and Chiligo, 
2008; Makoka et al., 2010). The three studies provided basis for further research to 
deepen the understanding of the key challenges in the paprika supply chain with an 
aim to appropriately address them and enable more efficient and sustainable relations 
between the players in the paprika supply chain 
 
6.7 Summary 
Chapter 6 focused on the study area in broader terms to position the research in the 
context of Malawi. The chapter outlined the socio-economic circumstances in 
Malawi, as well as the status of the agricultural sector and its key challenges. The 
competitiveness of Malawi’s agri-food supply chains was examined through 
examples of recent empirical studies. A review of contract farming practices and the 
paprika sector in Malawi provided the outline of the study setting. Chapter 7 now 
describes the research methodology employed. 
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PART FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 7 Research Methodology 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 outlines the research methodology used in this study. The first section 
provides the rationale for using a mixed method approach and describes The 
Embedded Design-Multilevel Model with both concurrent and sequential data 
collection and QUAL priority. The chapter continues with the focus on the case 
study, participatory approach and triangulation of sources and methodology. The 
study setting and sequence are also introduced. The third and fourth sections 
describe data collection methods, research instruments, sampling methods and data 
collection protocols for qualitative and quantitative research query respectively. The 
analytical framework of the study is outlined in section five. The last two sections 
outline how the study strived to achieve validity and reliability and explains the 
major methodological limitations. 
 
7.2 Mixed Methods Approach 
7.2.1 Rationale for the Approach 
This section develops the argument for using a mixed method approach in this 
study.
60 
The study follows pragmatism as a paradigm and the philosophical tradition 
stating that ‘the truth of an idea is dependent on its workability; ideas or principles 
are true in so far as they work’ (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013, p. 60) (see 
section 2.1.2 in chapter 2 for more details). Creswell et al. (2003) simply defined 
mixed method study as one involving collection and analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data with the integration of both types of data at one or more stages 
during the research. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), the key 
advantages of a mixed methods approach include: 
60
  
 Combining both types of data has the potential to provide a better understanding 
and more complete analysis of problems compared to only numbers or only 
words; 
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 Under section 7.2.2 in this chapter, the embedded single case study approach is described as an 
approach that was chosen for this research due to the idea of combining qualitative methods (case 




 A mixed methods approach encourages collection of more comprehensive 
evidence on studied phenomenon; 
 Using a mixed methods approach can overcome inherent weaknesses of 
separately applied quantitative and qualitative methods; 
 By using a mixed method approach, a researcher can identify and perhaps 
overcome discrepancies in the data, which would not be possible if only one 
method is used; and 
 A mixed method approach offers an alternative to back up one method with 
another one in cases where one method itself does not provide enough evidence 
about the phenomenon. 
 
Moreover, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) stated that a mixed methods approach 
provides stronger inferences and a better opportunity to capture divergent views. 
Nevertheless, a mixed methods approach also has some disadvantages. For instance, 
Bryman (2012) summarised two main arguments against a mixed methods approach 
as follows: 
 
(1) Research methods carry ontological and epistemological commitments, i.e. by 
choosing a certain research method, one commits to its related position about the 
nature of the reality and the relationship between the researcher and participant, such 
as constructivism or, in contrast, postpositivism (see section 2.1.2 in chapter 2, Table 
2.1). 
 
(2) Quantitative and qualitative research are seen as separate paradigms, and they are 
incompatible; thus, mixed methods research is not plausible.  
 
Both arguments, however, can be rebutted through the third paradigm - pragmatism, 
which combines both singular and multiple realities and objective and subjective 
points of view in addressing the problem.
61
 Another critique of a mixed methods 
approach is that it is time consuming since the data collection and analysis involve 
numerous respondents and large amounts of data. However, appropriate research 
design can overcome this pitfall by formulating research objectives that are heavily 
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focused on one problem and use one to two optimal instruments from each research 
method.  
 
As stated in chapter 2, the choice of a mixed methods approach was influenced by 
the pragmatic paradigm. The rationale for a mixed methods approach in this study is 
as follows: 
 
(i) It provided in-depth insights into the key challenges (qualitative part) and further 
recorded the extent of some challenges (e.g. how many small-scale farmers side-sell 
and in what ratios); 
 
(ii) It enabled methodology triangulation when addressing one issue to make more 
reliable conclusions (e.g., discrepancy in the data about the overall satisfaction with 
the contract were explained); 
 
(iii) It allowed recording of different positions on the key challenges in the supply 
chain through household questionnaires and semi-structured interviews; 
 
(iv) It allowed recording of detailed quantitative data on embedded unit of the 
analysis that was of high interest (small-scale farmers) to understand attitudes 
expressed in qualitative form; and  
 
(v) It bridged the gap that would exist if only quantitative or qualitative data were 
collected; e.g. well-identified challenges without idea of about households’ 
livelihood conditions, or recorded number of small-scale farmers unsatisfied with the 
contract without the reasons behind it.  
 
7.2.2 Embedded Design–Multilevel Model with both Concurrent and Sequential 
Data Collection and QUAL Priority 
There are various designs and models identified in the mixed methods literature. In 
this study, the embedded design was chosen as it allows nesting the household 
questionnaire within the mainly qualitative case study. Thus, this was utilised as the 
integration point where the embedded case study with three units was ‘transformed' 























QUAL                               


















of analysis 1, 
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Survey within the case study 
quan (Level 1) 
QUAL data collection 
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(Level 1, Level 2, Level 3) 
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of analysis 2 
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Phase 2 Participants’ 
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based on QUAL (quan) 
QUAL results 
Figure 7.1 Integration of the case study, concurrent and sequential mixed method 
design and multilevel approach to the study. Source: Based on Yin (2009, p. 13, 46): 
Integrated Mixed Methods design and Embedded single-case study and Creswell 





     
  
According to Creswell et al. (2003) and Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), an 
embedded mixed method design has one dominant method that leads the study and 
another supporting method, which provides additional information, and addresses a 
different type of question or gathers information from different levels. In this study, 
an additional method (quantitative) was needed to supplement the data from the 
qualitative method. The quantitative research method was used in the case of small-
scale farmers to explore the influence of contract farming on their livelihoods. 
Households under contract provided a broad spectrum of livelihood conditions, 
which was the base for development of the typology and in-depth analysis (chapters 
8 and 9). A quantitative research approach with small-scale farmers enabled the 
synthesis of data from a relatively large number of individuals to understand how 
they lived and behaved in relation to the studied phenomenon. In contrast, Company 
D (the contractor in the case of the paprika supply chain) and the enabling 
environment represent business subject/institutions that operate separately from each 
other and contract farming is only one of their activities. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to take into consideration the entire production or financial aspects of 
Company D and the enabling environment using a quantitative approach, so the 
focus remained on small-scale farmers. 
 
A multilevel model is one of the mixed methods approach models that uses several 
levels (units) of the analysis. In the study, the data were not collected from only one 
level but rather the participants represented three different levels of the supply chain: 
small-scale farmers (Level 1), Company D (Level 2) and the enabling environment 
(Level 3). In multilevel models, different methods are used to gather data from 
different levels, i.e. the dominant qualitative method was used to gather data from all 
three levels and the quantitative method was used to collect additional data from the 
small-scale farmers' level (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). The analysis in a 
multilevel model involves integrating data from all levels to make meta-inferences 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
The time component in a mixed methods approach plays a role. Initially, there are 
two basic options for conducting mixed methods: concurrent and sequential data 
collection. Concurrent data collection occurs when the study consists of a single 
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phase, and both qualitative and quantitative data are collected, analysed and 
interpreted simultaneously or within a minor time lapse (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007). Sequential data collection is present when the study has more than one phase, 
and one type of data (e.g. qualitative) is collected, analysed and interpreted before 
another type of data (e.g. quantitative) (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). Moreover, in 
sequential data collection, the sequences are related to completing the study’s 
objectives (Creswell et al., 2003). This study adjusted the time component of the 
mixed methods approach to use both concurrent and sequential data collection. This 
was done to allow the last stage (dissemination of the study’s findings) as part of the 
study. Therefore, the preliminary research and first two visits concurrently (although 
with some time lapse) were used to collect, analyse and interpret data by 
triangulating them (Phase 1). Furthermore, once all data were interpreted, the 
findings
62
 informed the data collection for the third visit or Phase 2 of the research 
where qualitative data were gathered from all three levels. The described adjusted 
multiphase approach was performed to complete the study objectives, which 
reflected the study's two phases: the first phase addressed the first three objectives 
and the second phase addressed the fourth objective. 
62
 
7.2.3 Alternatives to the Applied Methodological Approach 
The alternative to a mixed methods approach is using only one method generally. 
The justification for using mixed methods is provided under section 7.2.1. 
Nevertheless, due to well-developed designs and models within the mixed methods 
approach, there are other alternatives. This section briefly discusses one alternative 
design and model. First, instead of embedded design, a concurrent triangulation 
model could have been used. Concurrent triangulation model is widely employed by 
researchers in single-phase studies when quantitative and qualitative data are 
collected simultaneously and with an equal priority to compare two data sets and 
determine whether there is any difference or convergence (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007). Although concurrent triangulation offers straightforward and clear 
implementation, it would fail to capture (i) different levels that exist in the study’s 
case, (ii) priority dynamics in the study in terms of emphasising the small-scale 
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farmers’ side, and (iii) it would not be possible to incorporate and distinguish 
between two phases of the study as this model assumes only one phase.  Second, 
besides multilevel design, there are convergence, transformation and validating 
quantitative models that exist but none of them deals with the data from different 
levels (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). 
 
7.3 Overview of the Study’s Research Design 
7.3.1 Case Study in the Centre of Design: Recalling the Agri-food Supply Chain 
Management 
This study looks at relations among players in the paprika supply chain, as outlined 
in chapter 1 through the overall aim and objectives of the study, and further in 
chapter 2 through the overarching concept of supply chain and agri-food supply 
chain management. Hence, it is useful to revisit Christopher’s (2005, p. 5) leading 
thought about the SCM/ASCM: ‘Thus the focus of supply chain management is upon 
the management of relationships to achieve more profitable outcome for all parties 
in the chain.’ The appropriate research method for the stated circumstances is the 
case study. According to Yin (2009, p. 2), the case study is a preferred qualitative 
method when a study explores ‘a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life 
context’ and aims to contribute to deepening the knowledge about that phenomenon. 
Moreover, Creswell (2013) states that the case study is useful once the researcher has 
clearly identifiable cases and their boundaries. In addition, in the case study, one of 
the decisions involves the choice of whether single or multiple case studies will be 
used (Yin, 2009). Table 7.1 defines the case for this study. 
 
The case study method often relies on in-depth data collection, involving multiple 
sources of evidence and triangulation, which suits the study’s aim (Yin, 2009; 
Creswell, 2013).  Moreover, a single case study might have multiple units of analysis 
where one unit is studied in more detail by using a quantitative technique to provide 
richer data, which is then considered as an embedded case study design (Yin, 2009). 
Thus, the choice of an embedded case study method allows an emphasis to be put on 
small-scale farmers in the paprika supply chain to understand better their conditions 
and behaviours regarding contract farming. Since CF is a business model that is 
continuously being assessed in different circumstances, a great advantage of the case 
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study is that reporting of a case might take the form of lessons learned providing 
guidance on the efficient and less efficient ways to practice contract farming. The 
embedded case study design is further developed under section 7.3 within this 
chapter. 
Table 7.1 Defining the case study 
Phenomenon Contract farming 
Definition of the 
phenomenon 
Institutional arrangement between two parties, 
which organises cultivation and marketing of an 
agricultural product 
Context Low-income developing country 




Number of cases Single case, two locations (districts)  
Type of the case Representative/typical case 
Type of single case study Embedded design, a survey within a case study 
Major unit of the analysis 
(the case) 
Paprika supply chain  
Embedded units/levels of 
the analysis 
Small-scale farmers in two districts, Company D 
and the enabling environment 
Geographical boundary Central Region in Malawi 
Time boundary 
Farmers under paprika contract between seasons 
2014-16 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation based on Yin (2009), Creswell (2013) and Savin-Baden 
and Howell Major (2013). 
 
7.3.2 Key Principles of the Study’s Research Design: Participatory Approach and 
Triangulation 
Considering the studied phenomenon and the research design, this study adopted two 
principles that were practised throughout the research phases: a participatory 
approach and triangulation (Table 7.2). Contract farming involves and affects players 
in the supply chain; thus, players are the focal point of interest. Those players, who 
are affected by the system, carry a rich knowledge about the system itself. The 
participatory approach encourages the active participation of players from designing 
the research to dissemination of the study’s findings and discussion about study 
implications, which is often in contrast with the approach that treats players as 
passive subjects or relies heavily on experts who provide solutions detached from the 
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context-specific situation (Foote Whyte et al., 1991).  In addition, the participatory 
approach ‘treats participants as competent and reflexive agents capable of 
participating in all aspects of the research process’ and mobilises the knowledge 
that already exists within the community to increase collective understanding of how 
to act for the benefit of the community and strengthen its capacity (Kindon et al., 
2007, p. 14; Chancellor and Ludemann, 2012; Chevalier and Buckles, 2013). Related 
to the context of this study and in particular small-scale farmers, Chambers (1994, p. 
1445) summarised it as: 
 
 ‘A commonplace of [participatory] experience is that rural people can do much that 
 outsiders have thought  they could not do, and often that they themselves have not 
 known they could do. One by one the dominoes have fallen as they have shown that 
 they can map, model, rank, score, estimate, diagram and analyse more and better 
 than expected. Often, too, they have done these better than outsiders. The working 
 rule has become to assume that local people are capable of something until it is 
 proved otherwise.’  
 
Therefore, the study design envisaged the most important place for the participants
63 
as the drivers and users of the research. The practical value of the research derives 
from proposed options for addressing the key challenges and their usefulness for 
participants in the real-life situation (Kindon et al., 2007). 
63
 
The triangulation principle followed the methodological path chosen. Defined as ‘the 
combination of at least two or more theoretical perspectives, methodological 
approaches, data sources, investigators, or data analysis methods', triangulation 
serves to decrease inefficiencies of a single strategy for data collection and analysis 
(Thurmond, 2001, p. 258). Jick (1979) drew the parallel with geometry stating that 
multiple points of view will secure greater accuracy when applying triangulation. In 
the study, data source and methodology triangulation were used. The purpose of 
triangulation was to crosscheck the information from multiple sources (data source 
triangulation) and increase the credibility by contrasting results (methodology 
triangulation).
                                                          
63
 Participants are considered small-scale farmers, Company D and the enabling environment (i.e. the 
key players in the supply chain).  
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Table 7.2 Participatory approach and triangulation applied throughout the study 
Participatory Approach Triangulation 
 
Preliminary Research (2013/14) 
 Consultation with  Company D on restructuring 
initial research objectives 
 
First Field Visit to Malawi (2014) 
 Informal interviews with local stakeholders to re-
define initial research objectives 
 Training of local enumerators and facilitators in 
collecting the data 
 Re-defining research objectives through training 
and cross-checking of questionnaire questions with 
enumerators and facilitators 
 Re-defining research objectives and questionnaire 
questions through the interview with  Company D’s 
representative 
 Adding one sub-unit to the analysis (vendors) after 
interviews with key stakeholders 
 Conducting focus group interviews with small-scale 
farmers using interactive mapping, ranking and 
calculation of CF costs and benefits 
 
Second Field Visit to Malawi (2015) 
 Conducting focus group interviews with small-scale 
farmers using interactive mapping, ranking and 
calculation of CF costs and benefits 
 Debriefing on key lessons learned with 
enumerators and facilitators upon completion of 
data collection 
 
Third Field Visit to Malawi (2016) 
 Focus group discussions/interviews with key 
stakeholders, small-scale farmers and 
representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development to disseminate 
and verify main findings, discuss possible options 
for improving contracting through the Model What-
How-Who, propose final recommendations and 
spread the knowledge within the local context and 
to the main beneficiaries and players 
 
 
Research objective 1: Supply Chain Dynamics 
 Data source triangulation: data from small-scale 
farmers,  Company D and the enabling 
environment 
 Methodology triangulation: data from household 
questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and 
focus group interviews 
 
Research objective 2: Motivation to Enter and 
Influence of CF on Small-scale Farmers’ Livelihood 
 Methodology triangulation: data from household 
questionnaire and focus group interviews 
 
Research objective 3: Key Challenges Identified 
 Data source triangulation: data from small-scale 
farmers, Company D and the enabling 
environment 
 Methodology triangulation: data from household 
questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and 
focus group interviews 
 
Research objective 4: Options for Improving 
Contracting Conditions 
 Data source triangulation: data from small-scale 






     
  
7.3.3 Research Setting: The Nkhotakota and Lilongwe Districts  
The data for the study were collected in the Nkhotakota district located on the shore 
of Lake Malawi and the Lilongwe district, which surrounds the capital of Malawi. 
The distance from Company D’s headquarters
64 
varied: the Lilongwe district is 
situated on the capital’s outskirts and plays a significant role in connecting 
neighbouring districts with the capital city. The study area in the Nkhotakota district 
was approximately 145 kilometres from the capital. Table 7.3 outlines the main 
characteristics of the two studied districts. 
 64 
Table 7.3 Comparison of socio-demographic characteristics in two districts 
Socio-demographics Year Nkhotakota Lilongwe 
Capital  Machinga Lilongwe 
Land area (sq. km) 2008 3,771 5,703 
Population 2008 303,659 1,230,834 
Density (people per sq. km)  2008 130 216 
Sex ratio (females per 100 males) 2008 100.2 100.2 
Number of households 2008 62,468 275,194 
Average household size (persons per 
room) 
2008 4.8 4.5 
Enrolment in primary education 2007 78,050 431,003 
Enrolment in secondary education 2007 1,942 25,662 
Literacy rate (%) 2008 61 57 
Food crop area (ha) 2005 98 198 
Poverty (% of poor) 2005 48 37.5 




Source: Author’s compilation from National Statistical Office of Malawi (2016). 
 
Furthermore, the research was conducted both in an urban and a rural area, according 
to the residence of respondents. Key informant interviews were carried out within 
the capital Lilongwe, where the majority of stakeholders were gathered. 
                                                          
64
 Located in the capital Lilongwe. 
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The household questionnaires and focus group interviews undertaken with small-
scale farmers took place in villages of Nkhotakota and Lilongwe district. The 
districts were chosen after applying several criteria.
65 
First, the geographical position 
was determined taking into consideration the concentration of small-scale farmers 
cultivating paprika in the Central Region. According to the literature and sources 
from the field, Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts were identified as suitable for the 
research. Second, the prerequisite for choosing the area was established contractual 
agreements with small-scale farmers in the community. Since the research looked 
deep into contracts, the sub-criterion was that CF (directly or indirectly) must be 
already incorporated into the life of the rural community, so that small-scale farmers 
would be able to discuss its influence.  
65
  
Third, the number of small-scale farmers engaging in contract farming had to be 
relevant for the research, meaning that less than 100 small-scale farmers having 
contracts for paprika in the whole district was not acceptable. Fourth, small-scale 
farmers included in the questionnaire and focus groups had to have contracts with 
Company D; thus, the contractor and the small-scale farmer that signed the 
agreement must have been matched, since the study looked at how specifically 
Company D’s contract influenced small-scale farmers.
66
 Finally, the two districts 
were selected to include a wider range of small-scale farmers’ circumstances and 
experiences under CF. 
 
7.3.4 Research Sequence  
The study involved preliminary research and three visits to Malawi. The following 
subsections briefly describe the purpose and outcomes of each sequence in the study. 
 
7.3.4.1 Preliminary Research  
The preliminary phase of the study involved desk research and interviews with 
experts and Company D. The purpose of the desk research was a systematic 
                                                          
65
 The logic of sampling is explained here and is further expanded under sections 7.4.2 and 7.5.2 in 
this chapter. 
66
 There is an advantage in studying different contracts from different companies to explore how 
contract design might influence small-scale farmers. However, during the study, only Company D 
provided contracts to small-scale farmers in the Central Region. Therefore, the fourth criteria 
transformed into the criteria that small-scale farmers participating in the study have to have a contract, 
as non-contracted paprika farmers were not included in the study. 
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literature review to identify the gap in the knowledge on contract farming and set 
foundations for formulating research objectives. 
 
The desk research consisted of reviewing secondary data available through scientific 
databases (e.g. JSTOR, Science Direct, Scopus, Web of Science, and Google 
Scholar) with the primary focus on theoretical constructs (chapter 2), overarching 
concepts (chapter 5) and empirical evidence on contract farming benefits and 
constraints (chapters 4 and 5). In addition, the literature on Malawi’s conditions was 
consulted (chapter 6). The secondary data obtained were predominately in the form 
of books, scientific articles, policy documents, reports, FAO and WB publications, 
case studies, working papers and statistical databases.  
 
Skype interviews with 10 experts were conducted at the early stage of the research. 
The criteria for selecting experts was their knowledge and contribution to the field of 
contract farming in developing countries (Schensul, 2008). The purpose of those 
interviews was to: (i) explore the insights of leading experts about benefits and 
challenges of contract farming, (ii) formulating and revisiting research objectives, 
(iii) verifying the relevance of the study in the wider context. In addition, Skype 
interviews served as preparation for interviews and focus groups in the field and 
informed some parts of the interview guide and household questionnaire. 
 
The Skype interview with Company D was conducted prior to the first field visit to 
enable early participation of one of the key players in defining research directions. 
The interview provided: (i) brief insights about the situation in the field; (ii) 
information used to modify and determine the scope of the research;
67
 and (iii) 
information used to re-define research objectives. The interview also served to obtain 




In summary, preliminary research secured the context for the study, positioned the 
study in the existing body of knowledge, informed the formulation of research 
objectives and influenced the choice and construction of research instruments. 
                                                          
67
 For instance, the initial idea was to explore contracts for both paprika and chillies but the 
interviewee pointed out that contracts for chillies are almost non-existent due to the uncertain market 
in the previous year. 
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7.3.4.2 Three Field Visits: Purpose and Link with Research Objectives 




 of November 2014. The 
actions undertaken during this visit included formal and informal interviews with 
stakeholders, piloting of the questionnaire, the first round of household survey data 
collection and focus group interviews. Formal interviews with stakeholders were 
conducted to collect planned data, while informal interviews with local stakeholders 
included local residents with direct or indirect links to contract farming. The purpose 
of interviewing local stakeholders was to broaden the perspective on the situation in 
the field and continue re-defining research objectives. Before physically piloting the 
household questionnaires and performing focus group interviews in the field, 
enumerators and facilitators were selected and trained. The training involved 
clarifying each question in the household questionnaire and focus group interviews 
to remove any ambiguity and bias. This resulted in changes to some parts of the 
household questionnaire (see Table 7.4 for the excerpt and Appendix 2 for the entire 
questionnaire) and highlighting the important questions that needed to be answered 
during the focus group interviews. The first village Kasipa in Nkhotakota district 
was used for piloting the questionnaire in the field and included 15 respondents. No 
additional changes were needed for the questionnaire.  
 
The first field visit resulted in the administration of 125 household questionnaires 
and two focus group interviews in the Nkhotakota district and 14 formal interviews 
with stakeholders. The collected data contributed to the completion of the first three 
research objectives related to: supply chain dynamics, the influence of contracting on 
livelihoods and identifying key challenges. 
 
The second field visit to Malawi was conducted from 22
nd
 of February until 7
th
 of 
April 2015 in the Lilongwe district. The actions undertaken during the second visit 
included formal interviews with the remaining stakeholders, interviews with 
vendors, briefing and interviews with Company D’s representatives, observations, 





     
  










Final version in the questionnaire 
11 
If yes, what type of contract farming are 
you involved in?  
 Marketing (pre-determined price, 
volumes and quality) 
 Production (contractor controls 
labour and production) 
 Resources (pre-determined price, 






Comment: The question was irrelevant as 
during the initial interview with the Company 
D representative, it was stated that all small-
scale farmers are offered the same contract, 
which falls under the category ‘Production’. 
14 
Who is involved in contract farming 
activities in your household?  
 Household head 
 Head and wife 
 Males in household 
 Females in household 
 All members 
12 
Who is involved in contract farming activities 
in your household?  
 Household head 
 Head and wife/husband 
 Males in household 
 Females in household 
 All members 
Comment: Enumerators noticed that option 
2 supposed that the head of the household 
was male. The option was corrected to 
avoid gender bias. 
26 
How much do you pay for the seed used 
for planting Paprika per season? 
 Less than 2000  
 2001-3500  
 3501-5000  
 5001-6500  
 6501 and above 
 Don’t know 
24 
How much do you pay for the seed used for 
planting Paprika per season (in MKW)? 
 Less than 250  
 250-450  
 451-650  
 651-850  
 More than 
 Don’t know 
Comment: The initial options were 
overestimating the cost for the seed and 
were reduced accordingly. The currency 
was added for the clarity. 
33 
What means are used for the 




 Bicycle 31 
What means are used for the transportation 





 Carrying crop on the 
head/manpower 
Comment: The fourth option was added 
after consultation with enumerators who 
were familiar with local conditions. 
56 









 Solar system 
Comment: The solar system was available 





     
  
The second visit benefited the study in two ways. First, the vendor’s view
68 
was 
added to the body of collected data on the key challenges. Second, Company D's 
representatives were briefed on the preliminary results and offered their reasoning on 
why data pointed to certain issues. These views were later added for triangulation 
purposes. The second field visit resulted in 303 household questionnaires and six 
focus group interviews from the Lilongwe district and 7 formal interviews with 
stakeholders. The collected data contributed to the completion of the first three 
research objectives related to: supply chain dynamics, the influence of contracting on 
livelihoods and identifying key challenges.   
68
 




 of July 2016. The 
actions undertaken during the third visit included focus group interviews and 
discussions with small-scale farmers and stakeholders. The purpose of the final visit 
was to disseminate the study’s findings to participants. Also, in accordance with the 
fourth research objective and participatory approach, dissemination of the study’s 
findings was used to enable participants to suggest and discuss options for improving 
contracting conditions in their communities and therefore become the change-
proposers and change-makers rather than passive observers (Foote Whyte et al., 
1991; Chambers, 1994; Kindon et al., 2007).In the final step, the proposals from the 
small-scale farmers, Company D and the enabling environment were disseminated 
through focus group discussion to the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development. Thus, the third visit resulted in two focus group 
interviews and two focus group discussions and it completed the fourth research 
objective.  
 
7.4 Qualitative Approach 
This section describes the data collection methods and instruments, the sampling 
method and data collection protocol for the qualitative part of research query in the 
study. Figure 7.2 summarises the data collection tools and stakeholders involved 
organised by visit to the field. 
 
                                                          
68
 Vendors operate as an informal sector and in direct opposition to companies such as Company D. 
Thus, their view is a valuable source of information for triangulation purposes. In addition, appointing 
the interview with the vendor is not always feasible.  
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Figure 7.2 Data collection tools and stakeholders 
Preliminary research 
Period: July 2014; August 2014; 
September 2014; November 2014; 
December 2014; March 2015 
Data collection tools: 
QUAL 
 Semi-structured Skype 
interviews with 10 experts in 
the field of contract farming. 
 
First visit to Central Malawi 
Period: November 2014 
Location: Nkhotakota district 
Data collection tools: 
QUANTITATIVE 
 Household questionnaires 




 Semi-structured interviews 
with 14 key stakeholders. 
 Two focus group interviews 
with 36 contracted small-
scale farmers.  
 
Third visit to Central Malawi 
Period: July 2016  
Location: Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts 
Data collection tools: 
QUALITATIVE 
 One focus group interview with contracted small-scale farmers in each district (47 
small-scale farmers in Nkhotakota and 88 small-scale farmers Lilongwe). 
 Focus group discussion with seven key stakeholders in Lilongwe city. 
 Focus group discussion with five representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development. 
 
Second visit to Central Malawi 
Period: February-April 2015 
Location: Lilongwe district 
Data collection tools: 
QUANTITATIVE 
 Household questionnaires 
administered to 303 contracted 
small-scale paprika farmers. 
QUALITATIVE 
 Semi-structured interviews with 
seven key stakeholders 
(including three vendors). 
 Six focus group interviews with 




     
  
7.4.1. Data Collection Methods and Instruments 
7.4.1.1 Semi-structured Interviews: Key Stakeholders and Experts 
Semi-structured interviews are interviews conducted following a flexible guide, 
where the researcher asks questions and covers pre-determined topics in the guide 
but also includes additional questions depending on interviewee’s actions, comments 
and knowledge (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013). In the study, semi-
structured interviews were created for five different stakeholders, according to their 
knowledge and potential contribution to the research topic: (i) Company D, (ii) 
Government, (iii) civil society and NGOs, (iv) academic and research units, and (v) 
associations/unions. Additional short guides were created for vendors. Interviews 
were performed using a digital voice recorder and were transcribed to enable further 
analysis. Verbal consent for recording the interviews was obtained prior to every 
interview. The average length of an interview was between 45-90 minutes. Expert 
semi-structured interviews were carried out using a standardised interview guide. 
Interviews were conducted via Skype calls that were recorded and transcribed 
afterwards. A verbal consent for recording Skype calls was obtained prior to every 
interview. An average length of an interview was between 50-80 minutes. In total, 21 
stakeholder interviews and 10 expert interviews were conducted (see Appendix 4 for 
the interview guides).  
 
7.4.1.2 Focus Group Interviews with Small-scale Farmers 
This study makes a distinction between group interviews, focus group interviews and 
focus group discussions. Although the literature sometimes uses these terms 
interchangeably, in this study they are considered as separate instruments due to the 
language barrier encountered during the fieldwork (see Figure 7.3 for the 
differentiation). The most appropriate description of focus group interviews 
conducted in this study is the one from Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013) who 
compared focus group interviews with carefully planned and facilitated interview. 
The main difference between the group interview and focus group interview is that 
the latter encourages (if possible) the discussion among interviewees, which in turn 
‘allow[s] the researcher to view social processes in action’ (Savin-Baden and 




     
  












Source: Adopted from Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013, p. 375). 
 
In addition, Creswell (2007) stated that focus group interviews are useful in 
exploring a groups’ opinion about some specific topic and especially for 
documenting the range of different ideas within a community. 
 
Since focus group interviews were conducted in the local language, it was not 
possible for the researcher to capture the discussion of various topics between 
members. Rather, the transcripts from facilitators outlined individual views and 
group consensuses occasionally, which resembled the group interview transcript. 
Therefore, to acknowledge the limited role of the researcher in the focus groups 
conducted in the local language, they were marked as interviews and not discussions. 
Focus groups interviews contributed to the study to a great extent and are considered 
as one of the most valuable sources of information on the key challenges in the 
studied supply chain. According to Bryman (2012), the size of a focus group can be 
from 4-8 but bigger groups were also noted in the literature. 
 
Focus group interviews were held in two districts. The main facilitator and the 
assistant were leading the interviews with local groups using flip charts for mapping 
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 Group interview involves a group of interviewee who answer researcher’s questions, however, 
instead of the discussion - each interviewee provides an individual response (Savin-Baden and Howell 
Major, 2015). 
Group interview 
 A group of 
respondents 











 A group of 
respondents 
 Discussion as 
a crucial part 
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the supply chain and farming practices, ranking and cost analysis. Discussions lasted 
around 90 minutes and were audio recorded with prior verbal group consent from 
participants. In total, the study collected 10 focus group interviews with 131 
participants involved (Table 7.5). The focus group interview guide is in Appendix 3. 
  








Kamparilo  28 12/16 2014 
Limbikani 8 0/8 2014 
Chakaka Benga  11 5/6 2016 
Lilongwe district 
Kawaid  8 0/8 2015 
Kastoche  9 8/1 2015 
Chowa  11 6/5 2015 
Chiputu  6 0/6 2015 
Khongoni  12 0/12 2015 
Chawatha  8 0/8 2015 
Lisungwi Farm  34 3/31 2016 
TOTAL 135 34/101  
        Note: The female/male ratio was 25:75. 
 
7.4.1.3 Focus Group Discussions with Key Stakeholders 
Two focus group discussions with key stakeholders were conducted during the 
study. These discussions were performed using the English language. Therefore, 
they are distinguished from focus group interviews in the local language as it was 
possible for the researcher to understand and facilitate the discussion among 
participants. A focus group discussion is a form of interview with an emphasis on 
documentation of a dynamic interaction within the group and the joint construction 
of meaning (Morgan, 2008; Bryman, 2012). Flick (2006, p. 197) stressed that focus 
group discussions involve ‘interactive aspect of data collection’. Silverman (2010) 
argues that the main advantages of focus group discussions are: collection of data 
from a large number of participants in a relatively short time; provision of a more 
‘natural’ environment for the discussion; emergence of numerous communicative 
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processes that are less common when using other approaches (i.e. storytelling, 
joking, arguing or teasing between the participants in the same community). The 
purpose of focus group discussions in this study was to explore in-depth options for 
improving contract farming in Malawi based on identified challenges with 
stakeholders revealing their views, attributing priorities to issues they considered 
important and challenging each other’s opinions. Focus group discussions involved, 
in total, 12 participants, lasted around 90 minutes and were audio recorded with prior 
consent. A detailed guide for focus group discussion is located in Appendix 4. 
 
7.4.1.4. Observations 
Observations on the field were used to supplement collected material. Notes, digital 
camera and samples were used while observing the price of paprika in three 
supermarkets, capturing the process of marketing and documenting the difference 
between paprika grades. 
 
7.4.2 Sampling for Qualitative Approach: Non-probabilistic sample 
The rationale for selecting two districts was earlier described under section 7.3.3 in 
this chapter. Also, sampling for focus group interviews was related to sampling for 
the household questionnaire and is described in section 7.5.2. This section refers to 
sampling for semi-structured interviews. The interviewees and email correspondents 
were purposively selected using the logic of a stakeholder sampling where 
participants are chosen based on their role in an observed phenomenon (Palys, 2008). 
Therefore, selected stakeholders were implicitly or explicitly part of a paprika supply 
chain with some considerable roles, responsibilities and relations with the key 
players. Similarly, experts were purposively selected through reputational-case 
sampling based on their knowledge and experience in contract farming (Savin-Baden 
and Major Howell, 2013). 
 
7.4.3 Data Collection Protocol for Qualitative Approach 
The protocol of collecting data in qualitative query differed for semi-structured 
interviews, focus group interviews and discussions. The protocol for semi-structured 
interviews involved preparing an appropriate interview guide, scheduling the 
meeting with the interviewee, interviewing and recording the interview. The protocol 
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for focus group discussions involved preparing appropriate discussion guide with 
indicated key topics, and scheduling, facilitating and recording focus group 
discussions. The protocol for the focus group interviews is described below. 
 
Facilitators for the focus group interviews were recruited among Malawian master 
students from the Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Local 
facilitators were preferred over the international ones due to the language advantage. 
In total, two facilitators were selected: one to facilitate focus group interviews and 
another to assist with materials and making notes. Selected facilitators had previous 
experience in conducting focus group interviews, so their training was focused on 
introducing the topic of contract farming and highlighting the key points in the focus 
group guide that needed to be covered to complete related research objectives. The 
desired flow of the focus group interviews was explained, clarified, discussed and 
agreed with the facilitators.  
 
The role of facilitators in focus group interviews was to encourage and moderate 
discussion between participants. Although the initial idea was to keep facilitators’ 
presence to the minimum and as less intrusive as possible, occasionally facilitators 
had to break the long moments of silence and motivate participants to start the 
discussion (Bryman, 2012). The key role of the researcher in focus group interviews 
was that of an observer and coordinator because of the language barrier and, to a 
lesser extent, due to the epistemological stance (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 
2013). During the focus group interviews, facilitators continuously informed the 
researcher on the most important outcomes of the interviews for each topic and 
received the guidelines from the researcher on how to direct the interviews. This was 
done to ensure that the captured data are in accordance with the agreed flow of the 
interviews. All the interviews with small-scale farmers were audio recorded, 
transcribed by facilitators and cross-checked by the researcher to make sure all the 
interview topics were appropriately covered. 
 
7.5 Quantitative Approach 
This section describes the research instruments, sampling method and data collection 
protocol for the quantitative part of the research approach in the study. 
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7.5.1 Research Instrument 
7.5.1.1 Household Questionnaire 
The household questionnaire consisted of 78 questions divided into 11 sections: (i) 
household characteristics, (ii) contract details, (iii) motivation and satisfaction, (iv) 
future plans in relation to contracts, (v) input supply and extension services, (vi) 
meeting the requirements, (vii) communication, relations and networking, (viii) 
market and information access, (ix) housing and assets, (x) health, education and 
food security, (xi) farm characteristics. The time needed to complete the 
questionnaire was approximately 25-35 minutes. The household questionnaire was 
written and presented to small-scale farmers in the local language (Figure 7.4). In 
total 10 enumerators administered 428 questionnaires. 
 
       
Figure 7.4 Excerpt from the administered questionnaire in Chichewa 
 
Table 7.6 shows the distribution of questionnaires in two districts and the related 
number of small-scale farmers. The total number of respondents in Nkhotakota 
district was 125 and in Lilongwe district 303. The number of participants was higher 
in Lilongwe district due to the different size of villages and availability of contracted 
small-scale farmers, which was taken into consideration (i.e. more participants were 
selected from bigger villages). 
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Table 7.6 Number of households participating in questionnaire by area 
Area (cluster) Number of participants 
Nkhotakota district (2014), total = 125 
Kasipa  15 
Chikhata  15 
Nkhala  22 
Masewe  20 
Chakaka Benga  22 
Kamparilo  20 
Kaluzamoyo  11 








7.5.2 Sampling for the Quantitative Approach: Two-stage Cluster Sampling 
The participants in the household questionnaire were selected using the cluster-
sampling method. The cluster-sampling is considered as a probability sampling 
method (although on the border), where the population of interest is first organised 
into geographical clusters and individuals are subsequently randomly selected from 
clusters (Buckingham and Saunders, 2008). The population considered were all 
small-scale farmers under a Company D contract for paprika in the Central Malawi. 
The population was grouped into nine clusters, representing the country’s districts. 
Two districts, namely Nkhotakota and Lilongwe, were purposively selected based on 
their geographical position and the number of small-scale farmers having contracts 
for paprika.
70 
The list of contracted small-scale farmers was obtained from Company 





     
  
The Nkhotakota district consisted of 13 villages of interest where Company D had 
contracted small-scale farmers. The final choice of villages was narrowed to seven 
villages within an appropriate geographical distance. The participants for the 
household questionnaire were randomly selected from the list using the computer 
generated random numbers method and by initially selecting 10 participants from 
each village.
71
 The focus group interviews were conducted in two villages in 
Nkhotakota district selected purposively to include female participants. Where 
applicable, all female participants were included in focus group interviews to 
maintain gender balance. On the other hand, male participants were randomly 
selected from a provided list using the computer generated random numbers method. 
The Lilongwe district contained many villages; hence, two broader locations 
involving five villages were selected. The same procedure of including participants 
in the household questionnaire participants, and female and male participants for 
focus group interviews, was employed. Company D’s representatives were not 
involved in sampling and interviewing of small-scale farmers. 
 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p. 183) noted that for the ‘infinity’ population size, 
the sample size of 384 will give a confidence limit of 0.05, i.e. there is 95% of 
chance that the sample will represent the population. Since an estimated population 
of small-scale farmers under Company D contracts for paprika in Malawi is between 
10,000 and 15,000 (depending on the season), the sample size of 428 was considered 
as an appropriate representation.  
 
7.5.3 Data Collection Protocol for Quantitative Approach 
Before administering household questionnaires, 10 enumerators were recruited 
among Malawian masters students from the Lilongwe University of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources. Since the group had mixed levels of experience in administering 
questionnaires, the training involved completing the following steps: (i) introducing 
the purpose of the research; (ii) outlining the key rules in administering 
                                                                                                                                                                    
70
 The goal of the purposive sampling was to select two districts that differ in their characteristics so 
that the study could capture the diverse experiences with contract farming. Some districts had 
relatively few smallholders under the contract, and they were not selected for this study.  
71
 The idea was to keep similar proportions for all villages but the response rate was high as the 
participants from the spare list wanted to participate, too. Due to cultural norms, participation was not 
denied to any small-scale farmers. In addition, further in the research, the number of villages reduced 
but their size increased so the rule of thumb of 10 participants per village was not applicable anymore. 
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questionnaires (especially to avoid leading respondents to give an appropriate 
answer); and (iii) ensuring the accuracy and understanding of the questions posed in 
the questionnaire. The latter step is outlined in Table 7.7 in more detail (see also 
section 7.3.4.2 for the piloting process). 
  
Table 7.7 Steps for ensuring the accuracy and understanding of the questionnaire 
Step Description 
1 Translating the English version of the household questionnaire to 
Malawian language (Chichewa) by a Malawian PhD student.  
2 Distribution of the Chichewa version of the household questionnaire to 
enumerators and one University representative during the training. 
3 
Back translating - reading the Chichewa version of the household 
questionnaire (both questions and provided answers) by each enumerator 
and translating it back to the English language to cross-check whether the 
Chichewa version corresponds to the English version. 
4 
Clarifying the questionnaire and discussing ambiguous, poorly phrased 
and inaccurate questions and answers with enumerators and the 
University representative. 
5 Correcting the English and Chichewa version of the questionnaire. 
6 Piloting of the questionnaires in the field using the first batch of 
respondents (n = 15, location: Kasipa). 
 
Enumerators played an important role in data collection since they were reading 
questions to small-scale farmers and recording their answers. The researcher had a 
key role as an adviser and controller during the data collection. The advisory role 
was practised through guiding enumerators in cases of unpredicted situations in the 
field. The controlling role was practised through constant presence on the field 
during the research to manage and direct questionnaires distribution and dynamics of 
completion. 
 
7.6 Analytical Framework 
7.6.1 Embedding Results 
The principle adopted in the analysis is that results from the quantitative query and 
the qualitative query are separately analysed and represented, and then quantitative 
results are embedded into qualitative results during the discussion, which serves as 
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the integration point (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2009) (see Figure 7.5 for the summary of the research design with analytical 
framework included). However, while this principle is mostly followed in chapter 10 
and 11, in chapter 8 and 9 the quantitative component that serves to describe the 
profile of small-scale farmers and secure the context dominates the discussion. This 
is to set the scene for understanding the key challenges and small-scale farmers’ 
‘share’ in those challenges and to assess related consequences for small-scale 
farmers’ livelihoods. 
 
7.6.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
7.6.2.1 Thematic Analysis: Template Style 
For the qualitative query and textual data collected, a thematic analysis was 
employed to explore the data, report identified categories and analyse developed 
themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006).
72 
Since the thematic analysis does not imply using 
any particular theoretical framework, its flexibility enables a more detailed account 
of data (Joffe, 2012). Hence, the thematic analysis in this study was appropriate for 
the data-driven analysis employed, allowing the themes to organically evolve from 
the raw data rather than forcing the interview excerpts into the pre-existing 
categories.
73 
Moreover, the intention of the analysis was to organise the data set 





A particular form of thematic analysis employed in the study was template analysis, 
which combines a relatively high degree of structure in analysing the textual data 
and the possibility to adapt to a certain study (King, 2012). The central point of the 
template analysis is the development of a coding template that is applied to all the 
data (King, 2012). In this study, coding templates were developed for different 
                                                          
72
 Braun and Clarke (2006) provided a detailed description of six phases in doing a thematic analysis 
that were adopted in this study: (1) familiarising oneself with the data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) 
searching for themes, (4) revising themes, (5) defining and labelling themes and (6) reporting. The 
template analysis uses all stated phases with more emphasis on developing a code framework (phase 
2, 3, 4 and 5). 
73
 The exception was made during the third field visit. The pre-existing categories (What needs to be 
done? How should it be done? Who should do it?) were developed prior to focus group discussions 
and interviews to direct the participants.  
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Once developed, codebooks were then applied, revised and re-applied to materials, 
providing consistency and direction in the overall analysis. In particular, for 
analysing Company D’s contract, the study used both inductive and deductive 
approaches to coding (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). NVivo™ 10 software 
facilitated organising and coding data throughout the study. 
 
7.6.2.2 First and Second Cycle Coding 
Some data were coded in one and others in two cycles, depending on their 
characteristics and the research objective (Table 7.8). The first cycle involved 
structural coding where each question from the interview guide represented one 
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* Note: Only in the case of contract design, 
Source: Author. 
                                                          
74
 The exception was made during the third field visit. The pre-existing categories (What needs to be 
done? How should it be done? Who should do it?) were developed prior to focus group discussions 
and interviews to direct the participants.  
75
 Instead of performing each step of the thematic analysis on each transcript, the codebook is 
developed, improved and used across all applicable textual data (King, 2012).  
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The first cycle coding mostly resulted in extracting large sections of textual data 
collected from participants’ interviews and focus groups. The sections were then 
organised under redefined codes and prepared for the thematic analysis (Saldaña, 
2009). When applied, the second cycle coding built upon the first cycle. The pattern 
coding was used as it relies on results from the first cycle coding to assess the 
commonality across the data and assign the pattern code to the similar text passages 
(Miles et al., 2014). In the analysis, as suggested by Saldaña (2009), the pattern 
coding resulted in constructing statements with an explanatory narrative. 
 
7.6.3 Quantitative Data Analysis 
7.6.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The quantitative data collected were mainly categorical and ordinal. While 
categorical data denote different categories (e.g. gender, membership in farmers’ 
union and the possession of different assets), ordinal data consist of natural ordering 
but without the possibility to quantify the distance between categories (e.g. income 
level, education level and land size) (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Some initially 
ordinal data were transformed into categorical data for the purpose of the analysis. 
The descriptive statistics were used to explore categorical and ordinal data and the 
results were displayed in cross-tabs with indicated frequencies and percentages. 
Means and standard deviations were calculated for the variables used in the binary 
logit regression.  
 
The cross-tabs were created based on the household typology. The typology was 
developed according to the key concept - contract farming and variables that were 
considered relevant to contract farming. The guiding principle for the typology was 
to match the household types with the research purpose and achieve a distinctive 
simplicity (Daloğlu et al., 2014). Moreover, as Bidogeza et al. (2009) emphasised in 
their study, the typology was established with an expectation that different 
household types would practice different behaviour towards the studied 
phenomenon. The literature review provided the case to consider the household 
income as the variable of interest since previously mentioned studies (see chapter 4 
for more details) stated that: (i) contract farming has the potential to increase small-
scale farmers’ income (Bellemare, 2012; Bolwig et al., 2009; Goel, 2013) and (ii) 
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better off (medium to larger) farmers are more involved in contracting (Fréguin-
Gresh et al., 2012; Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw, 2013). Even though this study did 
not explore farmers’ income generation and it focused only on small-size farmers, 
the income variable was selected to capture potential differences between poorer and 
wealthier households, in particular regarding contract farming practices and paprika 
supply chain, which is of interest when making policy recommendations.  
 
In a recent study in Malawi, Franke et al. (2014) divided farmers into three types 
according to their wealth: low, medium and high resource endowment. Dorward 
(2002) suggested the following typology for Malawi's rural households across the 
three agro-ecological zones: poor female-headed households, poor male-headed 
households, less poor households, larger farming households, employed households, 
borrowers’ households and remittance households. However, the latter typology does 
not entirely fit this study's purpose and (apart from income) another variable was 
considered in this study - the size of the land allocated to the contracted crop. The 
choice of this variable was justified by the current gap in knowledge of the 
information about the profile of households that allocate less/more of their land to 
the contracted crop and the relevance of this information for the study's purpose 
concerning policy recommendations and future business practices.  
 
For the purpose of this study, surveyed households were divided into two main 
groups according to income and land allocated to contracted paprika. Six household 
types were identified: low monthly income type - LMI (<10,400 MKW/month), 
medium monthly income type - MMI (10,400-20,800 MKW/month), high monthly 
income type - HMI (>20,800 MKW/month), small land size allocated to contracted 
paprika type - SLA (up to 1.6 acres), medium land size allocated to contracted 
paprika type - MLA (1.6-2 acres) and large land size allocated to contracted paprika 
type - LLA (>2 acres). In further analysis, surveyed households were divided 
according to six types and the district where they were located.
76  
76
                                                          
76
 Dividing surveyed households by districts and six types provided robust outcomes. Hence, the use 
of more advanced (e.g. including two or more sub-categories under one household type) was not 
applied in this study. 
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In this study, the term ‘livelihood’ is understood as a set of different factors that 
enable farmers’ living (see chapter 9 for small-scale farmers’ livelihood). The 
following definition from Chambers and Conway (1991, p. 6) was adopted: ‘A 
livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (...) and activities required for a means 
of living (...)’. Three relevant proxies were identified in the literature and used to 
explore the influence of contract farming on the livelihood of small-scale paprika 
farmers: productivity (Jones and Gibbon, 2011; Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2012; Fréguin-
Gresh and Anseeuw, 2013; Rüsch et al., 2013), income generation (Miyata et al., 
2009; Bellemare, 2012; Mwambi et al. 2016) and food security (Bolwig, 2012; 
Bellemare and Novak, 2016). The livelihood proxies were analysed using cross-tabs. 
 
7.6.3.2 Inferential Analysis 
Kendall’s Tau B Correlation Coefficient and Concordance Coefficient for Ranked 
Data 
Kendall’s tau b and Kendall’s concordance coefficient (shorter Kendall’s W) were 
used to further explore gathered ordinal data. Kendall’s tau b is a non-parametric test 
of the strength and direction of the association between two ordinal variables 
(Gibbons, 1993). The output that was interpreted from Kendall's tau b included the 
value of Kendall's tau b (correlation coefficient) and significance value (p-value). 
Significant results at 5% and 1% are reported and analysed throughout this study. 
Kendall's W measures the agreement among raters assessing a set of n objects of 
interest (Legendre, 2010). The rank, Kendall's W value and significance value were 
interpreted. 
 
Kendall’s tau b test was used in this study to test the association between (i) the level 
of importance of key drivers for entering contracts and (ii) satisfaction levels and a 
set of ordinal variables (see chapter 9, section 9.2.2 and 9.2.4). Kendall’s W test was 
used to determine whether there is an agreement between small-scale farmers, 
Company D and the enabling environment in rating the key challenges according to 






     
  
Chi-Square test of association 
The Chi-Square test of association was used as a diagnostic tool to inform selection 
of independent variables in the binary logit regression models. The Chi-square 
reveals if there exists an association between two categorical variables (Dytham, 
2004). The output interpreted from the Chi-square test included the Pearson Chi-
Square (
2
) and significance value. For determining the strength of the association, 
Cohen’s (1988) convention was used where a correlation coefficient of 0.10 is 
considered as small association, 0.30 as moderate correlation and 0.50 as strong 
association between the variables. 
 
Binary Logistic Regression 
Binary logistic regression allows testing models to predict the outcome of a 
dependent binary categorical variable (with only two options, i.e. yes, no) by using a 
set of independent variables (categorical and/or continuous) (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009; Pallant, 2011). Binary logistic regression involves three main assumptions 
(Pallant, 2011): 
 
 A small sample size is usually not appropriate for the binary logistic regression, 
 A multicollinearity check is needed to see whether there exists a strong 
intercorrelation among independent variables, and 
 There might exist some cases (outliers) that are not well explained by the model 
and those cases should be explored. 
 
All three assumptions were accounted for. The sample size refers to the ratio 
between the number of cases in the study and independent variables in the model. 
Peduzzi et al. (1996) and Agresti (2007) suggested that, for the logistic regression, 
there should be minimum 10 cases per independent variable. For the models 
specificed in this study, Model 1 had 11 independent variables, Model 2 had 21 
independent variables and Model 3 had 13 independent variables. The ratio was 38 
cases per independent variable for Model 1, 19 cases per independent variable for 
Model 2 and 31 cases per independent variable for Model 3. High levels of 
multicollinearity could influence the model’s results by increasing the standard error 
of coefficients and making some of the independent variables statistically non-
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significant (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The following rule of thumb was adopted: the 
multicollinearity was not considered as problematic if the mean VIF was <10 
(variance inflation factor) and tolerance values (1/VIF) were >0.1 (Montgomery and 




Multicollinearity test was done using STATA® software and results were reported 
prior to the regression model output in chapter 8, 9 and 10. The presence of outliers 
was identified using the ‘Casewise listing of residuals’ option in SPSS® 21.0 and 
cases that were wrongly classified and had ZResid value >±2.5 were inspected and 
removed (Pallant, 2011). 
 
Binary logistic regression was employed in the study in three cases: to determine (i) 
households’ membership in a farmers’ union (Model 1), (ii) households’ willingness 
to expand their contract farming arrangement to other crops for which Company D 
offers the contract (bird’s eye chillies and groundnuts) (Model 2), and (iii) 
households’ engagement in side-selling (Model 3). The diagnostic tools for 
examining the strength of models were the Chi-Square and p-value of the whole 
model (goodness of fit test), Nagelkerke R
2
, Cox and Snell R
2
 and percentage of 
cases predicted correctly. Values are reported in each logit regression output table. 
Pallant (2011) suggested the following benchmarks for assessing the model: p-value 
less than 0.05, Nagelkerke R
2
 and Cox and Snell R
2
 values as high as possible to 
explain greater percentage of variability, and as much as cases predicted correctly.  
 
                                                          
77
 As stated by Studenmund (2011, p. 259), ‘the VIF is an index of how much multicollinearity has 
increased the variance of an estimated coefficient’. It is worth mentioning that the clear cut-off point 
for multicollinearity is not yet agreed in the literature and some authors (e.g. Studenmund, 2011, p. 
260) recommend an even lower value of VIF (>5 or even >2) to conclude that the multicollinearity 
between independents is severe. However, in this study, the widely accepted rule of >10 is applied. 
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Estimating Determinants of Expanding Contracted Production, Participating in 
Farmer’s Union and Side-selling 
For all three estimations, it is assumed that small-scale farmers are likely to (i) join 
the farmer’s union, (ii) expand their CF production to new crops and (iii) engage in 
side-selling if the utility derived from the chosen action is greater than the utility 
obtained in the current status. This case becomes a binary choice problem, which is 
expressed as: 
 
FUMi / Exi / SSi =
1, if y*i >0





                                                                                                    (1) 
following Cameron and Trivedi (2010), where FUMi/Exi/SSi denotes contracted 
farmers’ engagement in joining the farmer’s union/expanding to new CF crop/side-
selling. From here: 
yi
* =xib +ei                                                                                                                  (2)   
where yi
*
 is the latent variable not observable by the researcher and linearly 
dependent on xi  (vector of observed variables),  is a vector of unknown 
parameters and is a random error term (as recently used by Fiamohe et al., 2015; 
Vessalos et al., 2016). The generalised logit regression model used to model small-
scale farmers’ membership in farmers’ union/expanding CF production/side-selling 






=x 'ikbk +uik                                                                               (3) 
where Y (xik )and subscript k denote three binary logit models compressed into one 
signle model, exp denotes the exponential function,
78 
is a (N x 1) vector of 
parameters to be estimated, exponentiated coefficient  represents the odds 
ratio,  (N x 1) vector of independent variables and ui is the error term (as in 
Gujarati and Porter, 2009; Studenmund, 2011).  
78
                                                          
78
 Note that the Latin letter  is used in the case of side-selling, while letters  and  are used for 
membership in a farmers’ union and expanding CF to new crops respectively to distinguish among 










     
  
The selection of independent variables in the analysis was influenced by the 
empirical literature on contract farming, in particular the work of Nugusse et al. 
(2013), Wang et al. (2014), Briones (2015), Girma and Gardebroek (2015), 
Verhofstadt and Maertens (2015), Kariuki and Loy (2016), Kumar et al. (2016), 
Mwambi et al. (2016) and Shumeta and D’Haese (2016). In their studies on 
determinants of contract farming participation and income effects of contracting, 
among others, the authors used the following variables: age, education, farm size, 
distance to market, government support and membership in farmers’ cooperatives. 
All the variables included in the models (Equations 4, 5 and 6) are described in Table 
7.9. 
 
The empirical logit model specification used to determine the factors of small-scale 
farmers’ membership in farmers’ union/expanding CF to new crop/side-selling is 
specified as follows: 
FUMi = 0 + 1District_Nkhi + 2Young_agei + 3Middle_agei  
                  + 4Low_incomei + 5High_incomei + 6Small_landi 
                           + 7Large_landi + 8Closei + 9Large_distancei  
                  + 10NGO_assist1i + 11Government_assisti + i                                    (4) 
where FUMi denotes farmers’ membership in Farmers Union Malawi, is the 
constant term, ,...are the parameters to be estimated and  is the error term. 
It is expected that households with a young head of household, low monthly income, 
small landholding size, close distance to the collection point and with received 
assistance from both NGO and Government are more likely to be members of FUM. 
In contrast, it is assumed that households with a middle aged head, from Nkhotakota 
district, with high monthly income, large landholding size and large distance to the 
collection point would be less likely to be members of FUM.  
Exi = 0 + 1District_Nkhi + 2Primary_edui + 3Secondary_edui  
              + 4Medium_foodexpi + 5High_foodexpi + 6Small_landi 
                     + 7Medium_landi + 8 Medium_CF%i + 9Large_CF%i 
              + 10Low_yieldi + 11Medium_yieldi + 12Low_pestcosti 
              + 13Medium_pestcosti + 14Not_known/no_use_pesti 




     
  
              + 17Not_known/no_use_fungii + 18Price_afterharvi 
                     + 19Price_before/after_delivi + 20CFincome_partiallysuffi  
              + 21CFincome_notsuffi + hi                                                                       (5) 
where Exi denotes farmers’ willingness to expand contracting to other crops, 0 is the 
constant term, 1, 2 ... 21 are the parameters to be estimated and hi  is the error 
term. It is assumed that households from Nkhotakota district, with primary and 
secondary education (household head), high expenses for food/month, large 
landholding size, low proportion of land allocated to CF, high CF yield/season, low 
pesticide and fungicide costs, and households who know the price of paprika after 
the harvest are more likely to expand their contracting to other crops. On the other 
hand, households with low food expenses for food/month, small landholding size, 
large proportion of land allocated to CF, low CF yield/season, high pesticide and 
fungicide costs, and households who know the price of the contracted crop before or 
after the delivery are less likely to expand their contracting arrangement to other 
crops. 
SSi = β0 + β1District_Nkhi + β2Primary_edui + β3Secondary_edui             
             + β4Low_incomei + β5High_incomei + β6Low_foodexpi           
             + β7High_foodexpi + β8Closei + β9Large_distancei 
             + β10Positive_infli + β11Negative_infli + β12Membership_FUMi  
             + β13Government_assisti +v i                                                                       (6) 
where is the constant term, , ... are the parameters to be estimated and v i  
is the error term. It is hypothesised that Nkhotakota district, high monthly income, 
small land allocated to CF, high expenses for food/month, large distance to the 
collection point, the negative influence of CF on livelihood and Governance 
assistance received increase small-scale farmers’ probability to engage in side-
selling. On the contrary, primary and secondary education, low income, low 
expenses for food/month, close distance to the collection point, positive influence of 
CF on livelihood and membership in FUM will decrease small-scale farmers’ 




b0 b1 b2 b13
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Table 7.9 Description of the variables used in binary logit models 
Variable Category Description 
Dependent variables 
Membership in FUM Dummy Household’s membership in FUM (1 if member and 0 
otherwise). 
Expanding CF Dummy Household’s willingness to expand its contracted production to 
other crops (1 if willing and 0 otherwise). 
Side-selling Dummy Whether the household engaged in side-selling (1 if engaged 
and 0 otherwise). 
Independent variables 
District Dummy The district where the household is located (1 if Nkhotakota 
and 0 otherwise). 
Young age Dummy Farmers up to 30 years old (1 if <26-30 and 0 otherwise). 
Middle age Dummy Farmers 30-40 years old (1 if 30-40 and 0 otherwise). 
Older age (B) Dummy Farmers over 40 years old (1 if >40 and 0 otherwise) 
No education (B) Dummy Household head does not have official education (1 if no 
education and 0 otherwise). 
Primary education Dummy Household head has finished primary level of education (1 if 
primary education and 0 otherwise). 
Secondary education Dummy Household head has finished secondary level of education (1 if 
secondary education and 0 if otherwise). 
Low monthly income Dummy Households with <10,400 MKW/month (1 if <10,400 
MKW/month and 0 otherwise). 
Medium monthly 
income (B) 
Dummy Households with 10,400-20,800 MKW/month (1 if 10,400-
20,800 MKW/month and 0 otherwise). 
High monthly income Dummy Households with >20,800 MKW/month (1 if >20,800 
MKW/month and 0 otherwise). 
Low food 
expenses/month 
Dummy Household pays < 5,500 MKW for food per month (1 if food 
expenses < 5,500 MKW and 0 otherwise). 
Medium food 
expenses/month (B) 
Dummy Household pays 5,500-13,500 MKW for food per month (1 if 
food expenses 5,500-13,500 MKW and 0 otherwise). 
High food 
expenses/month 
Dummy Household pays >13,500 MKW for food per month (1 if food 
expenses >13,500 MKW and 0 otherwise). 
Small landholding size Dummy Households with the size of the entire land for cultivation up to 
1.6 acre (1 if up to 1.6 acre and 0 otherwise). 
Medium landholding 
size (B) 
Dummy Households with the size of the entire land for cultivation 
between 1.6 and 2 acres (1 if 1.6-2 acres and 0 otherwise). 
Large landholding size  Dummy Households with the size of the entire land for cultivation above 
2 acres (1 if >2 acres and 0 otherwise). 
Small % of land 
allocated to CF 
Dummy Household allocates up to 10% of the entire land for cultivation 
to CF crop (1 if up to 10% and 0 otherwise). 
Medium % of land 
allocated to CF (B) 
Dummy Household allocates 10-30% of the entire land for cultivation to 
CF crop (1 if 10-30% and 0 otherwise). 
Large % of land 
allocated to CF 
Dummy Household allocates 31-50% of the entire land for cultivation to 
CF crop (1 if 31-50% and 0 otherwise). 
Note: B=base category. 
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Table 7.9 Description of the variables used in binary logit models - Continued 
Variable Category Description 
Low CF yield/season Dummy   Household yielded less than 100 kg of contracted paprika in   
  one season (1 if <100 kg and 0 otherwise). 
Medium CF 
yield/season (B) 
Dummy   Household yielded 100-200 kg of contracted paprika in one    
  season (1 if 100-200 kg and 0 otherwise). 
High CF yield/season Dummy   Household yielded over 200 kg of contracted paprika in one  
  season (1 if >200 kg and 0 otherwise). 
Close to the collection 
point 
Dummy   Household has <15 min of walk to reach the collection point  
  (1 if <15 min of walk and 0 otherwise). 
Medium distance to 
the collection point (B) 
Dummy   Household has 15-30 min of walk to reach the collection point  
  (1 if 15-30 min of walk and 0 otherwise). 
Large distance to the 
collection point 
Dummy   Household has > 30 min of walk to reach the collection point  
  (1 if > 30 min of walk and 0 otherwise). 
Low pesticide 
costs/season 
 Dummy  Household pays up to 3,500MKW for pesticides/season (1 if    
 pesticide costs up to 3,500 MKW and 0 otherwise) 
Medium pesticide 
costs/season (B) 
 Dummy  Households pays 3,501-6,500 MKW for pesticides/season (1  
 if pesticide costs 3,501-6,500 MKW and 0 otherwise) 
High pesticide 
costs/season 
 Dummy  Household pays over 6,500 MKW for pesticides/season (1 if   
 pesticide costs over 6,500 MKW and 0 otherwise). 
Not known costs/no 
use of pesticide 
Dummy Household does not know costs or does not use pesticides (1 
if not known costs/no use of pesticides and 0 otherwise). 
Low fungicide 
costs/season 
Dummy Household pays up to 3,500MKW for fungicides/season (1 if 
pesticide costs up to 3,500 MKW and 0 otherwise) 
Medium fungicide 
costs/season (B) 
Dummy Households pays 3,501-6,500 MKW for fungicides/season (1 
if pesticide costs 3,501-6,500 MKW and 0 otherwise) 
High fungicide costs Dummy Household pays over 6,500 MKW for fungicides per season 
(1 if fungicide costs over 6,500 MKW and 0 otherwise). 
Not known costs/no 
use of fungicide 
Dummy Household does not know costs or does not use fungicides (1 
if not known costs/no use of fungicides and 0 otherwise). 
Price known before the 
harvest (B) 
Dummy Household knows the price for contracted paprika before the 
harvest (1 if before the harvest and 0 otherwise). 
Price known after the 
harvest 
Dummy Household knows the price for the contracted paprika after 
the harvest (1 if before the harvest and 0 otherwise) 
Price known before or 
after the delivery 
Dummy Household knows the price for contracted paprika before or 




Dummy Household received assistance from the NGO (1 if received 
assistance and 0 if not). 
Government 
assistance received 
Dummy Household receives assistance from the Government (1 if 
received assistance and 0 if not). 
Note: B=base category. 
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Table 7.9 Description of the variables used in binary logit models - Continued 
Variable Category Description 
Positive CF influence Dummy Contracting positively influenced households’ livelihood (1 if 
positive and 0 otherwise). 
No CF influence (B) Dummy Contracting did not influence households’ livelihood (1 if no 
influence and 0 otherwise). 
Negative CF influence Dummy Contracting negatively influenced households’ livelihood (1 if 
positive and 0 otherwise). 
CF income sufficient 
(B) 
Dummy Income gained through CF is sufficient to cover household’s 
needs throughout the year (1 if sufficient and 0 otherwise). 
CF income partially 
sufficient 
Dummy Income gained from CF is only partially sufficient to cover 
household’s needs throughout the year (1 if partially sufficient 
and 0 otherwise). 
CF income not 
sufficient 
Dummy Income gained from CF is not sufficient to cover household’s 




7.6.4 Alternative Approach to Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis 
In qualitative analysis, an alternative to thematic analysis is content analysis. The 
main characteristic of content analysis is its reliability and efficiency in analysing 
large numbers of textual data often through word counts (Namey et al., 2008). 
Content analysis is used to analyse the frequency and patterns of usage of certain 
terms or phrases (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2013). Finally, the aim of content 
analysis is to quantify the content of the data in a systematic and replicable manner 
(Bryman, 2012). Thus, content analysis is rooted in quantitative research and looks 
at the manifest content, while the wider context of the data is not considered (Namey 
et al., 2008; Bryman, 2012). The overall aim of the study was to explore, examine 
and address key challenges in CF arrangements in Malawi’s paprika supply chain 
(see Figure 7.5 for the summary of the analytical framework). This primarily 
involves uncovering the context in which those challenges occur, supported by rich 
data with reasons behind challenges. Since content analysis neglects latent content 
and the context, thematic analysis was the optimal choice as a qualitative analysis for 
this study. 
 
There are three main approaches to address the binary response models: the linear 
probability model (LPM), logit model and probit model (Gujarati, 2004). The linear 
probability model is the most simple binary regression model. However, this model 




     
  
has a considerable disadvantage: instead of being in the range 0 to 1, the fitted 
probabilities can be <0 or >1 (Wooldridge, 2013). The logit and probit models 
overcome this problem and are often used in the binary response model. Heii et al. 
(2004, p. 444) stated that ‘there are often no compelling reasons to choose between 
the logit and probit model’ but some differences do exist. The probability function in 
the logit model is the cumulative logistic function while the probit model uses the 
normal distribution (Gujarati, 2004). Another difference between the two models is 
in their coefficients. Amemiya (1981) argued that the logit model displays higher 
coefficients, and that multiplying a probit coefficient by 1.6 will give a matching 
logit coefficient and multiplying a logit coefficient by 0.625 will result in 
corresponding probit coefficient. Since logit and probit models give similar results, 
the logit model was chosen in this study due to its wide usage in social sciences and 
mathematical simplicity over the probit model (Gujarati, 2004).  
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Figure 7.6 Summary of the research design: Addressing research aim, overall question 
and objectives through the choice of approach, instruments for data collection and analysis
Survey within 
the case study 
Embedded Mixed 
Method Design 
A: To explore, examine and address key 
challenges occurring in contract farming 
arrangements. 
Q: How can contract conditions in Malawi be 
improved, especially for small-scale farmers, 
to facilitate more efficient and sustainable 
relations in the existing paprika supply chain? 
 
O1: To explore and analyse current dynamics in the 
paprika supply chain.  
O2: To identify factors that motivate small-scale 
farmers to enter the contract relationship and 
explore how existing contracts influence small-scale 
farmers’ livelihoods. 
O3: To identify, describe and analyse key 
challenges in the contract relationship within the 
supply chain. 
O4: To propose and critically evaluate options for 
improving contracting conditions, in particular for 
small-scale farmers.  
Field visit and data: 1st and 2nd, QUAL (semi-
structured and focus group interviews) and quan 
Levels: 1, 2 and 3 
Analysis: Thematic, descriptive statistics, chi-
square, Kendal tau b, binary logit regression 
Participatory approach                  
+                     
Triangulation of 
sources and methods 
Field visit and data: 3rd, QUAL 
(Focus group interviews and 
discussion) 
Levels: 1, 2 and 3 
Analysis: Thematic and ranking 
Field visit and data: 1st and 2nd, QUAL (focus 
grpup interviews) and quan 
Levels: 1 
Analysis: Thematic, descriptive statistics, chi-
square, Kendal tau b, binary logit regression 
Field visit and data: 1st and 2nd, QUAL (semi-
structured and focus group interviews) and quan 
Levels: 1, 2 and 3 
Analysis: Thematic, descriptive statistics, chi-
square, Kendal tau b, binary logistic regression 
Research Aim, Overall Question and Objectives  




7.7 Ensuring Quality of the Research 
This section describes criteria for ensuring quality of the research and outlines how 
each of the criterion is applied in the study. Krefting (1990) stated that models used 
to assess the quality of the qualitative and quantitative research differ and should not 
be assessed using the same strategies. Since the study used mixed methods approach, 
it mostly relies on Guba's (1981) classification in Criteria for Assessing the 
Trustworthiness of Naturalistic Inquiries.  
 
In the above mentioned text, Guba (1981) proposed four aspects of trustworthiness as 
a key element in achieving the quality of the research: truth value, applicability, 
consistency and neutrality. Each aspect is appropriate in a different form in a 
qualitative and quantitative case. Truth value establishes the confidence in the ‘truth’ 
of the results and it reflects as credibility in qualitative inquiry and as internal validity 
in quantitative inquiry. Applicability determines to what degree the results can be 
applied in other contexts or with other subjects. Transferability represents 
applicability in qualitative inquiry and external validity or generalizability represent 
it in quantitative inquiry. Consistency ensures that the results would be consistently 
repeated if the same methods were used in an equal (or similar) context or sample. 
Dependability reflects consistency in qualitative inquiry and reliability reflects it in 
quantitative inquiry. Finally, neutrality establishes the degree to which the results 
represent the function of subjects’ characteristics and research conditions only, that 
is, they are free from any biases or interest of the researcher. In qualitative inquiry, 
neutrality is ensured through confirmability, while in quantitative inquiry it shows 
through objectivity. 
 
7.7.1 Qualitative Inquiry Criteria 
Credibility 
One of the methods proposed to ensure credibility of the qualitative inquiry is 
triangulation of theories, data sources, methodologies or researchers (Creswell, 2007; 
Ivankova, 2014). Thus, to provide credibility, triangulation was considered as one of 








Related to the applicability of study’s findings, qualitative research is often context-
specific; thus, one of the methods proposed to increase transferability is collecting a 
large amount of  descriptive data and develop thorough descriptions in order to 
‘permit comparison of this context to other possible contexts’ and ‘make judgements 
about fittingness with other contexts’ (Guba, 1981, p. 86). In the study, transferability 
was applied by (i) providing rich data on the context of the study setting, (ii) 
comparing the results with similar studies done in Malawi and other developing 
countries, and (iii) comparing the status of the paprika supply chain with theoretical 
constructs to confirm or reject existing assumptions.  
 
Confirmability 
As with research credibility, the triangulation method is recommended to reach 
confirmability in qualitative inquiry. In particular, this study gathered the data on the 
key challenges in the paprika supply chain from a ‘variety of perspectives’ by 
involving all three levels and giving them ‘the voice’ (Guba, 1981, p. 87). This was 
deemed especially important since challenges are a sensitive issue in the supply chain 
and different players face different challenges. To keep neutrality and not to be 
biased towards any party in the contract, data were collected, analysed and 




Guba (1981) proposed to develop an audit trail to enable an external auditor to assess 
the process of data analysis and interpretation. This overlaps with developing 
codebooks (see section 7.6.2.2 in this chapter) for the template style of thematic 
analysis. Thus, to enhance dependability of the study, Appendix 1 contains a detailed 
record of codes and categories developed and used in the analysis and interpretation 
of the data for each research objective. In addition, in the case of analysing contracts, 
codes were crosschecked with a fellow researcher. The check resulted in over 75% 







7.7.2 Quantitative Inquiry Criteria 
Internal validity 
The validity can generally be summarised as ‘whether operationalisation and the 
scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure’ 
(Adcock and Collier, 2001, p. 529). In other words, validity ensures that the 
researcher (i) measures what was intended to be measured by (ii) using the 
appropriate instruments and analysis and that the relative truth is established. Guba 
(1981) suggested so-called ‘member checks’ with relevant human data source groups 
to test for internal validity. In this study, the checks were done through three steps. 
First, the key content of the household questionnaire was crosschecked with experts 
during Skype interviews and by consulting the literature on related issues (i.e. 
scientific articles were used to identify the key variables and questionnaire examples 
from FAO, World Bank and National Statistical Office of Malawi were used to 
structure the socio-economic section of the questionnaire). Second, the questionnaire 
was corrected in collaboration with enumerators and a representative from the 
Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Third, during 
dissemination of the study’s findings, relevant results were presented to small-scale 
farmers (focus group interviews) and stakeholders (focus group discussion) to 
scrutinise and discuss them, and thereby confirm or reject their validity and establish 
the truth. 
 
External validity or generalisability 
In quantitative studies, the external validity and generalisability are attempted to be 
established by ensuring that the results do not depend on chronological or contextual 
variations; hence, the results will be true in any context (Guba, 1981). The type of 
quantitative data collected in the study (e.g. age, income categories, satisfaction with 
the contractor) obviously change over time and are dependent on the context. 
Therefore, the external validity or generalisability criteria could not be applied in the 
study due to its overall purpose and nature.   
 
Reliability 
The criteria of reliability builds on validity as it suggests that ‘measurements should 
be consistent and repeatable […] an instrument should measure the same thing each 




Major, 2013, p. 473). In the study, reliability was provided by (i) detailed description 
of used instruments for quantitative inquiry and (ii) attaching the entire household 
questionnaire in Appendix 2, so that the conducted quantitative part of the research 
can be replicated by any other researchers.   
 
Objectivity 
One of the suggested methods of securing objectivity in quantitative inquiry includes 
explicating used methods that are replicable and removing the researcher from direct 
contact with participants (Guba, 1981). In the context of this study, it was important 
to reduce any pressure on respondents to give appropriate answers. This was 
achieved in two ways. First, the researcher made clear that the purpose of the study 
was  scientific research both in written form (see Appendix 2, Introduction to 
household questionnaire) and while respondents were addressed each time prior to 
data collection. The goal was to remove any association with the contractor. Second, 
enumerators administered questionnaires while the researcher facilitated and 
controlled the process. In addition, the language barrier here potentially served the 
criteria of research objectivity as respondents might have felt free to express their 
opinions knowing that the researcher cannot comprehend them (direct contact is 
reduced). 
 
7.8 Methodological Limitations 
Research limitations in general are outlined in section 1.9 in chapter 1. This section 
focuses on methodological limitations. 
(a) Language barrier 
It was not possible to facilitate focus group discussions to achieve more in-depth 
understanding of small-scale farmers’ views due to the obvious language barrier. 
Although the majority of small-scale farmers understood English, it was deemed 
more appropriate and efficient to enable them to speak in their local language. The 
interaction with small-scale farmers was recorded and transcribed, which resulted in 
the form of focus group interviews that yielded rich and significant data for the study. 
 
(b) Limited role of the researcher 
Related to the latter point, the researcher was limited in applying qualitative and 




dependence on facilitators and enumerators throughout the study. The researcher 
planned, organised, advised and directed the process of administering the 
questionnaires and interviewing small-scale farmers. Facilitators and enumerators 
were repeatedly encouraged by the researcher to behave in good faith. 
 
(c) Confidentiality and accuracy of some data 
Some data, such as income levels or Company D’s volumes, were considered 
sensitive since the study addressed (i) vulnerable group and (ii) a real-life business 
relationship. Thus, Company D requested that some information about volumes 
would not be mentioned in any written form, which limited possibilities to discuss 
and compare Company D’s operations with other entities. On the other hand, the 
information given by small-scale farmers on their incomes could be questionable as 
respondents might be tempted to give untrue responses. Similarly, the information 
about yields of dry paprika per season provided by small-scale farmers could be over- 
or under-estimated. Therefore, the focus group interviews were used to gather the 
information on yields from the group to crosscheck data provided by individuals. In 
addition, the data collected through semi-structured interviews from the three vendors 
in Central Malawi were considered confidential since the vendors were in direct 
competition with Company D for dried paprika and the data they provided contained 
sensitive business information. The vendors revealed information on their business 
activities that was not outlined in this thesis in order to respect a given guarantee of 
confidentiality. Likewise, the guide for the semi-structured interview with vendors is 
not contained in the Appendices. Limited data were used from the semi-structured 
interviews with three vendors to triangulate the data from different sources and 
clarify some situations that occurred in the paprika supply chain. 
 
7.9 Research Ethics 
Israel and Hay (2006, p. 2) defined ethical behaviour as one that ‘helps to protect 
individuals, communities and environments, and offers the potential to increase the 
sum of good in the world’. The consideration of research ethics thus involves 
planning, conducting and reporting the research according to ethical principles. 
Bryman (2012) and Silverman (2013) suggested the following general ethical 
principles applicable across various disciplines: (i) voluntary participation and the 




in the research; (iii) assessment of potential benefits or risks for participants; (iv) 
informed consent; and (v) not doing harm to participants. In addition, the emergence 
of new internet-mediated research brought other ethical concerns, such as data 
security and blurred the distinction between the public and private domain online 
(Hewson et al., 2016). 
 
In this research, the ethical principles were considered in the following context: 
Ethical approval prior to the fieldwork: Ethical approval for this research was 
obtained on 2nd of September 2014 from the Social Research Ethics Committee at 
University College Cork. The main ethical concerns related to this research were 
elaborated in the proposal and included: a vulnerable group (small-scale farmers); the 
confidentiality of some socio-economic data; and the confidentiality of some 
business data (see Appendix 5). 
 
Informed consent prior to administering a household questionnaire: The first page of 
the household questionnaire sought informed consent. Informed consent consisted of 
two parts: a thorough explanation (the purpose of the study, the procedure for 
completing the questionnaire; selection; voluntary participation; signing the consent 
form; anonymity; confidentiality; dissemination of the study's results; envisaged 
risks; and a statement that the research has been approved by the Social Research 
Ethics Committee from University College Cork) and signing of the informed 
consent by the respondent and enumerator as a witness (see Appendix 2). Each 
enumerator was trained and obliged to read the explanation of the informed consent 
to the small-scale farmer and obtain a signature before administering the 
questionnaire. Questionnaires without signature were considered as invalid and were 
not part of the analysed data. 
 
Informed consent prior to facilitating focus group interviews and discussions: Before 
every focus group interview or discussion, the facilitator or the researcher first briefly 
introduced the purpose of the study and the focus group dynamics. In addition, 
participants were informed that they had the right to withdraw from the interview or 
discussion at any point. Finally, before asking permission to record the interview or 




transcripts was explained. The researcher used the audio recorder only in cases where 
participants agreed to be recorded. 
  
Informed consent prior to conducting semi-structured interviews: The same 
procedure was followed for the semi-structured interviews as described in the case of 
the focus group interviews and discussions. The interviewee was introduced to: the 
main purpose of the research; informed about the right to withdraw; informed about 
the importance of recording the interview; and asked for agreement to be recorded. 
  
Confidentiality of some of the data: Due to the confidentiality of some of the data and 
the anonymity of sources, some information gathered in this research was not 
revealed in written form (the thesis, the academic manuscripts and presentations). 
This is particularly related to the identity of the contracting company and data 
gathered from vendors. Thus, the name of the company was coded as 'Company D' 
and the interview guides and some responses from the vendors were not 
communicated. 
 
Data management: To secure the data and ensure confidentiality, the data were kept 
complete, accurate and in shape for an official retrospective audit. The paper data 
(household questionnaires, interview transcripts and observations) were stored in 
locked cabinets and password-protected in electronic form. 
 
7.10 Summary 
This chapter described and justified the research methodology used in the study. The 
key methodological principles in the study involved case study and participatory 
approach. The study comprised of in total two research sequences: preliminary 
research and the first two visits, and dissemination of the study’s findings. In 
addition, the study used Embedded Design-Multilevel Model with both concurrent 
and sequential data collection and QUAL priority to gather the data. Qualitative 
research instruments included semi-structured interviews with 21 key stakeholders 
and 10 experts, 2 focus group discussions with key stakeholders, 10 focus group 
interviews with small-scale farmers and observations. Quantitative research 
instruments involved 428 household questionnaires. In the next section, the study’s 
results are presented. 
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PART FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Chapter 8 Dynamics in Paprika Supply Chain 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides analysis of the collected quantitative and qualitative data with 
the aim to explore and analyse current dynamics in Malawi’s paprika supply chain 
(Objective 1). The chapter also answers the related research sub-questions: How do 
key players in the paprika supply chain interact among themselves regarding their 
roles, responsibilities and relations? What are the characteristics of contracted 
small-scale farmers? What is the level of small-scale farmers‟ involvement in 




8.2 Presentation of the Study’s Results 
The results of the study are presented in the following four chapters (Figure 8.1).  
 





Players in a supply chain 
· L1 Small-scale farmers: Detailed profile 
(QUAN-survey) 
· L2 Company D (QUAL-interviews) 
· L3 Enabling environment (QUAL-
interviews) 
Relations among players 
· L1-3 All players (QUAL-interviews and 
FGD and FDI) 







Reasons for contracting 
· L1 Small-scale farmers (QUAL-FGI 
and QUAN-survey) 
Influence of CF on livelihood 
· L1 Small-scale farmers (QUAL-FGI 
and QUAN-survey) 
 







Key challenges identified 
· L1 Small-scale farmers (QUAL-FGI) 
· L2 Company D (QUAL-interviews) 
· L3 Enabling environment (QUAL-
interviews) 
Contract design as challenge 
· L2 Company D (QUAL-interviews) 
Side-selling as challenge 
· L1 Small-scale farmers (QUAL-FGI 
and QUAN-survey) 
· L2 Company D (QUAL-interviews) 
· L3 Enabling environment (QUAL-
interviews) 







Options for improving CF conditions 
· L1 Small-scale Farmers’ Model (QUAL-
FGI) 
· L2-3 Stakeholders’ Model (QUAL-FGD) 
 





Chapter 8 Dynamics in Paprika Supply 
Chain  
Chapter 9 CF and its Influence on 
Small-scale Farmers’ Livelihood 
Chapter 10 Key Challenges in CF: 
Contract Design and Side-selling 
Chapter 11 Options for Improving CF 
conditions for Small-scale Farmers  
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Chapter 8 presents dynamics in the paprika supply chain by first introducing the 
players in the paprika supply chain and then outlining the relations among players. 
Chapter 9 identifies the main factors that motivate small-scale farmers to join 
contracting arrangements and explores how having a contract influences small-scale 
farmers’ livelihood. Chapter 10 emphasises the key challenges found in the paprika 
supply chain, then focuses on the poor contract design and side-selling practices, and 
finally discusses how stated challenges reflect in the relationship between the 
contractor and small-scale farmers. Chapter 11 describes the options for improving 
contracting conditions proposed by the participants though two models: the Small-
scale Farmers’ Model and the Stakeholders’ Model. 
 
8.3 Players in the Paprika Supply Chain: Roles and Responsibilities 
Two main groups were identified in the paprika supply chain: the key players and the 
enabling environment (Figure 8.2). The key players in the context of this study 
included small-scale farmers and Company D as the contractor that offered the 
contract for growing paprika. The enabling environment consisted of two parts 
representing institutional elements (Government) and supporting services 
(Universities, consultancy sector, NGOs, civil society, aid organisation and farmers’ 
organisations). 
 
In general, the paprika supply chain in Malawi also involved other players: input 
providers, vendors (informal buying sector), another contracting company operating 
in the Northern Region, intermediaries, processors, retailers and further customers, 
which were not part of this study as the focus was on paprika intended for export. 





The product transformation and flow for the case study of dried paprika chain 
consisted of three main phases. In the first phase, small-scale farmers delivered 
whole dried paprika pods with the stem to Company D. In the second phase, 
Company D exported whole dried paprika pods to the processor in South Africa.  
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 Roles, responsibilities and relations among input dealers, vendors and the processor of dried 
paprika in South Africa are briefly considered further in this chapter. End-customers in Germany, 
Spain and South Africa were not part of this study due to technical limitations, so their contribution in 
























Figure 8.2 Paprika Supply Chain in Malawi 
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In the final phase, the processor extracted oleoresin from paprika and supplied one 




The information flow in the chain was concentrated around the two key players. 
Company D received information from the processor in South Africa and 
transformed the information into the request for quality and quantity of paprika to 
small-scale farmers, associations and NGOs. Small-scale farmers were sharing and 
receiving information on production and marketing-related practices from Company 
D, the informal sector, farmers’ organisations and NGOs.   
 
The most relevant information on price was based on the situation on the 
international market and was communicated to small-scale farmers by Company D 
after the negotiation with the processor in South Africa. Finally, the financial funds 
were flowing from Company D to small-scale farmers after supplying paprika, and 
from the processor in South Africa to Company D upon delivering the commodity. 
 
8.3.1 Small-scale Farmers under the Contract: A Detailed Profile 
8.3.1.1 Socio-economic Characteristics of Sampled Households 
This sub-section explores various characteristics of small-scale farmers under the 
contract to understand better farmers' conditions, attitudes and behaviours regarding 
contracting. Table 8.1 provides details on the socio-economic characteristics of 
surveyed households with the goal of enhancing the understanding of the 
background of small-scale farmers who undertake contract farming for paprika in 
Central Malawi. The majority of low-income households had a male household head 
(76%) above 40 years of age (54.8%) and who had completed primary level 
education (82.7%).  
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 Oleoresin is an extract from paprika, which comes in liquid or semi-solid from and contains the 
aroma and flavour of paprika (Berke and Shieh, 2012). The end product of paprika from Malawi is 




Table 8.1 Socio-economic characteristics of households in both districts 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                     
% of total N (% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                               
% of total N (% within the type) 










LLA   
(n=71) 
Age        




































Gender*        




























       



























 (38)  














       
























Tertiary  0.5 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.5 (2.6) 0 (0) 0.2 (0.5) 0.2 (1.4) 












Adult literacy  0.2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.2 (1.3) 0.2 (0.5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Experience in 
cultivating paprika 
       






























2.1 (5) 2.3 (5.7) 1.2 (7) 
Household main 
occupation  
       












Livestock  0.2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.2 (1.3) 0.2 (0.5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 














Other  0.7 0.7 (1.44) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.7 (1.7) 0 (0) 
Note: *one missing response. 
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Low-income households reported crop farming as their main occupation (87.9%) and 
had up to three years of experience in paprika cultivation (65.8%). 
 
Medium- and high-income households did not differ considerably from low-income 
households regarding socio-economic characteristics. Both types of households had a 
male household head (MMI=81.8%, HMI=81.9%) with >40 years of age 
(MMI=45.4%, HMI=48%) and completed primary education level (MMI=69.2%, 
HMI=58.4%). Crop farming (MMI=59.4%, HMI=53.2%) and mixed farming 
(MMI=40.5%, HMI=45.4%) were the main occupations of medium- and high-
income households. The majority of medium- and high-income households had short 
experience in paprika cultivation (MMI=69.2%, HMI=74%). 
 
Table 8.1 also indicates that there were similarities in socio-economic characteristics 
among households with various proportions of land allocated to CF crop. Across all 
three household types, the household head was male (SLA=77.3%, MLA=78.8%, 
LLA=83%) with completed primary education level (SLA=74%, MLA=74.3%, 
LLA=73%). Households were medium (SLA=34.2%, MLA=36%, LLA=38%) to 
small in size (SLA=39.2%, MLA=29.7%, LLA=38%) and the main households’ 
occupation was crop farming (SLA=70.1%, MLA=77.1%, LLA=63%). Regardless 
of the land size allocated for contracting purposes, all households had short 
experience in paprika cultivation (SLA=71.8%, MLA=64.6%, LLA=69%). 
 
The highest percentage of young household heads was found in medium-income 
households (24.2%) and households that allocated small (23.7%) to large land to CF 
(24%). Tertiary level education was reported in high-income households (2 
respondents) and a household that allocated medium (1 respondent) and large land to 
CF crop (1 respondent). The highest percentage of long experience in paprika 
cultivation was recorded in medium-income households (6.29%) and households 
with the large CF land (7%). 
 
8.3.1.2 Housing and Assets 
The vast majority of surveyed households (97%) owned the house where they were 




Table 8.2 Housing and ownership of assets in both districts 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                      
% of total N                                    
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                         
% of total N                                















Owning the house        
Yes 97 47       
(96.6) 










No 2.3 1.2        
(2.4) 
0.7          
(2.1) 
0.5      
(2.59) 
1.4        
(3.1) 




Family house 0.7 0.5              
(1) 
0           
(0) 
0.2       
(1.29) 
0.2         
(0.5) 






       
Yes 1.4 0.7   
(1.44) 
0.2        
(0.7) 
0.5      
(2.59) 
0.5        
(1.1) 
















Solar system 3.3 1.2         
(2.4) 
0.9        
(2.8) 
1.2       
(6.5) 
2.3      
(5.52) 






       












Motorbike 2.3 0.9      
(1.92) 
0.5     
(1.39) 
0.9    
(5.19) 
0.7      
(1.65) 
















Television *    2.8 0.2      
(0.48) 
0.7       
(2.1) 
1.9    
(10.3) 
1.4       
(3.31) 




Telephone*    8.4 0.5        
(1) 
4.7         
(14) 
3.3      
(18.2) 
2.1      
(4.97) 
4         
(10) 
2.3    
(14) 












Sewing machine      3 1.2        
(2.4) 
0.9      
(2.79) 
0.9      
(5.19) 
1.4       
(3.31) 




Hoes/spades 90.7 41.1    
(85) 
32       
(95.8) 
























15.7     
(87) 






Cart   5.4 1.4    
(2.88) 




1.4       
(3.31) 




Bowl 88.6 40.9 
(84.1) 










Note: * This question referred to whether the household has access to the asset, 
meaning that the access can be provided at the community level also and not 
exclusively as a household’s asset, ** panga is a type of machete usually used to cut 
weeds and clear bushes. 
 
183 
An alternative source of energy (solar energy) was available to 2.4% of low-income 
households, 2.8% of medium-income households and 6.5% of high-income 
households. Households with small CF land (5.52%) had better access to the solar 
system compared to households with medium (1.71%) and large CF land (1.4%).  
 
Concerning transport means, households owned bicycles (72.4%) to a bigger extent 
than motorbikes (2.3%). The bicycle as an asset was more prevalent in low-income 
households (75%) compared to medium- (70.6%) and high-income households 
(68.8%). Households with medium CF land (81.1%) had a higher percentage of 
bicycles than households with small (73%) and large CF land (50.7%). High-income 
households (5.19%) and households with large CF land (4.22%) owned the highest 
percentage of motorbikes.  
 
Households in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts had reasonable access to radio 
(64.7%) and mobile phones (42.3%), and relatively poor access to television (2.8%) 
and the landline telephone (8.4%). High-income households had better access to 
radio (71.4%), mobile phone (49.3%), television (10.3%) and the landline telephone 
(18.2%) compared to low- and medium-income households. Similarly, households 
with large CF land had better access to radio (77.46%), television (4.22%) and the 
landline telephone (14%) compared to households with small and medium land 
allocated to a CF crop.  
 
From remaining assets, the majority of households owned basic farming equipment: 
hoes/spades (90.7%), axe (80.4%) and the panga (79%). Furthermore, only 5.4% of 
households owned a cart - mostly high-income households (11.68%) and households 
with large CF land (11.2%). Sewing machine was owned by 3% of households, in 
particular by high-income households (5.19%) and households with large CF land 
(5.63%). A majority of households owned a bowl (88.6%) for preparing, storing or 
carrying food. 
 
8.3.1.3 Health and Education Expenses 
In this study, the costs of health services, schooling (and food) were considered as 






Table 8.3 indicates how those costs were distributed among different household 
types.  
 
Table 8.3 Health, education and food expenses in both districts 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total N Income levels                                                      
% of total N                                
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                               
% of total N                                 















Access to health services        
Yes 97.7 47       
(97) 










No 2.3 1.6 (3) 0.2 (1) 0.5 (3) 1.4 (3.4) 0.5 (1.2) 0.5 (3) 
Health services 
expenses/month* 
       
















































Not known 1.2 0.7 (1.4) 0.2 (1) 0.2 (1) 0.7 (1.6) 0.5 (1.2) 0 (0) 
Schooling fees/month        






























































Note: * two missing responses. 
 
The majority of households had access to health services (97.7%).
82
 Medium- (29%) 
and high-income households (29%) had a higher percentage of high health costs 
compared to low-income households, which had the highest percentage of low health 
costs (23%) within the group. High-income households had the highest percentage of 
high schooling costs (27%) and low-income households had the highest levels of low 
                                                                                                                                                                    
81
 Stated expenses are related to the basic household needs. Expenses for rented land are discussed 
further in this chapter. Chapter 9 explores in more details the key costs in contract farming activities. 
82
 The health services here involve basic services on the local level usually performed by available GP 
doctors and supporting medical staff. 
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schooling costs (22%). In terms of free access to services, high-income households 
had the lowest levels of free access to health services (25%) and schooling (28%) 
compared to other household types. 
 
8.3.1.4 Roles and Responsibilities of Small-scale farmers 
The main role of small-scale farmers in the paprika supply chain was that of a 
supplier of raw material intended for processing and export purposes. In addition, 





(a) Small-scale farmers as Suppliers 
As suppliers, small-scale farmers had the responsibility to deliver paprika at an 
agreed time and in appropriate quantities and quality to the collection point proposed 
by Company D. Small-scale farmers were responsible for paprika during cultivation, 
harvesting, drying and transportation. Especially during the cultivation phase, small-
scale farmers’ responsibility was to use recommended and allowed chemicals. 
 
Since the contract did not provide any inputs except seeds, small-scale farmers were 
also solely responsible for procuring appropriate fertilisers, pesticides and/or 
fungicides. Small-scale farmers were obliged to sell their paprika exclusively to the 
contractor as part of the contract they signed. When applicable, small-scale farmers 
were responsible for attending training provided by extension officers from 
Company D or the Malawian Government. Finally, small-scale farmers had the 
responsibility to grade their paprika
84
 prior to official evaluation and deliver paprika 
by organising and paying for the transportation themselves. 
 
(b) Small-scale farmers as Members of Group/Association 
When part of a group or association related to contract farming activities, small-scale 
farmers were responsible for attending meetings and discussing relevant points with 
other members, extension worker(s), NGOs and the contractor. Also, in some 
villages, the contract has been signed in the group/association’s name and members 
                                                          
83
 Roles and responsibilities of small-scale farmers were partially described in the contract. 
84
 Small-scale farmers had to separate high grade from the lower grade in sacks and present it to the 
company’s buying team for further assessment. See chapter 9, Box 9.3 for more details.  
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were obliged to deliver the crop in bulk to be forwarded to the contractor. In general, 
if part of a group or association, a small-scale farmer was responsible for 
contributing to the mutual economic benefit and using this channel to market 
contracted paprika. 
 
8.3.2 Company D 
8.3.2.1 Background 
(a) Establishing Company D and Starting a Business with Paprika 
Company D was established in 2008 and it was developed from initially a private 
farm founded in 2003 in Malawi. The headquarters of Company D are in London. In 
2016, Company D owned estates reaching over 6,000 hectares of land in 7 Malawian 
districts: Salima, Michinji, Lilongwe, Mzimba, Rumphi, Kasungu and Mangochi 




The main idea driving the founding of Company D was: 
 „...building on that concept of working with communities around the estate.‟ 
Company D’s Project Manager, semi-structured interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
 
Company D started commercial farming with paprika in 2010 after the acquisition of 
the company that previously dealt with paprika. Company D offered its contracts for 
cultivating paprika to small-scale farmers (outgrowers)
86
 in the same year and 
building on the existing outgrower programme from the acquired company. The 
main motivating factors to start contracting with paprika involved: (1) Malawi’s 
advantage in suitable climatic conditions for growing paprika, (2) the market and 
demand for paprika were present, (3) needed infrastructure was in place from the 
previous company, and (4) other cash crops (tea, coffee and sugar) require 
plantations while Company D wanted the crop to be available for cultivation to 
small-scale farmers. During the course of study (2013-16), Company D was the only 
official contractor for the dried paprika in Malawi’s Central Region. 
                                                          
85
 After official establishment and expansion of the company, Company D still continued to operate 
on a private investment basis. In addition, since the study was done in Malawi, this section on the 
company’s background briefly covers its activities in Malawi exclusively. However, Company D has 
operations in other parts of the world too: Guatemala (horticulture), Australia (livestock) and Russia 
(arable land) (Company D, 2016). 
86
 The term ‘outgrowers’ indicates that the company has its own estates used for large-scale 
commercial farming but also supplies paprika from small-scale farmers outside its estates. 
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(b) Supplier Base 
Apart from its own estates, Company D supplies paprika from 10,000-15,000 small-
scale farmers across Malawi. The supply from small-scale farmers can reach over 
65% more volume of paprika compared to the amount grown on Company D estates. 
At the time of the study, Company D offered contracts for paprika, bird’s eye chillies 
and groundnuts to small-scale farmers.  
 
(c) Social Responsibility, Christian Values and Importance of Paprika for Company 
D  
During the interviews, Company D representatives highlighted that the idea of social 
responsibility and Christian values determine Company D’s operations. This was 
further explained as follows: 
  
 „Well, I think it means that it‟s a business the profits of which are intended to, umm, 
 do some good in the country, rather than just make the profits for the shareholders. 
 [...] So, that‟s essentially what it means and I think it‟s really based on the 
 shareholder‟s Christian principles [...] a desire to do good with one‟s money.‟ 
Company D’s Project Manager, semi-structured interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
 
Paprika is Company D’s biggest export cash crop and it accounts for around 15-20% 
of Company D’s net sale. Moreover, the importance of paprika is in its potential to 
generate a high-income from a relatively small land area compared to other crops 
that Company D promotes. 
 
(d) Further Market for Paprika 
Company D has a long-term trading relationship with the processing company in 
South Africa where it transports the majority of dry paprika pods with stems from 
Malawi. Company D supplies about 55% of processors’ paprika material. In 
addition, Company D sells paprika to other traders in South Africa in smaller 
volumes; however, at the time of the study, all paprika was sold to the processor. 
 
8.3.2.2 Roles and Responsibilities of Company D 
Company D had a role as a buyer of raw paprika in the paprika supply chain. The 
main responsibilities of Company D included formulating the contract (see chapter 
10, section 2: Contract Design as a Challenge for more details), screening suppliers, 
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offering the contract to potential small-scale farmers, supplying seeds for cash to 
small-scale farmers, organising and delivering extension services, buying raw 
material from small-scale farmers, grading, packing and transporting paprika to the 
next buyer (processor) in South Africa. In addition, Company D had responsibility to 
comply with terms and regulations of national and international trade, in particular 
regarding allowed levels of aflatoxin in paprika and colour units that determine 




8.3.3 Roles and Responsibilities of the Enabling Environment 
8.3.3.1 NASFAM – National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi 
National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi (NASFAM) has a role as a 
small-scale farmers’ representative body in the country and it is the largest small-
scale farmers’-owned organisation. NASFAM consisted of 43 associations in 2015, 
which were based on action groups and farmers’ clubs (NASFAM, 2015). 
NASFAM’s core responsibilities thus include providing the market,
88
 inputs and 
training for small-scale farmers and linking interested traders with small-scale 
farmers. In addition, NASFAM represented small-scale farmers’ interests during the 
process of developing the national Contract Farming Strategy. Box 8.1 outlines 
NASFAM’s vision and mission. 
 
8.3.3.2 FUM – Farmers Union Malawi 
The Farmers Union Malawi (FUM) is another farmers’ body representative, 
however, not exclusively devoted to small-scale farmers but also to medium- and 
large-scale farmers in Malawi. FUM’s responsibilities are divided into three areas of 
influence. First, under institutional development, FUM has the responsibility to 
mobilise farmers to gather into cooperatives where FUM delivers training to promote 
efficiency of established cooperatives. Second, under agribusiness and marketing, 
FUM is responsible for linking farmers' cooperatives to inputs and outputs market 
and promoting value-addition. Third, under advocacy policy area and especially 
regarding contract farming, FUM conducts the research to suggest recommendations 
                                                          
87
 Aflatoxins are poisonous chemicals produced by some fungi that are found in or on food and have 
potential carcinogenic and toxicological effects for humans and animals (Cornell University, 2015). 
88
 At the time of the study, NASFAM provided the market for groundnuts, rice, soya, chillies and 
maize (NASFAM, 2015). 
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for policy changes and contract farming promotion based on evidence. Figure 8.3 

















Figure 8.3 The structure of the Farmers Union Malawi 
 
FUM had a similar role as NASFAM in advocating for farmers’ interests during 
consultation meetings for the national Contract Farming Strategy. FUM’s vision and 
mission are further described in Box 8.1. Moreover, FUM has an active part in 
contract farming since FUM connects buyers with well-established farmers’ 
cooperatives and scrutinises offered contracts, as indicated below: 
 
  „Because when [buyers] come through us, we scrutinise their contracts...yeah...we 
  will not just get the contract from the buyer and make the farmer sign.‟ 






Farmers Union Malawi (FUM) 

































8.3.3.3 CISANET – Civil Society Agriculture Network 
CISANET has a role of a civil society representative influencing positive policy 
changes in the agricultural sector to enhance agricultural productivity and improve 
small-scale farmers’ livelihoods. CISANET consists of four civil society 
organisations in Malawi. Its principal responsibility is policy advocacy concerning 
facilitating dialogues between various stakeholders and the Government. In 
particular, CISANET acts as a mediator for stakeholders who do not have the 
capacity to reach other players in the sector. CISANET was also participating in 
creation of the national Contract Farming Strategy by advocating for the small-scale 
farmers’ interests. 
 
BOX 8.1 Vision and mission of key farmers’ institutions in Malawi 
NASFAM 
Vision: To be the leading smallholder owned business and development organisation in 
Malawi, producing economic and social benefits for members, their communities and the 
country. 
Mission: NASFAM exists to improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers. Through a 
sustainable network of smallholder-owned business organisations, NASFAM promotes 
farming as a business to develop the commercial capacity of its members and delivers 
programmes that enhance their productivity and innovation.  
 
Source: The Magazine for National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi 
(obtained in 2014 during the visit to NASFAM, p. i) 
 
FUM 
Vision: To ensure a union of Malawian farmer with powerful collective voice to promote 
and advance the interests of farmers. 
Mission: To promote and safeguard interest of all farmers in Malawi, and create a 
conducive agricultural operating environment for improved agricultural productivity, 
market access and increased farmer incomes. 
 





8.3.3.4 Concern Universal – An International Development Organisation 
Concern Universal (Concern) is an international development organisation working 
in Malawi with the main role of linking farmers with markets. Concern's 
responsibility is working with farmers directly in the form of training on agricultural 
practices and providing seeds, fertilisers and irrigation intervention, i.e. securing 
treadle pumps for their beneficiaries. Concern initiates gathering of farmers into 
groups and connecting them with companies to provide a market for this agricultural 
produce and increase farmers’ negotiation power through collective action. 
Concern’s representatives emphasised that, regarding contract farming relations, 
their part is facilitation rather than direct involvement. Concern was, in particular, 
important in this study as small-scale farmers in Nkhotakota were introduced to 
Company D through Concern. 
 
8.3.3.5 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development  
The government has been so far participating in contract farming through its 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development to the greatest extent. 
The main role of the Ministry is to develop the national Contract Farming Strategy 
(Strategy), which will be a leading document for directing contract farming relations 
among different stakeholders and thus to regulate contracting within the country. The 
Ministry was involved in promoting and registering farmers’ groups and providing 
agricultural training to farmers through its extension workers. The key responsibility 
of the Ministry is to set the rules of the game, clarify contract farming principles for 
all parties, prevent exploitative contracts, create a win-win situation for all parties 
involved, and to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Strategy. The 
representatives from the Ministry highlighted, other than providing extension 
services, the Government does not intend to interfere with the market (e.g. no 
subsidies for inputs, outlet for the produce, providing credit or setting prices) but 
rather is tasked with securing a legal framework for contract farming activities. 
 
8.3.3.6 TLC – Total Land Care (NGO) 
TLC is an NGO with distinguished environmental awareness and collaborates with 
farmers in producing paprika. The key responsibilities include: ensuring that farmers 
produce adequately using best available technologies and in an environmentally 
conservative manner, providing farmers with inputs (paprika seed, fertilizers and 
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chemicals), offering soft loans, encouraging formation of cooperatives and collective 




8.3.3.7 Research and Academic Units 
As part of the supporting services, research and academic units have a role in 
providing recommendations for improving contract farming conditions. The main 
responsibilities of these units are: conducting  research (in particular case studies), 
evaluating existing models, structuring guidelines for the Government and 
companies based on collected evidence, raising awareness about good and bad 
contract farming practices and suggesting improved models. 
 
8.3.3.8 Consultancy Sector 
The consultancy sector shares the same role with research and academic units in 
recommending needed enhancements in contract farming. From 2008, the 
consultancy sector produced three studies on contract farming and paprika in the 
context of Malawi, which were intended to describe the current state in the country 
and inform stakeholders. The main responsibility of the consultancy sector was to 
explore a particular topic of interest and produce guidelines on how to improve 
certain aspects of contract farming. 
 
8.3.3.9 Input Dealers and Processor in South Africa 
Input dealers were part of the paprika supply chain with a key role in selling inputs, 
mainly fertilisers, pesticides and fungicides for paprika cultivation. Processor had the 
role of buying and processing Company D’s raw paprika and exporting it as 
oleoresin to the European and South African market.  
 
8.3.3.10 Other Players: Vendors and Supermarkets 
Vendors’ role in the paprika supply chain was to provide an alternative unofficial 
outlet for small-scale farmers’ paprika.
90
 Vendors were small- to medium-scale 
buyers of paprika, mostly located around the capital Lilongwe. The word ‘vendor’ in 
                                                          
89
 TLC procured inputs from input dealers and offered those to small-scale farmers under the 
condition that 50% of the input value is paid upfront and the remaining part after the product has been 
sold. 
90
 The role of vendors is described in more detail in chapter 10, section 10.4. 
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Malawi’s paprika supply chain marked two roles of an individual: a buyer of dry 
paprika from small-scale farmers and seller of that dry paprika to processors. From 
Lilongwe, vendors operated in the Central Region. Vendors did not provide inputs or 
training, but they were buying paprika directly from small-scale farmers’ farms. In 
contrast, supermarkets did not play an explicit role in the paprika supply chain 
because they dealt with the fresh paprika and not the variety intended for the export. 
Supermarkets represent a potential future channel for small-scale farmers but the key 
issue that small-scale farmers face related to supplying paprika for supermarkets is 
the consistency in quality and quantity. 
 
8.4 Relations among Players in the Paprika Supply Chain 
Figure 8.4 summarises relations between the players in Malawi’s paprika supply 
chain who were participants in this study. 
 
8.4.1 Small-scale farmers: Communication and Relations 
During the focus group interviews, small-scale farmers from the Lilongwe area 
expressed their concerns regarding the quality of communication with Company D. 
The communication between the two parties was poor, as farmers stated: 
 
 „There is little or no communication between us and [Company D].‟ 
Focus group interview no. 6, Nkhoma area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
 „The only communication we get is when extension worker comes and tells us that 
 tomorrow [Company D] will start buying the crop at this price.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 8, Nkhoma area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
However, small-scale farmers were communicating with other players. Figure 8.4 
captures the dynamics of relations that small-scale farmers had with players in the 
studied paprika supply chain. The majority of small-scale farmers established direct 
communication with Company D’s extension worker (87.1%), and high-income 
households (90%) and households with small CF land (91%) reported the highest 




















Figure 8.4.1a: Relations Between Players in Paprika Supply Chain 
Note: Figure 8.4.1a outlines relations only among participants of paprika supply chain stream that supplies export market (case study). 
 
Figure 8.4 Dynamics of relations in the paprika supply chain 
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Less than one-third of households (28.5%) directly communicated with the 
contractor: to the greatest extent, those communicating with the contractor were 
medium-income households (38%) and households with large CF land (41%). 
 
Table 8.4 Communication and entry point for contracting  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                             
% of total N                                
 (% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                       
% of total N                                               

















inside the supply 
chain 
       
Contractor 28.5 12 (24.5) 12.6 (38) 4 (22) 7.7 (18) 14 (34) 6.8 (41) 
Input dealer 22 0.2 (0.5) 3.3 (9.7) 1.6 (9) 1.4 (3.3) 2.1 (5.1) 1.6 (10) 
Extension worker 87.1 42.1 (86.5) 29 (87) 16.1 (90) 38.6 (91) 34.1 (83) 14.3 (86) 
Club/organisation 4.4 2.6 (5.3) 0.9 (2.8) 0.9 (5) 2.1 (5) 1.4 (3.4) 0.7 (4.2 
None 0.5 0 (0) 0.5 (1.4) 0 (0) 0.5 (1.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Point of entry to CF        
Household own 
initiative 
14 6.5 (13.5) 4.4 (13.3) 3 (16.9) 5.6 (13.2) 5.6 (13.7) 2.8 (17) 
Village head 4.7 2.6 (5.3) 0.9 (2.8) 1.2 (6.5) 0.9 (2.2) 2.3 (5.7) 1.49 (8.4) 
Extension worker 50.9 24.3 (50) 17.8 (53.1) 8.9 (49.4) 19.9 (47) 22.2 (54.3) 8.9 (53.5) 












NGO initiative 1.9 1.2 (2.4) 0.5 (1.4) 0.2 (1.3) 1.4 (3.3) 0.5 (1.1) 0 (0) 
Contractor 2.6 0.5 (0.9) 1.4 (4.2) 0.7 (3.9) 1.2 (2.8) 1.4 (3.4) 0 (0) 
 
Households in the Lilongwe district had a higher percentage of direct 
communication with both the contractor (35%) and extension worker (88%) 
compared to households in Nkhotakota (contractor=14%, extension worker=83%) 
(based on Table 1.1A in Appendix B). This could be attributed to the fact that the 
Lilongwe district is considerably closer to Lilongwe city, i.e. Company D’s 
headquarters; thus, visits from the contractor and extension workers might have been 
more frequent to Lilongwe district compared to visits to Nkhotakota district.  
 
About half of the respondents (50.9%) stated they entered into contract farming 
through an extension worker and one-fourth of households (25.9) joined contracting 
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through their colleagues. The respondents were motivated by an NGO initiative to 
join contract farming to the least extent (1.9%). Medium-income households (53.1%) 
and households with medium CF land (54.3%) joined contracting through extension 
workers to the greatest extent. Low-income households (27.9%) and households with 
small CF land (31.5%) showed the highest percentage in entering the contractual 
arrangement through colleagues compared to other household types. 
 
From the total number, 58.2% of households were linked to some NGO and 40.2% 
of households reported they received assistance from an NGO (Table 8.5). Medium-
income households and households with a large proportion of land allocated to CF 
recorded the highest percentage of NGO assistance in the form of training 
(MMI=47%, LLA=53%) and assistance with production processes (MMI=47%, 
LLA=45%). Furthermore, only 9.6% of households received assistance from the 
Government: to the greatest extent, those were high-income households (16.9%) and 
households with large CF land (21%). Government assistance involved mainly 
training (HMI=13%, LLA=18%) and help with production processes (HMI=12%, 
LLA=11%). 
 
Regarding received supporting services, a greater number of households in 
Nkhotakota district received assistance from an NGO (42%) compared to Lilongwe 
district (39%), but Lilongwe district had a higher percentage of assistance from the 
Government (LLW=10%, NKH=8%) (based on Table 1.1A in Appendix B). 
 
A total of 72% of surveyed households stated they were members of a local farmers’ 
association/cooperative/club and that the membership resulted in added value for the 
household’s farming (72.4%) (Table 8.6). The highest level of membership was 
found among medium-income households (82%) and households with medium CF 
land (73%). In addition, 40.7% of surveyed households stated they were members of 
an agricultural cooperative (mostly high-income households: 74% and households 







Table 8.5 Small-scale farmers’ relations with players in the supply chain 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                               
(% of total N) 
Land allocated to CF                          

















       
Yes 58.2 23.4  
 (48) 










No 40.4 24.1 
 (49.5) 
9.3          
(28) 
7         
(39) 
17.8      
(42) 
17.1       
(42) 
5.6       
(34) 




       
Yes 40.2 12.9 
    (26) 




13.3         
(31) 










29       
(68.5) 








       






































4.9 0.7 (1.44) 2.3 (7) 1.9 (10) 2.6 (6.1) 1.4 (3.4) 0.9 (5.6) 




















24.5       
(58) 







       


















38.4      
(91) 








       












With production 6.1 1.6 (3.4) 2.3 (7) 2.1 (12) 2.1 (5) 2.1 (5) 1.9 (11) 


























With negotiation 0 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 
N/A or none  90 46.3 
 (95.2) 














Moreover, 40.2% of respondents were members of the Farmers Union Malawi 
(mostly low-income households: 70% and households with small CF land: 47%). 
Again, for majority of households (72.5%), membership in specific 
cooperatives/unions had an added value for farming activities. 
 
Table 8.6 Small-scale farmers’ membership in organisations 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                             
% of total N                                 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                            
% of total N                               















Membership in local 
farmers’ 
association/coop/club 
       
Yes 72 32          
(66) 






















Added value for farming 
for due to membership 
       
Yes 72.4 32.5         
(67) 




































       












Trading union 13.6 5.6 (11.5) 7 (21) 0.9 (5) 6.5 (15) 5.8 (14) 1.2 (7) 
Agricultural coop 40.7 28.5     
(59) 








4.9     
(29.5) 
NASFAM 5.1 1.6 (3.36) 2.8 (8.4) 0.7 (4) 1.6 (3.9) 2.1 (5) 1.4 (8) 












None 26 17.1         
(35) 








5.6      
(34) 
Added value for farming 
due to specific 
membership 
       
Yes 72.5 31.5        
(65) 
























16.6         
(34) 











From surveyed households, low-income households had the lowest levels of 
membership in the local association/cooperative/club (66%) and received assistance 
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from an NGO to the smallest extent (26%) compared to all other household types. 
Households with small CF land had the lowest level of direct communication with 
the contractor (18%) in comparison with all other household types. 
 
Furthermore, households in Nkhotakota district reported higher levels of overall 
membership in a farmers’ association/cooperative/club (81%) and, in particular, in 
agricultural cooperatives (56%) compared to Lilongwe district (overall 
membership=68%, agricultural cooperatives=34%) (based on Table 1.1A in 
Appendix B). Nevertheless, the Lilongwe district had a higher rate of membership in 
the Farmers Union Malawi (43%) compared to the Nkhotakota district (34%).  
 
The highest proportion of households involved in a farmers’ 
association/cooperative/club (40.7%) expressed they were very satisfied with the role 
of the farmers’ institution in representing their voice (Table 8.7). Taking into 
consideration ranking from households that are part of some of the farmers’ 
institutions (NKH=105, LLW=207), both districts were very satisfied (NKH=45.6%, 
LLW=38.6%). The considerable difference among districts was the lowest score 
given (‘very unsatisfying’) as households in Nkhotakota district gave a greater 
amount of lower scores (4%) compared to households in Lilongwe district (0.3%). 
 
Table 8.7 Rating the satisfaction with the role of farmers’ 
association/cooperative/club in representing farmers’ voice 
Variable 
% 









Unsatisfying 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Neutral 8.4 8 8.6 
Satisfying 21.7 25.6 20.1 
Very satisfying 40.7 45.6 38.6 
N/A 27.1 16 31.7 
 
High levels of satisfaction with a farmers’ association/cooperative/club were 
encouraging. However, extension officers pointed out another issue: 
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 ‘Yeah, it's always a bit difficult, because of maybe the culture or so many things that 
 go around in Lilongwe, so each and every farmer wants to stay alone, do things 
 alone. But when you start talking about loans and credit, then they'll say: “Oh, we 
 are in the clubs!” So, these are just the clubs that want to serve the purpose of 
 getting [loans or inputs]. After that, they expire.’ 
Semi-structured interview with two extension field officers from Company D, 
Lilongwe, 2015 
 
In summary, small-scale farmers were in contractual relationship with Company D, 
they supplied inputs from input dealers (except the seed), often joined an 
association/union/cooperative and sold some of their contracted paprika to vendors. 
 
8.4.2 Company D: Relations with Small-scale Farmers and the Enabling 
Environment 
Company D was in direct relationship with three supply chain players: small-scale 
farmers, a processor in South Africa and Concern. With small-scale farmers, 
Company D had written contractual arrangements. The relationship with the 
processor in South Africa was based on trading paprika. Also, Company D was co-
operating with Concern in the Nkhotakota district to gather small-scale farmers and 
organise marketing of the contracted crop.  
 
8.4.3 The Enabling Environment: Relations with Small-scale Farmers, Company D 
and Environment Members 
The enabling environment was interacting with both key players in the supply chain. 
The representative of institutional elements - Government - was indirectly 
influencing Company D’s business activities through existing trade and export 
regulations. The association/union/cooperative served to negotiate favourable 
conditions for small-scale farmers with Company D. NGOs, civil society and aid 
organisation were building farmers’ capacities through training and co-operating 
with Company D in mobilising small-scale farmers for selling paprika. Research 
units were implicitly informing Company D on the status of contract farming in the 
paprika sector and recommending future actions.  
 
The enabling environment also developed relations among its members. The 
Government was directly co-operating with farmers’ body representatives while 
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developing the Strategy. Some associations/unions/cooperatives were co-operating 
with input dealers for supplying needed seed and fertilisers through soft loans to 
small-scale farmers. Also, the high-level association/unions (NASFAM, FUM) were 
advocating for farmers’ interests to the Government. NGOs, civil society and aid 
organisations were supporting associations in their collective action. Research units 
were informing and reporting recommendations for improvements to the 
Government and other representatives of support services in the supply chain. 
 
8.4.4 Estimating the Determinants of Membership in Farmers Union Malawi 
The logit regression was used in this section to estimate the determinants of 
household membership in Farmers Union of Malawi. The information on which 
variables are more likely to increase the likelihood of being a member in FUM has 
implications for public policy and attempts of various supporting bodies (farmers’ 
associations and NGOs in particular) to promote and increase the gathering of small-
scale farmers into groups. Membership in the union might improve access to the 
market and provide better contracting conditions through negotiation and because of 
the economies of scale. Chi-Square tests and a test for multicollinearity were 
performed prior to the regression estimation. The Chi-Square test was conducted to 
determine the association between the membership in FUM and following 
categorical variables: district, age, monthly income, entire landholding size, distance 





All expected cell frequencies were greater than 5. The test indicated that there was a 
statistically significant association between membership in FUM and stated variables 
(other than the District and Government assistance received, see the explanation 
below Table 8.8). The association was moderately strong between FUM and NGO 
assistance (χ
2
(1) =39.140, p=0.000, Cramer’s V=0.307) and weak in all other cases. 
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 All stated categorical variables are described in Table 8.10. 
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Table 8.8 Chi-Square test for association between being member of the Farmers 
Union Malawi and the set of categorical variables 
Variable Chi-Square (
2
) df p-value Cramer’s V 
District
∆ 
3.167 (2.790) 1 0.075 (0.095) 0.087 
Age 6.826* 2 0.033 0.128 
Household’s monthly income 18.422** 2 0.000 0.210 
Entire landholding size 11.787** 2 0.003 0.169 
Distance from household to 
collection point 
11.955** 2 0.003 0.169 
NGO assistance received 39.140** 1 0.000 0.307 
Government assistance received
∆
 0.440 1 0.507 0.033 
Note: Numbers in brackets report Yate’s Continuity Correction and related p-value 
and are calculated in the case of 2x2 tables. 
∆
District and Government were not 
statistically significant at 5% and 1% in the Chi-Square test, but both showed to be 
significant later in the model. District was significant at 10%. * significant at 5%, ** 
significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8.9 shows that there was no strong multicollinearity among variables as the 
mean VIF (variance inflation factor) was 1.58, all VIF values were considerably less 
than 10, while all tolerance values (1/VIF) were greater than 0.1. 
 
Table 8.9 Test for multicollinearity between variables used in binary logistic 
regression model (STATA output) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
District 1.23 0.8104 
Young age 1.15 0.8699 
Middle age 1.69 0.5909 
Low monthly income 1.40 0.7129 
High monthly income 1.31 0.7634 
Small landholding size 2.30 0.4340 
Large landholding size 2.37 0.4227 
Close to the collection point 1.94 0.5166 
Large distance to the collection point 1.86 0.5383 
NGO assistance received 1.20 0.8342 
Government assistance received 1.15 0.8673 




Table 8.10 describes variables used as predictors in the binary logit regression 
model. Table 8.10 indicates that 40.8% of contracted small-scale farmers were 
members of FUM. About 34.1% of small-scale farmers in Nkhotakota were FUM 
members, compared to 43.5% of small-scale farmers in Lilongwe.  
 
Table 8.10 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in binary logistic regression  
Variable Membership, % Mean SD 
 Yes No   
Membership 40.8 59.2 0.4077 0.4919 
Socio-economic variables     
District* 34.1 65.9 0.2950 0.4565 
Young age 31.5 68.5 0.2206 0.4151 
Middle age 37.4 62.6 0.2758 0.4474 
Older age  46.7 53.3 0.5036 0.5005 
Low monthly income  30.4 69.6 0.4964 0.5005 
Medium monthly income 52.2 47.8 0.3309 0.4711 
High monthly income  48.6 51.4 0.1727 0.3784 
Household’s farm characteristics 
variables 
    
Small landholding size 52.1 47.9 0.3373 0.4733 
Medium landholding size 38.3 61.7 0.1446 0.3521 
Large landholding size  34 66 0.5181 0.5002 
Close to the collection point 37.8 62.2 0.4436 0.4974 
Medium distance to the collection point 28.9 71.1 0.1990 0.3997 
Large distance to the collection point  51 49 0.3573 0.4797 
Institutional support variables     
NGO assistance received 58.9 41.1 0.4038 0.4912 
Government assistance received 35.9 64.1 0.938 0.2918 
*Note: In Lilongwe district, 43.5% of small-scale farmers were members of FUM.  
 
Older age small-scale farmers (46.7%) and medium-income households (52.2%) 
were members of the FUM to the greatest extent in respect to the age and income 
levels. Households with the small landholding size showed higher proportion of 
membership in FUM (52.1%) in comparison with medium (38.3%) and large 
landholding size households (34%). Households located at a large distance from the 
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collection point were members of the FUM in the highest proportion (51%) 
compared to households at close (37.8%) and medium distance (28.9%). Households 
that received assistance from the NGO accounted for more FUM members (58.9%) 
compared to households that received assistance from the Malawian Government 
(35.9%). 
 
Table 8.11 shows the results of the binary logistic regression performed to assess the 
effect of 11 predictor variables (district, young age, middle age, low monthly 
income, high monthly income, small landholding size, large landholding size, close 
to the collection point, large distance to the collection point, NGO assistance 
received and Government assistance received) on the likelihood that households will 
be members of FUM.  
 
The model consisting of all 11 variables was statistically significant, χ
2
(11, N=417) 
=104.64, p<0.001. This model explained 29.9% (Nagelkerke R
2
) and 22.2% (Cox 
and Snell R
2
) of the variance in membership of FUM, and it correctly classified 
72.9% of cases. Table 8.11 indicates that from 11 predictor variables, seven variables 
were statistically significant. The small landholding size and Government assistance 
received were statistically significant at 5%. The district, young age, low monthly 
income, large distance to the collection point and NGO assistance received were 
statistically significant at 1%. The strongest predictor variable of membership in 
FUM was NGO assistance received with an odds ratio of 4.39, which indicated that 
households receiving NGO assistance were over 4 times more likely to become 
members of FUM than households who did not receive NGO assistance. Another 
important predictor variable was the distance from the collection point. Households 
that were located a large distance from the collection point were 3 times more likely 
to be members of FUM (odds ratio of 3.76) compared to households with a medium 
distance to a collection point. Households in the Nkhotakota district were less likely 








Table 8.11 Binary logistic regression estimating determinants of being a member of 
the Farmers Union Malawi 
 




District -1.186** 0.309 14.771 0.000 0.306 
Socio-economic variables      
Young age -0.815** 0.300 7.364 0.007 0.443 
Middle age  -0.487 0.277 3.098 0.078 0.614 
Low monthly income -0.864** 0.269 10.349 0.001 0.421 
High monthly income -0.345 0.336 1.054 0.305 1.412 
Household’s farm 
characteristics variables 
     
Small landholding size  0.860* 0.359 5.748 0.017 2.364 
Large landholding size -0.099 0.349 0.080 0.777 0.906 
Close to the collection point 0.620 0.336 3.403 0.065 1.858 
Large distance to the collection 
point 
1.326** 0.350 14.334 0.000 3.767 
Institutional support variables      
NGO assistance received 1.481** 0.255 33.820 0.000 4.397 
Government assistance received -0.942* 0.419 5.060 0.024 0.390 
Constant 0.618 0.420 2.170 0.141 1.855 
Diagnostic statistics      
                χ(11)
 2 
(df) 104.64***     
              Nagelkerke R
2
 0.299     
              Cox and Snell R
2
 0.222     
              Sig. 0.001     
              % of cases predicted correctly 72.9%     
              N 417     
Note: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
∆
SPSS reports Wald value, which 
tests the null hypothesis that the value of a single coefficient is equal to 0 (Greene, 
2003). Null hypothesis is rejected if Wald value is greater than 2. Wald value is 
calculated as Wald = (coefficient/S.E.)
2
. Wald value is reported in all three binary 
logistic regression models throughout this study (see chapter 9, section 9.3.6 and 




Concerning socio-economic characteristics, households with a young household 
head were less likely to be members of FUM compared to households with an older 
household head. Low monthly income households were also less likely to be part of 
FUM compared to medium-income households.  
 
In terms of farm characteristics, households with small landholding size were over 
two times (odds ratio of 2.36) more likely to be members of FUM than households 
with medium landholding size. Finally, institutional support from the Government 
did not play a role in farmers’ membership in FUM. Households who received 
Government assistance were less likely to be part of FUM compared to households 
that did not receive Government assistance. The result indicated that the following 
coefficient of variables showed expected sign (see chapter 7, Section 7.6.3.2 on 
estimating determinants of being a member of FUM): district, middle age head, high 
monthly income, landholding size, close to the collection point and NGO assistance. 
 
8.5 Discussion 
8.5.1 Small-scale Farmers under the Contract  
This study showed that the paprika supply chain consisted of the key players and the 
enabling environment. The key players (small-scale farmers and Company D) 
organised their roles, responsibilities and relations mainly through the contract. The 
contract was the centre of Malawi’s paprika supply chain. The enabling environment 
provided institutional and practical support to small-scale farmers and interacted 
with Company D and with other stakeholders within the chain’s environment. 
 
In both the Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts and across all household types, the 
majority of household heads were male. This is in accordance with the overall status 
in Malawi, where about 69% of household heads are males and 31% are females 
(Malawi Data Portal, 2015). In all categories, household heads were over 40 years 
old. This suggests that seniors led contracted households. For contract farming, this 
might be an advantage and a pitfall. On the one hand, older household heads could 
have more experience with farming in general and might obtain better yields and 
higher quality crop. Older household heads may have higher levels of respect 
towards agreed terms and, because of their age, they could have a greater influence 
in the community to advocate for good contract farming practices and be followed 
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by other farmers. On the other hand, older household heads may be reluctant to adopt 
new farming practices suggested by Company D's extension workers as they might 
have been farming in a traditional way for a number of years. Older household heads 
might not be able to adapt to new ways of communication with the contractor as fast 
as younger household heads. The uncertainty about the impact of age on contracting 
is reflected in the literature exploring factors influencing participation in contract 
farming. The studies showed that the age of the household head might have positive 
(Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2016), negative (Sharma, 2008; 
Bellemare, 2012) or insignificant impacts (Arumugam, 2011; Hu, 2012). 
 
This study showed that in the majority of cases, the education level of the household 
heads in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe was low. This result is consistent with the 
national level data from different sources. According to the World Bank (2015), the 
literacy ratio in Malawi was 61% in 2010. At a district level, the literacy in the 
Nkhotakota district was 61% and in the Lilongwe district was 57% in 2008 (Malawi 
Data Portal, 2015). Moreover, 26% of the population in the Nkhotakota district and 
35% of the population in the Lilongwe district attained primary level education, 
while in both districts only 2% of the population obtained secondary level education 
(Malawi Data Portal, 2015). Thus, contracted small-scale farmers did not derogate 
from district levels. Concerning contract farming, better education might improve 
understanding of contracting, especially more complex legal situations such as 
breach of the contract or the request for termination of the agreement. Education 
might increase small-scale farmers’ capacities to achieve better yields and quality 
and reward farmers with better incomes. The most recent studies from Mwambi et 
al. (2016) and Kumar et al. (2016) suggested that the education level of the 
household head had a positive significant impact on participation in contract 
farming. 
 
The majority of households did not have access to electricity. On anational level, 
11% of the rural and 36% of the urban population in Malawi had access to electricity 
in 2009 (Malawi Data Portal, 2015). From respondents, 8.4% of households had 
access to a telephone, which was higher than the average in the rural Central Region 
(Malawi Data Portal, 2015). In addition, 42.3% of surveyed households had mobile 
phones while an average for rural Central Region was 31.5% (Malawi Data Portal, 
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2015). Access to radio in the studied area (64.7%) was aligned with the average in 
rural Malawi (63%) (Malawi Data Portal, 2015). Finally, respondents in two districts 
had poorer access to television (2.8%) compared to an average in the rural area of 
5% (Malawi Data Portal, 2015). 
 
The length of experience in cultivating paprika across household types was up to 
three years, which is a relatively short period. Although paprika is considered to be 
an attractive cash crop that can have high returns on small landholdings, it is not 
traditionally the crop grown in Malawi. Introducing paprika farming in other parts of 
Malawi could entail increased costs for Company D due to the need for appropriate 
training and risks of failure in the first few years of cultivation. Recent literature 
confirms that farmers' experience in farming (number of years) has no significant 
impact on participation in contract farming (Girma and Gardebroek, 2015; Kumar et 
al., 2016). However, Saenz and Ruben (2004), Birthal et al. (2005) and Ramaswami 
et al. (2006) found that years of experience had a significantly negative impact on 
joining contract farming. 
 
8.5.2 Supply Chain Dynamics 
The second part of the discussion is centred around the dynamics in the paprika 
supply chain. Although the contract itself was an agreement between small-scale 
farmers and Company D, the majority of small-scale farmers directly communicated 
with Company D’s extension workers. This implies that both the importance and the 
responsibilities of an extension worker were substantial in the paprika supply chain. 
First, the extension worker had more frequent contact with farmers' communities 
than any other of Company D's representatives. Second, the majority of Company 
D's extension workers were Malawians, who were capable of communicating with 
small-scale farmers in the local language. Third, the extension worker had the 
responsibility to convey Company D's messages, especially regarding the price for 
the season and was in charge of buying and collecting paprika during marketing 
days. Kumwenda and Madola (2005) reported on cases where the company’s 
extension officers abused their position to acquire benefits for themselves. Since 
Company D operates with a big number of highly dispersed small-scale farmers, it is 
likely that extension workers will become the core-operating element of contract 
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farming. It is not impossible that they could occasionally misuse their position at the 
expense of small-scale farmers and Company D. 
 
Furthermore, 72% of small-scale farmers were members of a farmers’ organisation. 
The advantages of being part of an association, union or cooperative while having a 
contract are numerous, especially as the association might advocate for farmers' 
interests while negotiating contracting terms and can obtain inputs in bulk at the 
reduced price to distribute them to the members. Wanglin and Abdulai (2016) found 
that membership in a cooperative had a positive significant impact on yields, farm 
net returns and household income for apple farmers in China, especially small-scale 
farmers. Chagwiza et al. (2016) argued that cooperatives could facilitate 
commercialisation for small-scale farmers. Abebaw and Haile (2013) suggested that 
cooperatives could positively influence the adoption of agricultural technology 
among small-scale farmers. Bellemare (2012) and Kariuki and Loy (2016) concluded 
that membership in cooperatives or producers’ organisations positively influences 




Despite the considerable enabling environment that surrounds the paprika supply 
chain, small-scale farmers received only limited assistance from the farmers’ 
organisations, NGOs and the Government. A total of 42% households in Nkhotakota 
district and 39% of them in Lilongwe district reported receiving assistance from an 
NGO, while the majority did not receive any assistance from the Government. The 
reluctance to provide more substantial assistance to contracted small-scale farmers 
might have the same root for both the Government and NGOs. Specifically, the third 
party's interference in the contracting relationship can distort relations between 
small-scale farmers and Company D and result in the failure of this business model. 
For instance, in cases where an NGO runs the project for subsidising inputs for 
small-scale farmers, once the project is concluded there might be a gap left behind as 
small-scale farmers create a dependency on NGO’s input provision. Without 
subsidies, small-scale farmers might not be able to participate in contract farming, 
which increases transaction costs mostly because Company D has to search for and 
train new suppliers. If the Government decides to set minimum prices for the 
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contracted crop and the market volatility causes major fluctuations in the price, 
Company D may be forced to drop out from contracting as it is not capable of 
providing the Government's prescribed prices. Thus, the Government and NGOs 
performed the role of facilitator rather than provider of services in Malawi’s paprika 
supply chain. 
 
The structure of the paprika supply chain in Central Malawi did not differ 
significantly from paprika chains in neighbouring countries. For example, Stevens 
(2004) explored the paprika supply chain in Zambia and found that small-scale 
farmers were selling their paprika to the contractor and the enabling environment 
involved donor groups and the Government. The paprika was processed into 
oleoresin and further exported to South Africa and Spain, which is very similar to the 
situation in the paprika supply chain in Malawi. Furthermore, Kabungo and Jenkins 
(2016) studied the paprika supply chain in Zambia and reported that the contractor 
had a dual role. First, the contractor was buying paprika from outgrower small-scale 
farmers and selling it further on the international export market. Second, the 
contractor was providing extension services to small-scale farmers (Kabungo and 
Jenkins, 2016). A similar pattern can be observed in the export paprika supply chains 
in Malawi and Zambia: (i) small-scale farmers usually had contracts with the 
contractor, (ii) the contractor further processed paprika or sold paprika to the 
processor and exported it to neighbouring countries and Europe, (iii) the enabling 




This chapter provided insights into the dynamics of the paprika supply chain in 
Malawi. The main roles, responsibilities and relations between key stakeholders 
were described. The chapter also provided a detailed profile of the characteristics of 
households under contracted production. Chapter 9 closely examined why 




Chapter 9 Contract Farming and its Influence on Small-scale Farmers’ 
Livelihoods 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides analysis and interpretation of collected quantitative and 
qualitative data to identify factors that motivate small-scale farmers to enter 
contracts and explore how the existing contract influences small-scale farmers’ 
livelihoods (Objective 2). This chapter answers these related research sub-questions: 
What factors motivate small-scale farmers to enter contracts? How does contracting 
affect small-scale farmers’ livelihood in terms of productivity, income generation 
and food security? Are small-scale farmers willing to expand their contracting to 
other crops and which factors influence small-scale farmers’ willingness to expand? 
 
9.2 Reasons for Joining Contracts, Perceptions and Satisfaction Level 
9.2.1 Reasons for Contracting: Results from Focus Group Interviews 
The key motivating factors for entering contract farming arrangements were 
explored in both focus group interviews and household questionnaires. Five main 
reasons for contracting were identified during focus group interviews. First, farmers 





Second, small-scale farmers considered free extension services for paprika 
cultivation as an attractive offer in contractual arrangements. Third, small-scale 
farmers were looking for a market that is accessible and reliable, and they found it 
through the contractor. Four, the choice of paprika as a contracted crop was also the 
reason for some small-scale farmers to join contract farming since paprika ‘is easily 
produced with minimal production costs’
94
 (Focus group interview no. 3, Chawatha 
area, Lilongwe district, 2015). Fifth, some interviewed small-scale farmers believed 
that the cultivation of paprika has no negative impacts on the environment, which 
was an additional motivation to enter the contract. 
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 Note that the contract provided the supply of seed for cash (see chapter 10, section 10.3), however, 
association(s) and NGOs secured easier access to fertilisers and chemicals for small-scale farmers 
under the contract. 
94
 This statement should be interpreted considering the wider context. As shown further in this chapter 
(section 9.3.2), the production costs for paprika are not negligible; thus, the statement points out on 
lower costs or investments needed for paprika production compared to other cash crops (e.g. tobacco, 
tea or coffee). 
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In addition, Table 9.1 summarises the results from the ranking exercise performed 
during the focus group interviews with the aim of identifying contract provisions that 
were considered essential in the small-scale farmers' view. Table 9.1 shows that both 
districts found extension services, guaranteed market and access to inputs necessary 
for contracting. Households in the Nkhotakota district valued access to extension 
services most, while in the Lilongwe district, access to inputs was the primary 
concern for small-scale farmers joining CF.  
 
Table 9.1 Ranking of the most important provisions in the contract by district 
generated during the focus group interviews with small-scale farmers 
 
Rank  Nkhotakota district Lilongwe district 
1  Extension services Access to inputs 
2  Guaranteed market Guaranteed market 
3  Access to inputs Extension services 
 
9.2.2 Reasons for Contracting: Results from Household Questionnaire 
The results from household questionnaires also show that the guaranteed market was 
one of the driving factors for entering into contracts as the highest percentage of 
small-scale farmers (96.8%) ranked this variable as important (Table 9.2). 
 
Also, stable price (96.5%) and access to inputs (94.9%) were highly important for 
surveyed households. The least important factor in both districts was access to credit. 
An observed difference between the two areas was that households in the Lilongwe 
district reported the highest percentage of importance for a stable price compared to 
households in the Nkhotakota district that valued the guaranteed market to the 
greatest extent. Households in the Nkhotakota district gave the greatest percentage of  
high scores to the following factors: guaranteed market (96%), stable price (94.4%) 
and access to information (93.6%), which was fairly different compared to results 
reported from the focus group interviews (see Table 9.1). In contrast, households in 
the Lilongwe district gave the highest percentage of importance to stable price 
(97.3%), guaranteed market (97%) and access to inputs (95.8%), which was more in 
line with the focus group interviews’ results. 
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Table 9.2 Motivating factors for entering CF in both districts 
Variable 
Not important, % Neutral, % Important, % 
Both NKH LLW Both NKH LLW Both NKH LLW 
 
Stable price 
0.7 2.4 0 2.8 3.2 2.6 96.5 94.4 97.3 
Access to inputs 0.7 1.6 0.3 4.4 5.6 4 94.9 92.8 95.8 
Stable income 0.7 0 1 10.7 12 10.2 88.6 88 88.8 
Access to information 0.5 0 0.7 5.6 6.4 5.3 93.9 93.6 94.1 
Guaranteed market* 1.2 2.4 0.7 1.6 0.8 2 96.8 96 97 
Access to credit 6.1 14.4 2.7 11 12 10.6 82.9 73.6 86.8 
Note: * one missing response. 
 
Kendall's tau-b test was conducted to assess the relationship between one of the 
motivating factors for entering CF, and relevant variables measured on an ordinal 
scale (Table 1.3A in Appendix B). The results show there was a weak, negative and 
statistically significant association between different levels of importance for the 
variable ‘access to inputs’ and household monthly income levels (τb= -0.268, 





This means that the importance of access to inputs for entering contract farming 
decreases as income levels and the size of CF land increases in the case of the 
paprika supply chain. Furthermore, the results also show there was a weak, positive 
and statistically significant association between different levels of importance for the 
variable ‘access to inputs’ and household costs for fungicides per season (τb=0.283, 
p=0.000). For surveyed households, the importance of access to inputs for entering 
contract farming increases as households’ costs for fungicide increase. Also, the 
variable ‘access to credit’ was taken into consideration and the results show that 
there was a moderate, negative and statistically significant association between 
different importance levels of ‘access to credit’ and the size of CF land (τb=-0.311, 
p=0.000). The latter implies that the importance of access to credit decreases as the 
CF land size increases in the case of surveyed households.  
                                                          
95
 Cohen’s (1988) criteria for the strength of an association are applied for all results of Kendall’s tau-
b tests in this study. There are opposite opinions and interpretations of strengths of the correlation 
(e.g. weak) and statistical significance levels (e.g. high) compared to the practical value of results. 
Acknowledging this fact, the purpose of running and reporting Kendall's tau-b test in this study is to 
explore the data and connect it with results from the qualitative inquiry to increase the understanding 




Kendall’s tau-b test showed a weak, positive and statistically significant association 
between different levels of importance for the variables ‘access to credit’ and 
households’ costs for fertilisers/season (τb=0.131, p=0.002), costs for 
pesticides/season (τb=0.146, p=0.001) and costs for fungicides/season (τb= 0.175, 
p=0.000) (Table 1.3A in Appendix B). These results suggest that the importance of 
access to credit increases with the increase in households’ costs for fertilisers, 
pesticides and fungicides. 
 
9.2.3 Perceptions of Contract Farming in the Community 
Small-scale farmers in the Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts experienced and 
elaborated on both the rewarding and challenging sides of contract farming. While 
the key challenges are reported in-depth in chapter 10, this section addresses more 




None of the communities participating in focus group interviews was satisfied with 
contracting conditions, and the overall perception of contract farming in the studied 
area was that this business model favours the contractor more than small-scale 
farmers. Nevertheless, small-scale farmers emphasised positive changes that 
contracting brought into their farming practices and livelihoods. Due to received 
extension services, small-scale farmers reported they produced higher volumes and 
quality of paprika, which enabled farmers to achieve a better price. Improved income 
generation then spilt over to the enhancement of livelihood conditions as small-scale 
farmers stated they were able to buy needed assets (bicycle, motorbike, radio, plots) 
or inputs (fertilisers for the next season) or pay school fees for children. When asked 
to compare their livelihoods with livelihoods of non-contracted paprika farmers, the 
respondents referred once more to higher volumes, quality and price obtained for the 
produced paprika. Small-scale farmers concluded that livelihoods of contracted 
paprika farmers were slightly better compared to the livelihoods of non-contracted 
farmers in the community. Moreover, small-scale farmers identified the following 
reasons why non-contract farmers did not operate through the contract: low price 
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 The part on the impact of contract farming on livelihoods is further covered in section 9.3 in this 
chapter where results from the questionnaire were reported. 
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compared to the one on the open market, not enough inputs provided and lack of 




9.2.4 Satisfaction with the Contractor 
When asked about the satisfaction with the current contractor, 58.6% of households 
stated the relationship was very satisfying (Table 9.3). This is, however, in contrast 
with opinions expressed in focus group interviews (see section 9.2.3 in this chapter).  
 
Households in the Nkhotakota district gave a lower percentage of the highest 
positive score (46.4%) to the contractor compared to the Lilongwe district (63.7%). 
In addition, the Nkhotakota district gave more low scores to the contractor than the 
Lilongwe district, which suggests that households in the Nkhotakota districts were 
less satisfied with the relationship compared to the Lilongwe district.  
 
Table 9.3 Household satisfaction with the current contractor  
Variable  Satisfaction (%) 
Both NKH LLW 
Very unsatisfying 0.5 0.8 0.3 
Unsatisfying 1.4 2.4 1 
Neutral 13.8 20.8 10.9 
Satisfying 25.5 29.6 23.8 
Very satisfying 58.6 46.4 63.7 
                           Note: One missing response. 
 
Kendall's tau-b test was conducted to assess the link between household satisfaction 
with the relationship and relevant variables measured on an ordinal scale (Table 
1.4A in Appendix B). The results show there was a moderate, positive and 
statistically significant association between satisfaction levels for the relationship 
between the household and the contractor and satisfaction with the farmers’ 
institution in representing the farmers’ voice (τb=0.349, p=0.000). This implies that 
household satisfaction with the contractual relationship increases as the household 
satisfaction with the farmers’ body rises. This result points to the importance of a 
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 Stated reasons for avoiding CF represent a foundation of key challenges that are further described 
and analysed in chapter 10.  
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triangle ‘contractor – small-scale farmers - farmers’ organisation’ and suggests that 
the farmers’ body has an important mediating role to play in the contract farming 
relationship by efficiently representing and protecting small-scale farmers’ interests.  
 
Additionally, the results show there was a weak, positive and statistically significant 
association between satisfaction levels for the relationship between the household 
and the proportions of paprika sold to the contractor (τb=0.115, p=0.009). This 
means that, as the satisfaction with the relationship increased, the proportions sold to 
the contractor increased. The satisfaction with the relationship might be considered 
as one of the indicators when analysing side-selling practices as the better the 
relationship, the lower should be the extent of side-selling. Apart from rating the 
satisfaction with the contractor, the subsequent question explored how often 




The majority of households did not change the contractor (91.8%) but of those who 
did - high-income households (11.7%) and households with medium CF land 
(10.9%) expressed the highest percentages across groups. Of those that changed 
contractor 1-2 times, medium-income households (7%) and households with medium 
CF land (7.4%) showed the greatest extent compared to other types.   
 
Respondents stated that contracting had an impact on their households (93.9%), and 
this impact was mainly positive (93.9%). High-income households (97.4%) and 
households with large CF land (95.8%) showed the highest percentage of positive 
influence across groups. In contrast, low-income households had the greatest 
percentage of negative influence recorded among all types (2.4%).  
 
The status at the district level is shown in Table 1.1A in Appendix B. None of the 
households in the Nkhotakota district reported a negative influence of contracting, 
while 2.3% of households in the Lilongwe district reported a negative CF influence. 
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 The point of two questions related to the change of contractor was to capture frequencies only, and 
no assumptions were made on reasons why small-scale farmers changed the contractor. The situation 
on the paprika market in Central Malawi has been dynamic from 2009 as many players (buyers) 
vanished and new ones emerged. It is beyond the scope of this study to enter into a deeper analysis of 
the history of relations in the paprika supply chain; rather the research is focused on the only 
remaining company that operates in Central Malawi.  
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Table 9.4 Change of contractor and impact of CF on household’s livelihood 
 
Note: *one missing response, * three missing responses. 
 
9.3 Influence of Contract Farming on Farmers’ Livelihood 
9.3.1 Influence of Contract Farming on Productivity 
The key variables forming the ‘productivity’ category in this study are: land, labour, 
inputs, yield and capacity to deliver agreed quantity and quality of paprika on time. It 
was observed that paprika was not the only crop that respondents cultivated under 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                              
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                             
% of total N 
(% within the type) 














       



























       


































5-6 times 0 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
CF an impact on 
household**: 
       




































       
















































the contract (Table 9.5). Apart from paprika, small-scale farmers had contracts 
mostly for maize (16.6%) and groundnuts (19.2%). Both maize and groundnuts 
under the contract were recorded to the greatest extent within medium-income 
households (maize=25.2%, groundnut=25.9%) and households with medium CF land 
(maize=21.1%, groundnuts=26.3%) compared to other household types.   
 
Table 9.5 Farm-related characteristics of contracting arrangement  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                              
% of total N  
(% within the type) 














       














0.5 0 (0) 0.5 (1.4) 0 (0) 0.5 (1.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 





























































About half of surveyed households (51.2%) had more than 2 acres of land and 
around one-third of respondents (32.7%) had up to 1.6 acres (Table 9.6). Large land 
size was dominant with low- and medium-income household types (LMI=55%, 
MMI=54%), while high-income households mostly had small land (35%). The 








Table 9.6 Households’ farm characteristics in both districts 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                                 
% of total N                                                     
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                                  
% of total N                                                                
(% within the type) 












Landholding size*        











 (3)  
Medium (1.6-2 acres) 15.7 5.2 (11) 6.1 (18) 4.5 (25) 3.8 (9) 4 (10) 8 (48) 
















       












No 4 2.3 (4.9) 0.7 (2) 0.9 (5.2) 0.9 (2) 1.6 (4) 1.4 (8) 
Family land 1.4 0.9 (2.1) 0 (0) 0.5 (4.8) 0 (0) 0.5 (2) 0.9 (5.6) 
Renting the land**        















Size of the rented land*        
Small (Up to 1.6 acre) 17.3 8.4 (17) 5.6 (17) 3.3 (18) 7.5 (18) 7.7 (18) 2.1 (13) 






































Expenses for the rented 
land/season 
       
Low (>8000 MKW) 9.8 4.7 (10) 3.7 (11) 1.4 (7.8) 4.2 (10) 4.4 (11) 1.2 (10) 
Medium (8000-10000 
MKW) 
7.7 3.7 (7.7) 2.3 (7) 1.6 (9) 2.6 (6) 3 (7) 1.9 (7) 
High (>10000 MKW) 10.3 4.4 (9) 2.8 (8.4) 3 (17) 3.7 (9) 4 (10) 2.6 (15) 
Not applicable 72.2 35.7  
(73.3) 




31.8     
(75) 
29.4     
(72) 




High-income households had the highest percentage of rented land (30%), rented the 
highest level of large land (10%) and had the highest rate of high expenses for rented 
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 This section deals with the household’s landholding size available for cultivation, and it should not 
be mistaken with the size of the land allocated to the CF crop (part of the typology). 




land (17%) among different income types. Households with small CF land had the 
highest percentage of small landholding size (49%) compared to households with
medium (29%) and large CF land (3%). Households with medium CF land had the 
highest level of large landholding size (62%), while households with large CF land 
had the highest proportion of medium landholding size (48%) within the group. In 
addition, households with large CF land had the highest percentage of large rented 
land (10%) and higher expenses for rented land (15%) compared to others. 
 
Table 1.1A in Appendix B showed that households in the Nkhotakota district had a 
higher percentage of small landholding size (39%) compared to households in the 
Lilongwe district who had higher levels of large landholding size (52%).  
 
Figure 9.1 outlines the composition of food crops grown by surveyed households in 
the two districts. The majority of households cultivated maize (100%) and 
groundnuts (90.9%). Soya bean (57.9%), sweet potato (44.4%) and common beans 
(36.2%) were also among the most grown food crops. Pigeon pea (3%) and carrots 
(0.5%) were the least represented food crops cultivated in the Nkhotakota and 
Lilongwe districts. 
 
Although in both districts maize and groundnuts accounted as the most cultivated 
food crops, the Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts further differed. In the 
Nkhotakota district, households mostly cultivated sweet potato (52.8%), rice (42.2%) 
and cassava (30.4%). In contrast, households in the Lilongwe district mostly 























The majority of surveyed households allocated small (42.3%) to medium (40.9%) 
proportions of the land to the contracted crop and only 16.6% of households had 
large CF land (Table 9.7). The Lilongwe district had more households with a large 
proportion of land allocated to contracted paprika (19.1%) compared to Nkhotakota 
(10.4%). 
Table 9.7 The size of the land allocated to contracted paprika by districts 
Note: * one respondent answered ‘Do not know’, which is not included in this table. 
 
Low-income households mostly allocated medium (46.15%) or small size land 
(42%) to paprika (Table 9.8). Similarly, medium-income households had small 
(43%) or medium CF land (38.5%). High-income households also allocated small 
(41.5%) to medium land (31.2%) for contract farming but had the greatest proportion 
of large CF land (27.3%) among all household types. 
 
Table 9.8 Distribution of the land allocated to CF crop by income levels  
Variable Districts 
 Both                                              
% of total N*                                
(% within the type) 
Nkhotakota                              
N in NKH** 
(% in NKH) 
Lilongwe                                     
N in LLW 
(% in NKH) 
 LMI             
n=208 
MMI             
n=143 
HMI              
n=77 
LMI                
n=45 
MMI              
n=44 






HMI             
n=41 
 












17   
(13.6) 
 
20              
(16) 
 
19              
(15.2) 
 

























33    
(10.9) 
12                    
(4) 








6                
(4.8) 
2               
(1.6) 
5                   
(4) 
18       
(5.9) 
24              
(7.9) 
16                
(5.3) 
Note: * one missing response, ** three missing responses. 
Variable 
Both districts 
(% of total N) 
Nkhotakota 
(% of total in NKH) 
Lilongwe 
(% of total in LLW) 
Land allocated to CF crop*    
 Small land allocated  181 (42.3) 56 (44.8) 125 (41.3) 
 Medium land allocated  175 (40.9) 55 (44) 120 (39.6) 
 Large land allocated    71 (16.6) 13 (10.4)   58 (19.1) 
Total 428 (100) 125 (29.2) 303 (70.8) 
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Both in the Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts, low- and medium-income households 
mainly allocated medium and small proportions of their land to contracted paprika 
production. High-income households in the Nkhotakota district mostly had small CF 
land (15.2%), while in the Lilongwe district, the majority of high-income households 
had large CF land (5.3%). The proportion of large land allocated to the CF crop in 
the paprika supply chain was 10.4% and 19.1% for the Nkhotakota and Lilongwe 
districts respectively (Table 9.8). 
 
The majority of the surveyed households (49.1%) allocated 10-30% of their available 
land for growing paprika under contract (Table 9.9). Low-income households mainly 





Table 9.9 Farm-related characteristics of contracting arrangement  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                            
% of total N  
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                 
% of total N 
 (% within the type) 










LLA              
(n=71) 
Land allocated to 
paprika in %*: 
       




































Note: *one missing response. 
 
In contrast, medium-income households mainly had the largest amount of land 
allocated to CF expressed in percentage of the total land (46.1%). Regarding the 
second category of typology (land allocated to CF), households with small CF land 
and medium CF land mostly allocated a medium amount of total land to CF 
(SLA=46.4%, MLA=57.1%). Households with large land allocated a high amount of 
total land to CF (59.1%). 
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 The percentage of land allocated to CF crops should not be mistaken with the size of the land 
allocated to CF in acres (the latter is one of two typology categories).  
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Box 9.1 shows that cultivating paprika requires substantial work during the 
preparation phase (6 months), managing the field with transplantation and 
application of fertilisers and chemicals (5 months) and harvesting and drying paprika 





















Note: * Small-scale farmers harvested paprika several times throughout one season. 
 
Table 9.10 indicates that, in most cases, household head and wife/husband (74.8%) 
were involved in paprika cultivation and less often, all household members 
participated (17.5%). Medium-income households (79%) and households with large 
CF land (80.3%) relied on the household head and wife/husband to the greatest 
extent compared to other household types. Over one-third of surveyed households 
(38.6%) reported hiring extra labour for CF activities. High-income households 
(61%) and households with large CF land (57.8%) had the highest proportion of 
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 Note that some activities overlap. An average time for paprika cultivation and harvesting is 7-9 
months in the studied area. 
BOX 9.1 Calendar of farming and marketing practices in paprika production in Central Malawi 









            
Land 
preparation 





            
Field 
management 
            
Harvesting* and 
drying 
            
Storage and 
marketing 
            
Source: Author, focus group interviews in Malawi in 2014 and 2015. 
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hiring extra labour across groups. Low-income households (25%) and households 
with small CF land (27.6%) had the lowest percentage of extra labour hired.   
  
Table 9.10 Households’ use of labour for cultivating contracted paprika  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                         
% of total N  
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                            
% of total N  
(% within the type) 

















       









































































       
























Note: *four missing responses. 
 
The decision on which crop to cultivate on the land was done mostly by agreement 
between the household head and wife/husband (57.2%) and to a smaller, yet 
considerable extent, exclusively by the household head (40.9%) (Table 9.11). This 
information is relevant as the decision about crops to be grown influences the 
distribution of activities for household members. The literature stated that males are 
more prone to allocate the land to cash crops while females are more concerned with 
food crops that will feed the family (see chapter 5 under Imbalanced Relations in 




Table 9.11 Households’ decision-making on cultivation 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                               
% of total N 
(% within the type) 













on crop cultivation 
(multiple choice): 
       
















































































Motivated by this assumption, further analysis was done to see whether male 
household heads would allocate a higher percentage of the entire land to CF crops 
compared to female household heads (Table 9.12). The results show that both males 
and females allocated mainly a medium percentage of their entire land to CF crop 
(50.8% of males and 42.6% of females allocated a medium size of their land to CF; 
calculated from Table 9.12). In the Nkhotakota district, male-headed households 
(36%) allocated a high percentage of the entire land for contracting to a greater 
extent compared to female-headed households (33%) (calculated from Table 9.12). 
Female-headed households (42%) in Lilongwe district allocated a high percentage of 
the entire land for CF crop to a considerably greater extent than male-headed 
households (25%) (calculated from table 9.12). Thus, for Malawi’s paprika supply 
chain, the assumption that male-headed households will allocate more land to 
contracted crop was not confirmed.
101  
101
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 Note that this claim is only confirmed in the case of a cash crop (contracted paprika) as the study 
did not take into consideration the ratio between the land allocated to food crops and cash crops.  
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Table 9.12 Allocation of CF land by gender of household head  
Variable 
Nkhotakota district**                      
Males=86, Females=39 
Lilongwe district**                
Males=252, Females=50 

































20            
(16) 
 
35            
(28) 
 
31               
(24.8) 
 



















11            
(8.8) 
15           
(12) 
13             
(10.4) 
6                 
(2) 
23              
(7.6) 






34       
(8) 
Note: *one missing response, **numbers in brackets represent % of the total N in 
Nkhotakota/Lilongwe, ***numbers in brackets represent % of the total N. 
 
The most used inputs for paprika cultivation were seeds (95.1%), fertilisers (90.7%) 
and pesticides (74.1%), while fungicides were used only by 28.3% of households 
(Table 9.13). Overall, high-income households used stated inputs to the greatest 
extent (fertilisers=93.5%, pesticides=83.1%, fungicides=41.5%) compared to other 
household types. Low-income households and households with small land allocated 
to CF showed the lowest use of pesticides and fungicides across the categories (LMI: 





Households mainly secured their inputs from the input dealer (68.9%) or contractor 
(24.1%). Medium-income households (32.9%) and households with large CF land 
(39.43%) were buying inputs from the contractor to the greatest extent compared to 
all other household types. 
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 In the household questionnaire, 95.1% of households reported using seeds. All households are 
expected to use the seeds sold by Company D but the 4.9% difference might be due to technical error 
or it represents the proportion of small-scale farmers that used the seeds from another provider. Seed, 
as the input, is not further discussed in the tables as the emphasis was on the use of inputs other than 
the ones provided through Company D. Furthermore, the usage of stated inputs should not be 
mistaken with the amount of stated inputs used. The results reported here refer only to the amount of 
households that generally used fertilisers, pesticides or fungicides and not to the amount of fertilisers, 
pesticides or fungicides that have been applied during paprika cultivation. 
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Table 9.13 Inputs required for contract farming production 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                                   
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                      
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
















       
































































       












































































       





































































































Table 9.13 Inputs required for contract farming production - Continued 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                                   
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                      
% of total N 
(% within the type) 












        
        
Pesticide 
cost/season: 




























































































































       






















































Regarding cost of inputs, low-income households (64.9%) and households with 
medium CF land (68.57%) had the highest percentage of high seed costs. The 
highest amounts of high fertiliser costs were reported within the medium- (47.5%) 
and high-income households (48%) and households with medium CF land (57.15%). 
Low-income households (45.67%) and households with large CF land (49.30%) had 
the greatest percentage of low pesticide costs across groups. Finally, medium-income 
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households (37.76%) and households with large CF land (49.30%) had the highest 
percentage of low fungicide costs. For all households, the inputs were most often 
bought in cash (96.7%) or credit (10.7%). The subsidies for inputs, when received, 
were distributed relatively equally among households with small (7.18%), medium 
(6.86%) and large CF land (5.63%). Nevertheless, medium-income households 
(17.48%) had a considerably higher percentage of received subsidies for inputs 
compared to low- (1.44%) and high-income households (1.3%). 
 
Small-scale farmers in Central Malawi were obtaining high (39.7%) to medium 
yields (33.6%) (Table 9.14). Within household types, the yield levels followed a 
pattern. Low-income households (36.1%) and households with small CF land 
(38.67%) had the highest percentage of low yields. Medium-income households 
(37.06%) and households with medium CF land (36.57%) had medium yields to the 
greatest extent. Finally, high-income households (55.84%) and households with 
large CF land (63.38%) recorded the most cases with high yields compared to other 
types. Nevertheless, the information on obtained yields was triangulated from two 
different sources (small-scale farmers and Company D's representatives) and using 





Table 9.14 Farm-related characteristics of contracting arrangement 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total N Income levels                                
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                               
% of total N 
(% within the type) 

























































Note: ** one/four missing responses. 
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 Note that Table 9.14 reports yields for dry paprika per season. Although small-scale farmers did 
not record the weight of the fresh paprika, according to Company D's extension officer, it was 
possible to reach 2 to 4 tonnes of fresh paprika per acre with appropriate management and inputs. The 
conversion rate of fresh paprika into dry paprika is around 20-30%. 
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Taking all of what has been stated above into consideration, it was assessed that an 
average volume of paprika delivered to Company D was 20-50 kg/farmer per season. 
 
Box 9.2 outlines the timing and type of extension services provided to small-scale 
farmers under the contract. Company D’s team of extension workers, according to 
their operating area, usually delivered the services.  
 
The biggest proportion of small-scale farmers under the contract did not have access 
to storage or transport services provided by Company D (Table 9.15). The majority 
of households stored (94.2%) and transported paprika themselves (73.4%). When the 
contractor provided transport services, this was recorded to the greatest extent within 
high-income households (28.57%) and households with large CF land (32.4%) 
compared to other household types. Over half of the respondents (57.5%) transported 
their paprika using a bicycle and less often by carrying the crop on their head (28%). 
High-income households (25.97%) and households with large CF (29.58%) used a 
truck for transporting purposes to the greatest extent compared to other household 




BOX 9.2 Extensions services provided by Company D 
Company D’s extension services provided to small-scale farmers under the contract were 
divided into four parts: 
No. Timing Main activity 
Part 1 October 
Training on the appropriate establishment 
and management of the nursery. 
Part 2 
November (or close to the rainy 
season) 
Training on transplanting. 
Part 3 February/March Training on the field management. 
Part 4 April 
Training on harvesting and post-harvest 
management. 
 




Table 9.15 Storage, transport and distance to the collection point  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                               
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                              
% of total N 
(% within the type)  
 % LMI        
(n=208) 








LLA        
(n=71) 
Storage provider 
for paprika (multiple 
choice): 



















































Vendor 0  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Transporter 0  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Transport provider 
for paprika (multiple 
choice): 



























Colleagues 0  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 












Vendor 0 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 















       
























Motorbike 0 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 



























       
Close                        













Medium                           













Large                            













*Note: two missing responses. 
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Table 9.16 indicates that the majority of households (75%) were capable of 
delivering the contracted crop on time; however, households in Nkhotakota had a 
considerably lower percentage score for delivering the crop on time (59.2%) 
compared to the Lilongwe district (81.5%). The compliance with contract terms 
regarding agreed quality and quantity proved to be challenging for the surveyed 
households in both districts. Only 58% of all households succeeded in delivering the 
agreed quality and an even lesser percentage of households (52%) delivered the 
agreed quantity. Once more, households in the Lilongwe district had higher levels of 
compliance with the contract terms in delivering the agreed quality (NKH=48%, 




Table 9.16 Household capability to comply with contracting terms  
Variable Yes, always (%) Yes, mostly (%) No (%) 
Both NKH LLW Both NKH LLW Both NKH LLW 
Delivery of crop on 
time 
75 59.2 81.5 10.3 17.6 7.3 14.7 23.2 11.2 
Delivery of agreed 
quality* 
58 48 62 14 2.2 16.2 27 40.8 21.8 
Delivery of agreed 
quantity 
52 40 57 17 11.2 19.5 31 48.8 23.4 
Note: * four missing responses. 
 
For over half of surveyed households (53.7%), there was no observed change in the 
size of plots for either food crops or cash crops since the household entered a 
contract farming arrangement (Table 9.17). However, a considerable percentage of 
households (42.3%) stated that the plot size increased, and this was found to be true 
to the greatest extent within high-income households (57.14%) and households with 
large CF land (47.89%) compared to other types. 
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 In the context of Malawi’s paprika supply chain, the ‘agreed quantity’ refers to all paprika 
produced using the seed bought from Company D. Therefore, failure to deliver the agreed quantity 
was considered whenever the household did not deliver its entire production to the contractor. 
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Table 9.17 Changes of the plot size for contracted small-scale farmers 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                               
% of total N 
(% within the type) 

























































Note: *one missing response. 
∆
The original phrasing in the questionnaire: ‘Since you 
started producing crop under the contract, have you changed the plot size of other 
crops (food crops or other cash crops)?’ (see Appendix 2). 
 
9.3.2 Influence of Contract Farming on Income Generation 
Table 9.18 indicated that the majority of surveyed households had low monthly 
income (48.6%), while only 18% of households had high income. In the Nkhotakota 
district, households were relatively equally distributed across low and medium 
household types, with lesser frequencies in high-income households. The Lilongwe 
district had more differences among household types, with a majority of farmers in 
the low-income category (53.8%) and a lower percentage of households in the high-
income category compared to the Nkhotakota district (NKH=18%, LLW=13.5%).  
 
Table 9.18 Income levels of contracted small-scale farmers  
Variable 
Both districts 
(% of total N) 
Nkhotakota 
(% of total in NKH) 
Lilongwe 
(% of total in LLW) 
Household income    
 Low monthly income 208 (48.6) 45 (36) 163 (53.8) 
 Medium monthly income  143 (33.4) 44 (35.2)   99 (32.7) 
 High monthly income    77 (18) 36 (28.8)   41 (13.5) 




Contract farming (92.5%), trade (47.9%) and part-time work (34.3%) were regular 
sources of income for contracted small-scale farmers (Table 9.19). Contract farming 
was a regular source of income to the greatest extent for medium-income households 
(94.4%) and households with large land allocated to CF (94%). Households with 
high income reported contract farming as their regular source of income to the least 
extent across the categories (88.3%). Also, high-income households (55.8%) and 
households with large land allocated to CF (57.7%) had the highest percentage of 
trade as a regular source of income. Households with small CF land (40.3%) showed 
the highest percentage of part-time work as a regular source of income among the 
household types. 
 
Table 9.19 Regular source of income for contracted small-scale farmers  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                      
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF  
% of total N 
(% within the type) 










LLA   
(n=71) 
Regular source of 
income for the 
household 
(multiple choice): 
       

















































































When asked about the importance of different income sources for their households, 
94.9% of small-scale farmers ranked contract farming as the most important one 
(Table 9.20). Trade (76.5%), and investments and savings (73.1%) were ranked as 







For the majority of households, the wages from part-time work were the least 
important source of income (25.3%). Regular work wages were more important to 
small-scale farmers in the Lilongwe district (28.7%) compared to the Nkhotakota 
district (16.8%). This might be due to the closeness of the capital city and 
opportunities for regular work that arise on a daily basis. Also, grants and 
remittances were more important in the Nkhotakota district (43.2%) compared to the 
Lilongwe district (37.3%), while investments and savings were more important in 
the Lilongwe district (75%) than in the Nkhotakota district (68.8%). 
 
Table 9.20 Ranking the importance of income sources for the household  
Variable Not important, % Neutral, % Important, % 























70.6 78.4 67.3 3.7 4.8 3.3 25.3 16.8 28.7 
Wages: part-time 
work 
37.9 41.6 36.3 17.1 18.4 16.5 44.6 40 46.5 
Trade 17.5 20.8 16.2 5.6 5.6 5.6 76.5 72.8 77.9 
Grants and 
remittances 
41.1 40 41.6 19.6 16.8 20.8 39.1 43.2 37.3 
Investments and 
savings 
21.7 26.4 19.8 4.7 4.8 4.6 73.1 68.8 75 
 
The majority of surveyed households received information on the price for paprika 
mainly from extension workers (78%) and less often from colleagues (35.5%) and 
the contractor (30.1%) (Table 9.21). Households with large CF land (42.25%) and 
medium-income households (38.46%) had the highest percentage of acquiring 
information on the price from Company D. Farmers received information on the 
price mostly after the harvest (63.3%). The greatest extent of households receiving 
the price before the harvest was found among medium-income households (37.06%) 
and households with small CF land (35.36%). Table 1.1A in Appendix B indicates 
that a higher proportion of households in the Lilongwe district were informed about 
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 In the context of this study, the term ‘trade’ means selling food surpluses on the green market, 
trading with manufactured goods (i.e. wooden souvenirs or furniture) or through small shops and re-
selling items (e.g. clothes or house necessities). 
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the price for paprika before the harvest compared to the Nkhotakota district 
(NKH=27%, LLW=34%).   
 
Table 9.21 Information on price for contracted small-scale farmers 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                                
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                         
% of total N 
(% within the type) 




HMI        
(n=77) 




LLA      
(n=71) 
Source of information 
on paprika price 
(multiple choice): 
       


































































































Household knows the 
information on 
paprika price: 
       





































One of the most important questions in the household survey was whether the 
income gained from contract farming suffices for household needs throughout the 
year. Table 9.22 indicates that the income from CF was sufficient for only 5.4% of 
households and partially sufficient for 57.2% of the contracted households. The 
income from contracting activity was not sufficient for 37.4% of households. The 
income from CF was sufficient throughout the year for high-income households 
(6.49%) and households with large land allocated to CF (7.04%) to the greatest 
extent compared to other household types. In contrast, low-income households 
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(47.6%) and households with small land allocated to CF (40.88%) stated that CF 
income was not sufficient for their needs in the highest proportions across the 
groups.  
 
Table 9.22 Influence of contract farming on household income generation  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                            
% of total N  
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                            
% of total N 
 (% within the type) 
 % LMI  
(n=208) 
MMI       
(n=143) 
HMI        
(n=77) 








       
Sufficient for the 
whole year 








































the lack of 
income*: 




















































































Note: * Multiple-choice response. 
 
The majority of small-scale farmers sold surpluses of food crops (71.3%) and 
engaged in occasional work (55.8%) to compensate for the lack of income. Of all the 
strategies, regular work was least represented, which suggests that surveyed small-
sale farmers did not intensively engage in regular work. High-income households 
(5.19%) showed the highest percentage of using the income from regular work to 
compensate for the lack of income. Low-income households showed the lowest 
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Regarding differences between two districts, households in Nkhotakota considered 
CF income as not sufficient to a slightly greater extent compared to Lilongwe 
(NKH=39%, LLW=36%) (based on Table 1.1A in Appendix B.). 
 
 


















One of the exercises during the focus group interviews was the calculation of 
production costs and profits from contract farming to gain a better insight into the 
amount  invested and returned. Table 9.23 represents a summary from eight focus 
group interviews. The quantities of used inputs, costs and final profits were 
compared across focus group interviews and brought to the table to represent an 
average case in Malawi’s paprika supply chain. 
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 Note that there is no intention to establish the causal relationship to claim that households engaged 
in other activities because the income from contract farming was not sufficient for their yearly needs. 
The information from Table 9.22 is used to establish whether the income from CF was sufficient and 
which other activities were practiced in order to compensate the lack of income.  
BOX 9.3 Marketing of paprika 





1. Small-scale farmers 
deliver paprika to an 
agreed collection point in 
sacks weighing 
approximately 20 kg. 
2. Paprika is unloaded for 
grading purposes. Company 
D’s staff members usually do 
the grading. 
3. Company D’s staff 
members then 
weighted paprika and 
the price is paid to 
small-scale farmers on 
the spot or within two 
weeks. 
Source: Author’s observation in Malawi, 2014. 
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Cost, MKW Comments 
Machinery    
Spray 1 30,000 Bought in cash 
Hoe 2 3,000 Bought in cash 
Water cane 2 5,000 Bought in cash 
Land    
Nursery 1 8,000 Rent per season, in cash 
Land 1 8,000 Rent per season, in cash 
Seeds 1 kg 1,000 Bought from Company D in cash 
Fertilizers    
D-compound 100 kg 32,000 Bought in cash 
CAN 100 kg 30,000 Bought in cash 
NPK 100 kg 32,000 Bought in cash 
Chemicals    
Diphenyl 0.5 kg 1,500 Bought in cash 
Copper 0.5 kg 1,500 Bought in cash 
Labour    
Ridging / 8,000 Uncertain number of individuals 
Weeding / 6,000 Uncertain number of individuals 
Land hallowing / 8,000 Uncertain number of individuals 
Harvesting / 10,000 Uncertain number of individuals 
Transport    
Ox-cart 1-2 8,000 Renting 
A) Total production 
costs 
 192,000  
a) Yield of dry paprika 
per acre 
800-1,000 kg   
b) Price per 1 kg:    
Grade A 550 MKW   
Grade B 450 MKW   
B) Revenue (a*b)    
Price at 550 MKW  440,000-550,000  
Price at 450 MKW  360,000-450,000  
C) Profit (A-B)    
Price at 550 MKW  248,000-358,000  
Price at 450 MKW  168,000-258,000  
Note: A) Total production costs = US$ 409. It should be noted that this price was an 
average captured during the research. Throughout the marketing season, the price for 
grade A went up to MKW 650. This table, however, provides an average case. a) Yield of 
dry paprika = stated yield represents the amount of dried paprika that is more likely to be 
achieved by farmers that are better off in the category of small-scale farmers. It suggests 
that an approximate yield of fresh paprika was 4 tons/acre. Grade A = US$ 1.2; grade B = 
US$ 0.95; revenue for price at 550 MKW = US$ 937-1,170; revenue for price at 450 
MKW = US$ 766-958; profit for price at 550 MKW = US$ 528-762; profit for price at 




The calculation was based on 1 acre. Table 9.23 shows that small-scale farmers 
bought the majority of the inputs in cash and the most expensive ones were 
fertilisers. Estimated production costs for 1 acre were US$ 409 and the price offered 
by the contractor varied depending on the grade: grade A=1.2 US$/kg, grade B=0.95 
US$/kg. Reported yield per acre was between 800 and 1,000 kg. Expected revenues 
for grade A were US$ 937-1,170 and for grade B US$ 766-958. Potential profits 
from contracting ranged between US$ 528-762 for grade A and US$ 358-549 for 
grade B.  
 
The following two cross-tabs indicate the distribution of income sufficiency 
according to the productivity and income levels. Table 9.24 shows that households 
who achieved medium yields had the highest proportion (7%) of sufficient CF 
income. The pattern for partially sufficient and not sufficient CF income was 
observed: the higher the yield obtained, the higher the ratio of partially sufficient CF 
income and lower the ratio of not sufficient CF income. 
 
Table 9.24 CF income sufficiency according to yields and land allocated to CF 
Sample Yield level 
Frequency                             
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF* 
Frequency                                    
(% within the type) 
 Low Medium High Small Medium Large 
Both districts*       




































Nkhotakota**       




































Lilongwe       








































Households that allocated small and large land to contracted paprika had the same 
ratio of sufficient CF income (6.1%). Households with large land allocated to 
paprika had the highest proportion of partially sufficient CF income (69.7%) and the 
lowest proportion of insufficient CF income (24.2%) compared to households with 
small and medium land allocated to CF. In Nkhotakota, households with low yields 
had the highest percentage of not sufficient CF income (50%), while households 
with high yields reported that CF income was sufficient (12.1) to the greatest extent. 
Similarly, households that allocated small land to CF had the highest proportion of 
not sufficient CF income (42.9) and households with large land allocated to CF 
showed that their CF income was sufficient (23.1%) to the highest extent across all 
categories. In Lilongwe, households with low yields had the highest rate of not 
sufficient CF income (62.2%) across all categories. Households with medium yield 
achieved the highest proportions of sufficient CF income (5.7%) among all types. 
Households that allocated small land to CF reported the greatest proportion of not 
sufficient CF income (40%) and households with medium CF land generated 
sufficient CF income (4.1%) to the highest extent within this typology category. 
 
Table 9.25 points that medium-income households generated sufficient income from 
contract farming to the greatest extent (6.4%) compared to low- (4.3%) and high-
income households (5.5%). High-income households had the highest proportion of 
partially sufficient CF income (65.7%). Low-income households reported that the 
income from CF was not sufficient to the highest level (47.6%) in comparison with 
other categories (medium-income=28.6%, high-income=28.8%). In Nkhotakota and 
Lilongwe, low-income households had the highest proportion of not sufficient CF 
income (NKH=51.1%, LLW=46.4%) across the categories. Medium- (11.4%) and 
high-income households (11.1%) in Nkhotakota had a similar extent of small-scale 
farmers who reported that CF income was sufficient for their yearly needs. However, 
medium-income households (38.6%) had a higher percentage of not sufficient CF 
income compared to high-income households (25%). Medium-income households in 






Table 9.25 CF income sufficiency according to the income levels 
Sample Income level 
Frequency (% within the type) 
Both districts Low Medium High 
CF income sufficient 9 (4.3) 9 (6.4) 4 (5.5) 
CF income partially sufficient 100 (48.1) 91 (65) 48 (65.7) 
CF income not sufficient 99 (47.6) 40 (28.6) 21 (28.8) 
Nkhotakota    
CF income sufficient 4 (8.9) 5 (11.4) 4 (11.1) 
CF income partially sufficient 18 (40) 22 (50) 23 (63.9) 
CF income not sufficient 23 (51.1) 17 (38.6) 9 (25) 
Lilongwe    
CF income sufficient 5 (3.1) 4 (4.1) 1 (2.4) 
CF income partially sufficient 82 (50.3) 72 (72.7) 28 (68.3) 
CF income not sufficient 76 (46.6) 23 (23.2) 12 (29.3) 
 
9.3.3 Influence of Contract Farming on Productivity and Income Generation – 
Results from the Focus Group Interviews 
During the focus group interviews, small-scale farmers emphasised that contracting 
enables producing quality produce, which in turn generates higher prices for a 
farmer: 
  
 ‘Farmers on contract produced quality produce which carries higher prices than 
 those doing individually. However, currently, production is low. For example, 
 farmers produce 3000 kg at club level and on average each farmer may produce  
 300 kg per acre.’ 
Focus group interview no. 1, Kamparilo and Kalilani area, Nkhotakota district, 2014 
 
However, the respondents also revealed a problem of low productivity, which 
prevented small-scale farmers from securing more benefits from contract farming. 
Challenges related to low productivity due to poor input provision are addressed in 
more detail in chapter 10.   
 
With regard to income generation, small-scale farmers provided examples where 
contract farming resulted in receiving income, which was used to improve either 
household livelihood or farming practices. For instance, respondents stated that the 
income from contract farming activity served to buy a means of transport (bicycle 




              ‘I bought a bicycle and a radio with the money realised from selling paprika.’ 
Focus group interview no. 5, Chawatha area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
 ‘Another participant said initially he was growing tobacco and always ran a risk to 
bankrupt but averted to paprika which he grew on 20 ridges where he applied 20kg  
fertilizer and after selling paprika bought a second hand bicycle. Another farmer 
said he applied 15kg fertiliser to paprika and after selling the produce, he bought 2 
bags of fertiliser (50kg NPK and 50kg Urea).’ 
Assistant's notes from the focus group interview no. 3, Chawatha area, Lilongwe 
district, 2015 
One participant said in 2012 he realised MKW 111,000 and in 2013 on 0.5 acre 
realised revenue of MKW 137,000 which he bought a motorbike at MKW 150, 000 
and 6 bags of chemical fertiliser which he used for the next growing season. Another 
farmer said in 2010 he managed to secure 0.25 acre at MKW 43,000 with the money 
from selling paprika. 
Assistant's notes from the focus group interview no. 4, Chiputu area, Lilongwe 
district, 2015 
 
Another example of the influence of contract farming on small-scale farmers’ 
livelihood concerned access to schooling: 
 
            ‘You can even see it as a matter of fact - our lives are getting better and better. This  
             crop is helping us. We can now afford to send our kids to school which we would not  
             do before.’  
Focus group interview no. 8, Nkhoma area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
Despite the positive influence on farmers’ livelihood, small-scale farmers reported 
that the income from contract farming was not satisfying and the low contract price 
was indicated as the key challenge (see chapter 10). 
 
9.3.4 Influence of Contract Farming on Food Security 
Most of the surveyed households reported medium food expenses per month (41.4%) 
(Table 9.26). High-income households had the highest percentage of high food costs 
(51%) and low-income households had the highest levels of low food costs (51%) 
within the income level type. Households with small CF land had the highest level of 
high food costs (26.5%). Households with medium CF land had the highest 
percentage of low food costs (38%) and households with the large proportion of land 
allocated to CF crop had the highest percentage of medium costs regarding the food 
(60%). Households in the Nkhotakota district had a higher percentage of high costs 
for food (39%) compared to households in the Lilongwe district (15%) (based on 
Table 1.1A in Appendix B).  
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Table 9.26 Monthly food expenses for contracted small-scale farmers 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                                      
% of total N                                
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                               
% of total N                                          
(% within the type) 














       
Low (>5 500 MKW) 35.5 24.9      
(51) 
8            
(24) 




15.7       
(38) 
3.8     
(22) 
Medium (5 500-13 
500 MKW) 
41.4 20       
(41) 
15.7      
(47) 
5.9     
(32) 
15.3     
(36) 
















Note: * two missing responses. 
 
Figure 9.2 depicts food security in the two districts throughout the year. The three 
hungry months for the majority of surveyed households were January (78%), 
February (94%) and March (61%). All households reported they were food secure 
during the period from May to August. Small-scale farmers’ inability to secure food 
for their household needs emerged again in September (1%), October (4%), 
November (9%) and December (22%).  
 
Figure 9.2 Food security for surveyed households in both districts  
 
















Figure 9.3 Food security for surveyed households in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe  
 
 
Households in Nkhotakota showed a higher proportion of food insecurity (6%) than 
households in Lilongwe (1%) in April (Figure 9.3). Households in Lilongwe had 
higher levels of food insecurity during March (65%), November (11%) and 
December (26%) compared to Nkhotakota  (March=52%, November=5%, 
December=12%). 
 
Table 9.27 Consumption of contracted paprika within the household 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                               
% of total N 
(% within the type) 















       




















































6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 5% 
12% 




1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
11% 
26% 





The consumption of produced paprika was mainly low among households (46.5%) 
(Table 9.27). The greatest percentage of high consumption was reported within 
medium-income households (3.50%) and households with small (2.76%) and large 
CF land (2.82%).  
 
Table 9.28 shows that households with sufficient CF income experienced less 
hungry months (max. 8, mean 5.64 months) compared to households with partially 
sufficient (max. 11, mean 6.64 months) and insufficient CF income (max. 12, mean 
6.64 months).  
 
Table 9.28 CF income sufficiency and food security 
CF income sufficiency Number of hungry months 
Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
CF income sufficient 0 8 5.64 2.421 
CF income partially sufficient 0 11 6.64 1.370 
CF income not sufficient 0 12 6.64 1.442 
 
9.3.5 Future Plans Related to Contracting 
The majority of surveyed households (98.6%) stated they intend to stay in contract 
farming arrangements for paprika in the coming years (Table 9.29). Low-income 
households (99.04%) and households with large CF land (100%) expressed their 
plan to remain under CF to the greatest extent across groups. In addition, 55.4% of 
households planned to extend their contracting to other crops. High-income 
households (72.73%) and households with large CF land (61.97%) were the most 
ready to expand CF compared to other household types. On the contrary, low-income 
households (56.25%) and households with small CF land (46.96%) were the most 
reluctant to expand their CF to other crops across all groups. 
 
Table 1.1A in Appendix B indicated that households in the Lilongwe district showed 
considerably higher percentages in not wanting to expand contract farming to other 





Table 9.29 Households’ plans for contracting in the coming years  
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 Total 
N 
Income levels                                               
% of total N 
(% within the type) 
Land allocated to CF                                               
% of total N 
(% within the type) 













plan to stay in 
CF for paprika in 
the coming 
years* 
       

























plan to expand 
contracting to 
other crops 
       
























Note: *one missing response. 
 
The topic of future plans regarding CF was explored during focus group interviews, 
too. The majority of small scale farmers stated they were willing to continue with 
paprika production for Company D. Nevertheless, the respondents requested changes 
in the contract, especially regarding inputs and credit provision and the price 




9.3.6 Estimating Determinants of Expanding Contracting to other Crops 
The binary logit regression was used in this section to estimate determinants of 
households’ willingness to expand contracting to other crops. The information on 
which variables are more likely to increase the likelihood of expanding CF has 
implications for Company D and the enabling environment (namely Government, 
NGOs and farmers’ associations). By knowing which households are more likely to 
commit to additional contracting arrangements, Company D has a better foundation 
to expand (or not) its production base in particular districts or targeting specific 
household types. Also, the Government and supporting bodies can tailor their 
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 From focus group interviews conducted within eight communities, small-scale farmers from one 
community stated they were not ready to continue with their contracting. 
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promotion of CF to attract households with desirable characteristics and potentially 
increase the efficiency of contracting. Prior to regression, the test for 
multicollinearity was run. 
 
A Chi-Square test for association preceded the binary logit model. The test was used 
to determine the willingness to expand contracting and following categorical 
variables: district, education, food expenses per month, monthly income, landholding 
size, proportion of land allocated to CF crop, CF yield/season, pesticide and 
fungicide costs per season, health expenses per month, distance from a household to 
collection point, timing when a household knows the price for paprika and 
sufficiency of CF income for households’ yearly needs (Table 30).
108
 All expected 
cell frequencies were greater than 5. 
 
Table 9.30 Chi-Square test for association between willingness to expand 
contracting to other crops and set of categorical variables 
Variable Pearson Chi-Square (
2
) df p-value Cramer’s V 
District 40.235 (38.861)** 1 0.000 (0.000) 0.312 
Education 14.655** 2 0.001 0.189 





23.834** 2 0.000 0.240 
Landholding size 16.140** 2 0.000 0.198 
Proportion of land allocated 
to CF crop 
15.499** 3 0.001 0.194 
CF yield/season 20.236** 2 0.000 0.222 
Pesticide cost/season 18.270** 3 0.000 0.210 
Fungicide cost/season 26.723** 3 0.000 0.254 
Health expenses/month
∆ 
18.936** 3 0.000 0.215 
Distance from household to 
collection point
∆ 
6.343* 2 0.042 0.124 
Timing when household 
knows the price for paprika 
11.800** 2 0.003 0.169 
Sufficiency of income from 
CF for household’s yearly 
needs 
6.060* 2 0.048 0.121 
Note: Numbers in brackets report Yate’s Continuity Correction and related p-value 
and are calculated in the case of 2x2 tables. 
∆
Monthly income, health 
expenses/month and distance to the collection point showed to be significant in the 
Chi-Square test but later in the modelling process were excluded as they were 
decreasing the strength of the model. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
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 All categorical variables are described in Table 9.31.  
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The Chi-Square test indicated there was a statistically significant association 
between willingness to expand contracting and the stated variables. The association 
was moderately strong between willingness to expand contracting and the district 
(χ
2
(1) =40.235, p=0.000, Cramer’s V=0.312) and weak in all other cases. 
 
Table 9.31 shows results for the test for multicollinearity. There was no strong 
multicollinearity among variables as the mean VIF was 2.36, all VIF values were 
less than 10, and all tolerance values were greater than 0.1.  
 
Table 9.31 Test for multicollinearity between variables used in binary logistic 
regression model (STATA output) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
District 1.35 0.7388 
Primary education 2.96 0.3374 
Secondary education 2.95 0.3391 
Low food expenses/month 1.43 0.6993 
High food expenses/month 1.44 0.6930 
Small landholding size 2.32 0.4315 
Large landholding size 2.56 0.3910 
Small % of land allocated to CF 1.29 0.7724 
Large % of land allocated to CF 1.28 0.7818 
Low CF yield/season 1.57 0.6355 
High CF yield/season 1.47 0.6824 
Low pesticide costs/season 2.79 0.3590 
Medium pesticide costs/season 2.95 0.3392 
High pesticide costs/season 2.53 0.3948 
Low fungicide costs/season 2.24 0.4469 
Medium fungicide costs/season 2.36 0.4239 
High fungicide costs/season 2.15 0.4650 
Price known after the harvest 1.14 0.8754 
Price known before or after the delivery 1.13 0.8823 
CF income partially sufficient  5.30 0.1886 
CF income not sufficient 5.41 0.1849 
Mean VIF 2.36  
 
Table 9.32 describes predictor variables tested in binary logit regression model. The 
table indicated that 54.9% of small-scale farmers were willing to expand their 





Table 9.32 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in binary logistic regression 
Variable Expanding, % Mean SD 
 Yes No   
Expanding 54.9 45.1 0.5487 0.4982 
Socio-economic variables     
District* 76.6 23.4 0.2945 0.4563 
Primary education 55.3 44.7 0.7440 0.4369 
Secondary education 64 36 0.1794 0.3841 
No education 25 75 0.0766 0.2662 
Food security conditions variables     
Low food expenses/month 44.7 55.3 0.3628 0.4813 
Medium food expenses/month 55 45 0.4081 0.4920 
High food expenses/month 70.8 29.2 0.2291 0.4207 
Household’s farm characteristics 
variables 
    
Small landholding size 46.4 53.6 0.3341 0.4722 
Medium landholding size 75.4 24.6 0.1456 0.3531 
Large landholding size 55 45 0.5203 0.5001 
Low % of land allocated to CF 52.3 47.7 0.2095 0.4074 
Medium % of land allocated to CF 48.1 51.9 0.5000 0.5006 
Large % of land allocated to CF 68.9 31.1 0.2905 0.4545 
Low CF yield/season 45.5 54.5 0.2638 0.4412 
Medium CF yield/season 46.2 53.8 0.3429 0.4752 
High CF yield/season 68.9 31.1 0.6929 4.8476 
Inputs-related variables     
Low pesticides costs/season 50.6 49.4 0.4228 0.4945 
Medium pesticides costs/ season 64.2 35.8 0.2518 0.4345 
High pesticides costs/season 73.3 26.7 0.1069 0.3093 
Not known pesticides costs/no use 43.5 56.5 0.2185 0.4137 
Low fungicides costs/season 57.5 42.5 0.3468 0.4765 
Medium fungicides costs/season 72.7 27.3 0.2090 0.4071 
High fungicides costs/season 61.3 38.7 0.0736 0.2614 




Note: * In Nkhotakota. In Lilongwe, 45.8% of households were willing to 




Table 9.32 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in binary logistic regression - 
Continued 
Variable Expanding, % Mean SD 
 Yes No   
CF variables     
Price known before the harvest 54.4 45.6 0.3230 0.4681 
Price known after the harvest 52.6 47.4 0.6318 0.4828 
Price known before or after the delivery 89.5 10.5 0.0451 0.2078 
CF income sufficient 77.3 22.7 0.0523 0.2228 
CF income partially sufficient 56.5 43.5 0.5677 0.4959 
CF income not sufficient 49.4 50.6 0.3800 0.4859 
 
Small-scale farmers in Nkhotakota (76.6%) were keener to expand their contracting 
activities compared to small-scale farmers in Lilongwe (45.8%) (Table 9.32). The 
results also pointed that the higher the education level, the more willingness was 
shown to expand contract farming (no education=25%, primary=55.3%, 
secondary=64%). Similarly, small-scale farmers who had high (70.8%) or medium 
food expenses for food/month (55%) were more willing to expand contracting 
activities than small-scale farmers with low food expenses/month (44.7%). 
Households with a medium landholding size (75.4%), a large proportion of land 
allocated to CF (68.9%) and high paprika yields per season (68.9%) were willing to 
expand their contracting to other crops to the highest extent considering the 
landholding size, land allocated to CF and yields obtained from the contracting crop.  
 
In terms of input usage, households that had high pesticides costs (73.3%) and 
medium fungicides costs (72.7%) were more interested to extend contracting 
activities. Small-scale farmers who were informed about the price before or after the 
delivery (89.5%) were more willing to expand their contractual relationship 
compared to small-scale farmers who were informed before (54.4%) or after the 
harvest about the price (52.6%). Finally, households who reported that the income 
from the CF was sufficient for their yearly needs (77.3%) were more willing to add 
another contracting crop to their farming activities compared to households with 




Further, Table 9.33 displays results of the binary logistic regression performed to 
assess the effect of 21 predictor variables (district, primary and secondary education, 
low and high expenses for food/month, small and large landholding size, low and 
large proportion of land allocated to CF crop, low and high CF yield/season, low, 
medium and high costs of pesticides and fungicides per season, price known after the 
harvest, price known before or after the delivery, and partially sufficient and not 
sufficient CF income) on the likelihood that households will expand their contracting 
to other crops.  
 
The model consisting of 21 variables was statistically significant, χ
2
(21, N=410) 
=126.94, p<0.001. This model explained 35.6% (Nagelkerke R
2
) and 26.6% (Cox 
and Snell R
2
) of the variance in willingness to expand contracting, and it correctly 
classified 72.2% of cases. 
 
Table 9.33 indicates that, from 21 predictor variables, 13 were statistically 
significant. The large landholding size, low and medium pesticide costs and CF 
partially sufficient and not sufficient were statistically significant at 5%. The district, 
primary and secondary education, small landholding size, large proportion of land 
allocated to CF crop, high CF yields/season and low and medium costs of fungicides 
were significant at 1%. 
 
The strongest predictors of willingness to expand contracting were primary and 
secondary education (odds ratio of 9.25 for primary and 10.16 for secondary 
education). This means that households with a head that had primary or secondary 
education were over 9 and 10 times more likely to expand their contracting for other 
crops compared to households whose head had no education. Households in the 
Nkhotakota district were over three times (odds ratio of 3.62) more likely to expand 





Table 9.33 Binary logistic regression estimating determinants of expanding CF  
 
Variables 
Coefficient S.E. Wald p-value 
Odds 
Ratio 
District 1.288** 0.307 17.589 0.000 3.627 
Socio-economic variables      
Primary education 2.225** 0.541 16.934 0.000 9.252 
Secondary education 2.319** 0.597 15.070 0.000 10.160 
Food security conditions variables      
Low food expenses per month -0.189 0.284 0.445 0.505 0.828 
High food expenses per month 0.576 0.349 2.717 0.099 1.778 
Household farm characteristics 
variables 
     
Small landholding size -1.676** 0.415 16.266 0.000 0.187 
Large landholding size 0.967* 0.404 5.726 0.017 0.380 
Low % of land allocated to CF crop  0.123 0.321 0.146 0.702 1.131 
Large % of land allocated to CF crop  0.875** 0.296 8.705 0.003 2.398 
Low CF yield/season 0.497 0.328 2.296 0.130 1.644 
High CF yield/season 0.776** 0.293 7.041 0.008 2.174 
Inputs-related variables      
Low pesticides costs/season -0.857* 0.391 4.817 0.028 0.424 
Medium pesticides costs/season -0.918* 0.464 3.910 0.048 0.399 
High pesticides costs/season -0.331 0.639 0.269 0.604 1.393 
Low fungicide costs/season 1.033** 0.369 7.822 0.005 2.809 
Medium fungicide costs/season 1.275** 0.436 8.550 0.003 3.580 
High fungicides costs/season -0.913 0.736 1.541 0.214 0.401 
CF variables      
Price known after the harvest -0.097 0.254 0.147 0.702 0.907 
Price known before or after the delivery 1.643 0.937 3.079 0.079 5.173 
CF income partially sufficient -1.322* 0.615 4.622 0.032 0.267 
CF income not sufficient -1.399* 0.628 4.957 0.026 0.247 
Constant -0.528 1.029 0.264 0.608 0.590 
Diagnostic statistics      




(df) 126.94**     
           Nagelkerke R
2
 0.356     
           Cox and Snell R
2
 0.266     
           Sig. 0.001     
           % of cases predicted correctly 72.2%     
           N 410     




Food security conditions variables did not show a significant impact on farmers’ 
willingness to expand contracting arrangements to other crops. Concerning farm 
characteristics, households with large landholding size were more likely to expand 
their contract farming and households with small landholding size were less likely to 
expand their contracting compared to households with medium landholding size. 
Households that allocated a large proportion of their land for CF were over two times 
(odds ratio of 2.39) more likely to expand contracting activities than households with 
medium proportions allocated to CF land. In terms of yields, households with high 
CF yields/season were more likely to extend CF compared to medium-yield 
households.  
 
Inputs-related variables showed significant effects on expanding household 
contracting activities. However, pesticides and fungicides showed opposite results. 
Households facing low and medium pesticide costs/season were less likely to expand 
their CF compared to households with not known costs/season or no use of pesticide. 
In contrast, households with low and medium fungicide costs/season were more 
likely to expand their CF activities compared to households with not known 
costs/season or no use of fungicides. Households that found CF income partially 
sufficient or insufficient for their yearly needs were less likely to expand contracting 
to other crops compared to households whose CF income was sufficient. The result 
showed that the following coefficient of variables had expected sign (see chapter 7, 
section 7.6.3.2 on estimating determinants of expanding contracted production): 
district; primary and secondary education; expenses for food/month; landholding 
size; low proportion of land allocated to CF crop; high CF yield/season; high 
pesticides and fungicides costs/season; and low fungicide costs/season. 
 
9.4 Discussion 
9.4.1 Motivation behind Contracting  
This study found that input provision, a guaranteed market and extension services 
were the key drivers for entering the contract. The study results showed variations 
among households since the importance of access to inputs decreased as income 
levels of the household increase. The higher the cost of fungicides, the more 
important it was to access those inputs through the contract. Similarly, access to 
credit was more important where costs for fertilisers, pesticides and fungicides were 
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high. The costs for pesticides and fungicides across households were reported as low. 
Yet, one of the most important inputs, fertiliser, represented a high cost for small-
scale farmers.  
 
Although contract farming might grant access to needed fertilisers through loans, in 
the case of the paprika supply chain, the contract did not provide any inputs except 
seeds (the issue of poor input provision is elaborated in more detail in chapter 10 and 11). 
The signed contract for paprika offered to secure extension services (mainly training 
while storage and transport services were not included) and guaranteed a market for 
small-scale farmers but the input provision was limited. The study’s findings 
correspond to some of the factors found in the extensive literature: the key factors for 
entering CF are access to market, guaranteed market price, stable income, access to 
credits and quality inputs, risk sharing, reduced production and marketing costs, and 
technical assistance (Echánove and Steffen, 2005; Masakure and Henson, 2005; 
Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; Guo et al., 2007; Imbruce, 2008; Sharma, 2008; 




The majority of surveyed households allocated 10-30% of their land to CF crops. 
Most of the households produced over 200 kg of dried paprika per season, which 
was initially categorised as ‘high’ yield. For  comparison purpose, the studies from 
Agar and Chilligo (2008), CYE report (2009) and Makoka et al. (2010) indicated 
that small-scale farmers, without using additional inputs, could yield between 150 
and 500 kg/ha, while estimated average yield was between 375-600 kg/ha.
110
 
Assuming that an average farmer in three studies from Malawi had 1 acre (0.4 ha), 
this means that an average yield would vary between 151-242 kg/acre, which is 
similar to what was recorded in this study. By comparing the yield that small-scale 
farmers achieved with volumes in the case of irrigated production or on estates, it 
can be concluded that the yield of paprika was low. In contracted production, the 
yield is explicitly related to income generation. Although the household 
questionnaire indicated that contract farming influenced households’ livelihoods 
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 This part revisits the literature review in chapter 4. 
110
 The three studies report great variations in possible paprika yields. This reflects the situation on the 
ground as yields for paprika differed considerably among farmers in the study mostly due to various 
levels of inputs usage and land size. 
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positively, it was also shown that the income was only partially sufficient to cover 
households’ yearly needs.  
 
The focus group interviews indicated that a small-scale farmer growing paprika on 1 
acre of  land and yielding 800-1,000 kg of  dried paprika could earn between MKW 
168,000-358,000 (US$ 350-760 per season). Comparing the findings from Agar and 
Chiligo (2008), CYE report (2009) and Makoka et al. (2010), two points can be 
further considered. First, the price for paprika in Malawi increased over the years 
from around MKW 150/kg in 2006/2007 season to MKW 850/kg in 2015/2016 
season (see Figure 10.9 in chapter 10 for the latter price). This has a direct 
implication for small-scale farmers as it suggested that the potential income 
generated through contract farming was increasing. This statement applies to price 
solely and does not take into consideration the change in costs of living or inputs that 
might have also increased in the stated period. Second, small-scale farmers yielding 
100-180 kg/acre could achieve profit of around MKW 40,000. The results from the 





About half of all surveyed households (48.6%) in the paprika supply chain reported 
low monthly income, which was less than US$ 22. Mean per capita income in the 
Nkhotakota district was US$ 52 and in the Lilongwe district US$ 60 in 2005, 
according to Malawi Data Portal (2015). Small-scale farmers in both districts earned 
income that was below average. Still, 48% of the population in Nkhotakota and 
37.5% of the population was categorised as ‘poor' (Malawi Data Portal, 2015). The 
low monthly income suggested that small-scale farmers would be mostly concerned 
with securing enough food for their families throughout the year, which can conflict 
with obligations regarding the contracted crop and can eventually lead to poorer 
yields and quality and low-income generation. All households, however, stated that 
the income earned from contract farming activities is very important for their 
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 This inference is made based on the indicated yield of 720 kg/acre achieved on the commercial 
farm (CYE report, 2009). The value of MKW 213,640 income per season is within the frame reported 
during focus group interviews. If the increase in the price that occurred since 2007/08 season is 
incorporated - it can be confirmed that potential profits reported in the focus group interviews are 
feasible but not for an average small-scale farmer. Rather they can be achieved by a better off small-
scale farmer, which was suggested earlier in section 9.3.5 of this chapter. 
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livelihoods, which suggests that the importance of contract farming for small-scale 
farmers in two districts is considerable.  
 
At this point, the study’s findings suggested that contract farming had an overall 
positive influence on small-scale farmers' livelihoods as it provided access to paprika 
seed, extension services, a guaranteed market and, ultimately, enabled income 
generation for rural households in two Malawian districts. Other studies such as 
Echánove and Steffen (2005), Chirwa and Kydd (2009), Fréguin-Gresh et al., 
(2012), Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw, (2013) and Narayanan (2014) reported a 
similar positive influence of contract farming (see Appendix A, especially under 
‘Positive contract impact’). This is not to claim there were no challenges in the 
studied contractual arrangement. For instance, small-scale farmers received the 
information on the price for a contracted crop from the extension worker (i.e. it was 
not stated in the contract) and mainly after the harvest, which potentially reduced 
farmers’ opportunity to accurately plan for income generation and increased the risk 
of side-selling. Thus, key challenges in the paprika supply chain were further 
explored in chapter 10 to follow. 
 
9.4.3 Expanding Contract Farming Arrangement 
Small-scale farmers stated they were very satisfied with the current relationship with 
Company D. A considerable percentage of households (42.3%) reported that they 
increased their plot size and some small-scale farmers reported that involvement in 
contracting enabled them to purchase assets and inputs and send children to school. 
Moreover, 55% of households stated they would be ready to expand their contracting 
to other crops. Expanding contractual relations to other crops could increase small-
scale farmers' financial capacities through better income generation and 
consequently result in more food secure livelihoods. By engaging in CF for other 
crops, small-scale farmer might receive additional training on farming practices and 
improve production levels of other (food) crops too due to acquired knowledge. 
 
Having contracted production for a number of crops might increase production and 
marketing risks to a greater extent compared to growing food crops. Households that 
were more likely to expand their contracting included ones with primary or 
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secondary education, high expenses for food/month, medium all-land size, with 
larger proportions of CF land and low to medium expenses for fungicides/season. 
This indicates that educated, slightly better off and small-scale farmers already more 
engaged in CF production are an optimal choice for Company D to expand its 
supplier base for other crops. 
 
9.5 Summary 
This chapter explored the influence of contract farming on small-scale farmers' 
livelihoods. The chapter started by identifying key motivating factors for joining CF. 
Small-scale farmers pointed out that access to inputs, a guaranteed market and 
extension services were the main reasons they entered into a business relationship 
with Company D. This study found that contract farming had a mixed influence over 
contracted small-scale farmers in terms of productivity, income generation and food 
security. The next chapter, chapter 10, explores in detail the key challenges in the 
paprika supply chain. 
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Chapter 10 provides an analysis and interpretation of collected quantitative and 
qualitative data with the aim of identifying, describing and analysing the key 
challenges in the contractual relationship within the supply chain (Objective 3). This 
chapter answers the related research sub-questions of: What are the key challenges in 
Malawi’s paprika supply chain? How do the structure and the content of the 
contract for paprika support efficient and sustainable relations? What is the level of 
side-selling in the paprika supply chain and which factors influence small-scale 
farmers’ engagement in side-selling? From this chapter on, the study focuses on the 
key challenges in the Malawian paprika supply chain. 
 
10.2 Section 1: Key Challenges Identified in Contract Farming Relations in the 
Paprika Supply Chain 
 
This section describes key challenges found in the studied case. Figure 10.1 depicts 
challenges and correlations found in the case of contract farming in Malawi's paprika 
supply chain. Analysis of the focus group interviews, semi-structured interviews and 
email correspondence identified in total 12 critical factors (major themes), which 
directed relationships in the supply chain. Themes were grouped and presented as 
three primary challenges (meta-themes).  
 
10.2.1 Challenges related to input provision, low trust level and previous negative 
experience 
 
Challenge 1: Poor input provision in the contract can be attributed to the low level 
of trust between parties. Low trust was based on negative experiences with 
previous contracting. 
 
In the focus group interviews, small-scale farmers stated that paprika cultivation 
requires specific inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers, sprayers, and chemicals. Besides 
seeds, the current contract did not provide any inputs. Small-scale farmers stated that 
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the negotiation with Company D concerning providing needed inputs or loans was 
not sufficient. Some small-scale farmers compared the paprika and tobacco sectors, 
emphasising that small-scale farmers growing tobacco received needed inputs or 
loans. Small-scale farmers remained determined in their claims that inputs should be 
an essential part of the contract design. 
 
During the interview, Company D representatives explained why the current contract 
did not offer more inputs. Company D's decision to deny required inputs to small-
scale farmers on credit was informed by previous negative experiences. Company D 
stated that, in the past, the contract ensured inputs on credit but small-scale farmers 
did not repay the loans. Small-scale farmers who received inputs turned to side-
selling. Company D's CEO was reluctant to include inputs in the contract believing 
that small-scale farmers would misuse inputs again, and Company D would have to 
deal with reduced volumes of the crop. 
 
The processor of contracted paprika confirmed Company D’s concerns related to the 
waste of inputs by highlighting that small-scale farmers usually followed the buyer 
offering the highest price for the crop, regardless of who provided inputs. In other 
words, Company D secured the seed through the contract since the cost of the seed 
was low. Company D did not supply costly fertilisers, pesticides or herbicides 
because of small-scale farmers’ likeliness to side-sell.  
 
Representatives of the paprika supply chain environment had the experience with 
small-scale farmers. For example, a consultant working with supply chains in 
Malawi pointed out that small-scale farmers demanded free provisions in the 
contract and long paying back periods for their loans. The image of Malawian small-
scale farmers who either took long to repay the loans or did not repay them at all 
dominated in the paprika supply chain. The negative experience with loans 
influenced the overall trust among players in the supply chain. Company D did not 
trust small-scale farmers because of side-selling practices. 
 
On the small-scale farmers' side, the main causes of mistrust towards Company D 
were the low price paid and non-transparent grading system. Small-scale farmers 
used stated reasons to justify their side-selling (link to Challenge 2, see Figure 10.1). 
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Figure 10.1 Key challenges identified in the contractual arrangements                                                                                                     
Note: *critical factors in Company D and small-scale farmers’ relationship where vendors provide alternatives for small-scale farmers. 
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Apart from Company D as a formal marketing channel for paprika, another informal 
channel was identified in the paprika supply chain - vendors. Vendors filled in 
specific gaps in the relationship between Company D and small-scale farmers (see 
‘*’ in Figure 10.1). For example, contrary to the low trust level in the supply chain, 
vendors stated that the trust between them and small-scale farmers existed due to 
open and friendly relations, especially concerning the grading system and bargaining 
over the price.  While Company D did not provide the required inputs because of 
previous experiences and low trust in small-scale farmers’ compliance with 
repayment and delivery conditions, vendors represented an alternative ‘trustworthy’ 
outlet for small-scale farmers.   
 
Returning to the starting point - the issue of an inadequate contract design was 
identified as the greatest obstacle in the paprika supply chain (this theme is further 
developed under Challenge 2 and 3 and revisited in chapter 11.). Small-scale farmers 
emphasised that the contractor did not specify the price for CF paprika in the 
contract, so they were not informed about the price on time (i.e. early in the 
cultivation process). On the other side, the enabling environment recognised the 
issue with the design and attributed the challenge of the poorly formulated contract 
to the absence of a national legal framework. The main role of the legal framework, 
i.e. the national Contract Farming Strategy, was believed to be in providing 
guidelines on how to organise the relationship between the contractor and small-
scale farmers and establishing legal support for contract farming. The Strategy will 





Small-scale farmers stated that the presence of Government is needed in CF, 
especially in regulating the market and the number of buyers. Small-scale farmers 
felt that the Government has the responsibility to break the monopoly of only one 
paprika buyer and assist with marketing. When confronted with this proposition 
from small-scale farmers, the Government, however, responded that, through the 
Strategy, their role is to facilitate CF arrangements and not interfere with the market 
or pricing. 
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 The Strategy was building on a previously existing document from Malawi's Government. The re-
drafting of the Strategy started in 2008. At the time of the study (2013-2016), the Strategy was still 
not officially released. 
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10.2.2 Challenges related to lack of participation in contract design 
 
Challenge 2: Small-scale farmers lacked the opportunity to bargain and 
participate in the design of the contract. This limitation resulted in small-scale 
farmers’ reduced sense of responsibility for complying with agreed terms and led 




Bargaining represented a challenge for the majority of small-scale farmers in paprika 
supply chain. Only one out of eight groups of small-scale farmers stated that 
Company D included them in discussion regarding the price and grades. The rest of 
the small-scale farmers reported that they were not given an opportunity to change 
terms in the contract. Company D defined prices, and small-scale farmers’ attempts 
to negotiate with Company D were not successful. 
 
Company D's representatives responded that it was inefficient to bargain with an 
individual smallholder due to geographical dispersion of suppliers and low quantities 
for trading. Company D encouraged collective action, so that small-scale farmers as 
a group might gain negotiation power based on substantial amounts delivered. In 
contrast, vendors gained an advantage as Company D offered fixed prices. Vendors 
were able to discuss the price with small-scale farmers and provide higher amounts 
than Company D. 
 
Grading was a point of dispute in the paprika supply chain (see Figure 10.2). 
Company D usually graded paprika into four grades by referring to international 
market standards since the contracted paprika was further exported. Company D 
stated that the grading process was subjective and dependent on the visual 
interpretation of the buying team on the spot. Small-scale farmers reported that they 
did not participate in establishing grading rules. 
 
Small-scale farmers described the existing grading system as non-transparent and 
arbitrary and provided examples where Company D classified the same crop into 
different grades. 
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Figure 10.2 Paprika during marketing days  
Note: Differences are between grades A (B and C included) and D. In 2014/2015 season, Company D had a different grading system 




MKW 350 in 2016 
GRADE A 
 
MKW 850 in 2016 
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Some small-scale farmers stated that they turned to side-selling due to the lack of a 
right to bargaining and the unfair grading system (link to Challenge 3, see Figure 
10.1). 
 
Interviewed vendors developed the grading system using two instead of four grades. 
Vendors stated that using two grades attracted small-scale farmers who complained 
about Company D’s grading. Vendors confirmed that grading was a subjective 
process. By classifying the crop in two grades vendors aimed to avoid biases in 
visual assessment. 
 
10.2.3 Challenges related to the breach of contract 
 
Challenge 3: The price offered in the contract did not match small-scale farmers’ 





The exact price was not defined in the contract, and Company D announced prices to 
small-scale farmers after the harvest, i.e. one month before the purchasing period. 
Small-scale farmers perceived the contract price offered by Company D as low 
compared to the vendors' price. Besides, small-scale farmers stated that distribution 
of benefits in the chain was unequal since Company D gained the most by offering 
the lower price and selling the crop at a higher price. The low price discouraged 
small-scale farmers from selling the entire crop to Company D, and some small-scale 
farmers reported that they sold more paprika to vendors than to Company D. 
 
During the focus group interviews, a misunderstanding of contracting principles was 
observed. For example, small-scale farmers claimed that the contract did not limit 
them to sell the crop to any buyer on the market. When Company D's prices were 
lower than promised or expected, small-scale farmers sold the crop for the higher 
price to vendors. One of the consultants stated that majority of small-scale farmers 
did not understand contracts and were dishonouring the terms due to occasional price 
improvements. Vendors reported that small-scale farmers' misunderstanding was a 
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 Triangulation of interview transcripts for Challenge 3 is located in Table 1.7A in Appendix B. 
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result of the contract itself since the language used was not consistent. Some 
contracts were written in English and others in Chichewa, which is the national 
language of Malawi. Nonetheless, when compared, vendors observed that two 
contracts differed in their meanings and introduced potential misconceptions. 
 
Company D's representatives stated that the contract was designed considering 
market conditions, namely international market prices and demand for paprika, 
Company D’s overhead costs and previous experiences with contracting in Malawi. 
Company D explained that the price was not indicated in the contract due to 
uncertainties in the international market, Chinese influence on the price and an 
attempt to protect the contracted crop against side-selling. As well, the price in the 





Company D confirmed that some small-scale farmers did not sell the entire crop to 
the buying team. Field officers provided an example where a smallholder delivered 
10-20% of the whole volume produced to the purchasing point while the rest of the 
crop was sold to the vendor. Company D concluded that the main reason for side-
selling was the higher price offered by vendors. The processor explained that 
vendors offered a high price because they do not act as input providers and do not 
carry any risks. Vendors had the financial means to purchase a few tonnes of 
paprika, compared to Company D, which was buying hundreds of tonnes. Company 
D was losing the crop by competing with the vendors who were able to pay a 
premium price for smaller volumes.   
 
Concerning the price, vendors offered higher prices compared to Company D's offer. 
Vendors stated that they used Company D's price as a benchmark and then added an 
extra amount to attract small-scale farmers. Besides the price, vendors explained that 
the main reason small-scale farmers preferred to sell the crop to vendors were 
payments in cash. Small-scale farmers usually needed the cash on delivery and 
vendors were able to pay for the crop on the spot. Vendors purchased paprika at 
small-scale farmers' doorsteps and eliminated the need for transporting the crop. 
                                                          
115
 A detailed pricing formula is outlined in section 10.4 of this chapter.  
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The market conditions mentioned earlier did not relate exclusively to an international 
market. In the paprika supply chain, market conditions refer to the number of active 
players, especially potential buyers. In this regard, vendors stated that the market for 
paprika showed sufficient demand and the issue was to secure required quantities. In 
contrast, small-scale farmers under Company D's contract suggested that other 
buyers should enter the market and create competition by offering different 
contracts. 
 
10.3. Section 2: Contract Design as a Challenge 
10.3.1 Contract Structure 
This section provides the layout and definitions of clauses found in the studied 
contract. The central features of the contract were Company D and small-scale 
farmer’s obligations, and general conditions. Company D's obligations included: 
purchasing the crop, defining grades, paying and training small-scale farmer, and 
organising purchasing points. Small-scale farmers’ obligations included: cultivating 
the crop, adhering to instructions regarding applied chemicals, and grading and 
selling the crop. General conditions were defined around quality failure, contract 
breach, and liability clauses. Table 10.1 displays the main contract clauses divided 
into three categories: defined, partially defined, and missing.  
 
Defined Clauses 
The studied contract (2013/14 season) began with identifying the parties who had 
entered into an agreement. The contract continued with an outline of the nature of 
the relationship between the parties and the exact duration of the contract. The 
amount of paprika expected from small-scale farmers was emphasised several times 
throughout the contract. The input provided in the contract was defined in various 
volumes. The contract specified the payment conditions and mandatory instructions 
regarding crop cultivation for small-scale farmers. Under the general conditions, the 
contract defined the following clauses: the consequences in the case of quality 
failure, clarification of contract breach, and Company D's disclaimer of liability 
regarding the price guarantee, input provisions, and any incidents that occurred. The 




Table 10.1 Identification of the main contract clauses in the structure of Malawi’s 
contract for paprika production and marketing 
 
Contract clause 2013/14 season 
Parties to the contract (+) 
Preamble (+) 
Duration (+) 
Input provision (+) 
Quantity  (+) 









Disputes  (-) 
Force majeure (-) 
Applicable law (-) 
Signatory (+) 
Note: (+) = defined, (+/-) = partially defined, and (-) = missing clauses in the 
contract. 
 
Partially Defined Clause 
Price was partially defined in the Malawian contract. The clauses mentioning the 
price were identified twice in the contract: under Company D’s obligations and 
within general conditions. In both cases, the clauses did not specify the figure as 
expected reimbursement for the delivered crop. However, the clauses indicated the 
procedure for price determination. The delimitation of Company D's responsibility 
for guaranteeing the price was explicitly stated in the contract. 
 
Missing Clauses 
The clauses defining delivery conditions and different grades for paprika were not 
included in the studied contract. The contract did not specify the conditions for 
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terminating the agreement. The appeal to the applicable law and options for settling 
the possible disputes between the parties were not contained in the contract. The 
contract did not involve the clause clarifying responsibilities in the case of force 
majeure events.  
 
Differences in Contract Structure of Two Malawian Contracts  
The contract from the 2010/2011 season was available through the FAO database 
and under this section it is briefly compared to the contract from the 2013/2014 
season. Company D adopted the contract from the 2010/2011 season from their 
antecedent (see chapter 8, section 8.2.2.1 on Company D’s background). The 
structure of compared contracts varied considerably in two most important aspects. 
First, the contract from the 2010/11 season outlined the minimum price for each of 
the five grades listed in the contract. As noted under the previous section (see 
Partially Defined Clause in this chapter), the studied contract partially defined the 
clause on price and did not include grades. Second, regarding breach, the studied 
contract expanded on the contract from 2010/11 and included the statement that 
Company D breaches the contract if it does not purchase the contracted crop. The 
studied contract contained the clause specifying English as the working language. 
The rest of the clauses appeared in both contracts and remained similar in their 
content. 
 
10.3.2 Contract Content 
This section summarises the key clauses of the studied contract (Table 10.2). The 
studied contract was drafted as an agreement between two parties; Company D on 
the one side, and the outgrower or association on the other side. The preamble of the 
contract defined that the outgrower entered the contract with the purpose of growing 
contracted paprika for and on behalf of Company D. The contract was agreed to last 
one season, which started on the day of purchasing the seed and continued until the 
last part of the crop was sold. 
 
The seed was the only input supplied through the contract, and Company D sold the 
packets of seed to outgrowers on a cash basis. The crop was further defined as all 
paprika produced was using bought seed packets. According to the contract, the 
outgrower was obliged to sell the entire crop exclusively to Company D. 
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Table 10.2 Content of the contract for paprika in Malawi 
Contract clause Content 
Parties to the contract Outgrower (individual or group) and Company D 
Preamble Outgrower grows paprika for and on behalf of Company D 
Duration One season 
Input provision Seed only; cash in advance 
Quantity All crop grown using the seed sold by Company D 
Delivery conditions Not defined 
Grades Not defined  
Price 
Company D's decision; based on the prevailing market prices, 
currency fluctuation, and demand; split by grade; not explicitly 
defined; no bargaining 
Payment Cash; immediately or within two weeks 
Training 
Instructions by Company D and third party, especially on grading 
and cultivation 
Quality failure Downgrading, price reduction, or rejection  
Breach Side-selling, purchase refusal 
Liabilities Producer: cultivation, grading, selling; Company D: purchase 
Termination Not defined 
Disputes Not defined 
Force majeure Not defined 
Applicable law Not defined 
Signatory 
Group’s/association’s chairman and secretary, Company D’s 
representative and one witness 
 
Grading was foreseen on the marketing day, where a complete description for each 
grade is provided, and parties agree on identified grades. Company D retained the 
right to determine the price. The price was subject to the world market price, 
fluctuation in exchange rates and demand for paprika. Company D's obligation was 
to make cash payments to the outgrower on the day of purchase or within two weeks. 
Company D had to organise central purchasing points not more than 30 kilometres 
from the original growing area if outgrowers delivered, at least, three tonnes of 
paprika. 
 
The contract included training on cultivation and grading practices, provided by 
Company D and the Ministry of Agriculture. The outgrower agreed to follow 
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instructions, especially on recommended chemicals usage. The failure to deliver the 
agreed quality of the crop was regulated through the contract by Company D’s right 
to: reduce the price of the crop, downgrade the crop, or reject the crop. The contract 
defined breach in two cases. First, the outgrower was breaching the contract if 
paprika was not sold to Company D. Second, Company D was breaching the contract 
if the contracted paprika was not purchased.  
 
The liability clauses were defined in the form of disclaimer. Company D claimed no 
responsibility for outgrower's injury, health or death incidents during growing and 
transporting processes. Company D did not accept liability for supplying inputs, such 
as chemicals, fertiliser or finances. Company D did not guarantee the price at which 
paprika would be purchased. 
 
The signatory clause required signing the contract so that each party had read and 
fully understood the content. The signing parties included the chairperson and 
secretary of the farmers’ association, a Company D’s representative, and a witness. 
 
10.4 Section 3: Side-selling as a Challenge 
10.4.1 Extent and Economic Implications of Side-selling 
As stated several times throughout this study, side-selling was one of the major 
challenges in contract farming arrangements. The households’ survey captured the 
extent of side-selling among contracted small-scale farmers in the Nkhotakota and 
Lilongwe districts (Table 10.3). 
 
Table 10.3 shows that 36.9% of households were engaged in side-selling practices. 
Medium-income households (47.6%) and households with small CF land (38.7%) 
were the ones with the highest percentage of side-sellers among household types. 
Low-income households (26.4%) had the least percentage of side-sellers across all 
groups. High-income households sold a low proportion of their paprika to Company 
D in 21% of cases, which was the highest recorded percentage of low proportion 
sold among household types. The most loyal of all types were households with small 
land allocated to the CF crop (74.6%) which sold large proportions of their CF crop 




Table 10.3 Side-selling extent in the two studied districts 
Variable  Both districts Nkhotakota and Lilongwe (N=428) 
 
Total N Income levels, % CF land allocated, % 
  
% 










Large   
(n=71) 
Household      
side-selling 
paprika: 
       
Yes 36.9 26.4 47.6 45.5 38.7 34.9 38 
No 63.1 73.6 52.4 54.5 61.3 65.1 62 
Proportion of 
paprika sold to 
the contractor:* 
       
Low                                     
(Up to 30%) 
15.6 18.3 9 21 13.8 18.9 12.7 
Medium                            
(31-70%) 
13.8 9.7 23 7.8 8.8 19.4 12.7 
Large                      
(71-100%) 
67.1 69.1 62.3 70 74.6 60.6 63.3 
Unknown 3.5 2.9 5.7 1.2 2.8 1.1 11.3 
Unknown 3.5 2.9 5.7 1.2 2.8 1.1 11.3 
Note: *Table 10.3 summarises proportion of paprika sold to the contractor.  
Small-scale farmers in the Nkhotakota district practised more side-selling compared to 
those in the Lilongwe district (NKH=52%, LLW=30.7%) (Table 10.4). It was confirmed 
that households in Nkhotakota sold low proportions of the CF crop to a greater extent 
than in the Lilongwe district (NKH=17.6%, LLW=14.9%). The Lilongwe district 
generally better complied with contract requirements regarding the quantity of the 
delivered CF crop as in this district, 69% of households delivered 70-100% of their 
paprika to the contractor. For comparison, in the Nkhotakota district, 62% of households 
did the same. The data generated from the household questionnaire and interviews with 




Table 10.4 Side-selling in the Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts 
Note: *One missing response. 
 
Variable Nkhotakota (N=125) Lilongwe (N=303) 
 Income levels                                       
(% of total N in NKH) 
CF land allocated                           
(% of total N in NKH) 
Income levels                             
(% of total N in LLW) 
CF land allocated                        

























Household engaged in side-selling of paprika 
Yes 14.4          21.6             16          28          23.2            0.8             12.2          13.5 5          11.5 10.6   8.6  
No 21.6        13.6       12.8 16.8 20.8          9.6     41.6           19.1  8.6 29.7  29           10.6 
Proportion of paprika sold to the contractor 
Low                              
(Up to 30%) 
4.8           2.4            10.4  11.2 3.2               3.2            10.6           3.3         1           3.6          9.6          1.7          
Medium                            
(30-70%) 
7.2 7.2 3.2 4 11.2 2.4 3.6 7.9 0.7 3.6 6.6 2 
Large*                                    
(71-100%) 
22.4  24.8          15.2 27.2 29.6          4.8          38.3        19.1 11.6  33.3 22.8  12.9 
Unknown 1.6 0.8 0 2.4 0 0 1.3 2.3 0.3 0.7 0.7 2.6 
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In particular, the information on potential losses for Company D that occur due to 
side-selling was relevant for assessing consequences of such opportunistic 
behaviour. For the calculation of potential losses in one season, the following 
scenario was considered: 
 10,000 small-scale farmers, 






Table 10.5 used the information gathered from the household questionnaire to 
calculate how many small-scale farmers sold different proportions of paprika to the 
contractor. The recorded percentages of different proportions of paprika sold to 
Company D in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts were translated into numbers for 
the scenario with 10,000 small-scale farmers. Table 10.5 indicates that 67.1% of 
small-scale farmers sold between 70% to 100% of their paprika to Company D. 
Also, 25.4% of small-scale farmers sold only up to 50% of their paprika to Company 
D. 
Table 10.5 Proportion of small-scale farmers selling different volumes to the 
contractor 
Percentage sold to 
Company D, % 
Small-scale farmers selling 
indicated proportions,         
% from total N (428) 
Number of small-scale farmers                     
(scenario with 10,000 small-scale 
farmers) 
<10 4.9 490 
10-30 10.7 1,070 
31-50 9.8 980 
51-70 4 400 
71-100 67.1 6,710 
Unknown 3.5 350 
TOTAL 100 10,000 
 
Table 10.6 shows the calculation of minimum, average and maximum quantities sold 
for each range. The maximum quantity sold (100% value) is 35 kg of dried paprika 
and all other percentages were calculated in relation to this value.
117
 
                                                          
116
 The number of 10,000 small-scale farmers supplying paprika in one season is not modified and it 
was reported by Company D. Company D requested from the authors not to reveal the exact operative 
volumes in any written form. Thus, the researchers determined the average kg/small-scale farmer, but 
the decision was informed based on information received and shaped to provide as accurate an overall 
frame as possible.  
117
 Quantities sold are calculated as the number of small-scale farmers for each range x 
minimum/average/maximum quantity for that range. 
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Table 10.6 Scenario for potential losses occurring due to side-selling: Minimum, 
average and maximum quantities sold 
118 
118
Note: *For the category ‘Unknown’, average values (31-50%) were assigned to 
control for the final output and reduce over- or under-estimation of lost volumes. 
 
Table 10.7 shows that if small-scale farmers were selling minimum quantities, the 
potential loss of volumes for Company D was estimated at 44.6%, which is the 
greatest loss across all categories. If small-scale farmers sold average quantities, 
Company D might have lost up to 32.3% of expected volumes. If small-scale farmers 
sold maximum quantities from each range, Company D could lose 19.9% of 
volumes. Regarding profits, Table 10.7 indicates that Company D might be losing 
between US$ 5,228 and US$ 11,714 due to side-selling practices. 
                                                          
118
 There are in total 6 ranges considered: (1) <10%, (2) 10-30%, (3) 31-50%, (4) 51-70%, (5) 71-
100%, (6) Unknown. Each range has a minimum, average and maximum value. The minimum value 
represents the lower value of the range (e.g. minimum value for the range 31-50% is 31%). The 
maximum value represents the highest value of the range (e.g. maximum value for the range 31-50% 
is 50%). Finally, the average value represents the medium value of the range (e.g. average value for 
the range 31-50% is calculated as a mean of 31 and 50, i.e. 40.5%). Each of these percentages is then 
assigned to the value of 35 kg. Therefore, for the range 31-50%, the minimum value is 31% of 35 kg, 
which is ~11 kg. This procedure was followed throughout Table 10.6. 
Percentage sold to 







<10% 1 kg 2 kg 3.4 kg 
10-30% 3.5 kg 7 kg 10 kg 
31-50% 11 kg 14 kg 17.5 kg 
51-70% 18 kg 21 kg 24.5 kg 
71-100% 25 kg 30 kg 35 kg 
Unknown* 11 kg 14 kg 17.5 kg 
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Table 10.7 Estimation of potentially lost volumes, revenue and profit in one season 
by Company D due to side-selling 











<10 490 980 1,666 
10-30 3,745 7,490 10,700 
31-50 10,780 13,720 17,150 
51-70 7,200 8,400 9,800 
71-100 167,750 201,300 234,850 
Unknown 3,850 4,900 6,125 
Reported volumes, kg 193,815 236,790 280,291 
Expected volumes, kg 350,000 350,000 350,000 
Potential losses, kg 156,185 113,210 69,709 
Potential losses 44.6% 32.3% 19.9% 
Missing revenue  
(average 0.30$ per kg) 
US$ 46,855 US$ 33,963 US$ 20,913 
Missing profit  
(average 0.075$ per kg) 
US$ 11,714 US$ 8,491 US$ 5,228 
 
The contracted small-scale farmers argued that Company D had cheated them 
because prices offered were lower compared to the price on the informal market. The 
implication is that Company D incurred quantifiable losses. Estimated losses of 
volumes ranging from 19.9% to 44.6% could cause substantial negative 
consequences for Company D due to shortages in delivered quantities and increased 
transaction costs.  
 
10.4.2 Reasons for Side-selling 
The most prevailing reason for side-selling among small-scale farmers who sold 
their paprika outside the contract was the belief that other buyers offered higher 
prices (87.3%) (Table 10.8). This reason was stated by the high-income households 
(91.4%) and households with large CF land (92.6%) to the greatest extent.   
 
Although the differences were small within groups, the medium-income households 
(85.3%) and households with small CF land (84.3%) quoted the higher price as the 
reason for side-selling to the least extent. This was contrary to the study’s initial 
assumption that households with lower income and smaller CF land would have a 
higher incidence of side-selling because of a perceived higher price and scarce 
income sources. The surveyed households were engaging in side-selling because 
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they needed money quickly (36%) and/or they were not satisfied with the treatment 
under CF (12.6%). Households with small land allocated stated they needed money 
quickly to the greatest extent (41.4%) across all household types. In contrast, the 
households with large land allocated identified dissatisfaction with their treatment 
under the contract to the highest proportion (37%) as one of the key reasons for side-
selling. 
 
Table 10.8 Results from the household questionnaire: Reasons for side-selling in 
both districts (side-sellers only) 
Variable Total N Income levels                                               
(% within the type) 
CF land allocated                                             
(% within the type) 
  
% 














       
Lack of trust 
towards the 
contractor 
3.2 0 1.5  11.4  4.3 1.6 3.7 
Money needed 
quickly 
36 38.2  39.7 25.7  41.4 36.1 22.2 
Offered higher 
price 
87.3 87.2 85.3 91.4 84.3 88.5 92.6 
Household does 
not care to whom 
it sells 
8.9 1.81 19.1 0 11.4 8.2 3.7 
Not satisfied with 
the treatment 
12.6 10.9  14.7 11.4 12.9 1.6 37 
Household has 
the right to 
decide to whom 
to sell 
12 3.6 20.6  8.6 12.9 13.1 7.4 
 
The argument about higher price offered by other buyers was further explored within 
the paprika supply chain through interviews and observations during the Company 
D’s marketing days. First, Company D representatives were confronted with the 
argument. Second, vendors were interviewed to capture the difference in offered 
price. 
 
Company D justified its pricing mechanism by stating that the costs of providing 
seeds and extension services are included in the final price. The main counter-
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argument provided by Company D was that, due to costs of investments, Company 
D was not able to compete with vendors’ prices:  
 
‘[…] if [Company D] said we are not [...] selling seed - there'll be no seed this year, 
 who would then give the seed? There would be no paprika in Malawi! Actually, for 
 your information, there's nobody else who sells paprika seed in Malawi, apart from 
 [Company D]. It's a cost! It's a big cost! Big, big cost.’ 
Semi-structured interview with two extension field officers from Company D, 
Malawi, Lilongwe, 2015 
 
Based on the interview data, Company D stated that the final price for 1 kg of dried 
paprika pods was influenced by the international price, exchange rate, overhead costs 
and outcomes of negotiation. The pricing formula showing Company D’s 
mechanism to determine the price is expressed as: 
                                                                        (4) 
                                                                                                     (5) 
                                                                                                         (6) 
                                                                                            (7) 
where IPMKW1/kg denotes the initial contract price set by Company D for 1 kg of dried 
paprika pods expressed in local currency (Malawian Kwacha) before negotiation, 
IMP$/1kg is international market price for 1 kg of dried paprika pods expressed in 
United States (US) dollars (varies throughout the season), ERMKW is the exchange 
rate (varies on a daily base), OCMKW/1kg are Company D’s overhead costs per season 
per 1 kg of the unit expressed in Malawian Kwacha (might vary from one season to 
another), c is the price correction (if needed) after the negotiation between Company 
D and the processor, FPMKW/1kg is the final contract price for 1 kg of paprika 
expressed in Malawian Kwacha and offered to small-scale farmers, SFPMKW/1kg is 
small-scale farmers’ price expressed in Malawian Kwacha (the amount that small-
scale farmers try to negotiate with Company D; SFPMKW/1kg is usually based on the 
information on price that small-scale farmers receive from vendors or other sources 
(e.g. farmers’ organisation, radio/television programmes, local markets, input dealers 
or neighbours), and NVMKW is the negotiation value if the price is negotiated with 
IPMKW /1kg = (IMP$/1kg x ERMKW ) -OCMKW /1kg+c
FPMKW1/kg = IPMKW /1kg +NVMKW
NV = IPMKW /1kg- SFPMKW /1kg
FPMKW /1kg =
IPMKW /1kg, if NV = 0
> IPMKW /1kg, if NV > 0








small-scale farmers (it represents the positive or negative difference between 
Company D’s and small-scale farmers’ prices). 
 
Table 10.9 compares the price offered by Company D and three vendors during the 
2014/2015 season. Two vendors were able to offer a considerably higher price 
compared to Company D, while one of the vendors used Company D's price as a 
benchmark to formulate the price.  
 



























600-1,500      
(US$ 1.28-
3.12) 
Grade B 450 (US$ 0.96) 900-1,000  600-1,500 
 
10.4.3 Estimating Determinants of Side-selling 
The binary logit regression model was used to estimate determinants of engaging in 
side-selling practices. The information on which variables are more likely to increase 
the likelihood of engagement in side-selling has implications for both Company D 
and the enabling environment (namely the Government, NGOs and farmers’ 
representatives). By understanding the potential triggers for side-selling, 
stakeholders have the opportunity to address existing gaps and act to reduce side-
selling. The Chi-Square test and test for multicollinearity preceded the regression to 
explore if predictor variables are correlated to each other.  
 
The Chi-Square test was used between the engagement in side-selling and following 
categorical variables: district, education, monthly income, food expenses/month, 
distance to the collection point, CF influence on the livelihood, membership in FUM, 
and NGO and Government assistance received (Table 10.10). All expected 
frequencies were greater than five. The Chi-Square test showed there was a 
statistically significant association between the engagement in side-selling and the 
stated variables. The association was weak in all cases. 
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Table 10.10 Chi-Square test for association between engagement in side-selling and 
set of categorical variables 
Variable Chi-Square (
2
) df p-value Cramer’s V 
District 20.281** 1 0.000 0.219 
Education 6.134* 2 0.047 0.121 
Monthly income 16.777** 2 0.000 0.200 
Food expenses/month 14.873** 2 0.001 0.188 
Distance from the household to the 
collection point 
23.678** 2 0.000 0.237 
CF influence on the livelihood 7.784* 3 0.051 0.135 
Membership in FUM 15.221** 1 0.000 0.190 
NGO assistance received
∆ 
19.048** 1 0.000 0.211 
Government assistance received 15.890** 1 0.000 0.195 
Note: 
∆
NGO assistance received showed to be significant in the Chi-Square test but 
later in the modelling process was excluded as it was decreasing the strength of the 
model. Satisfaction with the relationship with the contractor did not show to be 
significant (see chapter 9, section 9.2.4). * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 10.11 shows the results from the multicollinearity test. There was no strong 
multicollinearity among variables as the mean VIF was 1.78, all VIF values were 
below 10, and all tolerance values (1/VIF) were greater than 0.1. 
 
Table 10.11 Test for multicollinearity for variables used in binary logistic regression 
model (STATA output) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
District 1.30 0.7707 
Primary education 2.90 0.3451 
Secondary education 3.03 0.3304 
Low monthly income 1.49 0.6727 
High monthly income 1.35 0.7383 
Low expenses for food/month 1.29 0.7738 
High expenses for food/month 1.40 0.7127 
Close to the collection point 1.88 0.5323 
Large distance to the collection point 1.98 0.5047 
Positive CF influence on the livelihood 1.91 0.5238 
Negative CF influence on the 
livelihood 
1.91 0.5230 
Membership in FUM 1.11 0.9015 
Government assistance received 1.09 0.9167 




Table 10.12 presents the descriptive statistics for predictor variables used in the 
binary logit regression model. The choice of the set of variables was based on the 
objective to determine the engagement in side-selling. Although the price is 
considered as a highly important factor in determining side-selling, it was excluded 
from the model since all small-scale farmers received the same price under Company 
D’s contract and no variations were recorded.  
 
Table 10.12 Descriptive statistics for variables used in binary logistic regression 
model 
Variable Side-selling, %  Mean SD 
Yes No   
Side-selling 36.9 63.1 0.369 0.483 
Socio-economic variables     
District 52 48 0.292 0.455 
Primary education 35.4 64.6 0.743 0.437 
Secondary education 35 65 0.181 0.385 
No education 56.3 43.7 0.075 0.264 
Low income**  26.4 73.6 0.486 0.500 
Medium income 47.6 52.4 0.334 0.472 
High income 45.5 54.5 0.179 0.384 
Low food expenses  29 71 0.356 0.479 
Medium food expenses 35 65 0.415 0.493 
High food expenses  51.5 48.5 0.227 0.419 
Farm characteristics variables     
Close to the collection point 31.9 68.1 0.439 0.496 
Medium distance to the collection 
point 
25.5 74.5 0.213 0.407 
Large distance to the collection point 50 50 0.350 0.477 
Contract influence variables     
Positive CF influence  35.6 64.4 0.963 0.186 
No CF influence 37.5 62.5 0.019 0.137 
Negative CF influence 85.7 14.3 0.016 0.128 
     
Institutional support variables     
Membership in FUM 47 53 0.401 0.490 
Government assistance 63.4 36.6 0.096 0.294 
     
Note: * In Lilongwe district, 30.7% of small-scale farmers were engaged in side-
selling. ** Income variable included both farm and off-farm sources. 
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Table 10.12 shows that 52% of small-scale farmers in the Nkhotakota district 
engaged in side-selling, compared to 30.7% of the respondents in the Lilongwe 
district. About 35% of household heads with primary or secondary education were 
engaged in side-selling, while 56.3% of small-scale farmers with no education 
practised side-selling. Households with high food expenses per month (51.5%) were 
engaged in side-selling more than households with medium (35%) and low food 
expenses (29%).  
 
Households located at a large distance to the collection point (50%) were side-selling 
in greater proportions compared to households located at a medium distance (25.5%) 
and close to the collection point (31.9%). Not surprisingly, a substantial number of 
households that experienced negative CF influence on their livelihoods were 
involved in side-selling (85.7%). Finally, 47% of households that were FUM 
members and 63.4% of households receiving Government assistance practised side-
selling in the studied sample. 
 
Table 10.13 shows results of the binary logistic regression on the determinants of 
side-selling. The Chi-Square value of the model χ
2
(13, N=403) =94.16 was 
statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that the predictor variables included in the 
model jointly affect side-selling. The model explained 28.6% (Nagelkerke R
2
) and 
20.8% (Cox and Snell R
2
) of the variance in engagement in side-selling, and it 
correctly classified 73% of cases.  
 
Table 10.13 indicates that out of 13 predictor variables, the coefficients of eight 
variables were statistically significant. The district, secondary education, large 
distance to the collection point, membership in FUM and Government assistance 
received were statistically significant at 1%. The primary education, low monthly 
income and negative CF influence on the livelihood were statistically significant at 
5%. 
 
The strongest positive and significant predictor variable of engagement in side-
selling was the negative CF influence on household livelihood with the odds ratio of 
20.77, implying that households who reported negative CF influence on their 
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livelihood were over 20 times more likely to engage in side-selling compared to 
households reporting that CF had no influence on their livelihood.  
 
Table 10.13 Results from binary logistic regression estimating determinants of side-
selling 
Variables Coefficient S.E. Wald p-value 
Odds 
Ratio 
District 0.838** 0.280 8.957 0.003 2.311 
Socio-economic variables      
Primary education -0.924* 0.419 4.871 0.027 0.397 
Secondary education -1.322** 0.496 7.117 0.008 0.267 
Low monthly income -0.609* 0.276 4.850 0.028 0.544 
High monthly income -0.156 0.344 0.205 0.650 0.856 
Food security variables      
Low expenses for food/month -0.383 0.279 1.892 0.169 0.682 
High expenses for food/month 0.145 0.319 0.206 0.650 1.156 
Household farm characteristics 
variables 
     
Close to the collection point 0.331 0.335 0.975 0.323 1.392 
Large distance to the collection point 0.954** 0.354 7.259 0.007 2.596 
Contract influence variables      
Positive CF influence on the 
livelihood 
0.104 0.808 0.017 0.897 1.110 
Negative CF influence on the 
livelihood 
3.034* 1.391 4.757 0.029 20.77
6 
Institutional support variables      
Membership in FUM 0.707** 0.248 8.113 0.004 2.027 
Government assistance received 1.660** 0.413 16.171 0.000 5.261 
Constant -0.627 0.978 0.412 0.521 0.534 
Diagnostic statistics      
                χ(13)
 2 
(df) 94.16**     
              Nagelkerke R
2
 0.286     
              Cox and Snell R
2
 0.208     
              Sig. 0.001     
              % of cases predicted   
              correctly 
73%     
              Observation (N) 403     
Note: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
 
Concerning the socio-economic variables, both primary and secondary education and 
low monthly income showed significant negative effects on engagement in side-
selling. Households with an educated household head were less likely to practice 
side-selling compared to households led by an uneducated head.  
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It was expected that low-income households would have higher probability to 
engage in side-selling. However, households with low monthly income were less 
likely to side-sell compared to households with medium monthly income. Food 
security variables showed to be non-significant in determining farmers’ engagement 
in side-selling. This result implies that food expenses did not influence farmers’ 
decision to side-sell paprika. Households located at larger distance from the 
collection point were more likely to side-sell compared to households at the medium 
distance. Households in the Nkhotakota district were two times more likely to 
engage in side-selling than households in the Lilongwe district (odds ratio of 2.31). 
The Lilongwe district is considerably closer to Company D’s headquarters. 
  
Both institutional support variables (membership in FUM and Government 
assistance) displayed a significant and positive effect on side-selling. Members of 
FUM were two times more likely to engage in side-selling than non-members (odds 
ratio of 2.02). Households who received Government assistance were over five times 
more likely to side-sell paprika compared to households that did not receive 
Government assistance (odds ratio of 5.26). The results indicated that the following 
variables had expected sign (see chapter 7, section 7.6.3.2 on estimating 
determinants of side-selling): district, primary and secondary education, low income, 
food expenses/month, large distance, negative CF influence and Government 
assistance received.  
 
10.5 Discussion 
The key challenges in Malawi’s paprika supply chain identified in this study were 
the result of three meta-challenges including poor input provision due to low trust, 
lack of participation in contract design and perceived low contract price. The results 
suggested that all stakeholders had their share in ‘creating and maintaining’ stated 
challenges. Company D experienced the problem of side-selling, which was related 
to poor contract design. The contract offered to small-scale farmers did not clearly 
define all the necessary clauses and Company D withheld the right to decide on the 
price without first negotiating with contracted farmers. The poor design was allowed 
since the country and its institutional elements were missing a guiding policy that 
would organise relations between the parties. Finally, small-scale farmers were not 
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satisfied with some terms in the contract, and because they could not influence any 
changes, they turned to alternative outlets.  
 
10.5.1 Provisions and Power Balance in Contracting 
Contract farming in the paprika supply chain in Malawi was challenging for both 
Company D and small-scale farmers. Each party adopted strategies to overcome 
shortcomings of the contractual arrangement. Different strategies had diverse results 
on the overall efficiency and sustainability of the contract farming relationship.  
 
According to the literature, one of the main functions of the contract is to mitigate 
imperfections on the input and output markets, and to secure a regular supply of the 
produce (da Silva, 2005). In this study, the input provision was not sufficient for 
small-scale farmers' needs. It is likely that since the contract did not provide inputs 
other than seeds, small-scale farmers were not able to obtain required inputs 
elsewhere for their production. The contract offered output market; however, small-
scale farmers produced low volumes of paprika. For a contract arrangement, it is 
important to provide the opportunity for growth, especially related to yields. If small-
scale farmers did not receive incentives to increase the yields and generate higher 
incomes based on more volumes produced, it is possible that the contract farming 
arrangements will remain only the short-term solution for the majority of small-scale 
farmers. 
 
On the other hand, Company D was not able to purchase planned volumes of the 
crop from small-scale farmers. In this situation, Company D might consider 
terminating the contracting relationship with small-scale farmers, and turn to 
supplying the crop from a few medium-sized farmers. Although contract farming is 
not limited to small-scale farmers, the literature shows that small-scale farmers have 
particular advantages when it comes to contracting, such as the access to abundant 
family labour, lower supervision costs, and intensive use of land (Hazell et al., 2007; 
Key and Runsten, 1999; Singh, 2011; Wiggins et al., 2010). Nonetheless, since 
Company D failed to obtain planned quantities, the contracted crop might be 
supplemented by additional sources, which would increase Company D’s overall 
costs and decrease the efficiency of the contracting agreement. As both small-scale 
farmers and Company D encountered difficulties in benefiting from the contractual 
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arrangement, and had to search for additional provisions outside of the contract, the 
future of the contract relationship in the studied case may be considered as 
precarious rather than sustainable. This forecast is based on the assumption that both 
parties will engage in contracting if the expected advantages and gains exceed those 
of an alternative (Barrett et al., 2012; Birthal, 2008; da Silva, 2005; Minot, 2011). 
 
Another important point of the contractual relationship is the power balance. In this 
study, small-scale farmers had limited bargaining opportunities and did not 
participate in contract design. In contrast, Company D determined both the price and 
grading system concerning the contracted crop. Despite the unequal power 
distribution, results suggested that small-scale farmers shifted part of the power on 
their side by retaining the right to sell the crop to the most preferred party. Even 
though the signing of the contract in the majority of cases involves contractors’ 
exclusive right to be the first buyer of the produce, small-scale farmers may ignore 
this principle due to alternative channels offered, and as a response to limitations 
inside the contract relationship. The enforcement of the contracts in developing 
countries is slow (Narayanan, 2012), which is likely to encourage small-scale 
farmers in their side-selling practices. 
 
Considering that Company D was drafting the contract in the study, the possibility to 
manipulate the price and grade levels to maximise Company D's profits was high. 
Nevertheless, in contract farming arrangements, the contractor represents the 
extended link to the market and adjusts the contract to correspond to external 
conditions, taking into account internal circumstances. Due to information provided 
by the informal markets, small-scale farmers are often aware of the market price and 
grading system. Company D's opportunity to manipulate and achieve excessive 
profits is mainly limited. This finding is confirmed in the study by Agar and Chiligo 
(2008) who found that farmers in Malawi believed that companies were paying low 
prices and exploited farmers’ weaker position. The evidence showed that companies 
did not pay a substantially lower price compared to other buyers, although 
companies incurred significant costs while providing inputs and extension services 




Vavra (2009) and Poulton et al. (2010) argued that farmers’ bargaining power is 
weakened if companies act as a monopsonistic player and unequal market power 
could push farmers to accept unfavourable terms in the contract. This study shows 
that other factors have to be considered when discussing the power balance in 
contract farming, for example, the existence of informal channels. One such informal 
channel is discussed below.  
 
10.5.2 The Role of Vendors in Contractual Relationship 
In the study, the vendors represented an alternative sale channel to small-scale 
farmers. Vendors were able to fill particular gaps in the relationship between 
Company D and small-scale farmers, namely the lack of trust and bargaining power, 
the nontransparent grading system, and the low price. It is likely that stated trust 
between vendors and small-scale farmers existed only as a response to low trust 
levels in the initial relationship between Company D and small-scale farmers, and 
due to perceived higher prices offered by vendors. Since vendors attracted small-
scale farmers exclusively with premium prices, it is possible that in the case when 
Company D exited the market and withdrew the seed supply, vendors would incur 
additional costs for providing inputs to small-scale farmers. In this situation, vendors 
would not have Company D's prices as the benchmark anymore, and it is less likely 
that vendors would be able to secure a price above the market level for small-scale 
farmers. The trust between vendors and small-scale farmers might perish. 
 
Additionally, small-scale farmers and vendors negotiated on the price. Here, vendors 
gained an advantage over Company D, as vendors did not depend on international 
prices and buyers’ requirements but rather on transport and packaging costs mainly. 
It was possible for vendors to engage in price negotiation with small-scale farmers. 
Nevertheless, just by offering a higher price than Company D, it is likely that 
vendors did not experience many counter offers from small-scale farmers. 
 
Regarding the grading system, vendors used fewer grades than Company D, which 
small-scale farmers perceived as more fair practice. The grading process relates 
primarily to the final product; hence grading is dependent on the further market. It is 
possible that vendors used less strict characteristics of their further market to present 
the grading system as more compelling to small-scale farmers. If, for example, 
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vendors sell the crop further to processors within the country, it is less likely that the 
grading criteria will require more than two basic grades. By focusing on the local 
market, vendors were able to offer simpler and more transparent grading system, 
compared to Company D that exported the crop and had to comply with international 
grading rules. 
 
The vendor’s role in the contractual relationship has not yet been thoroughly 
discussed in the existing literature, although some studies mentioned side-selling 
practices in contract farming schemes (for example, Bingen et al., 2003; Minten et 
al., 2009; Gallacher, 2013; Goel, 2013; Mujawamariya et al., 2013). The overall idea 
about vendors in this study was that of a parallel informal sector, which used the 
existence of formal market channels - Company D. The vendors relied on Company 
D regarding inputs and training provided to small-scale farmers, as vendors 
themselves did not secure such services. Since vendors did not participate in cost 
sharing, they were able to offer a premium price to small-scale farmers.  
 
Company D lost considerable quantities of the crop due to vendors' operations. 
Company D was left with an option to terminate contracts with small-scale farmers 
without being compensated for the damage as contracts in Malawi were challenging 
to enforce. The presence of vendors created unofficial competition between 
Company D and vendors' prices. It is likely that vendors competed among 
themselves regarding prices, too. Small-scale farmers obtained short-term gain from 
higher prices offered by vendors, at the risk of losing trust and longer-term benefits 
from the contract. Nevertheless, vendors represented a relatively secure outlet for the 
small-scale farmers' crop with higher prices offered, and removed Company D's 
monopsonistic power over the paprika market. Without vendors, and when Company 
D is the major buyer of paprika in the area, it is likely that small-scale farmers would 
comply more with contract terms and sell most of the produced crop to Company D.  
 
10.5.3 Efficiency and Sustainability of Contract Farming  
The vendors may have a role in contract farming, not as a party or associate to the 
contract, but acting as one of the criteria to determine the efficiency of contracting. 
The higher the overall efficiency of a particular contract arrangement, the lower 
should be the amount of side-selling. Nonetheless, vendors' presence in the supply 
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chains is significant in the bigger picture, especially if Company D's backwards 
integration strategy shows to be cost-ineffective and lacking reliable supply. In this 
situation, Company D is likely to rely on an additional supply of the produce coming 
from the vendors. 
 
The studied contract farming arrangement suggested that strategies, which parties 
adopted to protect themselves from the contract’s shortcomings, potentially 
undermined the contract’s efficiency and sustainability. On Company D’s side, 
strategies included reluctance to allow better input provision and negotiation of 
contract features, including the price. On the small-scale farmers’ side, side-selling 
was the response to the lack of participation in the contract and the way to secure 
higher incomes. The findings raised the question whether the contract met its 
purpose as an institutional arrangement to enable efficient input provision and 
product supply. The low level of trust recorded between Company D and small-scale 
farmers was found to represent a considerable obstacle in building the sustainable 
relationship through the contract.  
 
The main findings from this part of the study correspond to the findings of several 
similar studies. For example, Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) and Singh (2002) 
examined the new role of contract farming in the globalised agricultural markets. 
Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) argued that one of the major challenges of modern 
contract farming involves establishing the institutional arrangements, which will 
enable small-scale farmers to benefit from the globalised markets. This study 
expands on the stated point by suggesting increasing the trust and understanding 
between the parties, and consequently involving negotiation practice to ensure an 
equal benefits distribution in the relationship. Singh (2002) found that in Indian 
Punjab, the local firm was able to connect with the producers more efficiently due to 
the local language and identity, compared to the multinational companies. The local 
firm was operating on a smaller scale and was only able to provide the higher prices, 
excluding other services (Singh, 2002). This is similar to the role of the local 
vendors described in this study. 
 
Additionally, Will (2013) highlighted the importance of traditional channels that 
exist beside the official contractual relationship and stated that the success of such 
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channels is a result of home-grown networking, and traditional ways of 
communicating and coordinating operations. This confirms the study’s finding on 
the relatively close relationship between the vendors and small-scale farmers. 
Although Will (2013) suggested that the way the traditional channels are functioning 
could serve as the example for designing contract farming schemes, this study 
argued that the vendors operate in a way that undermines Company D’s efforts and 
disturbs the relations in the supply chain. Nonetheless, Company D might adopt a 
more traditional way of doing business to increase trust and understanding among 
small-scale farmers. 
 
The recent study from Fréguin-Gresh et al. (2012) in South Africa discussed whether 
contract farming ensures opportunities for small-scale farmers. The authors argued 
that contracts did not reduce poverty and did not represent an institutional tool for 
improving livelihoods of the rural people; thus, contracting should not be considered 
as a panacea for small-scale farmers (Fréguin-Gresh et al., 2012). Notwithstanding 
that contracting cannot resolve all the market imperfections, poverty, and exclusion 
problems at once for all small-scale farmers, this study suggested improvement of 
contract farming by redefining the understanding of what the contracts represent and 
might provide for the parties involved. The study proposed that the contract may be 
seen as a growing legal relationship between Company D and small-scale farmers. 
Also, the contract should be structured to adjust to the increasing needs of the agri-
food sector, and an aim to reach and respect a transparent and fair consensus on 
production and marketing procedures involved.  
 
The growing legal relationships imply that contracts should be perceived as legally 
binding but open to amendments and improvements coming from both sides. The 
capacity to adjust to the increasing needs of the agri-food sector extends to the latter 
and emphasises the critical role of contracts in responding to food demand by using 
efficient supply chain management. Having the aim to reach and respect a 
transparent and fair consensus on production and marketing procedures involved 
places contract farming forward in promoting the sustainable inclusion of small-scale 
farmers into markets. A fresh view on contract farming is challenging to achieve due 
to both previous experiences and considerable heterogeneity of existing contracting 
arrangements. Yet, the importance of thoroughly revisited and re-established 
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contracting principles in food supply chains in developing countries cannot be 
overemphasised, as the Legal Guide (2015) suggested. 
 
10.5.4 Contractual Completeness 
The Malawian contract included in total eleven defined clauses and one partially 
defined clause. Defined clauses described contract background, production and 
delivery characteristics, money transfer, and undesired acts. The price clause was 
partially defined. The contract did not include clauses concerning marketing process 
(grades), legal aspects (applicable law and dispute settlement), exit options, and 
unpredictable events. Since a certain degree of incompleteness is inevitable in almost 
all the contracts (Vavra, 2009), the Malawian example was no exception. 
Nevertheless, omitting some clauses in the contract is justified when excluded 
clauses do not introduce additional risks or inequalities for parties involved.   
 
Defining the price of paprika in the studied contract involved some challenges. As an 
export commodity, paprika depends on international prices and currency 
fluctuations. The comparison of two contracts from Malawi showed that the current 
contract dismissed precise price definition, a practice observed in the past contract. 
In legal terms, apart from identifying parties and objectives of the agreement, the 
general contract law does not impose any requirements regarding contract form 
(Legal Guide, 2015). One may infer that contracts do not necessarily need to include 
the price clause. Still, in the Malawian contract, Company D retained the right to 
decide solely on the price considering market conditions. By doing so, Company D 
may have reduced its marketing risk and increased small-scale farmers’ vulnerability 
to fluctuations on the international market. Relating the issue back to the quantities 
expected from small-scale farmers, the Malawian contract required the entire crop to 
be sold to Company D at market price corrected for currency fluctuations. The 
contract provided a secure outlet for small-scale farmers’ produce but did not offer a 
stable or premium price. The contract did not involve the possibility to bargain over 
the price. According to the existing price clause, small-scale farmers signing the 
Malawian contract accepted the risk that volatile international prices often shape the 
final price paid by Company D. 
 
From clauses that this study characterised as missing in the Malawian contract, it can 
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be argued that omitting grades affected the contract fairness to the least extent. 
International traders in the paprika sector tend to follow existing guidelines 
describing grade levels and grades for paprika do not change as often as the price. 
For example, instructions for determining grades from the American Spice Trade 
Association (ASTA) are widely accepted international guidelines for export spices. 
The guidelines specify industry standards for spice quality and are mainly known for 
ASTA colour values (ASTA, 2016). Defining grade levels based on visual 
assessment may involve a degree of subjectivity, which is further related to the 
perishable nature of agricultural produce. Even though the contractor is usually 
familiar with ASTA specifications, small-scale farmers may lack access to essential 
information concerning grade levels. In this regard, the Malawian contract included 
training on grading for small-scale farmers and reduced the information asymmetry 
between the parties. Nevertheless, the mentioned subjectivity in the grading process 
left grounds for potential manipulation on both sides. 
 
The Malawian contract did not define applicable law governing the contract. It is 
unclear which jurisdiction applied when interpreting and enforcing the contract. The 
contract did not describe procedures for dispute settlement, so it was not possible to 
determine parties’ rights and responsibilities if disagreements arose. Considering the 
financial and information capacities of the two parties, Company D is likely to have 
the advantage in directing dispute settlements by influencing either arbitration or 
mediation. Due to the costs involved in pressing charges against Company D, small-
scale farmers may be reluctant to pursue legal claims. Since the contract remained 
silent on applicable law and disputes clauses, the more powerful party gained the 
opportunity to determine the rules ad hoc.  
 
A clause on termination was not included in the Malawian contract. The Malawian 
contract described acts that classify as a breach, without implying immediate 
termination as a consequence of the breach. On the other hand, the Malawian 
contract did not specify conditions for terminating the agreement by either party's 
free will. Therefore, if any party intended to exit the contract in an amicable way, the 





Since the contract omitted the termination clause, it remained each party's 
interpretation whether the contract locked-in the parties or gave the right to exit the 
contract arbitrarily. A similar case applied to force majeure events. The contract did 
not foresee natural disasters, which can result in delays in the delivery, reduced 
quality or complete destruction of the crop. It was unclear how the costs of suffered 
damage would be distributed between the parties. The Malawian contract introduced 
the risk of raising disputes if natural disasters occur since each party might try to 
claim indemnity rights. Possible disputes could not be easily settled due to the lack 
of dispute settlement and applicable law clauses in the Malawian contract.  
 
There are certain difficulties in formulating the relationship between two 
independent parties engaged in agricultural production and marketing. While the 
current contract for paprika in Malawi was found complete for the majority of 
included clauses, the specific clauses that were not part of the contract considerably 
influenced parties' risk and power balance. The inequality between the parties was 
introduced by omitting a dispute settlement clause. The market risk was increased 
for small-scale farmers, as the price clause was partially defined. The contract was 
vague in particular aspects due to its silence on applicable law, termination, and 
force majeure clauses; hence, the less informed party was exposed to risks of 
arbitrary law interpretation and manipulation. The contract was written in English, 
and although the official language in Malawi is English, the majority of the 
Malawian small-scale farmers speak the national language Chichewa. The clauses of 
the contracts are especially sensitive to the word order. Any differences in two 
languages might cause misunderstanding and add to the vagueness. 
 
The study's findings correspond to conclusions from two recent studies. Prowse 
(2012) argued that companies often fail to incorporate even basic information in the 
contract, leaving farmers without an accurate idea of what they signed. The author 
pointed out that farmers are rarely aware of the fact that, by signing the contract, 
they might be giving their rights over the crop to the company (Prowse, 2012). 
Pultrone (2012) analysed elements of typical agricultural contracts and concluded 
that complete contracts might contribute to the correct execution of parties' 
obligations and avert misunderstandings. In particular, the presence of price, quantity 
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and quality, force majeure, termination and dispute settlement clauses adds to a 
contract's clarity and certainty (Pultrone, 2012). 
 
10.5.5 Side-selling in the Paprika Supply Chain 
Since the main reason for side-selling on the farmers' part was the argument that 
other buyers offered a higher price, there are two points to reflect on. First, 
contracted small-scale farmers mostly had low incomes, meaning they were at times 
struggling to secure decent livelihoods for their households. Gaining a higher price 
for the same volume might seem as economically justified and even necessary due to 
limited opportunities available for income generation. This is in accordance with 
Mujawamariya et al. (2013) and especially Goel (2013) who described the case of 
PepsiCo in India where contracted farmers, supported by government regulations, 
were offered to choose whether they wanted to sell their rice to the contractor or to 
Company D offering a higher price. 
  
Second, vendors offered a higher price to small-scale farmers since vendors did not 
share production and marketing costs with farmers. Company D established the price 
in the contract mostly without previous consultation with small-scale farmers. 
Company D did not take into consideration farmers' production costs, which 
aggravated the pricing issue. Minten et al. (2009) argued that, in cases where 
Company D sets the price above the local market price, the occurrence of side-
selling is likely to reduce, which supports the argument that the main reason for side-
selling is the price offered. In the Malawian contract, the price was partially 
determined on the international market and Company D had limited influence 
because the crop was intended for the export market. Due to the absence of an 
official local market for dried paprika, Company D was the first one to announce the 
price and then encountered the competition from the vendors. One of the ways to 
avoid side-selling in the described situation is to negotiate the price with small-scale 
farmers.  
 
Still, there is no guarantee that the negotiated price would reduce side-selling as 
vendors pointed out that they will always add to the price that Company D offers. 
This finding challenges the argument from Boulay (2013, p. 212) who suggested that 
the competition between buyers ‘is probably important in enhancing the fairness of 
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CF schemes because the increasing rivalry for raw materials among buyers has 
been an incentive for companies to enhance their efforts to promote and improve 
their services to contract [...] growers’. In the Malawian example, the competition 
between Company D and vendors had quite a different outcome: Company D 
reduced the input provision to the minimum (the contract provided only the seed for 
immediate cash) to protect its investments and reduce the losses in the case of side-
selling. 
 
This study found that Company D might have lost up to 44.6% of its planned paprika 
supply. Bingen et al. (2003), in a similar study, concluded that, in the case of side-
selling, contracting companies face a double problem: poor loan repayment and the 
inability to meet market targets. Lost profits for Company D might not appear high, 
but that amount could have been used, for instance, for investing into better 
extension services by hiring additional staff, renting another vehicle or appointing an 
expert to provide training on legal aspects of CF for small-scale farmers. This 
example is used to illustrate that side-selling weakens not only Company D but 
limits its services to small-scale farmers; thus, in the end, side-selling poses a threat 
to small-scale farmers. 
 
Households reporting that CF had a negative influence on their livelihood were more 
likely to side-sell compared to households that experienced no influence of CF on 
the livelihood. There are not many solutions for this issue except to either terminate 
contracts with unsatisfied farmers or improve  communication to better understand 
why contracting did not result in a positive outcome for small-scale farmers. 
 
The study showed that education had a negative significant impact on engagement in 
side-selling. It is suggested that educated household heads can better understand 
contract terms and conditions as well as the legal consequences of the contract 
breach and that education will lessen the possibility of side-selling. This result 
corroborates with the studies from Gallacher (2013), Mwambi et al. (2016) and 





Furthermore, low-income households were less likely to practice side-selling in 
comparison to medium-income households. The explanation is that low-income 
households were less prone to risk their relationship with the contractor as the 
contract is one of their scarce regular sources of income. A similar observation was 
made by Wainaina et al. (2012) indicating that the rise in farm income increased the 
likelihood of farmers' participation in CF. Since one of the main motives to join CF 
is income, the study’s findings suggest that a farmer's initial pursuit of stable income 
sources might evolve over time into a strategy for higher income generation, and this 
is where the vendors play a role. Indeed, Table 10.3 showed that medium- and high-
income households were side-selling their paprika to a greater extent than low-
income households. 
 
The results from the binary regression suggest that  distance has a positive effect on 
side-selling, so more remote households are more likely to side-sell their crop since 
they might incur higher transaction costs of delivering paprika to the assigned 
collection point (e.g. increased costs for hiring  transport and fuel). These findings 
are consistent with previous studies (Miyata et al., 2009; Wainaina et al., 2012) 
showing ithat distance had a negative impact on farmers' participation in CF. 
 
Small-scale farmers who were members of FUM and received assistance from the 
Government were more likely to side-sell than non-members and those who did not 
receive assistance. This finding is in contrast with the assumption that the 
participation in farmers' organisation will decrease members' opportunism, as 
proposed by Swinnen et al. (2007). Bellemare (2012) and Kariuki and Loy (2016) 
found that membership in a cooperative had a positive impact on participation in CF. 
However, Mujawamariya et al. (2013) warned that vendors are often able to offer 
better payment conditions than farmers’ organisations, which attracts farmers. An 
explanation of the positive effect of FUM on side-selling might be in the potential to 
obtain needed inputs at a reduced price through FUM. Cheaper inputs may result in 
more crop produced and more income gained by selling larger quantities of paprika 
to vendors. In addition, while Government support might positively impact farmers’ 
participation in CF, as found by Guo (2005), the study findings indicate that  
Government assistance (in production practices) did not consequently increase 
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small-scale farmers' awareness of importance to find and retain a secure market 
outlet by, for instance, complying with the contract. 
 
10.6 Summary 
This chapter identified the key challenges in the paprika supply chain. In the first 
sub-section, the study found that the key challenges involved poor input provision 
due to low trust, lack of farmers’ participation in the contract design and the price 
was perceived as low compared to what other sources offered. The second sub-
section concluded that Company D has to make improvements in the design as the 
current contract was missing the following clauses: delivery conditions, grades, 
termination, disputes, force majeure and applicable law. The price clause was only 
partially defined. The third section focused on the issue of side-selling and suggested 
that Company D might be losing between 19.9% and 44.6% of volumes due to this 




Chapter 11 Options for Improving Contracting Conditions for Small-scale 
Farmers in Malawi 
 
11.1 Introduction 
Chapter 11 provides the analysis and interpretation of the collected qualitative data 
with an aim to propose and critically evaluate options for improving contracting 
conditions, in particular for small-scale farmers (Objective 4). This chapter answers 
these related research sub-questions: What changes or new practices need to be 
adopted for improved contracting conditions? How can the identified options for 
improving contracting conditions be implemented in the Malawian paprika supply 
chain? Which actors need to implement the identified options?  
 
This part of the study was in particular inspired by the work from Nijhoff and 
Trienekens (2010) who identified main challenges in contract farming arrangements 
in Ethiopia and then asked the key stakeholders to rank challenges according to their 
priority. The authors explored who should address the identified challenges (Nijhoff 
and Trienekens, 2010). This approach was adopted and adjusted in this study (see 
this chapter under section 11.3). 
 
11.2 Ranking the Key Challenges According to Priority 
The key challenges (chapter 10) identified through the qualitative thematic analysis 
required further verification and the establishment of a hierarchy from the 
stakeholders’ viewpoints, so  recommendations on how to efficiently address those 
challenges could be developed. The main findings were disseminated to allow 
participants to scrutinise them and establish priorities among identified challenges 
(see Appendix 7). Table 11.1 displays the results from the ranking exercise 
performed with small-scale farmers, Company D, the Government and 
representatives from the farmers’ association, research units, and international 
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 Stakeholders agreed with the identified challenges (see chapter 10, Figure 10.1) as the ones that 
represent the key issues in the paprika supply chain. Small-scale farmers expanded on the proposed 
challenges and added problems resulting as consequences of climate change. However, these were not 
included as the topic of climate change, although crucial, is beyond the scope of this study.  
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Table 11.1 Ranking of challenges according to priority: Small-scale farmers, key stakeholders and Government representatives 
Rank 
Small-scale farmers in 
Nkhotakota 




(without Company D) 
Government 
representatives 
1 Poor input provision Poor input provision Side-selling Contract design Contract design 
2 Low price 
Misunderstanding of 
contracting principles 
Small quantities sold to 
the contractor 









4 Side-selling No bargaining Low price  No bargaining Volatile market conditions 





Low price  Low price 







7 Contract design Side-selling Poor input provision Poor input provision 





Low level of trust Contract design 
Small quantities sold to 
the contractor 








Volatile market conditions No bargaining 
10 
Small quantities sold to 
the contractor 













Table 11.1 shows that, in both districts, small-scale farmers considered poor input 
provision as the primary challenge in contract farming relations. In contrast, 
Company D listed side-selling as the major issue. Key stakeholders and Government 
representatives were synchronised in their ranking of the most important challenge: 
the contract design.  
 
Volatile market conditions represented one of the important challenges for small-
scale farmers, Company D and the Government. Concerning less important 
challenges, both key stakeholders and Government rated side-selling as one of the 
least significant issues. The non-transparent grading system was not deemed as a 
priority for Company D and the Government.  Finally, small-scale farmers in both 
districts stated that the previous negative experience does not represent a principal 
challenge in the paprika supply chain. 
 
Table 11.2 indicated a certain degree of discordance among respondents regarding 
the priority of identified challenges. Kendall’s W test was run to assess whether there 
exists an agreement among respondents in ranking the challenges. 
 
Table 11.2 Results from Kendall’s W Test: Overall rank for challenges 
Rank Challenge 
1 Contract design 
2 Low level of trust 
3 Low price 
4 No bargaining 
5 Volatile market conditions 
6 Poor input provision 
7 Non-transparent grading system 
8 Misunderstanding of contracting principles 
9 Negative previous experience 
10 Side-selling 
11 Small quantities sold to the contractor 
 
The respondents were presented with the key challenges and asked to rank them 
according to priority using the scale 1-11, where 1 denoted the most urgent challenge 
and 11 denoted the least urgent challenge. Table 11.2 displays results from Kendall’s 
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W test in the form of an overall ranking, which is based on mean rank values 
indicated in Table 11.3.  
 
According to Tables 11.2 and 11.3, contract design was considered as the priority 
among all identified challenges (the lowest mean rank). Low levels of trust and low 
price in the contract were shown to be among the most important challenges in 
Malawi’s paprika supply chain. Small quantities sold to the contractor were the least 




Table 11.3 further confirmed that there was no statistically significant agreement 
among respondents (N=10, W=0.112, p=0.342).  
 
Table 11.3 Results from Kendall's W test for agreement among raters 
Ranked Challenges                                                                  Mean Rank 
Negative previous experience 7.00 
Volatile market conditions 6.00 
Low level of trust 4.80 
Contract design 3.80 
Poor input provision 6.10 
Non-transparent grading system 6.40 
No bargaining 5.90 
Low price 4.90 
Small quantities sold to the contractor 7.40 










Asymp. Sig. 0.342 
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 Despite the fact that the overall ranking showed such a result, small quantities were a substantial 








The analysis then continued with testing whether there exists a statistically 
significant agreement among the particular group of respondents. For instance, Table 
11.1 showed that small-scale farmers perceived different challenges as more 
important compared to other stakeholders. Kendall’s W test was run to assess 
whether the statistical significance increases if small-scale farmers are excluded 
since their rating was different to the rating of other key stakeholders.  
 
Table 1.8A in Appendix B indicates the results from Kendall’s W test in which only 
ranks from stakeholders were considered. There was a statistically significant 
agreement among stakeholders regarding the priority of identified challenges (N=7, 
W=0.319, p=0.014). Results showed that the agreement was statistically significant. 
Even when Company D was excluded from the test, that significance was lower 
(N=6, W=0.327, p=0.033) (Table 1.9A in Appendix B). This result suggested that 
stakeholders among themselves had more similar opinions on the challenges as 
opposed to when the assessment included small-scale farmers’ views too.  
 
11.3 Options for Improving Contracting Conditions: What? How? Who? 
Since the ranking of challenges showed disagreement among respondents in general, 
it was further expected that different groups (i.e. small-scale farmers opposed to 
other stakeholders) would have different ideas on: 
 
 What needs to be done to improve contracting in Malawi? 
 How to do it? What practices/procedures need to be adopted? 
 Who should do it? Which actors are needed to implement improvements? 
 
The questions above represent a guiding model (see Appendix 3 and 4) used during 
the final visit to Malawi to direct the discussion towards finding options for 
improving contracting conditions. The guiding model was applied to every challenge 
with an ultimate goal to facilitate participatory and local problem solving and to 
answer the study’s overall question. This section combines results from the focus 




11.3.1 The Small-scale Farmers’ Model 
Small-scale farmers developed the Small-scale Farmers’ Model during focus group 
interviews in the Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts (Table 11.4).  
 
Table 11.4 The Small-scale Farmers’ Model 
What needs to be done? How can it be done? Who should do it? 
 Improve input 
provision 
 Providing loans to farmers’ 
associations  
 Providing sufficient seeds, fertilisers 
and chemicals to farmers' 
associations in time 
 Establishing revolving funds 




 Improve pricing 
 Improving dialogue between 
Company D and small-scale farmers 
 Clearly defining the price in the 
contract 
 Ensuring minimum guaranteed price 
in the contract 
 Calculating costs of living and then 
formulating the price 







 Allowing small-scale farmers to be 
present, discuss and agree on the 
contract design 
 Honouring what was promised from 
both sides 
 Establishing and maintaining 
communication between parties 
 Providing accurate information 
 Company D 
 Small-scale 
farmers 
 Decrease market 
volatility 
 Encouraging/allowing other buyers 
to enter the paprika market 
 Assuring farmers that their crop will 
be purchased  
 Company D 
 Other buyers 
 Eliminate side-
selling 
 Paying in cash immediately after the 
purchase of paprika 
 Mutually agreeing on the price 
 Encouraging association or group 
members to sell to the contractor 
 Organising selling through farmers’ 
association and not individually 
 Enabling clubs to have revolving 
funds that can be used if farmers 
want to sell smaller quantities and 
then accumulated quantities can be 
sold to Company D 












 Encouraging/allowing other buyers 
to enter paprika market (it is hoped 
that Company D will allow bargaining 
in order not to lose its supplying 
base) 
 Increasing Company D’s presence in 
the local area (not just during the 
marketing days) 
 Company D 




Table 11.4 The Small-scale Farmers’ Model - Continued  
What needs to be done? How can it be done? Who should do it? 
 Increase knowledge 
on grading system 
 Educating farmers on grading rules 
and procedures 
 Company D 
 Increase trust levels 
 Honouring what was promised from 
both sides (especially regarding the 
price) 
 Ensuring minimum guaranteed price 
in the contract 
 Encouraging association or group 
members to sell to the contractor 
 Company D 
 Small-scale 
farmers 
 Advance the 
contract design 
 Providing complete contract, 
especially with defined clauses on 
the price, what to do in the case of 
breach and dispute mechanism 
 Appointing mediators and/or 
arbitrators (member of association) 








 Increase traded 
volumes 
 Early purchase by Company D 
 Mutually agreeing on the price 
 Establishing and maintaining 
communication between parties 





 Investing in warehouse and irrigation 
system (water tanks and dams) 
 Company D 
 
The Model suggests addressing challenges according to the priority small-scale 
farmers assigned to them (see Table 11.1). Therefore, the primary concern in this 
Model was the improvement of input provision. Small-scale farmers stated this could 
be done by providing loans to farmers’ associations (not individuals) and securing 
sufficient volumes of inputs in time. Small-scale farmers suggested the establishment 
of so-called revolving funds where small-scale farmers would invest a percentage 
from their sale after the marketing season so that the club/association can purchase 
required inputs for their members at a reduced rate. The responsibility to improve 
input provision was on Company D's side (offering loans), while associations/unions 
should be accountable for revolving funds. 
 
Small-scale farmers recommended that the price could be improved by enhancing 
the dialogue between Company D and farmers and the responsibility for doing so 
lies with both sides. In the small-scale farmers’ view, Company D would improve 
pricing by clearly defining the price in the contract, ensuring a minimum guaranteed 
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price and considering costs of living while formulating the contract price. This 
would also increase trust levels towards Company D.  
 
Similarly, small-scale farmers believed that the understanding of contracting 
principles and trust could be improved if both sides honoured their obligations and 
regular communication was maintained. Company D’s responsibility was to allow 
small-scale farmers to negotiate on the contract design and provide accurate 
information so that misinterpretation of the contract would be reduced. 
 
For decreasing market volatility, small-scale farmers stated that Company D should 
guarantee the purchase of paprika at all times and that other buyers should be 
allowed to enter the market. The latter was believed to have the potential to motivate 
Company D to include small-scale farmers more actively in contract formulation in 
order not to lose its supplying base over competing buyers.  
 
Small-scale farmers suggested approaching the challenge of side-selling from two 
sides. First, Company D would decrease side-selling by paying the cash immediately 
after purchasing paprika (see chapter 10, Table 10.8 on the key reason for side-
selling) and by allowing small-scale farmers to negotiate on the price. If Company D 
purchased paprika directly from associations and not individually, the trust and 
confidence levels would increase while the side-selling practice could be reduced 
due to peer-pressure present in associations. Second, small-scale farmers recognised 
that they are part of the solution, too. Hence, farmers proposed again to form 
revolving funds at the association level with an option to purchase and accumulate 
smaller quantities of paprika from small-scale farmers and then sell larger volumes 
to Company D. In this way, small-scale farmers would be able to deliver smaller 
volumes but on a regular basis, while Company D would only collect accumulated 
volumes and decrease its transaction costs. This option was proposed as many small-
scale farmers sell small volumes to vendors due to a great need for quick money and 
because vendors are ‘always around’. However, if the association in the local 
community would have the option to buy those small volumes, small-scale farmers 
believed this would help them to stay away from side-selling. To increase traded 
volumes, small-scale farmers stated that better communication, allowing negotiation 
on the price and early purchase could result in more volumes for Company D.  
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Small-scale farmers suggested that Company D should increase farmers’ 
participation in contract formulation by being present more often on the ground 
locally. By doing so, Company D could devote more time to educate small-scale 
farmers on grades and international procedures that apply while grading paprika. 
This practice would eliminate the impression of non-transparency of Company D’s 
grading system that existed among small-scale farmers and improve relationships 
overall.  
 
Small-scale farmers assigned some role to the Government only in addressing the 
challenge of poor contract design. Small-scale farmers stated that the Government 
should initiate forming complete contracts, which would contain clauses on price, 
contract breach and dispute mechanism. Apart from the Government, associations 
should have the task to advance the contract design by educating and appointing its 
members to serve as mediators or arbitrators and direct farmers in legal matters. 
 
Finally, small-scale farmers proposed to overcome previous negative experiences in 
contracting by building better relationships. Small-scale farmers suggested that 
Company D could show its readiness to engage in long-term arrangements by 
investing in local infrastructures, such as warehouse and irrigation system, which 
would create an even closer bond between Company D and small-scale farmers.  
 
11.3.2 The Stakeholders’ Model 
Stakeholders developed the second model during the focus group discussion (Table 
11.5). This section compares the Stakeholders’ Model to the Small-scale Farmers’ 




                                                          
121
 It is worth mentioning that small-scale farmers and stakeholders developed their models separately 
from each other and without information on what the other party suggested. This was done to secure 




Table 11.5 The Stakeholders’ Model 
 
What needs to be done? How can it be done? Who should do it? 
 Advance the contract 
design 
 Providing win-win contracts 
 Making contract terms and 
conditions clear 
 Regulating contracts through 
a legal framework 
 Allowing small-scale farmers 
to be present, discuss and 
agree on the contract design 
 Developing farmers’ 
associations or groups to 
increase the bargaining 
power 
 Finalising contract farming 
strategy and developing 
legal/institutional framework 
 Providing complete contracts, 
especially with defined 
clauses on the price, what to 
do in the case of breach and 
dispute mechanism 
 Government 







 Increase trust levels 
 
 Acting in a good faith 
 Long-term investment in 
making a relationship better 
 Knowing expectations from 
farmers 
 Increasing Company D’s 
presence in the local area 
(not just during the marketing 
days) 
 Establishing and maintaining 
communication between 
parties 
 Company D 
 Small-scale 
farmers 
 Improve pricing  
 
 Clearly defining the price in 
the contract 
 Ensuring minimum 
guaranteed price in the 
contract in $US 
 Company D 
 Improve enforcement 
of the contract 
 
 Organising selling through 
farmers’ association and not 
individually 
 Company D 
 Strengthen small-
scale farmers in 
paprika sector 
 Developing farmers’ 













Table 11.5 The Stakeholders’ Model - Continued 
 
What needs to be done? How can it be done? Who should do it? 
 Decrease market 
volatility 
 Clearly defining the price in 
the contract 
 Company D  
 Increase traded 
volumes 
 
 Organising selling through 
farmers’ association (and not 
individually) to achieve 
bigger volumes 
 Defining minimum volumes 
in the contract based on 
farmers’ average production 
 Providing bonuses or 





 Eliminate side 
selling 
 
 Introducing innovative selling 
methods (price information 
and selling intention by 
SMS) 
 Acting in a good faith 
 Increasing Company D’s 
presence in the local area 
(not just during the 
marketing days) 
 Organising selling through 
farmers’ association and not 
individually 












 Improve input 
provision 
 Providing sufficient seeds, 
fertilisers and chemicals to 
farmers' association in time 
 Establishing revolving funds 
 Calculating gross margins 
and the cost of inputs to 
encourage input provision 
 Developing farmers’ 
associations or groups so 
Company D can offer loans 
on the group basis, not 
individually 
 Rewarding loyal farmers with 
inputs to encourage them 




 Improve pricing 
 Mutually agreeing on the 
price 
 Company D 
 
Both Models showed great similarity in recommendations for improving input 
provision. Small-scale farmers and stakeholders were united in suggesting that 
Company D should provide sufficient amount of inputs in appropriate time, 
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associations should be encouraged to build their capacities and receive loans for their 
members and revolving funds should be established. Stakeholders proposed 
rewarding loyal farmers with inputs. It was suggested that Company D might 
consider calculating gross margins and input costs that small-scale farmers incur, as 
this would increase Company D’s understanding on how necessary it is to secure 
inputs for small-scale farmers through the contract.  
 
For improved price, stakeholders suggested that Company D should open the door 
for small-scale farmers and allow mutual agreement on the price, which was similar 
to what small-scale farmers proposed. While small-scale farmers required Company 
D’s guaranteed purchase and for other buyers to enter the market to decrease market 
volatility, stakeholders saw the solution in clear definition of the price in the 
contract. 
 
Following the set of options to overcome side-selling from Small-scale Farmers’ 
Model, stakeholders agreed with farmers that side-selling could be reduced if 
Company D purchased paprika through registered farmers' associations. 
Stakeholders believed that by acting in good faith and increasing Company D's visit 
to communities, side-selling could be lowered. 
 
An innovative system of purchase was proposed, which was similar to the small-
scale farmers’ idea on revolving funds to purchase small volumes from farmers. 
Stakeholders suggested that instead of associations, Company D should take the 
leading role by establishing a system where small-scale farmers would receive 
information on the daily price offered by Company D via mobile phones. Farmers 
would then be free to decide when and what quantities they want to sell to Company 
D. Also, Company D might have its local representatives who would purchase 
smaller volumes in remote areas and thereby decrease Company D’s transaction 
costs.  
 
Both small-scale farmers and stakeholders had similar ideas on how to increase trust 
between parties: through continuous communication, acting in good faith and 
honouring responsibilities, and eliminating vagueness by knowing the other side's 
expectations especially regarding price. Regarding poor contract design, small-scale 
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farmers and stakeholders stated that clearly defined contracts would improve the 
current status. Moreover, stakeholders strongly emphasised the role of Government 
in (i) finalising the Strategy and (ii) regulating contracts through an efficient legal 
framework. Another strong point in the Stakeholders’ Model was a suggestion to 
strengthen farmers’ associations to increase farmers’ bargaining power in the process 
of contract formulation. Strong farmers’ associations would have more power to 
initiate and insist on contract enforcement in the case of dispute.  
 
Unlike small-scale farmers, stakeholders highlighted the idea of defining minimum 
volumes in the contract based on farmers’ average production capacities to increase 
traded volumes. The increase was expected to be spurred by the fact that if Company 
D defined minimum volumes and coupled this new information with the incentive to 
provide bonuses or transportation for excess volumes delivered - small-scale farmers 
might supply more paprika. Finally, small-scale farmers and stakeholders agreed that 
previous negative experience in CF could be overcome by investing in the local 
infrastructure (e.g. warehouse). Nonetheless, while small-scale farmers attributed 
this responsibility solely to Company D, stakeholders believed the investment should 
be encouraged by NGOs and associations and through public funds from 
Government projects. 
 
11.4 Discussion Point 
The results indicated that stakeholders prioritised the key challenges differently. 
While the enabling environment put the most emphasis on the contract design, small-
scale farmers deemed that input provision is the most important issue. Company D 
was most concerned with side-selling. Prioritising challenges was followed by 
proposing and critically evaluating options for improved contracting conditions, 
which showed great similarities in how stakeholders perceived their roles and 
responsibilities in the supply chain. Recommendations in chapter 12 provide a 
detailed description on proposed options for improving contracting conditions 




11.5 Summary  
Chapter 11 builds upon the previous chapter, which identified the key challenges in 
the paprika supply chain. In this chapter, challenges were ranked according to 
priority by supply chain participants. The results showed that, initially, there was no 
agreement about priorities among raters. Once small-scale farmers were excluded, 
the results indicated significant agreement among raters. A further step involved 
proposing options for improving contract farming conditions. The options were 
suggested through two models: Small-scale Farmers’ and Stakeholders’ Model. 
Options were critically assessed, discussed and incorporated into the Integrated 
Model (chapter 12) that addressed each challenge identified in the chain. The 
Integrated Model represents a way forward for Malawi’s paprika supply chain. 
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PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 12 Conclusions  
 
12.1 Introduction 
The fifth part of the study synthesises all the evidence presented to draw conclusions 
and position the study’s findings within the existing knowledge. Chapter 12 is 
divided into four main sections. The first section revisits the study’s research 
questions and identifies the key conclusions from the study. Recommendations from 
the proposed Integrated Model are outlined for each supply chain participant in the 
second section. The third section outlines the study’s contribution to knowledge, 
methodology and practice. Suggestions for further research in the field of contract 
farming are provided in the fourth section. 
 
12.2 Dynamics of Vertical Integration for the Paprika Supply Chain in Malawi 
Related sub-questions for Objective 1: How do key players in the paprika supply 
chain interact among themselves regarding their roles, responsibilities and relations? 
What are the characteristics of contracted small-scale farmers? What is the level of 
small-scale farmers’ involvement in farmers’ organisations/unions and which factors 
influence small-scale farmers’ membership? 
 
12.2.1 Contractual Relationship within Vertical Marketing System for Paprika 
Production 
The paprika supply chain in Central Malawi reflected the tendency of the modern 
agri-food industry to organise tight vertical relationships among operating units. The 
choice of a contract as a governing mechanism had advantages over the traditional 
spot market mainly due to its potential to increase control over the production and 
marketing process, achieve quality standards and address market inefficiencies 
(Warning and Key, 2002; Coleman et al., 2004; Groenewald et al., 2012; FAO, 
2013; Jia and Bijman, 2013; Dries et al., 2014). The nucleus-estate model of 
contracting provided Company D with access to small-scale farmers as a production 
base, while at the same time Company D’s estates served as a backup for securing 
enough volumes of paprika  (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Prowse, 2012). The study 
concludes that the contractual relationship will continue to be the dominant 
marketing channel for export-oriented paprika production in Malawi since 
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contracting enables companies to mobilise the small-scale agricultural sector, which 
has the needed advantage of producing quality paprika with low-cost labour. The 
Government’s on-going attempt to regulate contractual production through the 
National Contract Farming Strategy also increases the attractiveness of contracts as a 
governing mechanism for a food supply chain. Moreover, contract farming 
arrangements for paprika in Malawi are likely to increase following global food 
trends, demand for high-quality diverse foods and strong vertical integration. This 
concurs with Kherallah and Kirsten (2002), Miller (2003), and Jia and Bijman (2013) 
who stated that contract farming and similar arrangements involving farmers in 
developing countries are likely to increasingly dominate global food supply chains in 
the coming decades.  
 
12.2.2 General Profile of Contracted Small-scale Paprika Farmers 
The study revealed the general profile of small-scale farmers that participate in the 
paprika supply chain in Malawi. The majority of contracted households had a male 
head, over 40 years old and attained a primary level education. The households had 
up to six members and poor access to electricity. The main occupation of the 
households was farming, and small-scale farmers had up to three years of experience 
in paprika cultivation. The differences in the household assets were mostly reflected 
in the transport and communications means as high-income households and 
households with large land allocated to contract farming owned more motorcycles 
and had better access to television and telephone compared to other household types. 
The study infers that small-scale farmers engaging in Company D’s contract for 
paprika are economically vulnerable, and with limited opportunities for 
commercialisation of their agricultural production. This finding is consistent with the 
ample literature that suggests contract farming attracts small-scale farmers, who are 
otherwise excluded from the premium food supply chains due to their low 
investment capacities, to access secure markets for their product and gain access to 
inputs and extension services (Singh, 2003; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; Reardon 
and Gulati, 2008; Vorley et al., 2008; Tonts and Siddique, 2011; Barrett et al., 2012; 






12.2.3 The Quality of Communication among Players  
The paprika supply chain in Malawi's Central Region consisted of two key players 
and the enabling environment. Two key players involved small-scale farmers 
supplying raw paprika and the contractor buying and exporting raw paprika. Small-
scale farmers and the contractor interacted with the enabling environment involving: 
the farmers' association and union; civil society; NGOs; aid organisations; research 
and development units; and the Ministry of Agriculture. The study concludes that 
overall communication among the actors in the paprika supply chain was poor in 
terms of direct and regular information sharing. Qualitative and quantitative analyses 
provided evidence to support this claim. Small-scale farmers rarely communicated 
with the farmers' club/organisation and received only limited assistance and policy 
support from the enabling environment considering production processes. The 
assistance was particularly missing with regard to marketing, input provision and 
negotiation issues. The official communication between the Company D and small-
scale farmers was limited to occassional visits from extension workers. Less than 
one-third of small-scale farmers directly communicated with Company D. This 
finding implied that the key players in Malawi's paprika supply chain operated under 
asymmetric information, which is partially due to poor communication. Asymmetric 
information is recognised in both contract theory and supply chain management 
literature as one of the obstacles that hinders small-scale farmers' active involvement 
in supply chains, since the information asymmetry could stimulate power imbalance, 
exploitation and opportunistic behaviour (Vavra, 2009; Minot, 2011; Jia and Bijman, 
2013). 
 
12.2.4 The Potential of Collective Action for Improved Contracting Conditions  
The level of involvement in the farmers' organisations was high among contracted 
small-scale farmers. The contracted households were mainly members of agricultural 
cooperatives, Farmers Union Malawi and trade unions. Small-scale farmers' 
membership in the Farmers Union Malawi was influenced by geographical location, 
age, income level, landholding size, distance to the collection point, and assistance 
received from the NGOs and the Government. This study concludes that despite 
small-scale farmers’ satisfaction with their membership in farmers’ organisations, 
the potential of collective action was underutilised in the paprika supply chain. 
Small-scale farmers did not fully exploit the opportunity for joint price negotiation, 
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potential income increase, new production practices, information sharing, input 
provision and collective marketing of paprika, which are some of the advantages of 
farmers’ organisations emphasised in the literature (Stockbridge et al., 2003; 
Merkelova et al., 2009; Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Wanglin and Abdulai, 2016). 
 
12.3 Implications of Contract Farming for the Livelihood of Small-scale  
Farmers 
Related sub-questions for Objective 2: What factors motivate small-scale farmers to 
enter contracts? How does contracting affect small-scale farmers’ livelihoods in 
terms of productivity, income generation and food security? Are small-scale farmers 
willing to expand their contracting to other crops and which factors influence small-
scale farmers’ willingness to expand? 
 
12.3.1 Factors Influencing Engagement in Contractual Relationship 
The study revealed that small-scale farmers joined contract farming to obtain needed 
inputs, have a guaranteed market for produced paprika and receive free extension 
services. In particular, the high costs of inputs (especially fertilisers) and the lack of 
quality seed available on the market motivated small-scale farmers to enter the 
contract. Better off farmers (with higher income and larger land allocated to CF) 
were less dependent on inputs compared to other household types. The main 
motivating factors reported by the contracted small-scale farmers were in accordance 
with the mainstream literature suggesting that the main function of the contract was 
to overcome market imperfections, namely lack of input markets, high transaction 
costs in finding a suitable market and information asymmetry (Bauman, 2000; 
Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Jia and Bijman, 2013). The study therefore concludes 
that small-scale farmers enter contract farming to take advantage of the suitable and 
in demand CF export crop, utilise available contractual offer and provisions, and 
gain economic benefit from their production. This conclusion supports the existing 
literature (especially Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Bogetoft and Ballebye Olesen, 
2002; da Silva, 2005; Barrett et al., 2012; Abebe et al., 2013) which suggests that 
farmers engaged in contracting if their perception is that the benefit received from a 
contractual relationship was higher or equal to the best alternative. Moreover, some 
studies (such as Glover and Kusterer, 1991; Simmons, 2002; Kirsten and Sartorius, 
317 
 
2002; Bijman, 2008) argued that farmers entered contracts to start production of a 
high-value crop, secure their market and reduce transaction risks, which corroborated 
with the findings in this study. 
 
12.3.2 Contract Farming Effects on Small-scale Farmers’ Livelihood 
The study’s results indicated that the majority of the households agreed that contract 
farming had a positive influence on their livelihoods. Small-scale farmers mostly 
allocated a small proportion of their land to contracted paprika. Small-scale farmers 
produced up to 200 kg of dried paprika per season, which was considered low. 
Although some small-scale farmers reported improvements in their productivity and 
an increase in the plot size after joining contract farming, the lack of the input 
provision from the contractor limited achieving higher yields. The income generated 
from contract farming activities was the most important source of households' 
income, but it was only partially sufficient to meet households' yearly needs. The 
perception on the sufficiency of the income from contracting varied among 
household types, and for the low-income households, the income from contract 
farming was the least sufficient. The contracted small-scale farmers experienced, on 
average, 7 months in a year when they faced troubles in securing enough food for the 
household members, but the households who generated sufficient income from 
contract farming activities reported a lower frequency of hunger. Thus, the study 
concluded that contract farming had a mixed influence on small-scale farmers' 
livelihoods in Central Malawi. Having a contract granted access to the guaranteed 
export market, quality seeds and free extension services for Malawian small-scale 
paprika farmers, and households with sufficient income from contracting had less 
hungry months. Nonetheless, small-scale farmers' productivity, income generation 
and access to other important inputs and services remained limited. This finding is in 
accordance with more recent studies on contract farming from Bolwig (2012), 
Bellemare (2012), Fréguin-Gresh et al., (2012), Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw, 
(2013), Rüsch et al. (2013) and Mwambi et al. (2016) who also reported mixed 
effects of contracting on farmers’ livelihoods in Uganda, Madagascar, South Africa, 




12.3.3 Conditions for Expanding Contracting Arrangement to Other Crops 
The results indicated that small-scale farmers intended to stay in contractual 
relationship for paprika in the coming years and more than half of the contracted 
households planned to expand contract farming to other crops. The factors 
influencing small-scale farmers' willingness to expand contracting to other crops 
included geographical location, the level of education, landholding size, the size of 
the land allocated to contracted crop, yield per season, costs of inputs, and 
sufficiency of income gained through contract farming. The study draws conclusions 
that education, farm characteristics and the sufficiency of the income generated from 
contract farming play a key role in small-scale farmers’ willingness to expand the 
contracting arrangement. This finding is in line with the literature suggesting that 
factors influencing farmers to participate in contract farming involve education level 
of the household head, farm size, geographical distance and farm income (Miyata et 
al. 2009; Okello and Nzuma, 2012; Girma and Gardebroek, 2015; Kariuki and Loy, 
2016; Kumar et al., 2016). 
 
12.4 Key Challenges of the Contractual Relationship 
Related sub-questions for Objective 3: What are key challenges in Malawi’s paprika 
supply chain? How does the structure and the content of the contract for paprika 
support efficient and sustainable relations? What is the level of side-selling in the 
paprika supply chain and which factors influence small-scale farmers’ engagement in 
side-selling? 
 
12.4.1 Overall Challenges in the Paprika Supply Chain 
The key challenges identified in the paprika supply chain involved: previous 
negative experience with contract farming; volatile market conditions; low levels of 
trust; missing legal framework; poor contract design and input provision; non-
transparent grading system; no bargaining; low price; small quantities sold to the 
contractor; misunderstanding of the contracting principles; and side-selling. Poor 
contract design and side-selling were the most severe challenges. Thus, the study 
infers that Malawi’s paprika supply chain encountered numerous challenges that 
were primarily related to the nature of the relationship between two contracting 
parties and the lack of external mechanisms to direct contracts within the supply 
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chain. The identified challenges concur with the existing literature as the unequal 
bargaining power, information asymmetry, side-selling, inputs misuse and difficult 
contract enforcement pose great threat for contract farming operations (da Silva, 
2005; Ramaswami et al., 2006; Shepherd, 2007; Pulton et al., 2010; Minot, 2011; Jia 
and Bijman, 2013; Cai et al., 2014b). 
 
12.4.2 Contract Design and Its Capacity to Support Efficient Supply Chain and 
Sustainable Contractual Relations  
The study found that the contract for paprika in this study consisted of 11 defined 
clauses, while the price clause was partially defined. The contract did not define the 
clauses related to grades, applicable law, dispute settlement, termination, and force 
majeure. The incompleteness of the contract was reflected in an unequal distribution 
of risks and power between Company D and small-scale farmers. Therefore, the 
concept of contractual incompleteness, which is essential to contract theory, was 
confirmed in this study (Hart, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1999; Maskin, 2002; 
Brousseau, 2008; Saenger, et al., 2012; Cordon et al., 2013). The study infers that 
poor contract design limited efficiency of the supply chain and sustainability of the 
relationship between the key players. This finding affirms some points from the 
literature addressing contract design. First, the potential of contract farming to secure 
a reliable supply, stable relationship and economic benefits for small-scale farmers 
can diminish due to unclear and incomplete contract clauses (Vavra, 2009; Melese, 
2012; Prowse, 2012; Pultrone, 2012). Second, poor contract design can amplify the 
power imbalance between parties and allow the imposition of unfair conditions on 
the weaker party, for instance the price determined at the sole discretion of the 
contractor as found in this study (da Silva, 2005; Echánove and Steffen, 2005; 
Bijman, 2008; Cotula, 2010; Smalley, 2013). Overall, the recommendations 
following the study’s conclusion on the contract design are in line with the direction 
of the Legal Guide (2015) advocating for more transparent, fair and complete 
contracts. 
 
12.4.3 Severity of Side-selling for Supply Chain’s Efficiency and Sustainability 
More than one-third of the contracted households engaged in side-selling and the 
side-sellers sold 10-50% of their contracted paprika to the vendors. The results 
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showed that the main reason for side-selling was the higher price offered by the 
vendors. The study concluded that vendors played an important role in the dynamics 
of the paprika supply chain primarily by offering a higher price, transportation 
service and building trust with small-scale farmers. Vendors enabled quick access to 
money for small-scale farmers and therefore contributed to farmers’ income 
generation. Nevertheless, Company D lost between 19.9-44.6% of the paprika due to 
side-selling, which reflected on the efficiency of the paprika supply: the shortages in 
expected volumes of paprika had to be substituted from other sources, which 
increased Company D’s transaction costs. In addition, side-selling practices 
decreased the trust level between Company D and small-scale farmers and 
threatened the sustainability of the contractual relationship. This study concludes that 
side-selling considerably contributes to low efficiency of the Malawian paprika food 
supply chain and promotes distrust among the chain participants. This finding is in 
line with the literature stating that, although side-selling might seem rational from a 
farmer’s economic perspective, it jeopardises the contractor’s capability to deliver 
expected volumes and does not support the sustainability of the contracts in the long-
run (Bingen et al., 2003; Swinnen et al., 2007; Mujawamariya et al., 2013). 
 
12.5 Improved Contracting Conditions in Malawi 
Related sub-questions for Objective 4: What changes or new practices need to be 
adopted for improved contracting conditions? How can the identified options for 
improving contracting conditions be implemented in the Malawian paprika supply 
chain? Which actors need to implement the identified options? 
 
The most important changes and practices identified by the supply chain participants 
as options for improving contracting conditions were: transparency in contract 
design; increased participation and negotiation with small-scale farmers through 
farmers' organisations; a sound legal framework; compliance with the contract terms 
and conditions; and quality communication. The options are to be implemented 
through a set of targeted actions at a local level and through policy measures on a 
national level. The actors responsible for implementing needed changes are small-
scale farmers, contractors and the enabling environment. The study draws the 
conclusion that improving contracting conditions for small-scale farmers in Central 
Malawi must be done simultaneously at the farmers’ and contractor’s level and 
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institutional instance to enable desired changes in the supply chain. Section 12.7 in 
this chapter addresses recommended options in more detail. 
 
12.6 Overall Conclusions and Implications 
The overall research question was: How can contracting conditions in Malawi be 
improved, especially for small-scale farmers, to facilitate more efficient and 
sustainable relations in the existing paprika supply chain? 
 
The study concluded that the current dynamics in the paprika supply chain do not 
enable further developments. The increasing competition in global food markets will 
continue to pose new standards and restrictions, which might result in tighter vertical 
integration. Since the current paprika supply chain in Malawi relies on poor small-
scale farmers, it is uncertain whether it will reach its potential regarding quality and 
volume due to the limited capabilities of small-scale farmers. Expanding the supply 
chain by increasing the number of small-scale farmers to achieve higher quantities 
will increase contractors’ transaction costs without the guarantee of better volumes. 
To improve its efficiency, there is a need for the paprika supply chain to be re-
structured primarily in terms of communication and targeted support provision to 
small-scale farmers to leverage the overall dynamics towards higher quantity and 
quality standards. 
 
Furthermore, the effect of contract farming in Malawi has to be reconsidered. The 
rising importance of the paprika sector for Malawi’s export and economic growth 
might tempt greater advocating for contract farming arrangements from the 
Government and NGOs' side. The increase in contract farming arrangements puts 
pressure on contractors in terms of provisions they are willing to include in the 
contract. Malawi's input and service market showed lack of efficiency, and one of 
the advantages of contract farming is the potential to overcome this failure. 
Nonetheless, contractors are limited in what they can efficiently provide through 
contracts due to cost implications. Small-scale farmers in Malawi are restrained from 
fully benefiting from contract farming because of their small land size and low 
productivity levels. Income generation in contract farming is tightly related to prices 
on the global market, which tend to fluctuate, so overall outcomes of contracting are 
often uncertain. This is an indication that contract farming in Malawi needs clearer 
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incentives, and the requirements should be communicated to potential contracted 
farmers and be accompanied with realistic expectations on what contract farming 
can and cannot secure in a given context. The study confirmed, as suggested in the 
literature, that contracting alone is not a suitable option for rural development or 
securing livelihoods. 
 
The study concluded that the paprika supply chain is not reaching its optimal 
performance and relationships in the supply chain are not viable in the long-term. 
Through the lens of supply chain management, the goal of every chain is to regulate 
relationships in a way that achieves maximum profits for all players with minimum 
costs incurred. According to this study's findings, this was not the case with the 
paprika supply chain. If the present situation continues, Malawi's paprika supply 
chain might be forced to collapse under the pressure of inefficient performance. The 
same paprika supply chain in Malawi already collapsed in the past due to similar 
challenges. Whilst lessons might have been learnt they have not yet been 
implemented in practice. This study suggests improving the situation in the chain 
primarily by re-formulating contracts and reducing side-selling. Both options have 
implications for the key players. Company D could allow small-scale farmers to 
actively participate in the price formulation since the negotiation of the price might 
sensitise small-scale farmers’ to comply better with the contract terms and avoid 
side-selling. The contract should be designed with greater attention to fair conditions 
for the involved parties and more consideration to prevent any negative impacts on 
the efficiency and sustainability of the supply chains. The contract should also 
account for the differences in market power and balance potential opportunistic 
behaviour by using various enforcement mechanisms. Well-designed contracts and 
strong vertical integration in marketing systems represent a crucial part in 
developing effective and efficient supply chains. 
 
More frequent visits to small-scale farmers might reduce the sense of distance 
between Company D and farmers, and thus reduce side-selling. Small-scale farmers 
should form and strengthen farmers' cooperatives to enable successful price 
negotiation with Company D and secure more volumes of paprika. The Malawian 
Government should promote the education of small-scale farmers through targeted 
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training to increase their understanding of long-term negative consequences of side-
selling and encourage practising loyalty to Company D. 
 
This study found that restructuring Malawi’s paprika supply chain is a feasible task 
since general opinions about how this should be done are similar among 
stakeholders. Company D and the Government must take the lead in such 
endeavours and influence the rest of the supply chain. The proposed options (see 
chapter 11) should be synchronised with conditions outside the chain as well, so that 
internal dynamics can accommodate what is happening in the global paprika market 
(e.g. increased or decreased demand) and avoid short-term ad hoc innovations. 
Improvements should be in accordance with economic conditions and available 
resources in Malawi. For instance, although useful in the long-term, options for 
investing in infrastructure might come after strengthening farmers’ associations and 
their capacity to allocate inputs for its members.  The study concluded that the key to 
improving contracting conditions in Malawi’s paprika supply chain lies in unlocking 
the existing potential of collective consciousness about the need for fair, reciprocal 
and trustworthy rules for contract farming and directing this potential to affect 
actions and reactions of every player in the chain. 
 
12.7 Recommendations for the Supply Chain Participants 
This section outlines the key recommendations for each player in the supply chain.  
The recommendations from two Models elaborated in chapter 11 were integrated and 
synthesised in an Integrated Model depicted in Figure 12.1. The Integrated Model 
follows the initial structure of identified key challenges (see chapter 10, section 
10.2.1, Figure 10.1) and proposes options to address each challenge and improve 
contracting conditions in the paprika supply chain. 
 
The first challenge was described as follows: Poor input provision in the contract 
can be attributed to the low level of trust between parties. The low trust was based 
on the negative experiences with previous contracting. The concept of absent trust 
was not easy to tackle since it was rooted in other challenges too. Previous negative 
experience and related reduced input provision were sensitive issues for both key 
players. The Integrated Model suggests focusing on creating a new image of contract 
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farming in Malawi, which will be grounded on building a relationship between 
parties based on trust, participation and fairness.  
 
One of the overarching principles in a renewed contract farming system should be 
guaranteed purchase and selling, which primarily means honouring one's obligations 
to avoid uncertainties. A well-designed contract should secure guaranteed purchase 
and selling, and contribute to creating a more positive image of contract farming. In 
addition, the key players should enhance their relationship, and the Government 
should develop and implement the National Contract Farming Strategy with an aim 
to: regulate and monitor contract farming activities; secure a sound legal framework 
for enforcing contracts; and offer incentives for ‘fair contracting’. 
 
The National Contract Farming Strategy should provide guidelines on contract 
design to create a win-win situation for both small-scale farmers and companies. 
Hence, the Strategy must encourage formulation of attractive contracts with defined 
minimum required clauses and fair contracting principles based on transparency and 
reciprocity. Malawian and other similar contracts should unambiguously include (but 
not be limited to) the following clauses: parties, duration, inputs provided, grades, 
price and payment, quantity, quality and delivery terms, breach and consequences, 
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Figure 12.1 Integrated Model for improved contracting conditions in Malawi’s paprika supply chain 
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The Integrated Model proposes that both sides should adopt practices that can 
contribute to increasing trust levels. To earn Company D’s trust to provide more 
inputs, small-scale farmers should direct their activities through associations, which 
can then establish revolving funds to channel inputs from Company D and regulate 
purchasing volumes. The Integrated Model proposes to address Challenge 1 through 
re-building the contract farming image and trust by having the National Strategy in 
place, offering attractive contracts, guaranteeing purchase and organising selling 
through associations that have the capacity to receive, distribute and control loans.  
 
The second challenge was described as follows: Small-scale farmers lacked the 
opportunity to bargain and participate in the design of the contract. This limitation 
resulted in small-scale farmers’ reduced sense of responsibility for complying with 
agreed terms and led to the breach of contract. Exclusion from contract formulation 
and negotiation of any term was another sign of mistrust in the supply chain. In 
particular, the non-transparent grading system was a critical challenge in Malawi’s 
paprika supply chain. The Integrated Model here extends on the recommendation of 
increasing mutual trust and proposes enhanced grading procedures. This means that 
Company D should include precise grade descriptions in the contract, monitor its 
staff and allow the presence of a neutral third person during the grading process. The 
proposed actions should restore small-scale farmers’ trust in Company D’s grading.  
 
Small-scale farmers could considerably increase their bargaining power by joining 
registered associations. The promotion of associations should, in particular, focus on 
households with (i) an older head, (ii) small landholding size and (iii) related to 
NGOs in the community since households with those characteristics showed to be 
more likely to become members of FUM. Strengthening of farmers’ associations 
should lead to negotiation of more favourable contracting conditions for small-scale 
farmers, potentially more inputs provided as Company D is keen to collaborate with 
associations and reduced breach of the contract due to peer-pressure within 
associations. The Integrated Model proposes to address Challenge 2 by introducing 
advanced grading procedure and empowering associations and their role in 
representing farmers' interests in the contract to increase small-scale farmers’ 




The third challenge was described as follows: The price offered in the contract did 
not match small-scale farmers’ expectations. Hence, small-scale farmers turned to 
selling the crop to vendors for a higher price. The lack of information sharing and 
negotiation left small-scale farmers with no guarantee for the price they will receive 
from the contractor for the delivered crop. In addition, a parallel paprika market 
offered by vendors was tempting for small-scale farmers. The Integrated Model 
suggests following up on ideas of attractive contract design and guaranteed purchase 
by clearly defining the price negotiated with small-scale farmers in the written 
contract. A stated minimum guaranteed price might attract associations to sell their 
crop to Company D and through peer-pressure reassure members to reduce side-
selling practices.  
 
The Integrated Model proposes three pillars for efficient and sustainable contracting 
relations: knowledge sharing, information sharing and quality communication. 
Through regular visits, demonstrations and communication, Company D could gain 
more trust among small-scale farmers and increase compliance with the contract.  By 
knowing the information on small-scale farmers' conditions concerning production 
costs and average yields, Company D could reduce information asymmetry and set 
more realistic goals for its trading volumes. Defining minimum volumes in the 
contract should be informed by appropriate calculations according to household 
types and capabilities. Encouraging small-scale farmers to exceed minimum volumes 
by offering targeted incentives (i.e. free inputs for the next season) could result in 
increasing trading volumes for Company D. Practicing early purchase (immediately 
after harvest cycles) might secure more volumes to the contractor. The Integrated 
Model proposed to address Challenge 3 through negotiating and clearly defining a 
minimum guaranteed price in the contract, determining minimum volumes, 
rewarding excesses and practising early purchase in communities, and by sharing the 
knowledge and information with small-scale farmers and nurturing communication 








Figure 12.2 Recommendations for supply chain participants 
 
12.8 Study’s Contribution and Originality 
12.8.1 Contribution to Knowledge  
The field of contract farming is extensive and lies on the intersection between of at 
least three disciplines: economics, agriculture and sociology. Contract farming is 
explored from many perspectives, while the body of evidence from developing 
countries is continuously growing. However, some gaps in our understanding of this 
phenomenon require special attention (see chapter 1, Section 1.4). This study 
contributes to knowledge in five main aspects. First, the study provides a new 
original dataset and evidence on the food supply chain management and contracting 
in a developing country context. In general terms, this study continues and expands 
upon the empirical studies on contract farming performance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bolwig et al., 2009; Jones and Gibbon, 2011; Rüsch et al., 2013; Girma and 
Gardebroek, 2015; Bellemare and Novak, 2016; Mwambi et al., 2016). More 
specifically, the study provides rich, in-depth insights into the Malawian paprika 
supply chain and the relations among participants using the mixed methods, 
participatory approach and the lens of New Institutional Economics. Thus, the study 
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farming in Malawi. Second, the study emphasised the importance of contract design 
for contract farming arrangements, as earlier pointed out by Cotula (2011), Prowse 
(2012), Pultrone (2012) and the Legal Guide (2015). Through the analysis of 
Company D’s contract, this study suggests better practices for designing food supply 
contracts to enable fair conditions and meaningful benefits for small-scale farmers.  
 
Third, this study extends the knowledge on side-selling. Side-selling as a 
phenomenon is still an underexplored topic in the food supply chain management 
literature. The theoretical framework for side-selling is well-developed through the 
concept of  opportunistic behaviour, however the empirical studies on side-selling 
are scarce despite the substantial influence that side-selling potentially has on the 
efficiency and sustainability of supply chains. This study investigated the extent of, 
reasons and triggers for side-selling to bridge the existing knowledge gap and, by 
using empirical evidence, contribute to better understanding of side-selling 
mechanism. The significance of the study is that it quantifies side-selling and 
estimates factors other than money that are likely to trigger side-selling. Also, the 
study recommends actions for decreasing levels of side-selling, which can improve 
the operations of Malawi’s paprika supply chain. The study’s recommendations are 
widely applicable in cases where a supply chain suffers from opportunistic behaviour 
like side-selling, both in developed and developing countries. Fourth, the study 
advances the understanding of the role of vendors in contractual relations. In 
particular, the vendors’ role is examined by triangulating the data from three 
different sources, which represents a contribution to current scant empirical evidence 
determining the influence of vendors in contract farming activities. Finally, this 
study introduces and discusses the Integrated Model for improving contracting 
conditions in the Malawian paprika supply chain. The Integrated Model is a result of 
applying a participatory approach to identified key challenges in the supply chain, 
and it provides a set of correlated actions involving all participants. 
 
12.8.2 Contribution to Research Methodology 
The study’s contribution to the research methodology reflects in two main aspects: 
dissemination of the study’s findings and the advanced use of mixed methods design 
(Table 12.1).  
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Table 12.1 The study’s contribution to methodology. Adapted from Creswell and Plano Clark (2007). 
Types of Mixed Methods Design Description Purpose Diagram 
Concurrent Triangulation 
Timing: single phase (concurrent). 
Priority: equal weight. 
Mixing: merging results or data. 
 
Concurrent but separate data collection and analysis, merging 
the results often in the interpretation phase. 
Variations: Convergence Model, Data Transformation Model, 
Validating Quantitative Data Model, and Multilevel Model 
(different methods used to address various level within a 
system). 
To better understand 
the research problem 
and arrive to solid 




Timing: single or two phases 
(concurrent or sequential). 
Priority:  QUAL/QUAN and 
qual/quan. 
Mixing: Embedding qual/quan in 
larger QUAN/QUAL design. 
One data set embedded in other data set, one data set providing 
a supportive role in a study primarily based on the other data set, 
qual. and quan. data answer different research questions. 
Variations: Embedded Experimental Model and Embedded 
Correlational Model (both models propose how to embed 
qualitative data into predominantly quantitative study). 
Used when a single 
data set in not enough 
and the study needs to 
answer different types 
of questions, which 




Timing: Two phases (sequential). 
Priority: QUAN usually as priority. 
Mixing: Connecting - quan. leads to 
qual. 
Qual. data assists in explaining or builds upon initially quan. 
results, first phase quan. data collection and analysis, quan. data 
results, second phase qual. data collection and analysis, qual. 
data results, interpretation how qual. data explain quan. results. 
Variations: Follow-up Explanations Model and Participant 
Selection Model. 
To explain or build upon 
or explain the quan. 




Timing: Two phases (sequential). 
Priority: QUAL usually as priority. 
Mixing: Connection – qual. builds to 
quan. 
The results from the quan. method assists in developing or 
informing the quan. method, first phase qual. data collection and 
analysis; qual. data results; forming variables; second phase 
quan. data collection and analysis; quan. data results; 
interpretation how quan. results provide new, better intervention. 
Variations: Instrument Development Model and Taxonomy 
Development Model. 
To explore the 
phenomenon using 
qualitative data and 
then to build the second 
– quantitative phase in 
the form of variables or 
propositions. 
 
Study design: Embedded Design-
Multilevel Model with both 
Concurrent and Sequential Data 
Collection and QUAL Priority 
Timing: Concurrent and sequential 
data collection. 
Priority: QUAL as priority. 
Mixing: Embedding. 
In the first phase, qual. and quan. data are collected and 
analysed concurrently (priority given to qual. data). The 
interpretation of QUAL and quan results is formulated into the 
study’s preliminary findings and disseminated to the study 
participants (the results from the first phase inform the second 
phase). In the second phase, qual. data are collected and 
analysed. In the final interpretation, the qual. data from the 
second phase are crosschecked with the qual. and quan. results 
from the first phase to reach solid conclusions. Modifications 
done: Timing (both Concurrent and Sequential data collection), 
multilevel model in Embedded Design and Priority (QUAL in 
Embedded Design) + Dissemination of the study’s findings. 
To allow dissemination 
of the study’s 
preliminary findings and 
increase the rigour and 
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This study included dissemination of the study’s findings as a vital part of its 
research design. Dissemination involved additional data collection and subsequent 
analysis, which increased the study’s practical value. Furthermore, the study adjusted 
the time component of the Embedded Design-Multilevel Model to allow 
dissemination of the study’s findings. Despite the well-developed area of mixed 
methods approach and many designs available, there exists a certain gap. Current 
mixed methods approaches divide research into concurrent and sequential only 
(according to Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; 
Creswell, 2013), while dissemination of the findings requires the combination of the 
two. This study demonstrates that the concurrent approach can be used during the 
first sequence of the research for collecting, analysing, interpreting and integrating 
qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously. Completely interpreted results from 
the first sequence can further inform the second sequence (sequential approach), 
which involves dissemination of the study’s findings. Thus, this study contributes to 
the methodology by incorporating dissemination of the findings into research design 
to ensure that the findings reach the key stakeholders and that those stakeholders 
verify the study’s findings, which increases reliability and results in better-informed 
recommendations. In addition, the study extends the use of the concurrent and 
sequential approach in Embedded Design-Multilevel Model to accommodate 
dissemination phase of the research. Some of the advanced multiphase mixed 
methods designs are already developed (see Abbot et al., 2012; Creswell, 2015; 
Lucero et al., 2016) and although this study has some characteristics of the 
convergent design (separate collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative 
data), there was a need to construct even more appropriate, time-efficient and 
straightforward design for applied research in the area of food supply chain 
management. 
 
12.8.3 Practical Contribution 
By the choice of research aim and overall question, the study undertook the task to 
contribute to problem-solve the constraints hindering efficiency and sustainability in 
the paprika supply chain in Malawi. As a result, the study contributed to contract 
farming practices in two main aspects. The study proposed and critically evaluated 
options for addressing the key challenges found in the paprika supply chain through 
the Integrated Model. This means that the study suggests needed practical steps for 
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small-scale farmers, Company D and the enabling environment to improve contract 
farming performance in the paprika supply chain. Also, the study mobilised existing 
knowledge through the participatory approach from various stakeholders on a 
country level to empower local participants and encourage them to recognise 
themselves as part of the solution. 
 
12.9 Further Research 
Future research in the area of contract farming in a developing country context 
should focus on several issues. First, the research should explore the concept of trust 
in contracting situations and bring new solutions to increase the trust between parties 
as this issue showed to be critical in this study. Second, assessing how different 
attributes of contract design affect financial and social welfare of small-scale farmers 
in developing countries using both qualitative and quantitative approaches will add 
needed evidence to contract farming literature. Future research should also aim at 
introducing more efficient and sustainable contract designs based on both farmers’ 
and company’s preferences. Improving the supply chain management practices for 
high-value products through contract design in developing countries should become 
the priority in future studies. Third, research that is more specific should orientate on 
exploring and re-defining the role of vendors in contract schemes. Fourth, in the case 
of Malawi’s paprika sector, future research should undertake a longitudinal study 
that compares contract and non-contract small-scale farmers to assess the impact of 
contracting on farmers’ productivity and income. Ultimately, analysis of the 
institutional framework(s) and countries' policies and strategies concerning contract 
design to assess the efficiency and level of alignment with the Legal Guide and 
SDGs will contribute to better understanding and disseminating of best practices for 
contract farming in developing countries. In general, future research should focus on 
assessing the efficiency of contract farming in context-specific conditions and then 
gradually shift its focus from learned lessons to proposing innovations in contract 
design and public policies supporting contract farming, in particular using the 
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Source Sector and country 
Contract farming impact 
Positive Negative 
Sub-Saharan Africa (1) 
Huddleston and 
Tonts (2007) 
Oil palm industry in 
Ghana 
 Contract farming created jobs in rural area. 
 Contracting promoted agricultural development and formed a foundation for 





 When based on trust and cooperation, contract can improve performance and 
reduce transaction costs of enforcement as the opportunistic behaviour decreases. 
 
Bolwig et al. (2009) 
Organic coffee in 
Uganda 
 Contract provided positive revenue effects and lowered farmer‟s uncertainty 
regarding net returns. 
 Contract guaranteed a price premium for meeting agreed quality requirements. 
 
Chirwa and Kydd 
(2009) 
Tea in Malawi 
 Contract farmers received better services and increased the profitability of their 
farming activities. 
 
Jones and Gibbon 
(2011) 
Organic cocoa in 
Uganda 
 Contract farmers were able to increase the product quality due to technology 
adoption. 
 Technology adoption was encouraged by credible incentives primarily from 
contracting scheme. 




and coffee in Uganda 
 Contract farming improved household‟s food security since farmers were able to 
obtain higher revenues, which enhanced their access to buying food. 
 Contracts led to poverty reduction for participating households. 
 Gender imbalances: women had less control 
over the benefits compared to men. 
 Women had the same or larger share of the 
labour and management tasks. 
Bellemare (2012) 
Various crops in 
Madagascar 
 Contracts positively impacted the household welfare and have the potential to 
alleviate the poverty.  
 Industrial development can be achieved by stimulating processors to expand their 
operations and involve farmers in agri-food chains. 
 Contract farming might increase inequalities. 
Bellemare and 
Novak (2016) 
Various crops in 
Madagascar 
 Contract farming can reduce the duration of household‟s hungry period for 8 days 
on average and contracted households are 18% more likely to end their hungry 
season at any time.  
 
 






















Contract farming impact 
Positive Negative 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2) 
Fréguin-Gresh et al., 
(2012) and Fréguin-
Gresh and Anseeuw, 
(2013) 
Citrus and sub-
tropical fruits in 
South Africa 
 Contracts enabled improvements in productivity, increased 
incomes, access to services (such as technical assistance, 
training and capacity building) and resources (such as 
inputs, credits and information) and opened opportunities 
for farmers to participate in competitive high-value market. 
 
 Contracts are not a panacea for farmers and should not be considered 
as a tool for majority of small farmers for addressing imbalances in 
agricultural sectors. 
 Contracts are limited to better off farmers (large- or medium-scale) 
who already have high productivity, equipment and output markets. 
 There are entry barriers for small farmers (such as access to land and 
irrigation and education levels) who remain excluded and 
marginalised. 
 Contracts did not reduce poverty nor they improved rural livelihoods. 
 There is a significant doubt whether contract farming can integrate 
small farmers into modern supply chains and how sustainable 
contracts are. 
Rüsch et al. (2013) 
Vegetables in 
Tanzania 
 Contract farming was recognised as a suitable institutional 
tool to overcome land and labour shortfalls and secure 
meeting quality standards in vegetable production. 
 Organisation of farmers proved successful based on 
involvement of village chiefs who ensured the contract 
details were fully understood and due to clear 
communication with other partners. 
 With the help of technical expertise and supervision, 
farmers were able to achieve certification standards, 
develop new skills and access lucrative markets. 
 
 The contract scheme suffered from internal issues as the role of 
management and administration was neglected. 
 Particularly, financial and operational management skills and 
experiences of the staff on the contractor‟s side showed to be an 
essential precondition for contract farming. 
 The lack of stated skills to manage complex contracting scheme (no 
integration of administrative and operational processes, no modern 
softwar  to track he flow of goods and funds, poor transport decisions 
which resulted in downgrading the product quality) negatively affected 
hundreds of farmers. 
Girma and Gardebroek 
(2015) 
Organic honey 
supply in Ethiopia 
 Farmers supplying an organic honey under the contract 
improved their incomes and were able to access the 
premium price. 
 The contract offered higher prices for produced honey 
compared to the local market. 
 Contract farming proved its potential for encouraging a 
sustainable management of forests through a supply of 
forest product. 
 
Mwambi et al. (2016) Avocado in Kenya 
 Contract farmers received better services and increased 
the profitability of their farming activities. 
 The participation in CF was not sufficient to improve household, farm 
and avocado income. 
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 Contracts enabled higher incomes for farmers and provided 
more employment for the labour force. 
 Contract farming was found to be biased against farmers since the 
agribusiness companies were dealing with large producers. 
 Contracts increased the existing challenges in the farm sector, 
namely high chemical input intensity and social differentiation.  
 The contract protected the company from unforeseen obligations 
while the farmer had to perform under all circumstances (no 
compensation was envisaged in case of force majeure events). 
 The contract was not considered fair: the farmer was obliged to sell 
the product only to the company and was penalised otherwise; the 
company was not liable for the failure to purchase farmer‟s product. 
 Contract farming was marked with lack of trust between parties and 
company‟s tendency towards monopolisation. 
Singh (2003) 
Hybrid cottonseed 
in Andhra Pradesh 
and vegetables in 
Punjab 
 Contract marginally increased real income for women 
farmers. 
 Working conditions under contract farming were inadequate: women 
workers reported lower wages compared to men, poor working 
conditions and limited bargaining power. 
 The increasing amount of child labour was recorder under contract 
farming schemes. 
Tripathi et al. (2005) Potato in Haryana 
 The yields, gross and net income over various costs and the 
price were higher for contract farmers compared to non-
contract farmers. 
 Contract farming improved profitability, resource-use and 
technology adoption among farmers.  
 The costs of production were found 17-24% higher under contract 
farming due to required investments on seed, fertilizers and 
equipment.  
Ramaswami et al. 
(2006) 
Poultry in Andhra 
Pradesh 
 Contract farming was found a useful institutional tool for 
supplying credit, technology and insurance to farmers. 
 Contracted farmers experienced lower risks (a proportion of 
market risk was shifted from farmers to processor) and 
gained higher returns. 
 Contracted production was more efficient than non-contracted, but 
the surplus was allocated to the processor. 
 The processor selected farmers with poor prospects as independent 
growers to increase the efficiency of contract impactand capture 
most surpluses.  
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Summary of 27 selected empirical studies on CF in developing countries - Continued 
Source Sector and country 
Contract farming impact 
Positive Negative 
India (2)  
Sharma (2008) 
Various commodities 
in Punjab, Amristar, 
Jalandhar and 
Ludhiana 




Winter maize, hyola 
and green peas in 
Punjab 
 
 Co tract farming scheme was proven inefficient in the case of 
adverse weather and input provision. 
 Winter maize and hyola experienced almost complete failure caused 
by the unfavourable weather conditions and poor quality seeds. 
 Farmers growing green peas had to sell their product on the open 
market since it was initially rejected by the contractor due to quality 
failure. 





 It is believed that consistent interaction over the long period 
between the farmers and the company discourages contract 
breach. 
 Contracts were primarily understood as a personal 
relationships. 
 The state policies intended to encourage development of institutional 
framework for contract farming might be misplaced and ineffective as 
it is found that both companies and farmers are reluctant to engage 
into legally binding arrangements. 
 Both parties preferred to continue transactions outside of legal 
structures. 
 Contracts were signed in other person‟s name from the farmers‟ side 
which complicates the track of contracted farmer. 
Goel (2013) 
Basmati rice in 
Punjab 
 A unique case of PepsiCo suggested that focusing the 
contract operations in areas less interesting to the 
competition can become a successful strategy. 
 Farmers under contract increased their income due to 
higher productivity and premium prices received and 
experienced less uncertainty regarding delayed payments 
and received technical training free of charge. 
 PepsiCo adapted their contract according to the government 
regulation and allowed farmers to sell their product to other 




marigold and broiler 
in southern India 
 Contracts for papaya and broiler enabled clear net gains to 
farmers. 
 Contracts for marigold left farmers worse off and contracts for 
gherkins varied in impact. 
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Source Sector and country 
Contract farming impact 
Positive Negative 
Latin America (1) 
Saenz and Ruben 
(2004) 
Chayote in Costa Rica 
 Contracts were considered as an important tool to improve 
security and involvement of small farmers in international 
marketing chains. 
 Farmers were granted access to credit, important inputs and 
information, and were able to benefit from economies of scale 
and scope. 
 Contracting increased products‟ quality due to better use of 
land. 
 Higher levels of loyalty were observed among farmers who 




Export vegetables and 
grains in Mexico 
 Contract farming represented a link between local farmers 
and national and international world market. 
 Contracts enabled a relatively secure outlet for farmers and 
offered technical assistance and finances for production. 
 The risk in contracting arrangement was not proportionally 
allocated between parties. 
Imbruce (2008) 
Asian vegetables in 
Honduras 
 Farmers increased their earnings through contracting. 
 Farmers gained bargaining strength and were forcing 
companies to abandon written contracts and adjust their 
policies so that farmers can be allowed to work with more 
than one export company at the same time. 
 Note: profits should not be the only measure of how 
successful is particular contracting scheme. 
 
Michelson et al. 
(2012) 
Tomatoes, small green 
peppers, cabbage and 
lettuce in Nicaragua 
 The contract systematically reduced the price volatility. 
 Contractor‟s prices were significantly lower than prices on 
traditional market. 
 Farmers paid too high amounts for their contractual insurance 
against price volatility. 
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Source Sector and country 
Contract farming impact 
Positive Negative 
Latin America (2) 
Fromm (2013) Cocoa in Honduras 
 Contract farmers received increased prices and improved their 
income. 
 It is expected that the investment in farmers‟ training 
(knowledge on production, quality and environment) will have 
the most significant impact in the future. 
 Note: Positive outcomes cannot be attributed only to contract 
farming but also to work of a number of local and international 
organisations from public and private sector. 
 
da Silva Júnior et al. 
(2013) 
Biodiesel in Brazil  
 Contract farming continues to be a crucial instrument for 
biodiesel producers and small farmers‟ organisations. 
 Having contracts increased farmers‟ average annual revenue 
by 600%, offered technical services free of charge, secured 
fixed price for the crop and reduced risks of finding the market. 
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Appendix B Tables related to results in chapter 8, 9, 10 and 11 
Table 1.1A Socio-economic and farming characteristics of households in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts 
Variable Nkhotakota (N=125) Lilongwe (N=303) 
 Income levels                             
 (% of total N in NKH) 
CF land allocated                
(% of total N in NKH) 
Income levels                            
(% of total N in LLW) 
CF land allocated                        
(% of total N in LLW) 
























Age             
Younger (<26-30) 12               
(9.6) 
12       
(9.6) 
4     
(3.2) 
12     
(9.6) 
11    
(8.8) 
5        
(4) 
31    
(10.2) 
23    
(7.6) 
13    
(4.3) 
31    
(10.2) 
24 
    (7.9) 
12 
     (4) 
Middle-age (31-40) 13              
(10.4) 
18     
(14.4) 






4     
(3.2) 
38    
(12.5) 
25    
(8.3) 
8   
  (2.6) 
26  
   (8.6) 
33    
(10.9) 
12  
    (4) 
Older (>40) 20                   
(16) 






25    
(20) 
4    
(3.2) 
94    
  (31) 
51 
(16.8) 
20    
(6.6) 
68   
(22.4) 




Education of HH head             
Primary 37       
(29.6) 














21    
(6.9) 
92    
(30.4) 
94  
    (31) 
42 
(13.9) 
Secondary 6           
(4.8) 
11       
(8.8) 
9     
(7.2) 
10 
     (8) 
13 
(10.4) 
3     
(2.4) 
14  
   (4.6) 
20    
(6.6) 
17    
(5.6) 
19 
    (6.3) 
20 
    (6.6) 
12   
   (4) 
Tertiary 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0.8) 0 (0) 1 (0.8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0.3) 
None 2 (1.6) 6 (4.8) 1 (0.8) 3 (2.4) 5 (4) 0 (0) 14 (4.6) 7 (2.3) 2 (0.7) 14 (4.6) 6 (2) 3 (1) 
Adult literacy 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0.8) 1 (0.8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Food expenses/month             
Low (>5500 MKW) 26 (20.8) 12 (9.6) 6 (4.8) 20 (16) 20 (16) 3 (2.4) 80 (26.4) 22 (7.3) 6 (2) 48 (15.8) 47 (15.5) 13 (4.3) 




















































Table 1.1A Socio-economic and farming characteristics of households in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts - Continued 
 
Variable  Nkhotakota (N=125) Lilongwe (N=303) 
 Income levels                                 
(% of total N in NKH) 
CF land allocated                         
(% of total N in NKH) 
Income levels                               
(% of total N in LLW) 
CF land allocated                         

























All-land size             
Small (Up to 1.6 acre) 13 (10.4) 17 (13.6) 19 (15.2) 30 (24) 18 (14.4) 1 (0.8) 59 (19.5) 22 (7.3) 10 (3.3) 58 (19.1) 32 (10.6) 1 (0.3) 
Medium (1.6-2 acres) 8 (6.4) 5 (4) 4 (3.2) 6 (4.8) 6 (4.8) 5 (4) 14 (4.6) 21 (6.9) 15 (5) 10 (3.3) 11 (3.6) 29 (9.6) 
Large (>2 acres) 24 (19.2) 22 (17.6) 13 (10.4) 20 (16) 31 (24.8) 7 (5.6) 90 (28.7) 56 (18.5) 14 (4.6) 57 (18.8) 77 (25.4) 26 (8.6) 
Membership in local farmers 
association/coop/club 
            
Yes 37  
  (29.6) 








10    
    (8) 
100   
   (33) 
81       
(26.7) 
25 
   (8.3) 
81 
 (26.7) 
85    
(28.1) 
40     
 (13.2)  
No 8      
  (6.4) 
7       
(5.6) 
8   
    (6.4) 
8    
   (6.4) 
12    
(9.6) 
3   
    (2.4) 
63 
   (20.8) 
18         
(5.9) 




35    
(11.6) 
18      
  (5.9) 
Other membership in:             
Credit union 1 (0.8) 3 (2.4) 1 (0.8) 1 (0.8) 4 (3.2) 0 (0) 5 (1.7) 17 (5.6) 8 (2.6) 11 (3.6) 8 (2.6) 11 (3.6) 
Trading union 2 (1.6) 1 (0.8) 2 (4) 4 (3.2) 1 (0.8) 0 (0) 22 (7.3) 29 (9.6) 2 (0.7) 24 (7.9) 24 (7.9) 5 (1.7) 
Agricultural coop 31  
  (24.8) 









     (6.4) 
55   
 (18.2) 
43        
(14.2) 




50    
(16.5) 
13     
 (4.3) 
NASFAM 1 (0.8) 3 (2.4) 2 (1.6) 1 (0.8) 4 (3.2) 1 (0.8) 6 (2) 9 (3) 1 (0.3) 6 (2) 5 (1.7) 5 (1.7) 
FUM 6       
 (4.8) 






10       
(8) 
1  
     (0.8) 
57  
   (18.8) 
59        
(19.5) 




50    
(16.5) 
26        
(8.6) 
None 10    
     (8) 
5          
(4) 
3    
   (2.4) 
3    
   (2.4) 
11    
(8.8) 
3     
  (2.4) 
63  
   (20.8) 
15            
(5) 




34     
(11.2) 
21      
  (6.9) 
Assistance from NGO             
Yes 12 (9.6) 24 (19.2) 18 (14.4) 19 (15.2) 27 (21.6) 7 (5.6) 43 (14.2) 60 (19.8) 15 (5) 38 (12.5) 44 (14.5) 36 (11.9) 
No 6 (4.8) 6 (4.8) 11 (8.8) 16 (12.8) 6 (4.8) 1 (0.8) 52 (17.2) 24 (7.9) 11 (3.6) 42 (13.9) 36 (11.9) 9 (3) 
N/A 27 (21.6) 14 (11.2) 7 (5.6) 21 (4.9) 22 (17.6) 5 (4) 68 (22.4) 14 (4.6) 15 (5) 45 (14.9) 40 (13.2) 13 (4.3) 
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Table 1.1A Socio-economic and farming characteristics of households in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts - Continued 
 
Variable Nkhotakota (n=125) Lilongwe (N=303) 
 Income levels                             
(% of total N in NKH) 
CF land allocated                     
(% of total N in NKH) 
Income levels                             
(% of total N in LLW) 
CF land allocated                         

























Assistance from Government             





33   
(26.4) 











  (9.6) 
114 
(37.6) 
106    (35) 43 
(14.2) 
N/A 0 (0) 0 (0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (2.3) 0 (0) 2 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 6 (2) 1 (0.3) 
Land allocated to paprika             
Low (<10 %) 10       
(8) 
9       
(7.2) 
12     
(9.6) 
28     
(22.4) 
2      
(1.6) 
0     
     (0) 
46     
(15.2) 
6        
(29) 
5          
(1.7) 
33       
(10.9) 
21         
(6.9) 
3             
(1) 
Medium (10-30%) 30      
(24) 
9       
(7.2) 
11     
(8.8) 
19      
(15.2) 
24         
(19.2) 
7    
   (5.6) 
91  
      (30) 
52      
(17.2) 
17        
(5.6) 
65   
  (21.5) 
76        
(25.1) 
19        
(6.3) 
High (30-50% and above) 5         
(4) 
26    
(20.8) 
13   
(10.4) 
9      
(7.2) 
29     
(23.2) 
6   
    (4.8) 
26      
 (8.6) 
40       
(13.2) 
19         
(6.3) 
26   
    (8.6) 
23         
(7.6) 
36       
(11.9) 
Dry paprika yields/season             
Low (<100 kg/season) 11    
(8.8) 
8       
(6.4) 
9       
(7.2) 
18      
(14.4) 
8      
(6.4) 
2   
    (1.6) 
64 
    (21.1) 
11        
(3.6) 
7           
(2.3) 
52          
(17.2) 
26         
(8.6) 
4         
(1.3) 
Medium (100-200 kg/season) 14 
 (11.2) 
16   
(12.8) 
8       
(6.4) 
17     
(13.6) 
19     
(15.2) 
2         
(1.6) 
60   
  (19.8) 
37      
(12.2) 
9             
(3) 
43 
    (14.2) 
45  
   (14.9) 
18        
(5.9) 
High (>200 kg/season) 19 
 (15.29 
20      
(16) 
19   
(15.2) 
20     
(16) 
28     
(22.4) 
9     
  (7.2) 
37     
(12.2) 
51      
(16.8) 
24        
(7.9) 
29         
(9.6) 
47  
   (15.5) 
36      
(11.9) 
Information on paprika price:             




9       
(7.2) 
13   
(10.4) 
15      
(12) 
6      
(4.8) 
53     
(17.5) 
40     
(13.2) 
11      
(3.6) 
51     
(16.8) 
40    
(13.2) 
13     
(4.3) 
After the harvest 27 
(21.6) 
25      
(20) 
21    
(16.8) 
36   
(28.8) 
30       
(24) 




58    
(19.1) 
30     
(9.9) 
73     
(24.1) 
80    
(26.4) 
45   
(14.9) 
Before or after delivery 6 (4.8) 6 (4.8) 6 (4.8) 7 (5.6) 10 (8) 1 (0.8) 0 (0) 1 (0.3) 0 (0) 1 (0.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
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Table 1.1A Socio-economic and farming characteristics of households in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts – Continued 
 
Variable Nkhotakota (N=125) Lilongwe (N=303) 
 Income levels                                       
(% of total N in NKH) 
CF land allocated                              
(% of total N in NKH) 
Income levels                                         
(% of total N in LLW)  
CF land allocated                             



























            
Low (<3500 MKW) 21 
(16.8) 
15               
(12) 
10               
(8) 
20             
(16) 
20           
(16) 
5               
(4) 
74              
(24.4) 
42    
(13.9) 
20            
(6.6) 










14            
(11.2) 
11               
(8.8) 




3             
(2.4) 




13               
(4.3) 
24            
(7.9) 
28             
(9.2) 
15              
(5) 
High (>6500 MKW) 4 (3.2) 10 (8) 13 (10.4) 11 (8.8) 11 (8.8) 5 (4) 11 (3.6) 5 (1.7) 2 (0.7) 4 (1.3) 8 (2.6) 6 (2) 
Unknown/not using it 3 (2.4) 5 (4) 2 (1.6) 7 (5.6) 3 (2.4) 0 (0) 56 (18.5) 20 (6.6) 6 (2) 47 (15.5) 28 (9.2) 7 (2.3) 
Fungicide 
cost/season: 
            




12               
(9.6) 
8             
(6.4) 
15              
(12) 
21   
(16.8) 
4              
(3.2) 












Medium              
(3500-6500 MKW) 
6 (4.8) 14 (11.2) 14 (11.2) 12 (9.6) 17 (13.6) 5 (4) 16 (5.3) 29 (9.6) 12 (4) 19 (6.3) 27 (8.9) 11 (3.6) 
High (>6500 MKW) 3 (2.4) 7 (5.6) 10 (8) 10 (8) 7 (5.6) 3 (2.4) 6 (2) 4 (1.3) 1 (0.3) 4 (1.3) 3 (1) 4 (1.3) 
Unknown/not using it 15 
(12) 
11             
(8.8) 
4           
(3.2) 
19           
(15.2) 
10             
(8) 
1             
(0.8) 
94                
(31) 
24           
(7.9) 






12             
(4) 
Distance from HH to 
collection point: 
            
Close (<15 min of 
walk) 
11            
(8.8) 
9            
(7.2) 
5            
(13.9) 
9              
(7.2) 
13           
(10.4) 
3             
(2.4) 












Medium (15-30 min 
of walk) 
11           
(8.8) 
5              
(4) 
7               
(5.6) 
8               
(6.4) 
11               
(8.8) 
3              
(2.4) 







  (7.6) 
21 
  (6.9) 
23 
 (7.6) 
Large (>30 min of 
walk) 
23          
(18.4) 
30           
(24) 
24         
(19.2) 
39           
(31.2) 
31          
(24.8) 
7             
(5.6) 
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Table 1.1A Socio-economic and farming characteristics of households in Nkhotakota and Lilongwe districts – Continued 
 
Variable Nkhotakota (N=125) Lilongwe (N=303) 
 Income levels                             
(% of total N in NKH) 
CF land allocated                                    
(% of total N in NKH) 
Income levels                             
(% of total N in LLW) 
CF land allocated                             

























Sufficiency of income from CF              




























23        
(18.4) 
24 
 (19.2)  
30            
(24) 
8              
(6.4) 




28          
(9.2) 
72           
(23.8) 














2            
(1.6) 
76              
(25.1) 
23           
(7.6) 
12             
(4) 
50           
(16.5) 




How does participation in CF 
influence household 
            
























Negatively 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (1.7) 2 (0.7) 0 (0) 2 (0.7) 4 (1.3) 1 (0.3) 
Does not influence 1 (0.8) 1 (0.8) 1 (0.8) 0 (0) 3 (2.4) 0 (0) 3 (1) 2 (0.7) 0 (0) 4 (1.3) 0 (0) 1 (0.3) 
Not known or N/A 2 (1.6) 0 (0) 1 (0.8) 3 (2.4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (2) 2 (0.79) 0 (0) 3 (1) 4 (1.3) 1 (0.3) 
HH play to expand contracting 
to other crops* 
            






















No 14 (11.2) 12 (9.6) 4 (3.2) 17 (13.6) 9 (7.2) 3 (2.4) 102 (33.7) 39 (12.8) 17 (5.6) 3 (1) 66 (21.8) 24 (7.9) 
Direct communication             
With the contractor 4 (3.2) 11 (8.8) 2 (1.6) 4 (3.2) 11 (8.8) 2 (1.6) 47 (15.5) 43 (14.2) 15 (5) 29 (9.6) 49 (16.2) 27 (8.9) 
























Note: * nine responses missing in the category CF land allocated in Lilongwe. 
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Variable Nkhotakota (N=125) Lilongwe (N=303) 
 Income levels                                       
(% of total N in NKH) 
CF land allocated                           
(% of total N in NKH) 
Income levels                             
(% of total N in LLW) 
CF land allocated                        



























            
Yes 18          
(14.4) 
27            
(21.6) 
20          
(16) 
35          
(28) 
29           
(23.2) 
1            
(0.8) 












No 27        
(21.6) 






26         
(20.8) 
12    
(9.6) 












Proportion of paprika 
sold to the contractor: 
            
Low                              
(Up to 30%) 
6           
(4.8) 






4              
(3.2) 
4           
(3.2) 
32          
(10.6) 
10         
(3.3) 
3           
(1) 
11          
(3.6) 
29         
(9.6) 
5          
(1.7) 
Medium                            
(30-70%) 
9 (7.2) 9 (7.2) 4 (3.2) 5 (4) 14 (11.2) 3 (2.4) 11 (3.6) 24 (7.9) 2 (0.7) 11 (3.6) 20 (6.6) 6 (2) 
Large                                    
(71-100%) 
28        
(22.4) 






37         
(29.6) 
6         
(4.8) 












Unknown 2 (1.6) 1 (0.8) 0 (0) 3 (2.4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (1.3) 7 (2.3) 1 (0.3) 2 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 8 (2.6) 
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Table 1.3A Results from Kendall’s tau-b test for association between two variables on ordinal scale 
Two variables b Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
Access to inputs x HH monthly income -0.268 0.000 
Access to inputs x HH costs for fungicides/season 0.283 0.000 
Access to inputs x Size of CF land -0.282 0.000 
Access to credit x Size of CF land -0.311 0.000 
Access to credit x HH costs for fertilizers/season 0.131 0.002 
Access to credit x HH costs for pesticides/season 0.146 0.001 
Access to credit x HH costs for fungicides/season 0.175 0.000 
 
 
Table 1.4A Results from Kendall’s tau-b test for association between two variables on ordinal scale 
Two variables b Correlation Coefficient p-value 
Satisfaction with the contractor x 
Satisfaction with farmers‟ institution 
0.349 0.000 
Satisfaction with the contractor x 
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Challenge 1 Level 1: Smallholders Level 2: Company Level 3: Chain's environment 
Poor input 
provision 
„[Our] neighbours see [our contract 
farming] as a waste of time, because no 
inputs or loans are given, as compared to 
other crops like tobacco.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 3, Chawatha 
area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
„We negotiate to [get] loan on input; this 
can be fertilizers, seeds, sprayers, [and] 
chemicals - this would help us. Right now 
we don‟t get loan.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 6, Nkhoma 
area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
„One of the most important things to be 
included [in the contract] is the farm input 
loan.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 8, Nkhoma 
area, Lilongwe district, 2015  
„But the issue is that as [Company], we 
cannot provide inputs to the farmers on 
credit. Because we had a bad 
experience in the past when we were 
giving farmers inputs on credit, they 
never repaired the loan. Actually, what 
happens is the more you give inputs to 
the farmers, the more they will carry 
what we call side selling.‟ 
 
Company representatives, joint semi-
structured interview with two field 
officers, Lilongwe, 2015 
  
„Small farmers are economically disloyal i.e. they follow price 
irrespective of who has supplied the seed to them. The 
consequence of this is that a purchaser will supply seed 
(relatively low cost) but will not supply the other costly inputs 
needed (fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides etc.) as when 
paprika is ready the [smallholder] will sell for the highest price 
irrespective of who has supplied inputs.‟                                                                                                                                    
 
Processor from South Africa, email correspondence, 2015 
Previous 
experience 
„The [Company] says [they] cannot give 
out loans because they go by a history 
that Malawian farmers do not pay back 
loans.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 4, Chiputu 
area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
„I mean, if I gave them four bags of 
fertilizer and a seed, and said I‟ll come 
back and buy from you at the end of the 
season, they‟ll probably knock off the 
fertilizer and we cannot buy [the crop].‟ 
 
Company’s CEO, semi-structured 
interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
„[Smallholders] want [1] as much for free as possible, [2] long 
pay back times, [3] clear information of how much will be 
bought, when and for what price.‟ 
Consultant no. 1, email correspondence, 2014 
 
„The [company X] experience actually was the bad one 
unfortunately. The farmers talk about: “Oh, [company X], the 
cheaters!” It could have been more of a perception than 
anything, but that‟s how the farmers felt about it because they 
just felt they were not given the price that they promised at 
the beginning.‟ 
Representative from NASFAM, semi-structured interview, 
Lilongwe, 2014 
Table 1.5A Triangulation of the interview data related to Challenge 1 
 
         402 
 Table 1.5A Triangulation of the interview data related to Challenge 1 - Continued 
Challenge 1 Level 1: Smallholders Level 2: Company Level 3: Chain's environment 
Low level of 
trust 
„We don‟t trust the company and 
that‟s why we sale to vendors. 
[Vendors] offer good prices on 
paprika. Imagine, they don‟t even 
grade the product; they buy it at 
higher price than [the Company]. 
How could we trust the [Company] 
when today they tell us the crop is 
at 500 MKW and tomorrow at 300 
MKW? The same crop. It‟s not fair.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 6, 
Nkhoma area, Lilongwe district, 
2015 
„Umm...I guess by my answers I don‟t 
trust [smallholders]. No, I don‟t trust 
them. Because they would go and sell to 
someone else, and run away from me. 
So, umm...I don‟t think...No! They 
haven‟t done anything to demonstrate 
we should trust.‟ 
Company’s CEO, semi-structured 
interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
„I can say farmers are my friends. Yes, yes, yes I trust them. And 
they trust me, also. Because, with me I‟m so open. I say: “We can 
use your scale or we can use my scale”.‟ 
Vendor no. 1, semi-structured interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
„But as for the private companies, I believe the trust is not that 
high.‟  
Representative from Concern Universal, semi-structured 




„We are not communicated to in 
advance of the expected produce 
prices.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 1, 
Kamparilo and Kalilani area, 
Nkhotakota district, 2014 
 
„The contractor should sit down with 
the farmers and set prices for the 
produce beforehand.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 2, 
Limbikani club, Nhkotakota district, 
2014 
  
[The topic did not appear during the 
conversation in a form that adds to the 
triangulation purpose.] 
 
„There are some facts that are hidden between the players.‟ 
Representative from the Ministry, semi-structured interview, 
Lilongwe, 2015 
 
„They [company in the contract] can‟t say they will be paying 
the farmers within two weeks. Already that‟s a problem! The 
farmers they want cash! The vendors are already out there 
and they are paying cash. I mean, waiting for two weeks? A 
smallholder farmer? It doesn‟t carry a weigh. [This] is already 
putting the farmer off. You cannot go by this.‟ 
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Table 1.5A Triangulation of the interview data related to Challenge 1 - Continued 
Challenge 1 Level 1: Smallholders Level 2: Company Level 3: Chain's environment 
Missing legal 
framework/strategy 
One participant suggested that there needs to 
be more involvement by the government or 
other organization to break existing private 
monopoly. Now only one player, Exagris, is the 
sole buyer and provider of seed so farmers 
have no choice. 
Assistant's notes from the focus group 
interview no. 6, Nkhoma area, Lilongwe district, 
2015 
 
„If the government would come in and help with 
marketing, it would help us a lot.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 8, Nkhoma area, 
Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
[The topic did not 
appear during the 
conversation in a 
form that adds to the 
triangulation 
purpose.]  
„Yeah, so we do not have the Contract Farming Strategy 
in place right now.‟ 
Representative from CISANET, semi-structured 
interview, Lilongwe, 2015. 
 
„Unfortunately, we don‟t have the right legal framework, 
the legal instruments to support contract farming.‟ 
Representative from FUM, semi-structured interview, 
Lilongwe, 2015 
 
„When a dispute erupts between the contractor and the 
contracted, or the buyer and maybe the farmer, nobody 
knows where to go because there are no legal 
instruments to guide them.‟ 
Representative from the Ministry, semi-structured 
interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
 
„And also…I think one of the biggest challenges is that 
as a country we don‟t really have like a contract farming 
or contract marketing strategy. So, there‟s no guidance 
on this how it‟s done.‟ 
Representative from NASFAM, semi-structured 
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Table 1.6A Triangulation of the interview data related to Challenge 2 
Challenge 2 Level 1: Smallholders Level 2: Company Level 3: Chain's environment 
No bargaining „We don‟t have bargaining powers. Only 
imagine, the contract is drafted by [Company]. 
We just sign. Most of us eve don‟t understand 
what is [in] the contract. And when it comes to 
price, we don‟t have any say. [Company] can 
come and tell us that the paprika will be at this 
price without [our agreement] on the price. It is 
very difficult for us to bargain for anything with a 
company that has no communication [with us].‟  
Focus group interview no. 7, Nkhoma area, 
Lilongwe district, 2015  
 
„[We] engage into discussion as per every 
grade produced. Contractor does us good 
because they [...] involve us in pricing.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 3, Chawatha area, 
Lilongwe district, 2015 
„And they are selling kilograms, like 5 kg, 10 
kg. And they don‟t have any [...] arguments 
for bargaining. We want as much as possible 
to work with groups of farmers. There are 
groups that will produce a substantial volume. 
We have always pushed them to [get] into 
organized groups where they can sell such a 
volume at the right time, and they can 
bargain.‟ 
Company representatives, joint semi-
structured interview with two field officers, 
Lilongwe, 2015 
 „And the farmers, too, they are not 
involved in the price-making of the 
[contract]...[Company] just go[es]: „We will 
buy this paprika this season at this price‟. 
Vendors are very friendly with the farmers 
[compared to] the company, because they 
can discuss about the price. The company 
has fixed price.‟ 




„On grading, [Company] is the one who grade[s] 
the product. We don‟t say anything on this 
issue. We tried to negotiate, but we failed.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 6, Nkhoma area, 
Lilongwe district, 2015  
 „[...] because grading is subjective, I‟d say 
our grading is subjective. Is what you see on 
that day, is what the buyer see at the [spot]. 
You see, we are targeting international 
market, they have their own standards. We 
can‟t just go in the field and buy....and buy 
any trash.‟ 
Company representatives, joint semi-
structured interview with two field officers, 
Lilongwe, 2015  
„But the companies normally have four 
grades, so grade A, B, C and D. So, the 
farmers hate that. They hate. Because 
there‟s no way you can differentiate [...] 
between grade A and grade B. What I can 
see as grade A, in another area it would 
not be grade A. So, yeah, they are visuals. 
I don‟t take advantage of that. I just buy in 
two grades: grade A and grade B.‟ 
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Table 1.7A Triangulation of the interview data related to Challenge 3  
Challenge 3 Level 1: Smallholders Level 2: Company Level 3: Chain's environment 
Low price „However, it is the contractor that benefits most 
because they [buy] from us at a lower price, 
whilst they sell at a high price.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 1, Kamparilo and 
Kalilani area, Nkhotakota district, 2014 
 
„We are not satisfied with the contract due to the 
fact that the price is low, [so] we sale to 
vendors. You can‟t expect from us to spend so 
much and sale product at low price.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 7, Nkhoma area, 
Lilongwe district, 2015 
„[...] we also look at the at the 
performance of the Kwacha at the time 
that we open the market, based on the 
dollar price „cause we are given a 
dollar price. So we [are] prepared with 
what the Kwacha is doing at that time. 
You see, it‟s a two way. While the 
Kwacha is now gaining, [...] what 
should happen is that the farmer will 
be paid less in Kwachas, because of 
the gain of Kwacha. And now, what will 
happen is - the farmer is like, he‟s 
losing, he‟s been affected.‟ 
Company representatives, joint semi-
structured interview with two field 
officers, Lilongwe, 2015 
„If [Company] say[s] we buy the paprika at 600 MKW 
per kg, then I say: „Okay, I‟ll buy this paprika at 900 
MKW‟. So, I can manage even if the company is 
buying at MKW 600. I can even buy at MKW 1,000, 
and sell at MKW 1,500. Still, MKW 500 is enough 
profit for me.‟ 
Vendor no. 1, semi-structured interview, Lilongwe, 
2015 
 
„But normally it‟s around 500 MKW [and] above. 
Yeah, so if I want to have more paprika from the 
farmers, if I want to beat my competitors, I have to 
put 600 MKW! If it‟s 1,000 MKW, I have to put 1,200 
MKW...or even 1,500 MKW, so that I should have the 
paprika.‟ 




sold to the 
contractor 
Another farmer said he was initially growing 
tomatoes and then averted to paprika. This last 
growing year he produced over 500 kg and out 
of that, he sold 196 kg to [Company] whilst 304 
kg was sold to vendors who offered higher 
attractive prices. This year he is expecting a 
revenue more than MKW 500,000 because he 
harvested more due to extension service 
received from [Company]. 
Assistant's notes from the focus group interview 
no. 2, Limbikani club, Nhkotakota district, 2014 
Officer 1: „I‟ve a very practical 
example. One of the farmer around 
where we went, he sold almost 80% or 
90% of his paprika [to vendors] and he 
said – “No, my friend, [...] I‟ve kept this 
for you”. How can you say like that?‟ 
Officer 2: „So, he only gave you 10%?‟ 
Officer 1: „Yeah.‟ (Silence for a while.) 
Company representatives, joint semi-
structured interview with two field 
officers, Lilongwe, 2015 
„[Vendors] can buy at relatively high prices as they 
have not taken any input risk - however they only 
have cash to buy relatively small quantities. 
[Company] is therefore trying to buy hundreds of 
tonnes but are competing against a guy who is 
buying 5 tonnes at a 10% premium. We cannot afford 
to buy large quantities at above international market 
prices as our end product [...] is an internationally 
priced commodity. [Company] will therefore withdraw 
from the market as their customer will not pay the 
inflated price.‟ 
Processor from South Africa, email correspondence, 
2015 
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„Why should we sell to [company]? 
The contract doesn‟t limit us to sell to 
[company]. It‟s an open market and 
we can sell to anyone.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 8, Nkhoma 
area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
 
„And when we realize that the prices 
are lower than what [company] 
promised us, we will engage into a 
discussion with them or just sell to 
vendors.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 3, 






„Well, [...] it‟s also to do with 
history - I mean every time 
there‟s a change in government, 
then they can write off any 
previous obligations of the 
previous governments, and 
that‟s gone on for many years. 
So, there‟s that culture of, you 
know, expecting things to be 
written off for convenience.‟ 










„However, understanding of contracts is not that good among the 
majority of most farmers. They tend to be carried away in case the 
prices improve so much such that they dishonour supply terms.‟ 
Consultant no. 2, email correspondence, 2014 
 
„They don‟t [understand the contract] because there are contracts 
which are written in English, and the other contracts are written in 
Chichewa. But if you translate the two, [you] find that they are too 
different in meanings. So the farmers have just being fooled.‟ 
Vendor no. 1, semi-structured interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
 
„The companies should be transparent and accountable in their 
dealings with the farmers. And most companies are not. They do 
not clearly explain to the farmers the implications of their 
commitments. And the farmers will not understand, because most 
of them are illiterate. And companies take advantage of that.‟ 
Representative from the University, Lilongwe, 2014 
Side selling „But for prices, vendors are good and 
with [company‟s] prices we fail to see 
the future of the crop production.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 2, 
Limbikani club, Nkhotakota area, 
2014 
 
„This is why we sale to vendors: 
because vendors do not grade the 
paprika and the prices are high.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 7, Nkhoma 
area, Lilongwe district, 2015 
„Because what [smallholders] 
normally do is that they know 
that there‟s [Company], but they 
also at the same time know that 
there‟s the vendor. And if the 
vendor doesn‟t buy at the higher 
price, which they normally offer, 
then [smallholders] will sell the 
paprika to [Company].‟ 
Company representatives, joint 
semi-structured interview with 
two field officers, Lilongwe, 2015 
„You buy from [small-scale farmers‟] doorsteps. You give them 
cash; there is no need of transportation. „Cause those [small-scale 
farmers] - they need money quickly. And they prefer to get cash.‟ 
Vendor no. 3, semi-structured interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
 
„But also what induces side-selling is either the price that was 
offered is low or maybe this guy is delaying to come and get the 
commodity and the farmer is desperate for money. So, what does 
he do? Side-sell! It‟s quite common.‟ 
Representative from the University, semi-structured interview, 
Lilongwe, 2014 
 
Table 1.7A Triangulation of the interview data related to Challenge 3 - Continued 
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Table 1.7A Triangulation of the interview data related to Challenge 3 - Continued 
Challenge 3 Level 1: Smallholders Level 2: Company Level 3: Chain's environment 
Market 
conditions 
„Let other organisations also come in with 
their contracts, so that there [will] be a 
competition.‟ 
Focus group interviews no. 2, Limbikani 
club, Nhkotakota district, 2014 
 
„More organisations should be involved to 
break the monopoly seal.‟ 
Focus group interview no. 2, Limbikani club, 
Nkhotakota district, 2014  
 
„And it‟s an export crop, so you‟ll have to 
really see what the exchange rate is at the 
time and what the competition is paying. 
Chinese [paprika] is much cheaper than 
our crop. Then our buyers will say: Well, 
look this is, well we can get it cheaper 
from China, so you‟ll have to drop your 
price a bit. And that will squeeze our 
margin, [...] and we‟d have to drop the 
price of the farmers as well. But the thing 
is that you have to be a bit careful, 
because [...] everyone waits for us to give 
a price, and then they just add 10 MKW.‟ 
Company’s Projects Manager, semi-
structured interview, Lilongwe, 2015 
„World prices are dominated by Chinese who 
produce many times more than any other country. 
The Chinese [...] price for a season hits the 
market in December/January. We then need to 
quote our customer an oleoresin paprika price in 
February/March and this in turn determines the 
price we can pay [Company].‟ 
Processor from South Africa, email 
correspondence, 2015 
 
„There‟s plenty of market for paprika. So you just 
need to have enough quantities to be able to sell 
to the customers.‟ 










         408 








































Asymp. Sig. 0.014 

























Asymp. Sig. 0.033 
a. Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 
 






 for Qualitative Data 
Codebook 1: Theme ‘Dynamics in the Paprika Supply Chain’ 
 
Table 1.1 Definition of general codes 
General categories 
 







Definition of the code in the context 
 
 Roles and responsibilities that small farmers/company/enabling 
environment play in paprika supply chain. 
 Relations that small farmers/company/enabling environment have in 
paprika supply chain with other players. 
 When did the company start contracting with small farmers and what are 
company‟s main activities, values and motivations? 
 
 
Table 1.2 Level 2: Company (semi-structured interviews) 
General categories 
 







Identified codes under each category 
 
 A buyer; formulating and offering the contract, screening potential 
suppliers, buying the produce, providing the seed on the cash basis, 
providing extension services as training on agricultural practices, grading, 
selling the produce to the next buyer, international rule of the game 
 
 Activities, crops, end market, establishing the company, estate and 
suppliers balance, further market in South Africa, growing paprika and 
groundnuts together, main motivation for paprika business, number of 
small farmers in supplying paprika, private investment setup, social 
responsibility meaning, start of contracting for paprika, starting paprika 
business in Malawi, the importance of paprika for the company, pricing, 
extension services provided 
 




 Roles and 
responsibilities 
 
Identified codes under the category 
 
 Linking small farmers with markets, advocating for policies, representing 
the voice of small farmers, facilitating contract farming, developing and 
revising legal framework for contract farming, promoting farmer groups, 
providing market for some small farmers‟ crops, providing training to small 
farmers, mobilising small farmers into cooperatives, promoting value 
addition for farmers‟ products, scrutinising contracts, collaborating on 
Contract Farming Strategy, enhancing agricultural productivity, improving 
small farmers‟ livelihoods, facilitating dialogues between stakeholders, 
consulting, promoting farmers‟ organisations, providing inputs and soft 
loans, encouraging farmers to use sustainable technology, providing 
guidance based on empirical evidence 
                                                          
1
All Codebooks in this study followed the principle where numerous codes make one category and 
few categories make one theme (Saldaňa, 2009, p. 8-9). 
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Codebook 2: Theme ‘Contract Farming and Its Influence on Small Farmers’ 
Livelihood 
 
Table 2.1 Definition of general codes 
General categories 
 
 Farmers‟ preferences for the 
contract 
 Cost-benefit analysis 
 
 Perception of CF in the community 
 
 Future plans  
 
 Farming and marketing practices 
Definition of the code 
 
 The most important parts of the contract. Are there any 
changes needed in the contract? 
 The main costs in the paprika production + the price 
received + an average yield + the final profit. 
 How do small farmers perceive contracting in their 
community? 
 Consideration to have the contract for the paprika in the 
future. Under which conditions? 
 Farming and marketing practices involved in the paprika 
cultivation according to the month in the year. 
 
Table 2.2 Codes identified at the level of small farmers 
General categories 
 
 Supply chain 
 





 Farmers‟ preferences for the contract 
 
 






 Perception of CF in the community 
 
 
Identified codes under each category 
 
 Agro-dealers, company, company‟s extension officers, 
vendors, Government, hired labourers 
 Easy to acquire inputs: seeds, fertilizers and chemicals, 
access to free extension services, market availabiility, 
minimum productions costs for cultivation paprika, no 
negative impacts for the environment while cultivating 
paprika 
 Guaranteed market, fertilizers, chemicals, transport, 
access to inputs, good prices, grading, extension 
services, quality standards 
 Equipment: sprayer, hoe, water cane; Land: nursery, 
land; Seeds; Fertilizers: D-compound, CAN, NPK; 
Chemicals: Diphenyl, Copper, Asphalt; Labour: ridging, 
weeding, land hallowing, harvesting; Transport: ox-cart; 
Market price: grade A and grade B; Production costs; 
Yield; Revenue, Profit 
 Satisfaction with contract conditions, positive side of the 
contract, impact of contracting on livelihoods, reasons 
why neighbouring farmers are not under the contract 
 
 





Identified codes under the category 
 
 Selling, buying, co-operating, regulating, supplying, 
contracting, trading, demanding, joining, advocating, 
supporting, negotiating, informing and recommending, 
linking and building capacity 
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Table 2.2 Codes identified at the level of small farmers - Continued 
General categories 
 
 Future plans 
 
 




Identified codes under each category 
 
 Readiness to continue under the contract, conditions 
that the company needs to change or add in order to 
make contracts more attractive 
 Nursery establishment and management, seed sowing 
and management, land preparation, transplanting, using 
fertilizers and chemicals, field management, harvesting 
and drying, storage and marketing 
 
Codebook 3: Theme ‘Key Challenges in Contract Farming’ 
 
Table 3.1 Definition of all codes 




 Breach of contract 
 
 CF perception in the 
community: challenges that 
farmers face and good side 




 Farmers‟ preferences for the 
contract design 
 Good side of the contract 
 Grades 
 
 Guidelines on chemicals 
 Input provision 
 
 Legal framework 
 
 More definition in the 
contract 
 Payment for farmers 
 
 Pricing in the contract 
 Quantity 
 




 Understanding the contract 
 
 Volatile market conditions 
Definition of the code in the context 
 
 Possibility to negotiate contract terms (e.g. price, grades or inputs 
provided). 
 Violation of the contract term (e.g. side selling, late delivery or 
late purchase). 
 How does the rural community of small farmers under paprika 
contract perceive challenges and benefits of contracting? 
 
 
 Issues found in the contractual relation. 
 Communication between the key players in the supply chain: 
frequency and quality. 
 Contract terms that small farmers prefer to see in the contract. 
 
 Benefits of the contract. 
 Evaluation of the quality of paprika through determined set of 
rules or guidelines. 
 Set of rules on applying chemicals. 
 Seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, chemicals and extension services 
provided as a part of the contract. 
 Official legal framework or strategy from the Government that 
defines contract farming relations. 
 What should be included in the contract? 
 
 Terms that describe how will small farmers be paid for delivering 
the paprika under agreed conditions. 
 The price paid to small farmers for their paprika. 
 Volumes of paprika expected to be delivered by small farmers. 
 
 Selling the paprika outside of the contract to an informal channel 
(vendors). 
 The level of confidence or certainty that the other party of the 
contract will fulfil its responsibilities. 
 The extent of comprehension of agreed terms and their 
implications. 
 Uncertain conditions regarding the price and demand for paprika 
on the international market. 
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Table 3.3 Coding for the level 2: Company (semi-structured interviews) 
First cycle codes 
 
 Bargaining 
 Breach of contract 
 Challenges 
 Communication 
 Company‟s background 
 Grades 
 Guidelines regarding chemicals 
 Input provision 
 Payment for farmers 
 Previous experience 
 Pricing in the contract 
 Quantity 
 Side selling and vendors 
 Trust 
 Understanding the contract 
 Volatile market conditions 
 
Second cycle codes 
 
 Low level of trust 
 Low price 
 Misunderstanding of contract principle 
 Negative previous experience 
 No bargaining 
 Non-transparent grading system 
 Poor input provision 
 Side selling  
 Small quantities sold to the contractor 





Table 3.2 Coding for the level 1: Small farmers (focus group interviews) 
First cycle codes 
 
 CF perception in the community: challenges 
that farmers face and good side of the contract 
 Communication, information and negotiation 
 Farmers‟ preferences for the contract design 
Second cycle codes 
 
 Contract design 
 Low level of trust 
 Low price 
 Misunderstanding contract principle 
 Negative previous experience 
 No bargaining 
 Non-transparent grading system 
 Poor input provision 
 Side-selling  
 
 
Table 3.4 Coding for the level 3: Enabling environment (semi-structured interviews and 
email correspondence) 
First cycle codes 
 
 Challenges 
 Company‟s side 
 Farmers‟ preferences 
 Good side of the contract 
 Input provision 
 Legal framework 
 More definition in the contract 
 Previous experience 
 Pricing in the contract 
 Side selling and vendors 
 Trust 
 Understanding the contract 
Second cycle codes 
 
 Contract design 
 Low level of trust 
 Low price 
 Missing legal framework/strategy 
 Misunderstanding of contract principle 
 Negative previous experience 
 Poor input provision 
 Side selling  
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Codebook 4: Theme ‘Contract Design’  
Table 4.1 Developed template with audit trail for inductive and deductive coding 
Categories 
 














 Delivery conditions** 
 Grades* 
 


























Definition of the code under each category 
 
 Group or individual entity entering into an agreement and accepting 
contract terms and conditions. ** 
 Underlying reasons for contracting and the nature of the relationship 
between parties.* 
 An indication of the dates of signing the contract and the exact 
duration of the contract. It might indicate if and how the contract can 
be renewed. ** 
 Provision of inputs to cultivate or deliver the crop (e.g. seeds, 
fertilizers, bags).* 
 An explicit statement of the production volumes that the small 
producer has to deliver to the buyer or the buyer is obliged to buy 
from the small producer. Can be determined explicitly, as minimum 
quantity, as a quota, or variable quantity depending on the buyer's 
orders. ** 
 Indicated the time and form of the delivery. ** 
 The explicit specification of the grades for the product; the description 
of quality levels for the product.* 
 The precise amount or system to determine final amount to be paid to 
small producers, taking into consideration variations in quality of the 
product and financial obligations, such as loans for inputs and 
services received.** 
 The procedure and timing for paying small producers. ** 
 The obligatory or free instructions provided by the buyer or third party 
on agricultural practices to improve the quality of the final produce. ** 
 An indication of the remedy/compensation if one or some of the 
contract terms and conditions are not completed.* 
 Deliberate and conscious violation of agreed terms and conditions 
coming from either party. It can result in contract termination or 
compensation procedures. ** 
 Legal responsibility for acts or omissions. ** 
 Conditions under which either party has the right to terminate the 
contract.* 
 The case of conflict between the parties regarding the definition or 
performance of agreed terms and conditions. It might be settled 
amicably, through mediation, arbitration or courts. ** 
 A provision that frees both parties from the obligation if an 
extraordinary event occurs. An extraordinary event includes 
unforeseeable and unavoidable situation, which is not the result of 
party's actions. ** 
 National or regional law competent for enforcing contractual 
arrangements, and especially applicable in the case of possible 
disputes.* 
 The warranty that the person signing the contract is an appropriate 









Note: * = originally in inductive coding, ** = changed/improved after applying deductive coding 
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Codebook 5: Theme ‘Options for Improving Contracting Conditions’ 
 




 How  
 Who  
Definition of the code 
 
 What should be done to improve contracting? 
 How should options to improve contracting be implemented? 
 Who should implement identified options? 
 
 





























Identified codes under each category 
 
 Advance the contract design 
 Decrease market volatility 
 Eliminate side selling 
 Improve enforcement of the contract 
 Improve infrastructure  
 Improve input provision 
 Improve pricing  
 Improve understanding of contract principle 
 Increase knowledge on grading system 
 Increase participation of small farmers in contract formulation 
 Increase traded volumes 
 Increase trust levels 
 Strengthen small farmers in paprika sector 
 Acting in a good faith 
 Allowing small farmers to be present, discuss and agree on the contract design 
 Appointing mediators and/or arbitrators who can direct farmers in legal matter 
 Assuring farmers that their crop will be purchased 
 Calculating costs of living and then formulating the price 
 Calculating gross margins and the cost of inputs to encourage input provision 
 Clearly defining the price in the contract 
 Early purchase by the company 
 Educating farmers on grading rules and procedures  
 Enabling clubs to have revolving funds that can be used if farmers want to sell 
smaller quantities and then accumulated quantities are sold to the company 
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Identified codes under each category 
 
 Encouraging association or group members to sell to the contractor 
 Encouraging/allowing other buyers to enter paprika market  
 Ensuring minimum guaranteed price in the contract 
 Establishing and maintaining communication between parties 
 Establishing revolving funds 
 Fnalising contract farming strategy and developing legal/institutional framework 
 Defining minimum volumes in the contract based on farmers‟ average production 
 Developing farmers‟ associations or groups 
 Honouring what was promised from both sides 
 Improving dialogue between the company and small farmers 
 Increasing company‟s presence in the local area  
 Investing in warehouse and irrigation system 
 Knowing expectations from farmers 
 Long-term investment in making a relationship better 
 Making contract terms and conditions clear 
 Mutually agreeing on the price 
 Organising selling through farmers‟ association and not individually 
 Paying in cash immediately after the purchase of paprika 
 Providing accurate information 
 Providing bonuses or transportation for excess volumes delivered 
 Providing complete contract, especially with defined clauses on the price, what 
to do in the case of breach and dispute mechanism 
 Providing loans to farmers‟ associations 
 Providing sufficient seeds, fertilizers and chemicals to farmers‟ association in 
time 
 Providing win-win contract 
 Regulating contracts through legal framework 
 Introducing innovative selling methods (price information and selling offer by 
sms) 
 Rewarding loyal farmers with inputs to encourage them  
 Small farmers  









Appendix 2 Sample of the Household Questionnaire 
 
                      
     HOUSEHOLD   
Contract farming and Supply Chain Efficiency for improved market 
access 
Malawi, 2014 and 2015 
 
08 Fall 
                                                                                        
                                                                                       Questionnaire /__/__/__/ out of /__/__/__/ 
                                                                                                                                                                  CODE 
District, parish:                                                                                                                         /__/__/ 
Interviewer‟s name and ID: _________________________________                       /__/__/__/__/ 
Status: (1 = completed, 2 = partially completed, 3 = rejected/withdrawn)                           /_____/ 
Date: /___/___/2015/                             
 
Observations during the survey: 
(Record general notes on the interview and any special information that occurs; to report) 
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INFORMED CONSENT – explanation (Must be read or presented to every respondent by enumerator) 
Purpose of the study As part of the requirements for fulfillment of the PhD degree at University College Cork 
(further referred to as UCC), I am carrying out a research study. The research is concerned with the contracts, 
supply chain and market access. 
Procedure The study involves filling out the questionnaire by a trained enumerator. The time needed for completing 
the questionnaire is approximately 30 minutes. 
Selection You have been pre-selected and hereby asked to participate because you are important source of 
information for the study. 
Participation Your participation is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw before the study commences even if 
you agreed to participate. You have the right to discontinue after data collection has started. You are allowed to 
withdraw within two weeks of participation and ask for your data to be destroyed. 
Signing the consent form If you decide to participate, you will be asked to sign the consent form. 
Anonymity My responsibility as a researcher is to ensure that no clues to your identity appear in the thesis. Any 
extracts from what you say that are quoted in the thesis will be entirely anonymous. 
Confidentiality from third parties The data will be kept confidential for the duration of the study. On completion of 
the thesis, data will be kept complete, accurate and in shape for only official retrospective audit. Storage is 
envisaged in paper (under locked folders) and electronic form (with password). 
Study results The results will be presented in the thesis. Official supervisors, internal examiners and external 
examiners will see the thesis. Future students on the course may read the thesis. The research may be published in 
a research journal. 
Risks I don‟t envisage any negative consequences for you in taking part in the research. It is possible that talking 
about some aspects in this way may cause some distress or inconvenience. You have the right to withhold the 
information. 
Approval Social Research Ethics Committee at UCC approved this study before it was commenced. 
If you need any further information, please contact me personally or my colleagues in the area at: 
Lana Repar      Email: l.repar@umail.ucc.ie    Mobile: +353 85 101 26 18 
Local address during the study:                              Contact (local number):                               
Lilongwe, 43/241/2 Area 43                                          099 1019 735 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM signed by participant (Must be read or presented to every respondent by 
enumerator) 
I______________________________________________agree to participate in this research study. 
The purpose and nature of the study has been explained to me in writing. I am participating voluntarily. 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study, without repercussions, at any time, whether before it starts or while I 
am participating. I understand that I can withdraw permission to use the data within two weeks of the participation in 
the questionnaire, in which case the material will be deleted. I understand that anonymity will be ensured in the 
write-up by disguising my identity. I understand that disguised extracts from my questionnaire may be quoted in the 
thesis and any subsequent publications if I give permission below: (Please tick one of the boxes below)  
I agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my questionnaire.         
I do not agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my questionnaire.  
Signed ______________________________________________________  
(Witnessed by enumerator ...................................................)    Date /___/___/2014/2015 
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1. What is your age group? 
 Less than 26  26 - 30  31 - 40   
 
 41 - 50  50 and above  Don‟t know   
2. Gender:  
 Male  Female 
3. How many members are currently living in your household? 
 Total of:  __________ 
4. What is your education level? 
 Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
 None  Adult literacy 
5. How many years of experience do you have in cultivating Paprika? 
 Less than 1 year  1 - 3  4 - 5  6 - 7 
 
 8 - 9  10 - 11  12 - 13   14 and more 
6. What is the main occupation of your household? 
 Farming: crops  Livestock  Mixed (crops + 
livestock)  
 Other 
7. What is the regular source of income for your household (tick all that 
applies)? 
 Contract farming  Wages from 
regular work 
 Wages from part-
time work 
  
 Trade  Grant and 
remittances 
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8. What is the importance of listed income sources for your household?  
 Contract farming:                   Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important   
  
 Wages (regular work):           Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important   
  
 Wages (part-time work):        Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important  
    
 Trade:                                    Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important  
 
 Grant and remittances:          Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important  
 
 Investments and savings:      Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important     
9. What is the monthly income of your household (all sources included, in 
MKW)? 
 Less than 10 400  10 401 - 20 800   20 801 - 31 200  31 201 - 41 600 
 
 41 601 - 52 000  52 001 - 62 400   62 401 - 72 800  72 801 and above 
10. Are you engaged in contract farming?  
 Yes  No   
11. What crops are you cultivating under the contract (tick all that 
applies)? 
 Paprika  Bird‟s Eye Chili   Tobacco  Cotton 
 Soya bean  Maize  Groundnut  Other: 
12. Who is involved in contract farming activities in your household 
(tick all that applies)? 
 Household head  Head and 
wife/husband  
 Males in 
household 
 Females in 
household 
 All members 
Contract details 
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13. Do you hire any extra labour for farming activities related to 
Paprika? 
 Yes  No  
14. Please rate how important for you are stated reasons for 
involvement in     contract farming. 
 Stable price:                          Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important   
  
 Access to inputs:                   Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important   
  
 Stable income:                      Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important  
    
 Access to information:           Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important  
 
 Guaranteed market:              Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important  
 
 Access to credit:                    Not important        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
important     
15. Have you ever change your contractor? 
 Yes  No   
16. If yes, how many times have you changed contractor since you 
entered contract farming? 
 Never  1 - 2 times   3 - 4 times  5 - 6 times 
17. Please rate your relationship with your current contractor. 
 Relationship:                    Very unsatisfying        1        2        3        4        5        Very 
satisfying  
  
Motivation and satisfaction 
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18. Does involvement in contract farming has an impact on your 
livelihood? 
 Yes  No   Don‟t know   
19. How your participation in contract farming influences your 
livelihood? 
 Positively  Negatively    Does not 
influence 
 Don‟t know 
 
20. Are you planning to stay in contract for Paprika in the coming 
years? 
 Yes   No  Don‟t know   
21. Are you planning to have contract for any new crop in the coming 
years? 
 Yes  No  Don‟t know   
22. What farm inputs do you use for producing Paprika (tick all that 
applies)? 
 Seed  Fertilizer   Pesticide   
 Chemicals  None   Don‟t know   
23. How do you source your inputs for producing Paprika under the 
contract (tick all that applies)?  
 Contractor  Local input 
market  
 Agro dealer   
 
 Colleagues  NGO   Farmer union 
Future plans in relation to contracts 
Input supply and extension services 
 
         422 
24. How much do you pay for the seed used for planting Paprika per 
season (in MKW)? 
 Less than 250  250 - 450  451 - 650 
 651 - 850  More than 851   Don‟t know     
25. How much do you pay for the fertilizer for Paprika per season? 
 Less than 10 000  10 001 - 12 000  12 001 - 14 000 
 14 001 - 16 000  More than 16 
001 
 Don‟t know/not using it 
26. How much do you pay for the pesticide for Paprika per season? 
 Less than 2 000  2 001 - 3 500  3 501 - 5 000 
 5 000 - 6 500  More than 6 501   Don‟t know/not using it 
27. How much do you pay for the chemicals (fungicides) for Paprika per 
season? 
 Less than 2 000  2 001 - 3 500  3 501 - 5 000 
 5 000 - 6 500  More than 6 501  Don‟t know/not using it 
 
28. How do you pay for your farm inputs for Paprika (tick all that 
applies)? 
 In cash  On credit   Getting subsidies 
for inputs 
 Deductions from 
contract payment 
29. Who provides storage for your Paprika (tick all that applies)? 
 Self  Contractor  Colleagues 
 Club or organisation  Vendor  Transporter 
30. Who provides transport to the collection point for your Paprika (tick 
all that applies)? 
 Self  Contractor  Colleagues 
 Club or organisation  Vendor  Transporter 
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31. What means are used for the transportation of your Paprika?  
 Truck  Car  Motorbike 
 Bicycle  Carrying crop on 
the head/man 
power 
32. How far from your house is the collection point where you deliver 
Paprika? 
 It is on my farm  Less than 15 min 
of walk 
 15 - 30 min of walk 
 31 - 45 min of 
walk 
 46 min - 1h of 
walk 
 1h of walk and above  
 Not applicable 
33. Do you deliver your crop on time? 
 Yes, always  Yes, mostly   Not always  No 
34. Do you deliver an agreed quality? 
 Yes, always  Yes, mostly  Not always  No 
35. Do you deliver an agreed quantity? 
 Yes, always  Yes, mostly   Not always  No 
36. With whom do you directly communicate regarding production and 
marketing of your Paprika? (tick all that applies)? 
 Contractor  Input dealer  Extension worker 
 Club or organisation  None 
37. Are you a member of local farmer association/cooperative/club? 
 Yes  No 
Payment and meeting the requirements 
Communication, relations and networking 
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38. If yes, please rate the role of local farmer 
association/cooperative/club in representing your voice. 
 Role:                        Very unsatisfying        1        2        3        4        5        Very satisfying 
 Not applicable 
 
39. If you are a member, does membership have added value to your 
farming? 
 Yes  No   Not applicable 
40. Are you a member of any of the following unions (tick all that 
applies)? 
 Credit union  Trading union   Agricultural 
cooperative 
 NASFAM 
 Farmers Union 
(FUM) 
 None  
41. If yes, does the membership in unions have added value to your 
farming? 
 Yes   No   Not applicable 
42. Are you connected to any NGO within your community? 
 Yes  No   Don‟t know 
43. If yes, do you receive any assistance from NGO related to your 
Paprika? 
 Yes  No   Not applicable 
44. If yes, what kind of assistance you receive from NGO?  
 Training/education  Assistance with 
production 
process  
 Assistance with of marketing the product 
 Assistance with 
input provision 
 Assistance with 
negotiation  
 Not applicable 
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45. Do you receive any assistance from the Government in relation to 
Paprika? 
 Yes  No   Don‟t know 
46. If yes, what kind of assistance you receive from the Government?  
 Training/education  Assistance with production process   Assistance with 
marketing of the 
product 





 Not applicable 
47. How did you enter the contract you are having with your 
contractor?  
 My own initiative  Village head  Extension worker 
 Colleagues  NGO initiative  Contractor 
48. What is your source of information on price for the product under 
the contract (tick all that applies)? 
 Contractor  Colleagues   Radio/TV  Extension worker 
 Organisation  Local market   Digital extension 
(text messages) 
 Other 
49. At what stage do you know the price of the product?  
 At the beginning 
of the season 
 After planting  Before the harvest 
 After the harvest  Before delivery  After delivery 
50. Are there other buyers interested in your crop under contract in 
your area? 
 Yes  No  Don‟t know 
51. Do you own the house you are living in? 
 Yes  No  It‟s a family house 
Market and information access 
Housing and assets 
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52. Do you have access to electricity in your house?  
 Yes  No  Solar system 
53. Does your household own following assets (tick all that applies)? 
 Bicycle  Motorbike  Radio  Television 
 Telephone  Mobile phone  Sewing machine  Hoes/spades 
 Axe  Panga   Cart  Bowl 
54. Do you have an access to health services when needed? 
 Yes  No 
55. What is your usual expense for health services per month (in 
MKW)? 
 Less than 2 000  2 001 - 3 500   3 501 - 5 000  5 001 - 6 500 
 6 501 - 8 000  8 001 and above  Free service  Don‟t know 
56. How many school going children are currently in the household 
(from 5 – 18 years old)? 
 Total of:  ________ 
57. How many school going children are attending school regularly 
(every week day)? 
 Total of:  __________ 
 
58. What is your usual expense for schooling per term (in MKW)? 
 Less than 5 000  5 001 - 8 500   8 501 - 11 000  11 001 - 14 500 
 14 501 - 17 000  17 001 - 20 500   20 501 and above  Free education 
 Not applicable 
59. What is your usual expense for food per month (in MKW)? 
 Less than 3 000  3 001 - 5 500   5 501 - 7 000  7 001 - 9 500 
 9 501 - 11 000  11 001 - 13 500  13 501 - 15 000  15 001 - 17 500 
Health, education and food security 
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 17 501 - 19 000  19 001 - 21 500  21 501 - 23 000  23 001 and above 
60. Does your household have problems in securing enough food for 
everyone during some months of the year (tick all that applies)? 
 January  February  March  April 
 May  June  July  August 
 September  October  November  December 
 Not applicable 
61. What is the size of the land you are cultivating at the moment (all 
land, not just the plots under contracted crop, in acres)? 
 Less than 0,25   0,25 - 0,4   0,5 - 0,6  0,7 - 0,8 
 0,9 - 1   1,1 - 1,5  1,6 - 2  2,1 and above 
62. Do you own the land you are cultivating? 
 Yes  No    It‟s family land 
63. Do you rent any land for cultivating crops? 
 Yes  No 
64. What is the size of the land you are renting from the landlord (in 
acres)? 
 Less than 0,25   0,25 - 0,4   0,5 - 0,6  0,7 - 0,8 
 0,9 - 1   1,1 - 1,5  1,6 - 2  2,1 and above 
 Not applicable 
65. What is the expense for renting the land per season (in MKW)? 
 Not applicable 
 Less than 2 000  2 000 - 4 999  5 000 - 7 999  8 000 - 10 000 
 10 001 and 
above  
 Don‟t know  Not applicable 
66. What food crops does your household cultivate (tick all that applies)? 
 Maize   Sweet potato   Irish potato  Millet 
Farm characteristics 
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 Banana  Cassava   Rice  Groundnuts 
 Soya bean  Common beans   Pigeon pea  Cowpea 
 Carrots  Cucumbers  Other 
67. What is the size of the land on which you are cultivating Paprika? 
 Less than 0,25   0,25 - 0,4   0,5 - 0,6  0,7 - 0,8 
 0,9 - 1   1,1 - 1,5  1,6 - 2  2,1 and above 
68. How much of your land do you allocate for Paprika (use the visual)? 
 Less than 10%   10 - 30%   31 - 50% 
  
 
69. How much of Paprika you yield per year? 
 Less than 100 kg   100 - 200 kg   201 - 300 kg 
 301 - 400 kg  401 - 500 kg   501 - 600 kg 
 601 - 700 kg   701 - 800 kg   801 - 900 kg 
 901 - 1 000 kg  1 001 - 1 200 kg   1 201kg and above 
70. What is the price you are paid by your contractor per kg of your 
Paprika? 
 Price in MKW:  _________________ 
71. Who makes the decision on what to cultivate on the land for the 
season (tick all that applies)? 
 Landlord    Household head   Head‟s wife/husband 
 Contractor  All HH members  Household head and landlord/contractor 
72. What proportion of contracted crop does the household sell to the 
contractor (use the visual)? 
 Less than10%   10 - 30%   31 - 50% 
USE THE VISUAL 
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73. What proportion of contracted crop does the household consume 
(use the visual)? 
 < 10%   10 - 30%   31% and above  Don‟t know 
        
USE THE VISUAL   
74. Do you sell any of Paprika to anyone else but the contractor?  
 Yes  No  
75. If yes, what are the main reasons selling your Paprika to other 
buyers (tick all that applies)? 
 I don‟t trust my 
contractor 
 I need money 
quickly  
 Others offer higher 
price 
 I simply don‟t care 
to whom I sell 
 I am not satisfied 
with the treatment 
from my 
contractor  
 Because I have 
the right to decide 
whom to sell 
 Other  Not applicable 
76. Since you started producing crop under the contract, have you 
changed the plot size of other crops (food crops or other cash crops)? 
 Increased  Decreased   No change 
77. Does the income earned from contract farming suffice for the 
household needs during the whole year? 
 Yes, the whole 
year  
  Only partially  No 
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78. If not, how do you compensate the lack of income (tick all that 
applies)? 




 Off-farm activities 
 Selling surpluses 
of food crops 






























THANK YOU SO MUCH! 
FOR ENUMERATOR ONLY 
I hereby verify that the information in the questionnaire was collected from the 
household representative, recorded in a way it was answered; with nothing changed, 
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Total number of participants: /_____/        Males: /_____/       Females: /_____/ 
 
Research assistant 1 (administrator): __________________________________ 
 
Research assistant 2 (note taker): _____________________________________ 
 
Status of the discussion: (1 = Completed, 2 = Partially completed, 3 = Rejected/withdrawn) /_____/ 
 






Conducted by:    Researcher                   Assistant(s)    
 
Equipment used:              Voice recorder              Notes       
 
Informed consent:                 YES/ NO 
 
At the beginning of the focus group interviews, the short introduction will be made 
(researcher’s details, purpose of the research, expected outcomes and the ethical 
considerations - informed consent, signed on the piece of paper). Additionally, the 
focus group concept will be explained to the participants, as well what is considered 
under the main terms: supply chain and contract farming. 
The focus group consists of 2 main parts and it is expected to last between 45 – 90 
minutes. The first part of focus group consists of participatory approach where 
participants together with the researcher and facilitators make a map of the supply 
chain. When the mapping is done, the sketch will be exposed before the participants 
until the end of the focus group. The second part brings discussion topics that tend to 
look deeper at the relations inside the supply chain, and especially encourage opinion 




FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE (I) 
Small farmers having contracts for Paprika  
Malawi, 2014 and 2015  
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No. 
While mapping the supply chain, to the best knowledge of participants, please answer following 
questions: 
1 Who is involved in this Paprika supply chain? 
2 How are players connected (how do they communicate, through what means)? 
3 What is the role of each player in the supply chain? 
4 
In this supply chain, which player(s) make the most important decisions (specify what is meant by 
„important decisions‟: pricing, grading, timing, quality, quantity, credits/loans, etc.) 
5 
Expand the map with adding appropriate: 
(i) Existing enabling environment = Who else is included in this supply chain too? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: Is it NGO? Government? Farmer‟s union? International organisations? Name 
them. 
(ii) Geographical distribution/travelling path of the produce = Do you know where is your product going 
after you sell it to the buyer? 
PROBING QUESTION:  Who is the final buyer of your product? 
(iii) Calendar of farming practices and marketing = When is the planting period? When is the cultivation 
period? When is the harvesting period? When is the drying period? When do you sell your produce? 
When and how do you transport your produce? 
 
No. Section 1: Motivation for entering the contract arrangement 
6 
Why did you decide to have the contract with your buyer?  
PROBING QUESTIONS: What was the most important reason for entering? Price? Secure market? 
Trust? Good reputation? Input provision? Transport? Costs? Are there any other buyers interested in 
your produce? 
7 What do you think why some of your neighbour farmers do not have the contracts? 
 
No. Section 2: Farmers’ preferences regarding contract formulation 
8 
What do you think are the most important parts in the contract?  
(List them first and then rank them.) 
PROBING QUESTIONS:  
Price 
Time frame 






Penalties for breaching the contract 
9 
Would you like to change anything in your contract?  
PROBING QUESTIONS: If so, why? What exactly would you like to change? How should a good 
contract look like in your opinion (catch all the categories, possible quantities and numbers)? How 
should a good relation with your contractor look like in your opinion? 
10 
At the moment, can you easily meet the requirements for the quality and quantity on time?  
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11 
What inputs do you use in production of Paprika? 
 
From where do you source your inputs for the production of contracted crops (seeds, fertilizer, 
pesticides, and other chemicals)? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: Do you know the exact price of each input you are using? How do you 
pay for your inputs? Do you have the choice among few input providers? How easy is for you to 






Inputs   
- seed   
- fertilizers   
- pesticides   
- fungicides   
- other chemicals   
Machinery   
- type:   
- type:   
- type:   
- type:   
- type:   
Labour   
- family force (no. of  
  members working) 
  
- hired force   
Other costs   
- transportation   
- packaging   
- storage   
- other:   
- other:   
Yield of paprika per acre   
Price received for paprika (1 kg)   
Usual amount of loan to repay per season   
 
12 
What extension services are provided for you from your contractor? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: Do you think any other services should be provided to you? Which ones? 
Why? 
 
No. Section 3: Contract farming perception in the community 
13 
What is your opinion on the contract you have with your contractor?  
PROBING QUESTION: Are you satisfied? Why? 
14 
What do you gain from being part of the contract? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: What are the advantages about having the contract? Are you treated 
differently in the business environment and/or in the community because you have contract? If so, how? 
Are you proud of having the contract? What do you think about the distribution of benefits in this 
producer-contractor relationship? Why?  
15 
Are there any low sides of having the contract? 
PROBING QUESTION: Do you face any problems because of having the contract?  
16 
Does having the contract have any impact on your livelihood? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: Do you think your livelihood conditions (food availability and security, income 
generation - do you think you earn enough income, networking, farming practice, health conditions of 
the whole household, education opportunity for the children, access to credits and other public services) 
are any different since you are involved in contracted production? Why?  
17 
How do you see yourself compared to your neighbours‟ farmers without contracts? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: Are there any differences between your livelihood level and their? Why?   
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No. Section 5: Future plans 
25 
Are you considering having the contract for Paprika in the future? 
Are you considering having the contract for Paprika with the same contractor in the future? Will you 
change the volumes produced under the contract? 
PROBING QUESTION: Why? 
26 
If not yet a member, do you consider joining a Farmer‟s association?  
PROBING QUESTION: Why? 
 




No. Section 4: Communication, information, bargaining and breaching 
18 
What do you think about the relations inside your supply chain? 
In your opinion, do you think that, as a small farmer, you can contribute to improvement of relations 
inside your supply chain?  
PROBING QUESTIONS: Do you think something should be changed? What things should be 
changed, and what things should be left as they are? Do you think you can make changes? Who is 
responsible for making those changes and improvements?  
19 
Do you trust your contractor? 
PROBING QUESTIONS:  Why? What is your experience with your contractor? Do you trust other 
players in the supply chain? Why? What is your experience with them? 
20 
From whom/where from do you get the information regarding production and marketing of Paprika (for 
example: price for your produce and inputs; the quality and quantity of inputs required for your 
production; possibility for getting the loans)? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: In what form are the information presented to you? How often do you get the 
information? 
21 
Are the information regarding the price and other requirements for contracted crops on time?  
Are the information accurate?  
Are the information sufficient for you to make decisions about your produce? 
22 
Do you negotiate with your contractor? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: Who negotiates (you personally or the association or third party in your 
name)? Can you use the information on, e.g. local prices or input prices in your negotiating process?  
How do you see yourself in the process of negotiating? Do you have the option to negotiate with your 
contractor regarding:  
  (i) Pricing? 
 (ii) Grading system? 
 (iii) Timing?  
 (iv) Quantity of produce? 
 (v) Quality of the produce? 
 (vi) Loans?  
Do you achieve what you are negotiating? How and/or why? 
23 
Have you ever experienced the situation where the price in the contract is not the same as the price on 
the market (higher or lower) for your Paprika?  
PROBING QUESTIONS: How do you deal with this situation with your contractor? What price do you 
get then (as written in the contract/higher/lower)?  
24 
Do you know what are your obligations regarding the contract? Do you know what happens if you 
breach the contract? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: What happens if the contractor breaches the contract? Do you feel that you 
have to bear a certain risk in this contracted production? Why/which one? How do you cope with that 
risk? Is the risk equally divided between you as a producer and the contractor? Why? Can you 
negotiate with the contractor about the risk sharing? Why? 
Do you sell your Paprika to other buyers except your contractor? 
What are the main reasons for that (e.g. needing money quickly, they offer better price, etc.)? 
 






The facilitator will ask the village chief to start the event with the prayer and continues with 
appropriate greetings. Then the facilitator explains the purpose of data dissemination and what 
will be the role of participants in FG interviews. 
Challenges 
The researcher and facilitator will place the paper with Challenges written in Chichewa to be 
visible to all participants. After the short presentation of key challenges found in the paprika 
contract farming arrangements in Malawi, participants will be asked to look at challenges, think 
about them and discuss them (e.g. add new challenges and/or agree with proposed ones). The 




The researcher and facilitator will place 11 boxes (sheets of paper) with Challenges written in 
Chichewa in front of participants and the facilitator will give instructions to rank Challenges by 
locating sheets according to what participants consider are the most urgent Challenges. The 
point of the exercise is to get those 11 Challenges listed according to the priority from 1-11. 
The facilitator will help farmers to understand the task and the researcher will write the final list 






The facilitator will call all participants to discuss on presented ranked challenges in the supply 
chain. The discussion will be formed around stated challenges and finding solutions by 
following the Model presented in Chichewa language: 
 
 
The aim is to address each challenge (11 in total in figure) by answering questions and 
following the flow in this proposed Model. Duration: 1 hour approximately.  
Summarising 
challenges and 
options on the 
poster 
With the help of the researcher, the facilitator will write up in Chichewa the main challenges and 
related options identified to address those challenges and improve contracting conditions in the 
community on the poster. The poster will remain with the village head. 
 
Material outcomes from each FG interview:  
 Rank of 11 challenges by priority 
 Addressed 11 challenges through Model What/How/Who and summarised in 
the poster 
 
FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE (II) 
Small farmers having contracts for Paprika  
Malawi, 2016  
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Appendix 4 Sample of the Preliminary Expert Semi-structured Interview Guide, 
Synthesised Semi-structured Interview Guide and Focus Group Discussion Guide for 
key stakeholders 









No. Section 1: General on contract farming 
1 What is your opinion on contract farming? 
2 
What are the main advantages for (i) private sector companies and (ii) small farmers in contracted 
production? What features of contracted production are well developed? 
3 
What are the main limiting factors for (i) private sector companies and (ii) small farmers in contracted 
production? What features of contracted production are not well developed? 
4 What are the main challenges in contract farming? 
5 Who are contract farmers from your own experience? 
6 Who are non-contract farmers? 
7 What is the main difference/advantage of contract farming compared to production without contract? 
No. Section 2: Farmer’s choice and preferences 
8 What are your ideas on what makes farmers to engage in contract farming? 
9 Why farmers decide to stay away from contracting? 
10 What are farmer‟s preferences regarding contract farming? Why? 
No. Section 3: Controversy of contract farming 
 11 
Introduction to the question: today the two different opinions arise regarding contract farming. From one 
side, it is considered as business model that is directed towards making profit, and includes farmers, which 
are capable of meeting the requirements (most often large and medium scale farmers, and small better off 
farmers). On the other hand, some NGOs are devoted to promotion of contracted production as the way out 
of poverty for most vulnerable small scale farmers. The debate is on–going.  
The question: Is contract farming anyhow controversial (likely to give rise to controversy or public 
disagreement)? Should it be considered as exclusively business model or one of the ways of beating 
poverty? Why do you hold that opinion? 
Introduction: My name is Lana and I am 1
st
 year PhD student at University College Cork, Ireland. My PhD 
Project is entitled dealing with contract farming and supply chains in Malawi. I am conducting an expert interview 
to which you are invited to participate since your insights are valuable source of information for my research. 
Objectives: In this interview I would like (i) to hear your opinion about the topics we will tackle, (ii) to learn from 
your experience, (iii) to discuss the approach I am planning for this research, and (iv) to position the research in 
existing body of knowledge. 
Time frame: approximately 45 – 60 minutes 
Equipment: Recording software 
Date: __________________________________ 
 
         437 
 
No. Section 5: Relations inside supply chain 
15 
What is the most important in supply chain relations? Can the „philosophy‟ of the value chains that operate 
in Western countries be implemented into African context (What are the differences and similarities? Why 
some things work and other do not?)? Are there possibilities for improving relations in supply chains? 
16 How can stakeholders be better connected? 
 
 
No. Section 7: Price volatility and contract farming 
20 
How do contracting small farmers respond to price volatility on the market (taking into consideration they are 
both buyers and producers of the food)? 
21 
What does price volatility mean for contracted production – both for contractors and small producers? 
22 
How does price volatility affect small producers‟ livelihood? 
23 
What happens in the situations when a good harvest „crashes‟ the prices of the certain commodity?  
24 
In the situation described above, is it better to have contracts or not? 
Why is that so? 
25 
Is the Government anyhow responsible for mitigating the effect of price volatility regarding the vulnerable 
groups (contracting small farmers) even though they (farmers) are in business relations with contractors (so 
the market rules apply only)? 
No. Section 4: Strategy for contract farming 
12 
Is it better to promote contracting for medium-scale farmers or small-scale farmers in Africa? Why do you 
hold this opinion? Do you have any evidences/experience to share that supports your opinion? 
13 
Which supply chains work better for small-scale farmers: export chains or traditional local markets or 
supermarket chains? Why do you hold that opinion? Any evidences? 
14 Are there some other options besides contract farming?   
No. Section 6: Role of enabling environment 
17 What is the role of NGOs in contract farming? 
18 What is the role of Government in contract farming? 
19 What is the role of research units and institutes (e.g. your institution/Department) in contract farming? 
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Table 4.1 List of contacted experts by institution (Skype Semi-Structured Interview) 
No. Institution Research period 
1 Wageningen University, the Netherlands July 2014 
2 Overseas Development Institute (ODI), United Kingdom July 2014 
3 




Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), consultant, 
Italy 
August 2014 
5 German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), Germany  
6 
Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation ACP-EU, the 
Netherlands 
August 2014 
7 Indira Gandhi Research Institute, India September 2014 
8 Consultancy, Malawi November 2014 
9 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rural Infrastructure 
and Agro-Industries Division, Italy 
December 2014 
10 
University of Pretoria, Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and 








No. Section 8: Future of contract farming 
26 What steps are needed in order to improve contract farming? 
27 Who is responsible for that steps/change? 
28 Where do you see the future of contract farming in Africa? 
29 Where do you see small-scale farmers in the future? 
30 Generally, what is the future of contracted production? 
31 And what is the future of production without contracts? 
32 
Considering the recent elections in Malawi, what do you think about the implications for small farmers? 
What do you expect from the new Government regarding the direction of agricultural strategy? IF 
APPLICABLE 
33 
What implications will the change or the same status have for small farmers? IF APPLICABLE 
34 
At the moment, is there a clear strategy or initiative regarding Malawian agriculture: to push for export cash 
crops or develop local and regional traditional markets or to direct cash crop production for supermarket 
supply? IF APPLICABLE 
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Synthesised semi-structured interview guide for the key stakeholders 
No. Section 1: General on contract farming 
1 
What is your opinion on contract farming? 
PROBING QUESTIONS: What is the status of contract farming in Malawi? To what extent are 
farmers engaging in contracted production? Why? What are the main driving factors for engaging 
in contract farming? What are the most important crops under contract farming in Malawi? 
2 
Are there any advantages for (i) private sector companies and (ii) small farmers in contracted 
production?  
In your opinion, what aspects of contract farming are developed? 
3 
Are there any limiting factors for (i) private sector companies and (ii) small farmers in contracted 
production?  
In your opinion, what aspects of contract farming are not developed? 
4 In your opinion, what are the main challenges in contract farming? 
5 From your own experience, who are contract farmers in Malawi? 
6 From your own experience, who are non-contract farmers in Malawi? 
7 
Is there any difference between contract farming compared to production without contract?  
If so, where is that difference visible? 
 
No. Section 2: Farmer’s choice and preferences 
8 
What are your ideas on what makes farmers engage in contract farming? 
Why some farmers decide to stay away from contracting? 
9 
From your own experience, what are farmer‟s preferences for the points in the contract (regarding 
timing, quantities, qualities, input provision, credit provision, and extension services)? 
 
No. Section 3: The core of contract farming 
 10 
In your own opinion, should contract farming be considered as exclusively business model that 
supports economy growth or one of the ways of beating poverty? Why do you hold that opinion? 
 
No. Section 4: Strategy for contract farming 
11 
In your own opinion, is it better to promote contracting for medium-scale farmers or small-scale 
farmers in Malawi? 
Why do you hold this opinion? Do you have any evidences/experience that support your opinion? 
12 
In your opinion, which supply chains are more efficient for small-scale farmers: export chains, 
traditional local markets or supermarket chains?  
Why do you hold that opinion? Any evidences? 
13  In your opinion, are there some other (institutional) options besides contract farming in Malawi?   
 
No. Section 5: Role of enabling environment 
14 
What is the role and responsibility of your organisation/Department in contract farming? 
Does your organisation/Department develop/follow any official strategy/recommendations 
regarding contract farming? 
15 In your opinion, what is the role and responsibility of Government in contract farming? 
16 
In your opinion, what is the role and responsibility of Farmer‟s union/cooperatives in contract 
farming? 
17 
In your opinion, what is the role and responsibility of academic and research units in contract 
farming? 
 
No. Section 6: Price volatility and contract farming 
18 In your own experience, how do contracting small farmers respond to price volatility on the market? 
19 
In your own opinion, what does price volatility mean for contracted production – both for 
contractors and small producers? 
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20 In your own opinion, how does price volatility affect small producers‟ livelihood? 
21 
In your own opinion, is anyone responsible for mitigating the effect of price volatility regarding the 
vulnerable groups - contracting small farmers?   
 
No. Section 7: Future of contract farming 
22 
In your opinion, are there any steps needed in order to improve contract farming? 
If so, who should take those steps? 
23 In your opinion, where do you see the future of contract farming in Malawi? 
24 In your opinion, where do you see Malawian small-scale farmers in the future? 
25 
In your opinion, considering the recent elections in Malawi, are there going to be any implications 
for small farmers?  
What do you expect from the new Government regarding the direction of agricultural strategy?  
26 
At the moment, to the best of your knowledge, is there a clear strategy or initiative regarding cash 
crop production in Malawi? (E.g. to push for export cash crops, or develop local and regional 
traditional markets, or to direct cash crop production for supermarket supply?  
 
Table 4.2 List of interviewees                                                                                                                
(*Semi-structured Interviews, **Skype Interview and ***Email correspondence) 
N0. INSTITUTION/SECTOR RESEARCH PERIOD 
1 NASFAM*, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
2 FUM*, Lilongwe, Malawi April 2015 
3 CISANET*, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
4 Concern Universal*, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
5 Concern Universal*, Nkhotakota, Malawi November 2014 
6 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development*, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
7 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development*, Lilongwe, Malawi April 2015 
8 TLC**, Nhkotakota, Malawi December 2014 
9 University, Chancellor College* (interviewed in Lilongwe, Malawi) November 2014 
10 University, Chancellor College* (interviewed in Lilongwe, Malawi) November 2014 
11 Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources*, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
12 Consultancy sector***, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
13 Consultancy sector***, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
14 African Institute of African Citizenship***, Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
15 Company (CEO*), Lilongwe, Malawi November 2014 
16 Company (Projects Manager)*, Lilongwe, Malawi March 2015 
17 Company (extension field officers)*, Lilongwe, Malawi 
November 2014 and 
March 2015 
18 Vendor 1*, Lilongwe, Malawi March 2015 
19 Vendor 2*, Lilongwe, Malawi March 2015 
20 Vendor 3*, Lilongwe, Malawi April 2015 
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Focus group discussion guide with the key stakeholders 
Task Description 
The Schedule 
for the Focus 
group 
discussion 
10:30 am – Greetings and introduction to the FG discussion 
10:40 am – Presentation of study findings 
11:00 am – Interactive discussion with stakeholders 
12:45 am – Summary of discussion points 
01:00 pm – Final word and wrapping up 
Ranking 
Challenges 
After the presentation of the key challenges, each participant will receive one-page paper with 
the task to rank priorities. The point of the exercise is to get those 11 Challenges listed 






The researcher will invite all participants to discuss on presented challenges in the supply 
chain. The discussion will be formed around stated challenges and finding solutions by 
following the Model presented: 
 
 
The aim is to address each challenge (11 in total in figure) by answering questions and 




After the discussion on options for improving contracting conditions in Malawi‟s paprika supply 
chain, the researcher will present its own Model based on the data collected, experts interview 
and literature review. Participants are invited to comment the Model, compared it with what 
has been discussed and evaluate it. Duration: 20 minutes. 
 
Material outcomes from each FG discussion:  
 Rank of 11 challenges by priority 
 Addressed 11 challenges through Model What/How/Who  
 
Table 4.3 List of participants (Focus Group Discussion with the key stakeholders in 
Lilongwe, Malawi) 
NO. INSTITUTION/SECTOR RESEARCH PERIOD 
1 NASFAM July 2016 
2 University (Chancellor College) July 2016 
3 Concern Universal July 2016 
4 Consultancy sector July 2016 
5 Consultancy sector July 2016 
6 GIZ July 2016 
7 Company July 2016 
8 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development; 5 





Appendix 5 Ethical Approval for the Research  
 
Figure 5.1 Ethical approval obtained on 2
nd
 September 2014 prior to the field 





Appendix 6 Conference Contributions, Manuscripts and Presentations 
CONFERENCES: 
1) Tropentag, September 17-19, 2013, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, ‘Agricultural development within 
the rural-urban continuum’. Poster presentation Contract Farming as Business Model for 
Sustainable Rural-Urban Supply Chains: Sincere Efforts or Just Profit? Authors: Lana 
Repar, Stephen Onakuse, Joe Bogue
 
and Ana Afonso. 
2) Tropentag, September 17-19, 2014, Prague, Czech Republic, ‘Bridging the gap between 
increasing knowledge and decreasing resources’. Poster presentation Management in Agri-
Food Chains: What Do We Know about Contracts and How to Move Forward? 
Authors: Lana Repar, Stephen Onakuse, Joe Bogue
 
and Ana Afonso. 
3) Tropentag, September 17-19, 2014, Prague, Czech Republic, ‘Bridging the gap between 
increasing knowledge and decreasing resources’. Poster presentation Impact of Crop 
Production Strategies on Household Food Security and Welfare in Malawi’s Central 
Region Authors: Gretta Fitzgerald, Lana Repar, Nicholas Chisholm, Mike FitzGibbon, 
Howard Dalzell. 
4) Forthcoming: June 15-16, 2017, Dubrovnik, Croatia, International Food Marketing 
Research Symposium. Oral presentation: Food Supply Chain Contracts in Vertical 
Marketing Systems Authors: Lana Repar, Joe Bogue, Stephen Onakuse and Ana Afonso. 
PUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT: 
 Repar, L., Onakuse, S., Bogue, J. and Afonso, A. (2017) ‘Optimising contract design in 
modern food supply chains: The case of paprika sector in Central Malawi’. Journal of 
Agriculture and Rural Development in the Tropics and Subtropics, 118(1), pp. 113-127.  
PUBLISHED PAPER IN AN EDITED BOOK: 
 Repar, L., Onakuse, S., Bogue, J. and Afonso, A. (2015). Case study of paprika supply chain 
efficiency in Malawi Central region. In: Escajedo San Epifanio, L. and De Renobales 
Scheifler, M., (Eds.). Envisioning a future without food waste and food poverty. Societal 
challenges. Wageningen Academic Publishers, the Netherlands: pp. 143-148. 
              Note: This paper was presented as an oral presentation at the International Conference,     
              November 17-18, 2015, Bilbao, Spain, ‘Envisioning a Future without Food Waste and Food   
            Poverty: Societal Challenges’. 
MANUSCRIPTS IN REVIEW PROCESS: 
1) Repar, L., Onakuse, S., Bogue, J. and Afonso, A.: Exploring key challenges in paprika 
supply chain in Malawi: New evidence on contract farming performance. Under revision 
at Development in Practice.  
2) Repar, L., Onakuse, S., Bogue, J. and Afonso, A.: Is It All About the Money? Extent, 
Reasons and Triggers for Side-selling in Malawi’s Paprika Supply Chain. Under 
revision at International Journal on Food System Dynamics. 
3) Repar, L., Onakuse, S., Bogue, J. and Afonso, A.: In our Out? Determinants of 
Participation in Farmers’ Organisation among Small-scale Farmers under Contract 
Scheme in Central Malawi. Intended to submit at Journal of Rural Studies. 
4) Repar, L., Onakuse, S., Bogue, J. and Afonso, A.: Expanding Contracted Production to 
New Crops: Evidence from Nkhotakota and Lilongwe Districts in Central Malawi. 
Intended to submit at NJAS Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences. 
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PRESENTATIONS: 
 GCARD 3 2015-2016 Global Conference for Agricultural Research for Development, April 
5-8 2016, Johannesburg, South Africa, Topic 3 Keeping Science Relevant and Future-
Focused, Multidisciplinary PhD Training Systems and Relevance of Research to 
Development: Lessons from AGTRAIN’s and ARI’s Experience in Europe and Africa, 
oral presentation as an AGTRAIN and YPARD Representative 
 Participation in Doctoral Showcase 2014(10th of June) at the University College Cork in the 
category The Grand Plan: Beating the Poverty by Using Rich People's Weapon: Is the 
Introduction of Business Contracts in African Agriculture a Huge Mistake?  
 Annual Review presentation and reports at the Food Business and Development Department, 
December 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
 







Figure 7.1 Posters with the key propositions on how to improve contracting 
conditions that remained within local communities at Kuchacho club (Lilongwe 
district) and Umodzi club (Nkhotakota district), Malawi July 2016 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Ranking task performed during the Focus group interview in Lilongwe 
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Your institution is (please circle it): 
a. Company            b. Ministry          c. NASFAM          d. University       e. Institute 
f. Partners/developing organisation/consultancy           g. NGO          h.Other:______ 
Using the figure below, please rank challenges identified in the paprika supply chain. The 
ranking should reflect how you/your institution prioritise identified challenges. Ranking frame 
is from 1 to 11. LEGEND: 1 = most urgent challenge, 11 = least urgent challenge. 
 
1 = ____________________          6 = _____________________        
2 = ____________________          7 = ______________________  
3 = ____________________          8 = ______________________ 
4 = _____________________        9 = ______________________ 
5 = _____________________       10 = ______________________ 
                                                        11 = ______________________ 
Figure 7.3 Ranking task performed during focus group discussion with the key 
stakeholders, Malawi July 2016 
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Appendix 8 Appropriateness of the Theoretical Framework 
Table 8.1 Theoretical underpinnings compared against the status in Malawi’s 
paprika supply chain 
Theoretical underpinning Status in paprika supply chain 
Key success factors in the Supply Chain Management 
Efficient design and operation - Poor contract design hindered efficiency. 
Overcoming uncertainties - Price was not stated in the contract. 
Managing evolution of relations 
+/- 
The evolution of relations in terms of awarding long-




Contracting principles were not entirely understood 
by small-scale farmers; the „tradition of 
dependency‟ was present. 
Choosing appropriate supplier 
+ 
Small-scale farmers had the advantage in paprika 
production and the „social responsibility‟ coupled 
with Christian values made small-scale farmers 
appropriate for the Company D‟s suppliers. 
Negotiation 
- 
The lack of negotiation was one of the key 
challenges in the chain. 
Specific challenges in the Agri-food Supply Chain Management 
Long production time 
+ 
The time needed for paprika to be harvested was 
around 7 months. 
Seasonality 
+ 
Paprika was available for marketing from April until 
December. 
Diseases and weather threats //  
Inconsistency in quality and quantity 
+/- 
58% of small-scale farmers delivered agreed quality 
always and 52% of them delivered agreed quantity 
always. 
Low flexibility //  
Assumptions from Proposed Theories 
Principal-Agent Theory: The principal outlines the 
contract that secures appropriate incentives, which 
will exceed any alternative choice and make the 
agent complete the principal‟s requirements. - 
The incentives secured in the contract did not 
exceed those of alternative choice. The contract 
offered only seeds and conditionally bonuses for 
achieved high volumes on the group level but the 
price, as the most important incentive, was not 
attractive to small-scale farmers.  
New Institutional Economics: The contract is an 
institutional arrangement that facilitates 
cooperation among parties and mitigates specific 
market failures, e.g. expensive inputs, lack of 
credit and information asymmetry. 
+/- 
Although the contract organised relations between 
the Company D and small-scale farmers, it did not 
overcome challenges on the input market for small-
scale farmers. 
Transaction Cost Economics: Employing contracts 
will decrease transaction costs over time. 
+/- 
The Company D had its supplying base of 10-
15,000 small-scale farmers every year, but costs of 
extension services were high. Company D 
encountered high transaction costs due to side-
selling. 
Note: // not assessed/reported, * this part has been elaborated earlier in the thesis. 
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Table 8.1 Theoretical underpinnings compared against the status in Malawi’s 
paprika supply chain – Continued  
                                                                               
Theoretical underpinning   
 
Status in paprika supply chain 
Assumptions from Proposed Theories 
Asymmetric Information: The two parties in the 
transaction do not have the same information. 
+ 
The Company D withheld the information on the 
price until one month before the marketing. Also, 
small-scale farmers were missing the information 
on the end market and precise guidelines on 
grading principles. 
Opportunistic Behaviour: A dishonest behaviour 
practiced by one or both parties to shirk or 
disguise the actual conditions related to the 
contract performance. 
 Ex ante opportunism (e.g. manipulation 
with input loans) 








Ex ante opportunism: the Company D cut this type 
of opportunism by refusing to offer loans of any kind 
based on previous negative experiences. 
Ex post opportunism: side-selling was one of the 
key challenges in paprika supply chain. 
Bounded Rationality: Parties are limited in their 
perception of the world and economic 
transactions. + 
Small-scale farmers were in particular limited in 
their perception on contracting principles and 
transaction costs related to it. 
Contract Incompleteness: Contract does not 
contain all the necessary information and does not 
describe all possible present and future „states of 
the world‟ or parties‟ rights and responsibilities. 
+ 
The contract had: 
Partially defined clause: the price 
Missing clauses: delivery conditions, grades, 
termination, disputes, applicable law, force 
majeure. 
Key Contract Farming Benefits 
Access to technology and extension services + Contract provided extension services. 
Access to inputs +/- Contract provided only seeds. 
Access to credit - Contract did not provide any credits. 
Secured outlet and price +/- Contract secured outlet, but the price was uncertain 
and dependent on the market. 
Reduced production, marketing and transaction 
risks 
+/- Small-scale farmers carried production and 
marketing risk (force majeure and price).  
Improved productivity, quality and income 
generation 
+/- Small-scale farmers reported higher productivity 
and quality, but the price was low. 
Creating employment //  
Key Contract Farming Challenges 
Contract design* + Contract design was a challenge. 
Loss of autonomy - Not reported by small-scale farmers. 
Shift of traditional production patterns + Paprika is not traditionally grown in Malawi. 
Exploitation of small-scale farmers +/- As a perception, but not evidence-based. 
Unequal bargaining power + No bargaining on the price. 




Risk of indebtedness - The contractor does not provide loans. 
Side-selling  + 36.9% of small-scale farmers practiced it. 
Input misuse + In previous years, reported by Company D. 
Problematic contract enforcement + Missing national CF Strategy. 
Note: // not assessed/reported, * this part has been elaborated earlier in the thesis. 
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